

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
41	5	11/11/1968	Memo	To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: Developing Negro leadership in the Republican Party, and bringing them into national unity. 1 Page.
41	5	11/11/1968	Memo	To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: Negotiating a Vietnam Settlement. 2 Pages. Attached to report entitled, "A Proposal on how to end the War in Vietnam: The Case for an Asian Peace-Kepping Force."
41	5	n.d.	Report	"A Proposal on how to end the War in Vietnam: The Case for an Asian Peace-Kepping Force." 16 Pages.
41	5	11/11/1968	Memo	To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "White House Conference on 'Woman Power.'" 1 Page.
41	5	11/11/1968	Memo	To: DC From: Safire Re: "Method of Appointments." 2 Pages.
41	5	11/13/1968	Memo	To: H. R. Haldeman From: Jim Keogh Re: Keogh's "readings" of "key people" for the White House. 1 Page.

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41	5	11/13/1968	Memo	To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Several Foreign Policy Recommendations from Soviet Expert Frank Siscoe - RE: Post election reflection in this area." 1 Page.
41	5	11/14/1968	Memo	To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Manpower Report." 2 Pages.
41	5	11/11/1968	Memo	To: RN From: Glenn Olds Re: "Developing Negro leadership in the Republican Party, and bringing them into national unity." 1 Page. Not scanned due to previous scanning.
41	5	11/14/1968	Memo	To: Haldeman From: Safire Re: Intermediate and long range ideas on an "open presidency." 1 Page.
41	5	11/15/1968	Memo	Re: "All expenses should now be listed on standard expense forms." 1 Page.
41	5	n.d.	Memo	To: H. R. Haldeman From: Kevin Phillips Re: Presidential return data by state in both raw numerical and presentage. 5 Pages.
41	5	n.d.	Letter	Handwritten note To: Bob Haldeman From: "L" Re: follow up. 1 Page. Attached to letter from James H. Stroman to H. R. Haldeman dated 11/18/1968.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
41	5	11/18/1968	Letter	To: H. R. Haldeman From: James H. Stroman Re: Contacting Haldeman for an appointment. 2 Pages.
41	5	n.d.	Memo	To: H. R. Haldeman From: Kevin Phillips Re: "Trends of the Last Three Weeks of the Campaign - Their Causes and Effects." 4 Pages.
41	5	n.d.	Other Document	Note to Bob Finch from Herbert Klein regarding summary of conversation with Jim Haggerty. 1 Page. Attached to memorandum from Herb Klein to Bob Finch dated 11/19/1968.
41	5	11/19/1968	Memo	To: Bob Finch From: Herb Klein Re: "notes on a conversation with Jim Haggerty." 2 Pages.
41	5	11/19/1968	Memo	To: Haldeman and Ehrlichman From: Safire Re: Inaugural Theme and Ideas." 5 Pages.
41	5	11/20/1968	Letter	To: Bob Haldeman From: Jim Keogh Re: Bill Safire's paper and major points from a Tuesday session. 1 Page. Attached to memo from Safire to Keogh regarding "Nixon Image Abroad" dated Nov 20.
41	5	11/20/n.d.	Memo	To: Keogh From: Safire Re: "Nixon Image Abroad." 7 pages.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
41	5	11/20/1968	Letter	To unkown from unknown regarding Mayor Yorty and Henry Salvatori. 1 Page.
41	5	11/21/1968	Other Document	"Additional Information on Incomplete Precincts." 1 Page.
41	5	11/23/1968	Memo	To: Bob Haldeman From: Larry Higby Re: ASA. 1 Page.

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NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
P. O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION,
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
PHONE (212) 661-6400

MEMORANDUM

November 11, 1968

TO: RN

FROM: Glenn Olds *GO*

SUBJECT: Developing Negro leadership in the Republican Party, and bringing them into national unity.

Now that the campaign is over, the urgent task of involving responsible Negro leadership and participation to heal and help the growing alienation cannot be exaggerated. The ignorance of your real interest and intentions toward them is tragic, and their fears have been magnified by the rhetoric of the opposition in the campaign.

My experience with many of the leaders convince me they are eager to change this, to know and work with you. In the tribal symbol of "the king" they need to be able to identify with "you". This cannot be done through white advisors or staff. What is required is a top Black leader appointed now on your personal staff, who will go to the White House as Special Assistant. He can, from there, help build these bridges with a minimum of personal involvement for you, create those bridges of confidence, and help bring them into the party. The party cannot bring them in, but you in the White House can.

I strongly recommend you consider Art Fletcher, who was barely beaten by 10,000 votes for the Lieutenant Governorship of the State of Washington. This is a powerful man (former pro-football player!), emotionally eloquent, deeply committed to the Republican philosophy of private initiative, self help, a splendid "mover of men", who from the White House and close to you, could greatly reinforce what must be done in HEW, Labor, etc. in this area.

Ralph Cake and Walter Williams both concur in this estimate of Fletcher. An early appointment would make it much easier to recruit manpower from this constituency, and also, bring them responsibly into party participation.

cc: Messrs. Mitchell, Haldeman, Garment and Keogh

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MEMORANDUM

November 11, 1968

TO: RN

FROM: Glenn Olds *Go*

SUBJECT: Negotiating a Vietnam Settlement

In the course of seeing key people over the last few months, several pertinent suggestions have been made which you may now wish to consider as you contemplate your strategy as President for ending the war.

1. There is general agreement among the key people, expert on Vietnam in AID, State and major private organizations, that the President is badly bungling present negotiations, will be psychologically outmaneuvered and that you should not get "tarred with his brush", or the chance to bring a new and fresh strategy will be critically weakened. He might wish to "send you" to share the blame, much as he used Ambassador Lodge.

2. Dr. Guy Pauker, Vietnam expert from Rand Corporation, who leaves for Saigon today as part of General Abrams' study group on strategic alternatives in ending the war, has prepared a proposal on how to end the war which he left with me last night. It deserves reading, but his thesis, summarized on page 12 - 14 makes an important case for an Asian Peacekeeping force pivoted on Pakistan and Indonesia, two moslem countries with special experience with communist subversion and interest in regionalizing security in the area. Pauker will collect any intelligence you may wish while in Vietnam these next three weeks.

3. Dr. Herman Kahn, President of the Hudson Institute, suggests developing (a) a reconstruction of the moral and political rationale for the war, (b) announcing a simple theory of victory, (c) radically improving the tactics (he has a wide range of suggestions) and (4) define and consummate the range of military victory contemplated. He is in Vietnam now pursuing this model and will report on return.

4. Donald Coster, former AID head in Vietnam and currently advisor to our special arms forces training school at Fort Bragg, strongly urges early contact with Trudeau and activation of a Canadian neutralizing role. He leaves next week for Vietnam, has close personal associations with Vietnamese leaders from the President down, and would be pleased to collect any intelligence desired. He strongly recommends pursuing approaches through neutral agencies such as the World Bank (Livingston Merchant, our Canadian Ambassador is a key here), where the Mekong Delta development, etc. can be more than the political gimmick the Southeast Asian people feel President Johnson made of it.

5. Colonel Kelly, friend of Reuben Nathan, former head of the Special Forces in Vietnam, has volunteered to work on or help staff a task force on a Vietnam settlement. He has a grasp not only of military, but political and economic realities, and would be ready and willing if desired to recommend civilian and military composition for such a group. Please see attached proposal.

cc: Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Garment
Mr. Keogh

A PROPOSAL ON HOW TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM

The Case for an Asian Peace-Keeping Force

The mainstream of the debate on Vietnam in recent months has centered on two issues: (1) under what circumstances should the bombing of North Vietnam be stopped and (2) should a coalition government be imposed on South Vietnam through negotiations among third parties or should the people of South Vietnam be given a chance to elect their future government from among all political forces existing in the country.

Significantly, these two issues concern respectively the beginning and the end of the process of negotiation required for terminating the war. Much less attention seems to have been devoted, at least in public discussions, to the long process that should lead eventually from reduction of hostilities as a first step to the creation of a new political regime in Saigon as the last step toward peace.

Concern with the initial and terminal moves in the negotiatory process is understandable. The circumstances under which the bombing of North Vietnam would be stopped could be so complex as to defy interpretation. But they might also lend themselves to partisan claims that either Washington or Hanoi are giving in. Positions on whether a peace conference should discuss the composition of a coalition government or arrangements for general elections can be reduced in essence to the question of whether one accepts or rejects a delayed Communist take-over.

Advocates of a coalition government prior to elections are implicitly accepting defeat in Vietnam, writing off seven years of war. The specific provisions of an agreement concerning a coalition government can, of course, provide a larger or smaller measure of face-saving to cover this American defeat, but another outcome than an eventual Communist take-over is most unlikely, due to the obvious weakness of countervailing political and military forces in Vietnam today. ||

If a coalition government is established in the near future, eventual Communist dominance can be achieved without the support of a majority of the population. Once legalized through inclusion of the NLF in the Saigon government, an activist and ruthless Communist minority can proceed to liquidate its active opponents by all the means which have proved effective in the past in Eastern Europe and in China, and of course in Vietnam itself in 1945-46. The passive, though not necessarily indifferent, majority of the population will be left without alternative leadership and will choose to survive rather than fight. ||

The destruction of the anti-Communist opposition will be relatively easier than in Eastern Europe or in China because of the characteristic weakness and brittleness of all Vietnamese political forces other than the Communists. |

On the basis of personal contacts going back fifteen years, I surveyed the political situation in South Vietnam last March and returned with the firm conviction that no South Vietnamese political forces existed then which could hold their own in free political competition with the Communists. Nothing that I have seen or heard since would induce me to change this estimate. | Note

Arguments on a possible accommodation between Communists and other political forces in South Vietnam today are based on wishful thinking. Even the allegedly well organized religious groups -- such as the Catholics, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai -- are splintered, factionalized and vary in their degree of anti-Communist commitment. Traditional political parties such as the VNQDD and the Dai-Viet are merely small cliques, while new political formations have no popular substance behind their new, ephemeral, shingles.

But not only a coalition government imposed from outside, even free elections if held too soon would be nothing but a disguised way of accepting a Communist takeover. This does not mean that all we have to do is to play for time. Those who discount the future assuming that the extent of face-saving for the United States depends on the time span which would lapse before South Vietnam becomes an overtly Communist state underestimate the capacity of the rest of the world to anticipate the likely course of events and to read our true intentions. We may have to bow to the inevitable but we should not maximize the enemy's chances of winning.

This is why, in my judgment, we must strive for a political solution which would make it clear that the United States really wants to keep the future open and to secure for the people of South Vietnam a last chance to save themselves -- if they really have the will and the spiritual resources to do so -- by gaining for the disorganized and fragmented political forces of South Vietnam time to rally in extremis, despite their past failure to do so.

This would require convincing the South Vietnamese political elites not only that they will not be able to carry on with factional strife indefinitely under the protection of the American military umbrella, but also that they still have a real opportunity to redress the balance of political forces by organizing themselves for the forthcoming political competition with the Communists.

While nobody can predict whether genuine political reconstruction will in fact take place in South Vietnam, it would be worth trying to create an environment favorable for such an attempt, both for the sake of the people of South Vietnam and in order to maintain the reputation of the United States as a country which is a genuine and valuable protector. Even if the South Vietnamese fail to take advantage of our efforts on their behalf, the lesson will not be lost on the rest of the world.

Political reconstruction would involve the establishment of vigorous political organizations and a free exchange of ideas concerning the future of South Vietnam. I am fully aware of the problems posed by the initial advantage this could give to the Communists, who would thus gain a chance to participate overtly in the political life of the country, starting with a stronger organization and with more militant and purposeful propagandists than the other groups.

But we have little choice: authoritarian suppression of the Communists in the past has also stifled the political development of other political forces with a potential mass base, until they became unable to hold their own against an activist Communist minority, while armed suppression of the Communist insurgency has led us to the present impasse.

The alternatives to a period of political reconstruction which might, hopefully, still create a viable non-Communist political system are either a protracted war or rapid American disengagement, to be followed almost certainly by a Communist take-over.

The third way proposed here avoids these two undesirable alternatives and offers a solution which has at least a reasonable chance to succeed. Naturally, the creation of conditions which would permit a period of political reconstruction in South Vietnam is not possible without willingness on the part of all parties concerned to refrain from the use of violence. Neither side is likely to be cooperative in the search for a political solution as long as it still believes that it can win militarily without paying an exorbitant price for victory. It is obvious that if either side gives in, it has actually been forced to do so by the superiority of its adversary. If the United States withdraws unconditionally, this means that Communist conduct of the war made an alternative course of action intolerably costly to us, militarily or politically. If the Communists give up their efforts to secure control of South Vietnam, we have coerced them to renounce their objectives.

To induce the Communists to accept a cease-fire and a period of peaceful political competition they will have to be convinced that the alternative is much less desirable from their point of view, namely that the American forces which they cannot displace will remain for an indefinite duration in South Vietnam. A protracted war and an extended American presence may be a more gloomy prospect for Hanoi than even a few months ago. Their forces and supplies are

suffering significant attrition. Furthermore there are signs of a Sino-Vietnamese rift and the Soviet Union may be entering a period of considerable difficulties in Eastern Europe. All this raises for Hanoi the specter of serious logistic shortages in the future and may increase their interest in a settlement.

It can of course also be argued that precisely because it faces serious problems in its Eastern European sphere of influence the Soviet Union may be interested in keeping the United States engaged in Vietnam. The Soviet leaders may also conclude that the highly unpopular course of action on which they have embarked in Czechoslovakia is a lesser political burden if simultaneously the United States continues its present policy in Vietnam.

It may not be possible to convince Hanoi that the United States can win the war at a cost politically and morally acceptable to the American people, but it should be less difficult for the next administration to convince the Vietnamese Communist leaders that if they remain unwilling to cooperate in the search for a peace with honor, the American forces can deny them victory and remain stationed indefinitely in South Vietnam. This would require a change of Allied strategy to reduce American casualties and expenditures to a fraction of the annual costs since 1965. Such alternative strategies are conceivable, but their adoption would require leadership of exceptional firmness.

A political solution that would remove the American presence from South Vietnam and give the Communists a chance to participate legitimately in the political life

of the country might be an attractive alternative if they perceive the present situation as a military stalemate that cannot be easily overcome.

Assuming that by January 20, 1969, the test of wills between President Johnson and President Ho has ended in a draw, a new negotiating team should then try to obtain quickly agreement in principle on a new approach to the resolution of the conflict, which would allow to halt the bombing below the 19th parallel, in a different context from that of 1968.

In my judgment, the crucial issue is not whether halting the bombing above the DMZ would increase the military risks for our troops. There are alternative means to reduce those risks, including a change in troop deployment. The really important question is whether stopping the bombing is a meaningful first step toward a resolution of the conflict rather than a demonstration of Hanoi's superior willpower, which forced the United States to accept their terms.

The key elements in the approach to a resolution of the conflict suggested here are (1) a period of about two years for political reconstruction in South Vietnam, (2) substantial Asian peace-keeping forces as custodians of the agreement. If Hanoi is willing to accept these two elements of a new approach to the termination of the war, then it would make sense to stop the bombing south of the 19th parallel as a first step toward the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement.

It should be noted that this approach does not demand from Hanoi a military quid pro quo, which would in any case not be too meaningful in view of the difficulties we would

Key

encounter in proving violations of agreements on a reduced rate of infiltration or for the restoration of the DMZ, which are both so much less visible than aerial bombardments.

The Asian peace-keeping forces, which form an essential element of this plan, would have to be a substantial, combat ready, presence in South Vietnam, not an expanded version of the ICC established under the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Whether these forces should be under U.N. auspices or made directly available to the parties agreeing on a settlement of the conflict can be left open at this time. Details of the command structure of those forces would also have to be worked out later.

The peace-keeping forces would require substantial amounts of modern equipment, which they could perhaps receive by direct transfer from the departing American forces. The cost of this operation is likely to be high and may have to be carried indirectly by the United States in the form of expanded aid to the participating countries.

The communists may have legitimate reservations about the impartiality of any country which receives massive American aid. It would therefore be desirable to reach an understanding with the respective Asian governments that indirect compensation for their peace-keeping expenditures should be deferred.

Such arrangements are not compatible with American governmental processes and the established practice of aid administration. Therefore the financing of peace-keeping forces through the intermediary of the U.N. appears imperative, despite the well-known past difficulties of such endeavors. In practice, I am compelled to admit, this reduces greatly the probability that the present proposal can be implemented.

NOTE

NOTE

There are very few countries that have the military manpower that would permit them to make a substantial contribution, and are also politically eligible for this mission. India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Japan could make substantial contributions, but it is unrealistic to expect Indian and Pakistani forces to be willing to operate jointly. Japan could make substantial contributions, but would probably refuse to get involved and might also create a political issue because of its occupation of Vietnam between 1942 and 1945. This leaves Indonesia, together with either India or Pakistan as potential contributors among the larger Asian powers. ||

Prospects for cooperation between Indonesian and Pakistani forces appear at first glance excellent, whereas between Indonesia and India there has never been much love lost. Indonesia and Pakistan are the two largest Moslem countries in the world, almost equal in population (cca. 110-130 million each), with armed forces of the same size (340,000 for Indonesia and 324,000 for Pakistan). They have maintained throughout their independent existence excellent relations. Both are on good terms with the West and with the Soviet Union, and Pakistan has also good relations with China. |

Among the smaller countries in Asia, Iran and Malaysia, which are also Moslem countries, could make token contributions. There is some advantage to have a Moslem peace-keeping force in a Buddhist country with a strong Catholic minority as this would at least simplify its task with the non-Communist elements. While the above-named four countries are all anti-Communist in their domestic policies, they have not taken sides against Hanoi and could therefore ||

be acceptable, unlike Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, who are all combatants, and the Republic of China which could not get involved without the risk of a sharp reaction on the part of Communist China.

