

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NSC/Soubers to Smith 09/06/2002

By Date 06/27/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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October 4, 1973

National Security Decision Memorandum 235

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: NSSM 150, United States Policy on Transfer of Highly
 Enriched Uranium for Fueling Power Reactors

The President has reviewed the interagency study in response to NSSM 150 and has considered the views of the interested agencies.

The President has decided that the United States will:

- Review any future requests for the supply of large quantities of highly enriched uranium abroad on a case-by-case basis without an a priori presumption of supply.
- Require that a recipient has acceptable physical security measures in effect.
- Weigh the position of the recipient with respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in reviewing and deciding on requests for supply.
- Not require as an essential precondition of supply that fuel fabrication and reprocessing take place in the United States or in multinationally-owned facilities, but will consider this factor in reviewing and deciding on requests for supply.

In addition, the President has directed that:

- The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission should obtain the views of the Secretary of State prior to making any informal or formal commitments and contracts regarding the supply of large quantities of highly enriched uranium, and any proposal to make a supply commitment should be referred to the President for his

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consideration. (It is recognized, however, that the U.S. has informed the European Community that its requests for supply of highly enriched uranium will receive sympathetic consideration.)

- The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, after consultations with the Secretary of State, should advise interested U.S. parties, including producers of equipment, of these more selective and restrictive procedures, as compared to our policy on supplying slightly enriched uranium, and the rationale behind them.

- Although diplomatic representations need not now be made on the decisions contained herein, an action program (with options and argumentation as appropriate) should be developed by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee for diplomatic and other steps the U.S. can consider taking with other nations, and in particular other supplier nations, with regard to the security, non-proliferation, political, and economic aspects associated with the increasing growth and dissemination of nuclear power industries, with particular focus on potential problems associated with highly enriched uranium.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee