



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Friday, January 14th. The President's at Camp David.

I went into the office for the first half of the day and worked at home in the afternoon on my opus. We had some bad economic news today. The GNP figures revised downwards will be out, also the wholesale price index is up eight-tenths, which means the '72 deficit projection will be way up. We had announced in September it would be about \$28 billion, now it turns out it's going to be over \$35 billion, which will be a tough one to live with.

The President called this afternoon to say he'd been thinking about the Tuesday night Vietnam announcement. He wants me to try to get Rogers on board regarding it. That's been the one thing he's been worrying about, in conjunction with that announcement, because he's afraid of Rogers's adverse reaction.

He said, first, the President's been doing a lot of thinking since this blew on the Pentagon Papers, or the Anderson papers. The problem is the guy also has the dope on the secret negotiations. We don't know if he's given it to Anderson, but there's a good chance that Anderson has it. Second, anyway, the President thought we should surface the secret talks at some time, running through the history, plus the Thieu offer to resign, plus a deadline in six months. Third, he thinks the worst way for this to come out is via Anderson with his distorted view. Fourth, he thinks it's best for the President to do it, and make the offer publicly. The President thinks the channel's blown now anyway, so now everything goes into the Porter channel. He'll say that everybody, including Rogers, agreed that we should explore the offer of withdrawal in six months, cease-fire, etcetera. He'll inform Laird just beforehand, he doesn't want to argue about it. He'll say here's the offer we've made, and add a couple things. Rogers is not to tell anyone in his shop about this. As he went on building the case on the phone, he says this has the advantage of defusing the deadline



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issue and the POW issue, so that they know we've been trying and have gone the extra mile. It gives credibility to what Rogers and the President have implied regarding the use of other channels. He'll have Porter lay this on the table at the negotiations Thursday morning. I'm to say this is a decision the President has made on his own. That Kissinger is not too hot for it, because he wants to continue the private channel, but the President thinks it's too late, we have to go open. The President has asked for the record and will write the speech himself. The President feels Rogers will be against this for the wrong reason, which is that Kissinger was doing the negotiations, but that we've got to talk him into accepting it. The President thinks now is the time to go public and make our October offer public. The President will shape it up a little more. He says Rogers may not know about the Thieu resignation and some other factors in it, but he knows about the thing in general. There's also the advantage of defusing the issue at the beginning of Congress. In other words, also Anderson's guy has the information, therefore, we're sitting on a time-bomb. He wants Rogers's cooperation. It's a tight decision, but we want his help. We'll get the leaders together two hours ahead of the announcement, and then go public for our country. And Thursday morning, Porter puts it out in Paris. We'll be making a peace offer at the start of Congress, like we did in October of '70, and buy time for a couple of weeks before China. Also, we have to do it before the North Vietnamese offensive begins, so it doesn't look like we're dealing from weakness. This way, it puts them on the bad side of the psychological issue if they attack after the offer, and it'll answer the seven points publicly, which we've never done. It has to be, so there's to be no discussion. I'm to tell Rogers that the President will probably want him to look it over on Monday afternoon.

He also told me to tell him about the Muskie rumor, and the fact that we have an open-and-shut circumstantial case against the Anderson guy, but no witness, so we can't move on it.



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I called Rogers, and went through all of this with him. He reacted reasonably well, said that he only had one question, which is that we shouldn't make all the papers public. There's a problem if Kissinger makes them pub--, makes public what was offered, what they said, how many meetings, etcetera, and all the details. He thinks we should avoid all the secret mumbo-jumbo and just cover the general substance of the talks.

This morning the Attorney General and I had our meeting with Henry and with AI Haig, as a follow-up to our meeting with Bill Rogers, in an attempt to try and solve that problem. Henry kept interrupting us as we tried to start telling what the situation was. And we had to listen to a 45 minute tirade from him, at the end of which he emotionally said, tell me what your proposition is, and I'll do it. I'm not here to strike a treaty with the President. Every time when we tried to tell him, he'd interrupt again, and go off. He made a lot of sort of random points.

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Audio Cassette 17, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 18 [AC-17(B) Sel 15-1]
Duration: 10 seconds

He said that Marvin Kalb in Bermuda told Kissinger that his attack on Kissinger came from the highest level of the State department. Henry is convinced that's Rogers.

Kissinger says he's caught in a dilemma with the President, because the President doesn't want details on any of the matters. So Kissinger does them, and that creates an endless battle with the State Department. Then when the things blow up, the President wants to go through the whole thing and find out what happened and get in the middle of it.



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Duration: 2 minutes 31 seconds

On India-Pakistan, he said WASG is an action body, not a policy body, and there were seven SRG meetings which is policy. The President met four times with these groups, made clear what his policy was. And Kissinger came back from the India last summer convinced that there'd be a war told the President so. The President said give this to Rogers, he's got to have something to handle.

Rogers's approach was to turn it over the UN, and give them a \$1 million relief fund. Consistently, we said publicly that if war came, we would cut our aid to India. When we did cut the aid, the announcement was distorted. So the President had to fight for the President's policy at WASG. State refused to take the President's direction.

At one meeting, Kissinger asked what was in the pipeline, and State said, we've been ordered by the Secretary not to tell you. Rogers never said he disagreed with the policy, but the sabotage went on consistently underneath.

He says the real problem in this is Rogers. The bureaucracy has some degree of loyalty to Rogers and does what he wants. When challenged Henry says he can't demonstrate any incident of Rogers's violation or refusal to carry out an order, but they're there all over the place.



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Kissinger never sees Dobrynin without first submitting talking points to the President and an immediate report afterwards. He has records of falsified reports from State, cables distorted from what we were told, and so on. He says Rogers is totally self-willed, totally incompetent, and totally self-centered. He made the point that State was the one that put the question of sending arms to Pakistan through a 3rd country on the agenda and then they let the President take the blame for raising it and being tricky. Rogers's position is that whatever Kissinger does, Rogers is opposed, such as the Berlin Agreement, etcetera. Rogers talked to the President on, about Taiwan in Key Biscayne while Henry was sick according to Henry's view. He says, "they" say that everything we do is subordinated to getting on television with the China trip. Attorney General made the point that we have to have a modus operandi, so Rogers knows enough to satisfy him. Kissinger agreed that he'll tell Rogers whenever the President tells him to. Kissinger says the problem is that Rogers will blow his top on everything that he doesn't do. Whenever he's called in advance, he puts the President through hell, so we have to wait until the last minute to tell him. The problem is, if Kissinger tells Rogers he's conducting side negotiations on the Mideast, he'll blow up.

When it was all over, we ended up not having accomplished a great deal, but at least we didn't lose any ground, I don't think.

The question of Shakespeare's resignation also came out, and both Kissinger and the AG agreed that it was imperative that Shakespeare not resign, and Henry agreed that he would move to try to keep him on track.

Kissinger called me later in the day to say that...



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...in regard to the meetings with the Israelis, Sisco told Haig yesterday that he was talking with them about planes, but he never mentioned that he was talking about negotiations. Yet, we know from Rabin that they did talk about negotiations. So Henry wants me to make the point to Rogers that we want substantive, advanced notice so that we can register objections. They've got to tell us ahead, with sufficient advanced notice, so that we can object and be in on the planning.

That's the point that hasn't gotten across to Rogers, at least at this stage.

End of January 14th.