Contingents from other continents need not necessarily be excluded, but at least three arguments can be invoked against their participation: (1) it would be preferable to develop the concept of a regional Asian responsibility in this matter, even if the operation is placed under global, U.N. auspices; (2) if forces from outside Asia are introduced it will be difficult to reject contingents from Eastern European Communist countries; (3) the size of the forces required makes it unlikely that sufficient numbers from outside Asia would be deployed and the advantages to be expected from token contributions are outweighed by the disadvantages just mentioned. My preference would be for merely Indonesian and Pakistani forces, with the supreme command alternating between the two but with troops from both countries deployed in all parts of South Vietnam.

I explored this idea in March in Diakarta with some very high Indonesian officials and found them sufficiently responsive to make further discussion worthwhile. The manpower resources exist. Indonesia has about 150 Army battalions. Of them about one-third could be made available for the envisaged mission, which would permit to place one combat-ready battalion in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces and have a few battalions available as a strategic reserve or for special duty in the major cities.

Note

My estimate that one-third of Indonesia's land forces could be made available is based on Indonesian positions expressed in October 1962, when the leaders of the Army anticipated a period of peace following the satisfactory solution of the conflict over Western New Guinea and before Sukarno engaged their country in the armed confrontation with Malaysia.

At that time Indonesia's military leaders estimated that their Army, which was of about the same size that it is now, would use one-third of its forces for garrison duty and keep one-third in training. They were soliciting American help to employ the remaining third usefully in civic action programs.

Facing currently no international crisis, with an internal security situation considerably better than in 1962, and only modest involvement in civic action programs, the Indonesian Army should be capable of making 50 battalions available for a two-year peace-keeping mission in South Vietnam. If Pakistan could deploy forces of about the same size, each province would be secured by a sizeable force, capable of dealing effectively with violations of the cease-fire and of protecting the population.

The Indonesian Army has considerable operational experience with civil affairs and has constantly rotated units from Java to the Outer Islands for garrison duty or for counter-insurgency. No other Asian army has comparable logistic experience with inter-island deployment. It is not much more difficult to send Army units from Djakarta to Saigon than it is to send them to Medan or Makassar. A Pakistani presence would of course require a somewhat greater logistic effort and the Pakistani Army lacks the Indonesian's experience with counter-insurgency.

Despite the anti-Communist record of the Indonesian Army, there are also several political factors which would operate in their favor: Indonesia has not only diplomatic relations with North Vietnam, but also a NLF representative and a South Vietnamese Consulate in Djakarta. The Indonesian government has maintained a neutral posture in recent years toward the conflict, having previously vocally supported the Communist side. Although Indonesia's strained relations with China appeared as a serious obstacle to this plan last March, Hanoi's assertion of independence from Peking, manifested in accepting the Paris talks and otherwise, may now allow the Vietnamese Communists to accept an Indonesian involvement in the termination of the conflict, especially if Pakistan, which has good relations with China, would also participate.

If a period of political reconstruction under the custody of Asian peace-keeping forces is accepted in principle by both sides, the solution envisaged here would involve the following sequence of events:

1. A cease-fire in position of all combat forces involved, perhaps with some minor local regroupment in order to reduce the likelihood of armed clashes. The alternative of regrouping the opponents into large designated areas is not realistic because nobody will want to abandon terrain and thus risk a new division of the country following lines of political-military control.
2. ARVN and VC forces remain in the areas in which they operated previously. Neither side is expected to give up their weapons immediately.

The alternative is unrealistic because neither side would trust the other and put itself at its enemy's mercy. But both sides are expected to respect the cease-fire and will be demobilized eventually.

3. Asian peace-keeping forces take over temporary control of the territory, according to a detailed but flexible schedule, dependent on the demonstrated willingness of all combatants to enforce the agreement. NVN and Allied forces leave the areas which have been transferred to the custody of the Asian peace-keeping forces. At the end of a period to be established by negotiations, all NVN and Allied forces are expected to depart from the territory of South Vietnam. Temporarily the Asian peace-keeping forces become custodians of the military installations and of the equipment left behind by the departing forces.

4. The Asian peace-keeping forces, suitably provided with fire-power and mobility, are expected to act as riot squads in case of renewed armed clashes between ARVN and VC elements, to protect the population from "armed propaganda" and other forms of violence, and to exert residual police power in situations beyond the capabilities of local Vietnamese authorities.

5. A Political Reconstruction Commission is created including representatives of all political forces in South Vietnam. Its role is limited to guaranteeing freedom of political organization and expression and the preparation of national

elections. The Political Reconstruction Commission enforces its decisions directly through the Asian peace-keeping forces, without interference by regular South Vietnamese authorities.

6. The government resulting from the September 3, 1967 elections or its successor, as determined by South Vietnamese political processes, remains in power for its full term of four years in accordance with the Constitution promulgated on April 1, 1967.. In exchange for Communist agreement to accept the present regime in South Vietnam till September 1971, the South Vietnamese government undertakes to amend Article 4 of the Constitution which bans "Communism in any form" and is therefore incompatible with the process of political reconstruction underlying the peace settlement. As some major political functions will have been transferred from the government of South Vietnam to the Political Reconstruction Commission, the Saigon authorities would be concerned primarily with public administration and economic rehabilitation which might make them somewhat less objectionable to the Communist side.

7. If peace negotiations would be completed by September 1969, leading to a cease fire, this would initiate a period of political reconstruction of about two years, coinciding with the complete, simultaneous, withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Vietnam, other than the Asian peace-keeping forces. At the end of that period, in September 1971, free elections

would be held, monitored by the Asian peace-keeping forces, which would then also withdraw, following the creation of a new government in Saigon.

8. The international peace conference would also have to negotiate whether the two Vietnams, Laos and Cambodia should be neutralized under international guarantees, or whether this issue should be left open, to be negotiated after September 1971 by the new government in Saigon with its neighbors. I would incline toward the latter formula which would give more freedom of action to a South Vietnamese government friendly to the West, if such a government happens to be elected. The converse risk that a Communist or pro-Communist government would then have the freedom to align itself with China or Russia does not strike me as excessive. Any Vietnamese government will need aid for reconstruction and will probably try to maximize its independence by relying on aid from a variety of sources, including, if available, from the West. //

One final observation: once they have left the country, NVN and American forces would not face a symmetrical situation with regard to possible re-entry into South Vietnam. NVN forces could be easily infiltrated again, initially at least with as little visibility as they choose to seek. American forces could not return without being very conspicuous. This is not necessarily a disadvantage. The problem we have to solve now is how to secure Communist //

cooperation in providing the non-Communist and anti-Communist forces a last chance to organize. In this endeavor our trump card is the offer to withdraw the American forces from Vietnam. The Vietnamese Communists are unusually suspicious and have good reason for it after their 1946 and 1954 experiences. If the asymmetry with regard to the return of NVN and American forces works in their favor, this might allay some of their suspicions and facilitate an agreement.

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MEMORANDUM

November 11, 1968

TO: RN
FROM: Glenn Olds

RE: White House Conference on "Woman Power"

One of the largest untapped sources of leadership essential to "uniting" the country are women. Increasing numbers of well-educated responsible women are emmerging with competence and convictions regarding education, health, welfare, job-training, urban affairs, and foreign policy.


Mary Harvey, a close friend, and senior editor of McCall's (who did the Eisenhower interview on reconstructing the UN sent on recently) has developed a remarkable network of leaders of these various women's groups.

She would be willing to help mobilize these women through a White House Conference, early in your administration to take a hard look at how they could help "unite the country" and contribute to the leadership needed to solve our hard problems. I would be glad to pursue this to provide a substantial proposal if you wish to encourage it.

cc: Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Garment
Mr. Keogh

DC from Safire

November 11, 1968.



Re: Method of Appointments

1. Order: The "first appointment" was Rose Woods, which was good; had a symbolic appeal to women and to millions of secretaries.
 - a. The first appointment outside your close official family might be a Mexican-American, perhaps announced in your speech at Cardinal McIntyre's dinner in Los Angeles on December 5 for the hospital that services Mexican-Americans. At whatever level this appointment is, it will achieve greater significance if it comes very early, upholding your pledge to do better for the Spanish-speaking Americans. Also, not as blatant a grandstand play as an early Negro appointment.
 - b. The natural tendency is to appoint the Cabinet from top down -- State, Defense, Treasury and down the line. This has a dribbling-off effect. From public opinion point of view, greatest impact would be to make those the climactic appointments.

2. Setting:

The most skillful technique used by Kennedy in 1960 was to make all appointments out of doors, at Hyannisport or Palm Beach. On television, gave the appearance of freshness, briskness, letting in the fresh air.

Some of your own introductions of new Cabinet members could be at Key Biscayne or in California, outside on the lawn; the meeting with Agnew (and with Humphrey) for example, was aided by the outdoor press conference.

3. Cumulative Effect:

There will be a clear effort by liberal columnists to seize on the first two appointments of liberals, Democrats or moderates as evidence of a "move left" in your party.

Their attitude is "We couldn't lick him, so now we'll capture him." An early "move left" would be met with only a little public approval by these writers, and with a deep-seated contempt by most of the Eastern establishment.

At the same time, it would start the "sellout" charge by conservatives, and "I told you so" by Wallace. You would then be in a narrow strip of no-man's land in the midst of severe crossfire.

No matter what the ultimate composition of your Cabinet, I believe the first few made public should be centrist or slightly right of center. You should reassure those who voted for you before reaching out to those who voted against you. With that base laid, then is the time for the "coalition" concept.

4. Common Denominator of Appointments:

Big point should be made that each appointee is a "problem solver," despite his political coloration.

The four great problems should be constantly referred to -- ending the war, halting the rise in crime, preventing violence, stopping inflation. Problem-solving teams, perhaps headed by Cabinet officers, should be publicly focused on each problem.

In this way, the emphasis will be on action to meet the problems, and less on which direction the new administration will "move" philosophically.

5. Good Quote on Appointments:

Thomas Jefferson: "No duty the President had to perform was so trying as to put the right man in the right place."

MEMORANDUM



November 13, 1968

TO: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JIM KEOGH

Here are the readings I got from some of our key people:

Alan Greenspan: He is basically not interested in a government position except, as he put it, one or two that would be presumptuous for him to mention. By this, I take it he means Secretary of the Treasury or Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Alan really wants to go back to his own business. He says he will be happy to help out in any way he can during the transition, and if there is some way that such a connection would be possible, he would like to be thought of as available for consulting work after January 20th.

Dick Allen: He is extremely interested in being a member of the White House staff, and would particularly like the post of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. If that specific assignment is not possible, he would be pleased to have a President's Assistant position having to do with foreign policy and/or defense.

Bill Safire: Bill would be interested in a speech writing role in the President's staff. He is quite willing and ready to sell his business to take such a position.

Bill Gavin: He is interested in a writing role, preferably in the White House.

Henry Loomis: He is interested in a government organization position and would be particularly pleased to be associated with any new Hoover Commission. He feels that he is better suited to a line job, rather than a staff assignment.

Martin Anderson: Highly pleased with the prospect of a role in research at the White House.

Darrell Trent: Interested in a line position rather than a staff assignment, and would like something having to do with business or aviation, which would seem to send him toward commerce, and particularly FAA.

Note-I did not talk with Price or Buchanan since I assumed that their roles were pretty well established.

JK:bls

N

NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
P. O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION,
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
PHONE (212) 661-6400

MEMORANDUM

November 13, 1968

TO: RN

FROM: Glenn Olds *GO*

SUBJECT: Several Foreign Policy Recommendations from Soviet Expert
Frank Siscoe - RE: Post election reflection in this area

In brief they concern:

1. The misuse of Foreign Service Reserve - which has multiplied "foggy bottom" with ill-prepared personnel who can hang on indefinitely. A clue to major reform of State Department.
2. The policy toward Cuba - suggested agenda page 2.
3. Strategic Arms Control Negotiations - suggestions from Russian expert.
4. Exchanges with USSR - critical notes with reference to trade.
5. Some approaches to dealing with USSR.
Agenda for negotiations - page 2
Elements of policy - page 4
6. Background paper re: Soviet policies toward United States
(Useful general analysis as file background for negotiation -
very little new - page 3-5 useful analysis current leadership.)

attachments

cc: Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Garment
Mr. Keogh

MEMORANDUM

November 14, 1968

TO: RN
FROM: Glenn Olds
SUBJECT: Manpower Report

On October 21 I prepared an initial report on the formal organizational structure I have been using on the manpower effort, with nine specific recommendations for systematic organization of the total problem of staffing. John Mitchell suggested I hold this report and the working model (Black Book - Manpower Structure) as enclosed, until after the election.

My own report of recommendations I had hoped to deliver and discuss with you personally. Our last conference was on July 19, and so much has transpired since, I had wished to make some interpretive remarks personally on the material. Efforts to see you or John in this busy period have proven so difficult it has occurred to me you might be better served to have the material delivered to you for such review as you might care to give it now.

In order that you might profit most by the material of the second book (Manpower-Content - Models), I offer these interpretive notes.

Section I - General

Simply indicates how we have organized and developed the files with profiles and backup material on well over 1000 key people, programmed, where possible, into specific positions within the executive branch.

Section II - Specific Models

We have analyzed all the policy statements you have made as guidelines for the selection of manpower, and illustrated how our files can be used to produce comprehensive recommendations. I have chosen HEW and State which I know best, and made recommendations to include (1) the comprehensive generalist, (2) the political generalist, (3) the specialist and (4) the special for each position.

November 14, 1968

For State Department, I have illustrated how the analysis and recommendations of one of Washington's brightest younger men describes one of the strengths of our file, i. e. , specific recommendations of one type of source.

Finally, in this section, I have selected what I consider important positions requiring early attention, with comprehensive recommendations covering a wide range of types in terms of ideology, age, region, and experience background.

Section III

Is merely the brief summary in terms of the six broad categories I have used from the beginning, of the people whom I have seen in depth, soliciting their ideas, manpower recommendations and support.

Section IV

Represents a simple model for processing, evaluating and recruiting in the manpower field, with a simple flow chart indicating how the various inputs and controls could give you the best comprehensive management of the manpower problem in the limited time available.

attachment

cc: Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Keogh
Mr. Garment

MEMORANDUM

November 11, 1968

TO: RN

FROM: Glenn Olds

SUBJECT: Developing Negro leadership in the Republican Party, and bringing them into national unity.

Now that the campaign is over, the urgent task of involving responsible Negro leadership and participation to heal and help the growing alienation cannot be exaggerated. The ignorance of your real interest and intentions toward them is tragic, and their fears have been magnified by the rhetoric of the opposition in the campaign.

My experience with many of the leaders convince me they are eager to change this, to know and work with you. In the tribal symbol of "the king" they need to be able to identify with "you". This cannot be done through white advisors or staff. What is required is a top Black leader appointed now on your personal staff, who will go to the White House as Special Assistant. He can, from there, help build these bridges with a minimum of personal involvement for you, create those bridges of confidence, and help bring them into the party. The party cannot bring them in, but you in the White House can.

I strongly recommend you consider Art Fletcher, who was barely beaten by 10,000 votes for the Lieutenant Governorship of the State of Washington. This is a powerful man (former pro-football player!), emotionally eloquent, deeply committed to the Republican philosophy of private initiative, self help, a splendid "mover of men", who from the White House and close to you, could greatly reinforce what must be done in HEW, Labor, etc. in this area.

Ralph Cake and Walter Williams both concur in this estimate of Fletcher. An early appointment would make it much easier to recruit manpower from this constituency, and also, bring them responsibly into party participation.

cc: Messrs. Mitchell, Haldeman, Garment and Keogh

Haldeman from Safire

November 14, 1968.

file

Here are some intermediate and long-range ideas on an "open presidency." Not all to be used, of course, but elements of a mix.

Jim Keogh told me of your query about availabilities. I am available to the point of panting to be a Special Assistant.

For that, I would sell my business, sever all ties, turn stock into government bonds, and enter Washington totally unencumbered.

Three books in the past five years labels me an author, qualified for speechwriting and the myriad other chores in the White House.

As for public relations ideas, my anonymity in the campaign and over the past couple of years testifies to a certain discretion and loyalty. I believe the PR thinking is needed, but its source need never surface.

Other selling points: A New Yorker who once worked for Javits and Rockefeller without losing his Nixon identity; 38; a regular synagogue-goer; a sympathetic historian with some credentials to interpret Nixon later; no interest in elective office; ready to take the financial beating; passion for anonymity; affinity for the telling phrase; open mind and trap shut.

Hope you can use me.

Enclosure

LH

file

November 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM

All expenses should now be listed on standard expense forms, and forwarded to Pat Dugan at 400 Park Avenue. Reimbursement checks will follow.

LH:bs

J-
Lold

To: H.R. Haldeman

From: Kevin Phillips

As per your request communicated by Larry Higby, I have collected the enclosed data giving presidential returns by states in both raw numerical and percentage terms.

Most of the enclosed figures were taken from AP (Nov. 9) and UPI (as printed in the Washington Post of Nov. 17). The wire services do not have more recent figures available for the collectivity of states -- or so I was advised.

The most recent material available from our research department was the Nov 9 AP tabulation; the most recent data available from the Republican National Committee and given me by Gil Rudolf was the Nov 17 UPI compilation.

For a number of states, the wire service returns were inadequate or conflicting, so that I telephoned the offices of the several secretaries of state to inquire after the certified returns. In California, Michigan and Illinois, the returns have not yet been certified, although the semi-official California canvass agrees closely with the press figures.

The most recent total figures (UPI Nov 17) are:

RN	31,284,747
HHH	30,948,643
GW	9,820,896

The RN majority - 336,000 above - is likely to increase just a bit more.

If any precise estimate or claim is to be made, the enclosed data cannot be taken as gospel; official state canvasses are likely to show a number of minor changes. Most of the canvasses will be completed next week.

Alabama - 50g-?

Penna. absentees - ✓

Florida - absentees - ✓

Maryland - absentees - L

The 1968 Presidential Returns by States

State	HHH	(%)	RN	(%)	GW	(%)	Comments on Completeness
Alabama	196,579	(19%)	146,923	(14%)	691,425	(67%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)*
Alaska	34,501	(43%)	36,428	(45%)	9,887	(12%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
Arizona	166,742	(35%)	255,970	(55%)	45,066	(10%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
Arkansas	183,317	(30%)	186,547	(31%)	236,504	(39%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash Post</u>); however AP figures for Nov. 9 give slightly higher totals for each man with only 99% tabulated
California	3,187,364	(45%)	3,409,554	(48%)	482,162	(7%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>); semi-official canvass figures are about the same. This includes <u>most</u> absentee votes
Colorado	336,272	(42%)	409,262	(51%)	60,691	(8%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash.Post</u>)
Connecticut	624,661	(50%)	557,830	(44%)	76,707	(6%)	<u>New York Times</u> Nov 8; this set of figures is slightly different than AP Nov 9

The UPI state totals carried on November 17 do not indicate what percentage of the state's vote has been tabulated; in most cases, the vote is complete. Where there is evidence of incomplete totals, mention has been made

State	HHH	(%)	RN	(%)	GW	(%)	Comments on Completeness
Delaware	88,730	(42%)	96,162	(45%)	27,658	(13%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
DC	136,452	(82%)	29,617	(18%)	-----		AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Florida	676,794	(31%)	886,804	(41%)	624,207	(28%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>) with presumably full tabulation; AP on Nov 9 gave lower figures with an alleged 100% of ED's reporting
Georgia	333,062	(27%)	365,722	(29%)	535,389	(44%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>) nearly complete
Hawaii	141,300	(60%)	91,440	(39%)	3,465	(1%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>) presumably complete
Idaho	88,835	(31%)	164,029	(57%)	36,058	(12%)	AP Nov 9 and UPI Nov 17; complete
Illinois	2,008,319	(44%)	2,137,239	(47%)	385,065	(8%)	AP Nov 9 with 98% of EDs tabulated; no certified total available as yet from Illinois Secy of State
Indiana	806,259	(38%)	1,057,784	(50%)	243,030	(12%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>) presumably complete
Iowa	477,445	(41%)	616,776	(53%)	66,258	(6%)	AP Nov 9 and UPI Nov 17; complete
Kansas	299,890	(35%)	468,172	(55%)	87,453	(10%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Kentucky	395,097	(38%)	458,905	(44%)	190,493	(18%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>) complete
Maine	212,484	(55%)	164,477	(43%)	6,307	(2%)	AP Nov 9 with 94% tabulated; Maine Secy of State data not final
Maryland	533,045	(43%)	515,674	(42%)	179,859	(15%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation (but does not include absentees)

State	HHH	(%)	RN	(%)	GW	(%)	Comments on Completeness
Massachusetts	1,458,058	(64%)	762,477	(33%)	85,556	(3%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
Michigan	1,585,447	(48%)	1,364,497	(42%)	327,361	(10%)	AP Nov 9 for 99% of EDs; the Michigan Secy of State does not yet have official returns Official Minnesota State Canvas
Minnesota	857,738	(54%)	658,643	(43%)	68,931	(4%)	
Mississippi	149,419	(22%)	88,214	(12%)	414,402	(66%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>) presumably complete
Missouri	785,908	(44%)	807,635	(45%)	205,129	(11%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
Montana	109,218	(42%)	130,119	(51%)	18,548	(7%)	AP Nov 9 with 96% tabulated
Nebraska	163,531	(32%)	303,968	(60%)	42,604	(8%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation of EDs.
Nevada	59,853	(39%)	73,523	(48%)	20,491	(13%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation of EDs
New Hampshire	130,589	(44%)	154,903	(52%)	11,173	(4%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation of EDs
New Jersey	1,264,206	(44%)	1,325,465	(47%)	262,164	(9%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
New York	3,444,812	(50%)	2,966,987	(44%)	347,786	(5%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
N. Carolina	462,601	(29%)	626,690	(39%)	497,482	(31%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
N. Dakota	94,319	(38%)	138,667	(56%)	14,244	(6%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
Ohio	1,692,213	(43%)	1,785,318	(45%)	468,591	(12%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Oklahoma	301,658	(32%)	449,697	(48%)	191,731	(20%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Oregon	355,875	(44%)	403,491	(50%)	49,151	(6%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)

State	HHH	(%)	RN	(%)	GW	(%)	Comments on Completeness
Pennsylvania	2,203,946	(48%)	1,991,784	(43%)	368,275	(8%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Rhode Island	239,497	(65%)	115,929	(31%)	14,967	(4%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
S. Carolina	196,889	(29%)	260,558	(39%)	211,754	(32%)	AP Nov 9 with 99% tabulation
S. Dakota	117,505	(41%)	147,438	(51%)	23,209	(8%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
Tennessee	350,041	(28%)	467,232	(38%)	421,044	(34%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
Texas	1,267,317	(41%)	1,227,199	(40%)	581,717	(19%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
Utah	157,072	(37%)	238,637	(57%)	27,052	(6%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Vermont	70,449	(44%)	85,128	(53%)	4,953	(3%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
Virginia	447,675	(33%)	590,515	(43%)	325,427	(24%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Washington	561,675	(48%)	520,491	(45%)	85,713	(7%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)
W. Virginia	373,382	(50%)	306,601	(41%)	72,022	(9%)	AP Nov 9 with 100% tabulation
Wisconsin	748,895	(44%)	810,092	(48%)	126,762	(8%)	UPI Nov 17 (<u>Wash. Post</u>)

JWT

Bob - do you
want to follow
up on this

L.

file

~~NP~~

Bob Haldeman

JAMES H. STROMAN

6815 Lake Shore Drive
Dallas, Texas 75214
November 18, 1968

Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Hotel Pierre
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Haldeman:

Mr. Larry Higby, your able assistant, called me last Wednesday and asked me if I could be in Key Biscayne on Saturday to meet with you. He indicated he would discuss the matter further with you and arrive at a time for the appointment. We then talked again on Friday and decided that it would probably be better if you and I had a telephone conversation first due to your rigid schedule with the President-Elect. Mr. Higby asked me to call you at 10:30 Sunday morning. I attempted to reach you at that time and also at various other times throughout the day, but you were unable to accept the calls.

I just wanted you to know that I did follow Mr. Higby's instructions.

I would also like to give you a few more personal references; all of these individuals have known me for years.

Thank you again for any consideration you might be giving me.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James H. Stroman".

cc: Key Biscayne Office

Honorable Fred Harris
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dr. M. Norvel Young
President
Pepperdine College
Los Angeles, California

Honorable Ben Barnes
Lieutenant-Governor-Elect of Texas
Austin, Texas

Hon. J. Howard Edmondson
Former United States Senator and
Former Governor of Oklahoma
2700 First National Bank Building
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Mr. John H. Banister
Minister
Skillman Avenue Church of Christ
Dallas, Texas

Mr. A. Pollard Simons
4800 Preston Road
Dallas, Texas

Mr. Will Hayden Griffin
Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Dallas, Texas

Mr. James L. Fisk
Former Executive Assistant to Governor of Oklahoma
4961 Quebec Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

To: H.R. Haldeman

From: Kevin Phillips

As per your request communicated to me by Larry Higby on my return to New York on November 18, I have prepared an analysis of the changing political trends during the final three weeks of the campaign which suggests what happened -- and why -- to substantially narrow the gap and endanger RN's victory.

Trends of the Last Three Weeks of the Campaign
- Their Causes and Effects

A. As of October 15, the generality of polls put RN ahead in most states except that:

HHH led in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Hawaii, D.C., West Virginia and Minnesota (and even the last two were uncertain)

Wallace led in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, Arkansas, South Carolina, Tennessee, North Carolina and Florida; and

Texas, Michigan and Maine were rated toss-ups

B. Between October 15 and Election Day, RN slipped substantially in the Northeast, markedly along the Pacific Coast, moderately in the Great Lakes, very little if at all in the Farm states and Mountain states. At the same time, he gained slightly in the Border and substantially in the perimeter South. As a result of these trends, the following changes occurred in the above list:

HHH captured Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington and Maryland; and

RN took some Southern states - South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee and Florida - away from Wallace

C. Because of these changes, RN's ultimate if narrow victory rested on a combination of West, Midwest, Border and Southern perimeter - the basic alignment corresponding to the changing ideological patterns of national politics and projected in RN's original strategy. This would not have been true of the RN coalition which seemed possible in early October - an RN alliance of the North and West against a Wallaceite South.

In the last three weeks of the campaign, a number of ideological and organizational factors emerged to drive blue-collar Democrats and liberals of both parties to HHH, and this same tightening of the two-party context raised the prospect of HHH victory, inducing many Southern conservatives to switch from Wallace to Nixon.

D. The major trends and their causes are as follows:

1. Wallace losses and HHH gains among normally Democratic union members - In October, labor union leaders mounted a strong campaign to induce their members to abandon racially-motivated Wallace support and return to the HHH column. At the same time, the Democrats attacked RN with blatant but effective misrepresentation on the issues of employment, Social Security and medicare. The GOP went on the defensive rather than attacking and showing blue-collar unionists the link between Great Society failures and attitudes and growing crime and racial turmoil. In the end, almost all of the Democratic blue-collar vote went back to HHH; in states like Ohio and Pennsylvania, most of the Wallace vote came from Republicans (very much contrary to hopes and early expectations).
2. HHH's strong resurgence among long-suspicious liberal Democrats - Beginning with his October 1 bombing halt speech - the Viet bombing halt was a liberal symbol not just a political/military tactic - HHH began to recoup ground with McCarthyites, youth, blacks and liberals in general. This trend accelerated sharply in mid-October as signs grew of potential for a bombing halt and fruitful Vietnamese negotiations. Other major causes of HHH's recovery among liberals, all beginning to mesh together by late October, were:
 - a) intense liberal distaste for VP nominee Agnew, inflamed by the rising hubbub of bloopers (and Democratic advertising relating thereto) and the anti-intellectual tone of Agnew's campaign and the anti-establishment thrust of the Agnew-related attack on the New York Times; Agnew personified what liberals had feared viz RN in the past and this undermined the ticket's appeal and was a godsend (among liberals) to an HHH troubled by lingering memories of Chicago and Mayor Daley;
 - b) RN's security gap speech and the media misrepresentations and Democratic distortions relating thereto; liberals (and many moderates) shrank from the idea of spending billions on a bomb and missile race - and this is what RN's position was presented as being - with the result that they turned to Humphrey.

Of course, the last-minute bombing halt gave the Democratic campaign a major impetus. Pollster Louis Harris has privately said that his last-minute poll results were fashioned by women trending to HHH in support of the bombing halt. Ultimately, HHH ran very strongly in those very liberal areas where he had been extremely unpopular in September (in Wisconsin, his best gains over 1960 levels came in McCarthyite and Vietnik Madison; in New York, his best gains over 1960 levels came in rich and liberal Scarsdale and Manhattan's East Side).

3. RN's late-hour pick-up from Wallace in the South and Border - As HHH recovered in the North, making Wallace a hopeless contender and putting himself back in the race, many conservatives in the South and Border left Wallace for RN. This trend was augmented by the same conservative imagery - Agnew, the security gap and so forth - which hurt RN (and helped HHH) among Northern liberals
- E. The chronology of the HHH trend is conjectural, although the polls offer some guide. A large number of undecided voters were breaking to HHH throughout October, however private polling done for RN by Joe Bachelder indicated a late-mid October stabilization at a non-fatal level. Lou Harris suggests that the bombing halt prompted a last minute rush to HHH, and although polls taken for RN indicated no such movement, there is some voting pattern evidence that it did occur. HHH did very well in exactly the McCarthyite areas that would have been receptive to a bombing halt.
- F. George Wallace's impact is not conjectural; he hurt RN far more than he hurt HHH. Most of the persons who voted for Wallace this year voted for Barry Goldwater in 1964. The Labor Union/Democratic campaign to drive blue-collar unionists back to the Democratic presidential ticket was highly successful. In Pennsylvania, for example, Wallace did poorly in labor strongholds around Pittsburgh or in Wilkes-Barre, Scranton or Altoona. And most of the Wallace blue-collar vote came from Republicans (or conservatives who would have voted for RN) while the small-town and white-collar vote was very Republican in its derivation. For example, Wallace carried two townships in the greater Pittsburgh area - Indiana and Kilbuck. Neither are blue-collar strongholds like Braddock or McKeesport (where Wallace did much less well); they are units which backed RN in 1960 and Pennsylvania Republicans Shafer in 1966 and Schweiker in 1968. In the South and Border, Wallace took votes which had gone to Goldwater in 1964 or which were breaking towards the GOP in 1966. Wallace clearly cost RN Texas and Maryland. The size of the Wallace vote of Republican and Goldwater origins, as well as the lack of Wallace success among blue-collar Democrats, partially reflects the GOP failure to articulate the social and urban failure of Great Society liberalism in a way which would have both drawn GOP Wallaceites back to RN and encouraged blue collar Democratic unionists to persist in their (Wallaceite) opposition to Democratic policies.
- G. The impact of the Non-Indictment of LBJ domestic and foreign policy - RN lost an opportunity for considerable political benefit when he declined to attack the chief personage and policies of the most unpopular administration since the Nineteen-Twenties. By not taking issue with the Vietnamese and domestic social policies generally unpopular with the American people for their profound failure, RN lost
- a) a chance to impede HHH's recovery among liberals by saddling him with the Johnson policy failure (instead RN sometimes verged on seeming the Johnson policy perpetuator)

- b) a chance to attract Wallaceites and cement blue-collar Democratic adherence to Wallace by spotlighting the failure of Great Society liberalism; and
- c) a chance to spark the campaign and rebut allegations of blandness and evasion of the key issues

On the other hand, such a campaign would have left a large residue of bad feeling which would have handicapped the success of the upcoming administration in dealing with a Democratic congress. Still, in terms of winning votes, a strong indictment of the LBJ/HHH Administration would probably have been more successful than the policy actually pursued.

H. The meaning of the election, despite RN's narrow majority, is quite clear. 57% of the electorate chose RN or Wallace in repudiation of the policies of the last four years. Most of the Wallace vote would have gone Republican in a two-party contest --- and it should go for RN in 1972 (assuming that Wallace is no longer viable in light of his relative confinement to the Deep South). By retaining an ideological option throughout the campaign, RN did not carve out a clearcut constituency and won what turned out to be a narrow victory in the face of concerted liberal opposition and conservative fragmentation between Wallace and the GOP. The opportunity of 1972 probably focuses on winning the bulk of the 1968 Wallace vote.

Herbert G. Klein
Manager for Communications

Nixon Agnew
Campaign Committee

Staff of Richard M. Nixon
450 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10022
(212) 661-6400

BOB:

The following is a summary of
a conversation initiated with me
by Jim Haggerty.

HERB

File

November 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM:

TO: BOB FINCH

FR: HERB KLEIN

The following are notes on a conversation with Jim Haggerty:

1. VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE: He has had calls from three senators all of whom are worried about having the Vice President in the White House. They say if he spends too much time there, he limits communication between Senate and President. They recall that they felt RN was someone on whose shoulder they could cry. They say that with the Vice President away, it lessens advance notice on blow up points or danger problems which can be handled in advance if known. They say RN did this often by learning of a problem and communicating with Ike, Persons or even Jack Martin.
2. NO PRESS SECRETARY: He says that circumstances gave him power no others will have or should want to assume. He says, however, that calls he has received indicate that present plan gives them the short end of the stick and thus antagonizes press even before inauguration. They say a second echelon press officer is not enough, regardless of the idea, they want top attention. Haggerty says this is part pride, part self interest. He says the challenge will now be to trap other aides and get answers and the difficulty may be that in their answers they may differ when exchanging black sheets. He says Johnson tried something like this with Georbe Reedy and it was a failure. He says present setup could blow up in three months. He says RN has to be a

great President and his comments are because he believes he will be but that he is handicapping himself unnecessarily before he begins.

3. ALL PURPOSE AIDES: He believes operation of federal government day by day is different from a campaign. White House aides should deal with compatible departments of government. Top aides are important.

HIS CONCLUSION: A campaign or what happens now is child's play next to what happens in critical time of government. Every president has the right and a desire for a separate structure, but this plan as now drawn forth will create disaster to the reputation of a man who should avoid it and can avoid it to become a great president.

#

November 19, 1968

TO: MESSRS: HALDEMAN
EHRLICHMAN

FROM: SAFAIRE

RE: INAUGURAL THEME AND IDEAS

file

I. THEME:

"Bring Us Together" was perfect for the victory statement; it is not quite adequate for an inaugural theme.

"National Unity" was not the primary Nixon campaign message; "New Leadership" was. A straight unity appeal now smacks of 'consensus'; it makes it appear that we feel our mandate is weak.

Dynamic movement, a fresh approach, should be our primary inauguration theme, with national reconciliation the first order of business. Therefore, I suggest "Forward Together."

II. THE SYMBOLIC OPPORTUNITY:

The inaugural activities provide a ⁵one-in-an-administration chance to keynote and characterize leadership.

Although "Unity" is an abstract word, "reconciliation" -- between the races and between the generations -- is an urgent concern.

Symbolism costs nothing; we should build into the address, the parade and the ball the new president's understanding of the need for reconciliation. Inaugural honors are used to pay political debts; we should do this, but also use these honors to demonstrate how we are reaching out.

Here's how:

1. What the President says: Progressive reconciliation, not stagnant unity; diversity, not divisiveness; dissent, not disruption. Tone should neither plead nor lecture; should evoke and inspire. Needed: one good surprise.
2. Who the President Invites: The feeling of the inauguration will be carried in pictures of the faces of the people attending the functions.
 - (a). I have already suggested inviting the twenty-three Viet Nam Medal of Honor winners and the Presidential Medal of Freedom winners;
 - (b). We should see plenty of black faces; not just ~~the~~ Ed Brookses and Whitney Youngs, but the Abernathy's and Roy Inneses (though stopping short of the preachers of violence). This will not only be a positive move toward reconciliation, but it will avert picketing and demonstrations that would mar the Inauguration. In this way, the "demonstration" will be ours.
 - (c). We should invite and help finance the transportation for delegations of Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and Indians. Not postcard Indians---Indians dressed in suits, looking dignified and proud.
 - (d). We should focus attention on the delegation from the "New South" -- Tower, Thurmond, many of the

Republican candidates in the states Wallace carried as well as the border states. This would provide the counterbalance to the minority groups and underscore the reconciliation theme.

3. The President's Hatlessness: Even so trivial an item as this has symbolic possibilities. Handled wrong, it will be played as (1) disrespect for tradition and evidence of gaucheness; (2) a slap at the hat industry and all its employees. Explained properly, it will be interpreted as (1) an effort to introduce informality to a ceremony that belongs to what is not an essentially informal people; (2) anti-stuffiness (3) a desire to be recognized as the same man who was elected, and not transformed into a top-hatted "dignitary".
4. What we make available to the media in text and especially pictures: Everything to do with Inauguration will be picked out and laboriously chewed over. We can direct the thrust of the coverage by:
 - (a). Commissioning five eminent painters (including one Negro and one Spanish-speaking American) to do a painting on the theme of "Foward Together", also five great photographers. Has to be a spread in Life and all over television, hammering home our theme; also shows an interest in the non-chi-chi arts. Tom Hoving at the Metropolitan could move ~~guidely~~ on this.
 - (b) Similiarly, five poets on the reconciliation

theme, to be published in the inaugural program and widely disseminated. Marianne Moore, the best in the business, is a Nixon fan and nobody knows it.

- (c) An unprecedented attention to detail at the ball, which is customarily handled by a half dozen harried banquet managers. Food should be regional, indigenous American dishes (George Lang of the Four Seasons did this successfully at the World's Fair). Will show the necessity of cross-fertilizing American Society with the best of each region, and the special cultural contribution of minority groups. Sounds small, but will be covered big.
- (d) Entertainment at the ball. The few entertainers who helped us should get recognition here. But most of show business was on the other side. We can turn this minus into a plus in this way; by importing, for the first time at an American Inaugural, one great entertainer from Europe and one great one from Asia. Will help with overseas press as well. A wild thought: the prima ballerina from the Moscow Bolshoi. In the old days, we were only inaugurating an American president; now we inaugurate a leader of the world.

III. STAFFING:

We should move quickly to involve people like Hoving, Lang, Hobe Lewis (for the best printed program ever) to work in the planning stages with Marriot and Ehrlichman. I've spoken to some already

they are dying to be volunteers. Frank Leonard should put out several issues of "The Nixon Inauguration^{OR}" to call attention to these details.

IV. STYLE:

This inauguration should not be;

- (a) Austere because of the war --- we will recognize the fact of the fact of the war with the Medal of Honor winners;
- (b) An imitation of Camelot --- that was all style and elegance and had no real theme, and the whole thing would be wrong for Nixon;
- (c) Another one of the staid, average-type Eisenhower inaugurals (though one of Eisenhower's Inaugural speeches was damn good).

The Nixon Inauguration should be:

- (1) the focusing of attention on an urgent concern of reconciliation, with an affirmation of the ability to do something about it;
- (2) in step with the informal, moral tone of the heartland of America;
- (3) the rediscovery of the richness of our national diversity, which is our strength and not our weakness.

To: Bob Haldeman
From: Jim Keogh

11/20/68

File

Image

Bill Safire put down on paper the major points we discussed at our Tuesday session--plus some added thoughts. Some copies are attached.

The search for better intelligence (first point) is in progress. Herb Klein was to ask the U.S.I.A. to gather a summary and analysis of overseas press reaction and comment on the election. This should be available in a few days. Also, Martin Anderson and Klein are getting a summary and analysis of positive comment in the U.S. for use in drafting our own memorandum on the campaign and election.

Safire has put down a pretty good outline for such a memorandum. Pat Buchanan is thinking about how the memorandum should be written.

In connection with the idea for a trip abroad by Nixon intimates, we considered at a second session today the problems related to a believable cover story and the danger that such a trip might seem too defensive. An acceptable alternative could be a series of personal and private visits by individuals--with proper alerting of the press and perhaps some arranging of lunches or dinners with editors by the embassies. For example, Jack Whitney might make a personal trip to London and have a lunch with editors. Perhaps Garment could go to Paris on business and his presence could be tipped to the press. And maybe Ehrlichman could go to Bonn. Surely a tip that John was in Bonn would bring the press running.

Incidentally, Frank McCulloch is doing a two-part piece for LIFE to run in January. I think we can do some good spadework there.

KEOGH FROM SAFIRE

RE: NIXON IMAGE ABROAD

Nov 20

Intelligence Needed: a study of post-election clips and comments in London, Paris, Rome, Frankfurt-Bonn, Amsterdam, Tokyo, New Delhi.

The Reston column from Moscow about European commentary on the "old" Nixon may be misinformed. Our own State Dept sources could get files quickly, and private clip services would do an analysis also. Gallup, too, does opinion polling overseas, and has affiliate arrangements with leading pollsters abroad; he could make these available to us.

Basic Line Needed

On Campaign Strategy: For use abroad and at home as well, we should develop a memorandum setting forth the wisdom of the 1968 campaign strategy.

This to nip in the bud a historical decision that we "almost blew it" or "stumbled in."

Should stress point that win was planned in a way that enables new Administration to govern.

Elements:

- 1) Choice of primary route to nomination was dangerous but laid to rest "loser" image for campaign;
- 2) Choice of Agnew was brilliant, as proven by results; a Tower or Reagan would have blown Ohio, Illinois, and possibly California while only picking Texas---and a Lindsay or Rockefeller would have blown all border states and Florida while only picking up Pennsylvania. Would have fallen short either way.
- 3) Though all pundits and polls thought Democratic party was hopelessly split after Chicago, we based strategy on (a) the likelihood of Ted Kennedy and Larry O'Brien swinging much disaffected Dem support in East back to Humphrey;

(b) the likelihood of ultimate if qualified McCarthy endorsement in final weeks;

(c) the ability of organized labor to cut 5% of Wallace 20% strength, swinging much of East back to Humphrey (Wallace drop correctly and publicly predicted by Nixon);

In light of these strategic assumptions (which were the opposite of conventional wisdom at the time), we positioned ourselves to withstand the most powerful thrust of all: a bombing halt just before the election.

4) We knew the bombing halt was sure to come because:

(a) Johnson had done something similar before 1966 election, and knew he could override political timing charge;

(b) Humphrey campaign, starting at Salt Lake City speech, was geared wholly to anticipated peace vote swinging to him, explaining also the arms-control and nuclear proliferation treaty stress. Nothing could fully ~~xxx~~ counter this Presidential move. Blunting it somewhat was (a) Nixon's emphasis on negotiating from strength and the security gap issue, and (b) total support of Johnson peace moves to the extent of publicly refusing to believe political motivation.

With the Democratic strategy long anticipated, Nixon kept his cool in the final week as Johnson's move before his Saigon ~~xxxx~~ "ducks were in a row" made the political motivation apparent; despite pressure from Nixon aides, the candidate held to his long-planned strategy "trusting" that communist assurances were given and saying that Johnson did not realize that our allies would ~~xx~~ refuse to go along. Thus, on final weekend, Nixon was not impugning Johnson integrity (which would have backfired), only questioning President's diplomatic judgment and offering to help bring Saigon into line.

This remarkably cool decision under enormous pressure was the final key to Nixon's victory, allying him with peace efforts while underscoring his ability to be a better diplomat and bring peace quicker. And in the long run, it enabled Nixon to work closely with Johnson after the election to end the war; the post-election cooperation shattered precedent, helping Nixon in his first aim of bringing the nation together.

5) In this regard, throughout the campaign, Nixon refrained from the slashing personal attacks on either his opponent or the President. Strategic reason: (a) would have reinforced image of Nixon the Democrats were trying to recall (b) would have made governing later that much harder.

At the same time, Nixon stayed on the attack throughout, never being drawn into an attitude of "protecting his lead".

(6) Nixon introduced the technique of the "talking position paper"---a striking re-use of radio that had been dormant for thirty years. Enabled him to deal at length with specific issues without having to reduce enthusiasm of rally audiences. The planned

Democratic charge of "not dealing with the issues" ~~x~~ found itself with noplac~~e~~ to go; at the end, reporters received two complete books with extensive Nixon positions proving his had been a campaign of substance.

7) The Nixon television technique, perfected in the primaries, was so successful it was copied by the Democrats. The regional panel, showing Nixon at his strongest answering questions, was ~~xxxx~~ imitated by Humphrey in the final stages. Samewith the national telethon.

We had to concede an edge to the Democrats on their use of television spots, since personal attacks and emotional appeals about "trust" are a more effective use of the spot format than issue attacks. But we had to adapt our technique to our overall strategy.

8.) Another part of the overall strategy dealt with the "battleground states". The decision was made early to concentrate both time and money in California, Ohio, New Jersey, Illinois (four we won) and Michigan New York, Pennsylvania and Texas (which we lost, the last two narrowly.) Obviously, this strategy paid off; also, a less publicised but major effort was made in the border states, where the choice of Agnew was crucial, and a sweep was made there with the exception of a squeaker in Maryland.

Though the Democrats sought to charge a "Southern strategy" (which helped them solidify the Negro vote) the five Wallace states received little Nixon attention; the law and order issue, a stand against busing and the active support of Thurmond helped carry Virginia, the Carolinas and Florida. But a real "southern Strategy" with no hope of the Deep South would have been foolish.

On geography, the Nixon grand strategy achieved an important goal: a national rather than regional victory. Woodrow Wilson won while carrying only Ohio and New Hampshire in the East; Humphrey tried to win without the South and the West; Nixon took at least one major state in each section. (Jersey in the East, Florida and the Carolinas in the South, most of the midwest and most of the west, plus the border states.)

9) Nixon strategists recognized the Negro vote as a lost cause from the start, but the candidate never stopped pressing for "justice" with law and order, and developed the "black capitalism" concept, again aiming past the election toward effective government.

10) The strategic mistake should be admitted, since it was an error on the side of restraint and ~~xxxx~~ decency. Muskie was vulnerable on several juicy

counts---matters involving the FHA, Billy Sol Estes, the TFX affair. Much more substantive than anything leveled against Agnew. But Nixon said no, which permitted the Democrats to build up Muskie into a major asset and helped their attack on Agnew by contrast.

11) ~~N~~ Ideologically, Nixon occupied the middle from the start, gambling that he could ~~kk~~ keep the middle in a three way race large enough to win. Amazingly, the solid Nixon strength held at 42% throughout, assuming Gallup to be correct. He successfully fended off erosion from both sides, holding his bloc of independents and Republicans, finally picking up some extra support from Wallace protesters.

An Eastern Republican nominee, or a Nixon who adopted a all-out liberal stance, would~~x~~ have lost the East anyway as traditional Democratic strength came together, and ---worse for the nation---would have permitted Wallace to get one fourth to one third of the popular vote. Thus, the Nixon victory was a victory for the center, enough of a change to satisfy the non-racist rightist protesters, and indeed the only type of candidacy that could effectively govern the nation. (Walter Lippman and Stewart Alsop foresaw this.)

When you lose, the "if only" begins. But consider the "ifs" in the way the Nixon strategy turned out: He could never have won, if (a)he had neglected the primaries, (b) he had chosen a vice presidential nominee from either left or right (c)he had depended on the disaffection of vocally unhappy Democrats (d)he had launched a slashing attack on Johnson or Humphrey (e)he had neglected the thoughtful speeches and opened himself to the 'no substance' charge (f)he had spent more time in states either surely won or lost (g) he had adopted a regional or southern strategy, and most important at the end, if (f) he had panicked and blasted the President on a phony bombing halt.

One ~~misstep~~ misstep, and he could easily have lost; one strategic or tactical error, and the traditional Democratic majority plus the far right's breakaway would have meant a Humphrey victory. But Nixon moved straight ahead without stumbling once; that was the secret of the greatest comeback in modern political history.

Interpretation Abroad
Follows Pundits Here:

The trend of opinion formation about the US abroad is started by the writers stationed in the US from foreign papers; they all take their lead from US columnists.

Therefore, an understanding of the preceding strategy of the campaign must originate with a respected US writer.

Since this interpretation is different from the standard line (of "Nixon locked out"), it will start a fresh spate of stories which the foreign press will pick up. And if it is accompanied by some "inside" revelations, it will get a good play. These second thoughts make the history.

Needed: Our Own

Donovan or Schlesinger: The Eisenhower administration opened its files to a respected reporter, Robert Donovan; the Kennedy administration had Schlesinger Jr. live in.

On a much more limited scale, we should confide in a respected writer to do the inside story of the campaign. In the course thereof, he will reflect Nixon to be the cool, careful, thoughtful, strong leader he proved himself to be in the campaign.

One suggestion: Nick Timmesch of Newsday, author of a good book on the Republican party. He is nobody's patsy, but 90% of our message would come through.

Another suggestion: Peter Maas of New York magazine, a Bobby Kennedy intimate. Would add immense credibility, and I know him well enough to judge that 80% of the message would come through.

In opinion-formation, 80% of the message from a credible source is far more effective than 100% from a source inside that clearly is grinding the new administration's ax.

A reporter such as one of these would write ~~from~~ for a publication of limited circulation, even the Statepost; however, we might interest the Readers Digest in reprinting it, which would make it mass circulation here and abroad.

Follow-Up to

Selected Foreign Press: We should begin now to open up channels to the foreign press stationed here. Some, like Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times, are bellwethers (and Brandon is charming to the Nixon staff but files unfriendly material.)

These men want personal interviews with Nixon, of course, but they can be satisfied with close attention by top Nixon staffers and a feeling that they have been chosen to get a look "inside".

We should select a half-dozen from key capitals and assign staffers to get across our message just before publication in the US of the first story on these lines.

Trip Abroad byNixon Intimates:

A task force of three men known to be close to the President-elect should be sent to Europe. Announced purpose: fact-finding on respect for America and its present policies among non-governmental sources.

Composed of: an editor (a Klein or a Keogh or an editor or publisher who knows Nixon well who was not in the campaign); a financial man or economist; and somebody who was connected with USIA in the Eisenhower administration.

In the course of their fact-finding, they would hold press conferences and private meetings with journalists abroad, revealing what they know about Nixon the man and the way the American campaign was conducted---in the only way that enables the winner to govern.

This should be a non-diplomatic mission, and the task force should steer sharply away from questions to them about foreign policy. Of course, to avoid offense, they should set up their meetings with private individuals in consultation with our State Department and probably through the governments of the countries they visit.

Television Abroad: Frank Shakespeare informs us that the USIA is preparing a half-hour documentary on the new President. Needless to say, this should be carefully viewed and appropriate comments given with all due attention to propriety.

I understand that our own campaign documentary is being thoroughly distributed abroad.

If we decide to cooperate to the extent of an interview with the President-elect with any or all of the US networks, provision should be made to make the interview simultaneously available to overseas networks.

Nixon philosophy abroad

We should set someone to work immediately on translating relevant portions of "Nixon on the Issues" and "Nixon Speaks Out" into French, Italian, German and Japanese.

These excerpts should then be mailed to a wide list of foreign editors with a letter from Zeigler introducing himself and opening a channel of answers to queries.

We should make a deal with a US publisher to publish a book of Nixon campaign speeches, with a new introduction and an epilogue to make it copyright-able. Proviso: quick translation and publication abroad in paperback form.

And while we're at it, we should write a new conclusion to "Six Crises" and have that translated and published around the world. By the time the translation is finished and type set, the Inaugural address will be delivered and can be included.

A Final Thought:

Between Christmas and Inauguration Day, Julie and David will be going on their honeymoon. Perhaps, after a week of idyllic privacy on some hideaway, they would be willing to make a tour of Europe. Impact: fantastic. And they would have the best and most natural reason to be travelling abroad.

file

*Call
Salvatori*

Fried

November 20, 1968

HENRY SALVATORI called rmw and said:

"Mayor Yorty called me. He told me to call RMN. He said that during the campaign RMN asked him to become a member of his Cabinet and he said yes. Since he has to make his plans he would like to know whether he is being considered, etc. "

Henry Salvatori said we should either call him back or call Yorty direct and let him know what the score is -- he is apparently quite anxious. (You will recall the Salvatori's were the ones who got after us to call Yorty when we were in California just prior to the election!!!!)

*Tell Salvatori Yorty is under consideration -
but can't be specific until all other*

November 21, 1968

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON INCOMPLETE PRECINCTS

Illinois: Cook and DuPage Counties have not yet certified.
This can be expected Friday or Monday.

Maine: We will have complete story on Friday.

Michigan: There is a scattering of precincts. We are
not missing any blocks of precincts.

Montana: No information but we are trying to track this
down.

LRN

MEMORANDUM

File

November 23, 1968

TO: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: LARRY HIGBY
RE: ASA

With regard to your query on ASA, we found no agency containing those initials.

However, there is an agency entitled ESSA, which stands for Environmental Sciences Service Administration. *- in Commerce*

It is involved with coastal and geodetic services, and also the Weather Bureau.

NASA is ind. agency

*Eddie -
Deputy Admin?*

or in space