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Folder List

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50	19	8/24/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Patrick J. Buchanan to RN RE: Tips for the Campaign of 1970 regarding democrats, swing voters, vice president, etc. 4pgs.
50	19	11/6/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Patrick J. Buchanan to RN RE: Campaign of 1970 strategies regarding economy, governors, advertising, etc. 14pgs.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N-1 [178]	memo	Buchanan to RN re VP! campaign of 1970	8/24/70	C
N-2 [179]	memo	Buchanan to RN re 1970 Campaign	11/6/70	C

FILE GROUP TITLE

PPF

BOX NUMBER

6

FOLDER TITLE

CAMPAIGN of 1970

RESTRICTION CODES

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Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: President's Personal Files

Box Number: 6

Folder: Campaign of 1970

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
178	Return Private/Political
179	Return Private/Political

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan

THE VEEP AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1970

Given this Scammon-Wattenburg thesis -- which I believe is right on the mark for Democrats -- we are in serious danger of being driven back to our minority party posture. Our needs seem crystal clear.

1. We cannot allow the Democrats to get back on the right side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do right now with tough talk, etc. They have to be branded -- and the brand must stick -- as permissivists, as indulgent of students and black rioters, as soft on crime. This can be accomplished with their record in the last Congress I believe. But for us to contest with them primarily on the Economic Issue -- Big Spenders, etc. -- as the major assault seems to me not a prescription for success. Republicans for forty years have been tarring Democratic Congresses with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrats have been winning those Congresses, lo, these same Forty Years.

J agree

The focus should be on tarring them with "ultra-liberalism" and "radicalism" especially on the Social Issue where we are strong and they are weak.

2. Where are the swing voters in 1970? We must assume left-wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and Republicans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water. The swing voters are thus Democrats -- law and order Democrats, conservatives on the "Social Issue," but "progressive" on domestic issues. This is the Wattenburg thesis -- and I think it is basically correct. How to conduct ourselves then.

*for bussing -
against our
crisis control
bill*

Tar the Democratic Leadership specifically with the "radical" label on social policy; tar them as well with the "obstructionist" label on the President's programs for reforming society, for getting America moving.

Frankly, we should go after the "Daley Democrats." No one can do this better than the Vice President -- but we cannot get these voters by using rehashed Republican arguments or stale Republican rhetoric.

right "Big Spenders" is a theme that might work, will work, with our Republicans -- we are using it in all our GOP literature -- but will it have any real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may mean the medicare for his mom or old man? (Foot-dragging Congress" does not seem charged with much electricity, either.) *Boilerplate*

3. Scammon contends that a hard-line on riots etc. by Democrats may anger "liberals," but liberals have no place to go anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, regular Republicans have no place to go in 1970 (no Wallace) but the GOP. So, let's go straight after the Daley Democrats.

✓ 4. The Vice President should win these Democrats to the Presidential banner by contending that RN is a progressive on domestic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership of the Democratic Party; that RN is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and pornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the Senate who care so much about the rights of the criminal that they forget about the rights of society; that the President is a man trying with veto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the chance, create the kind of inflation that would put Indonesia in its heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists who think peace lies in an abject retreat from the world and the dismantling of the army, navy and air force. This is said strong -- but these I would think would be the ways the Vice President could best appeal to the patriotic, hard-line pro-medicare Democrats who are the missing element in the Grand New Party.

5. There is move afoot to "low-key" the Vice President's campaign in 1970 -- to have him focus specially on the local issue and not seek the national publicity. There is no conflict between garnering national publicity and helping local Senate candidates -- the two are thoroughly complimentary.

(not focus but focus on the local candidate)

The Democrats -- see Scammon's book -- are only now coming around to recognize what we knew in 1966 and 1968 -- that a strong statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to voters in New Jersey than a banal statement in Trenton, Tenafly, Newark and Elizabeth. The way for the Vice President to help the Senatorial Candidate is to praise him to the skies, fine -- but to hammer the national Democratic leadership in a manner that will keep our big press corps excited and with us, that will get network time every night if possible with our message; and so help every Republican Senatorial Candidate while we are helping the local one.

Right now the Agnew tour is getting tremendous publicity as the potential best show in town. All we have to do to forfeit that national publicity is run around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper, as has been suggested already. We ought to remember also, that when we give up the television time -- on the networks -- someone else, namely our Democratic friends, gets it.

never

Mike Mansfield says the Democrats have no one to compete with the Veep on the hustings. We have a tremendous advantage here -- which we should use, not throw away by talking about local issues that carry no national wallop.

We should have something topical and tough for the national media every day. If the Vice President can raise the Republican Administration a few points in the polls and the President by his decisions and actions raise it several more the effect will be like raising the water level and all the boats in the lake will rise at once.

Good

A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators and Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.

6. Clearly, from the Scammon book, we should tar the Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" but the party of bussing, the advocates of "compulsory integration," the party whose last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago in order to testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership that let this

Liberal

bugout, bussing,

Separate Southern
Democrats from
Northern & Western
-4-

country turn into the porno capital of the world, and is blocking RN's effort to change that. Also, the Democratic leadership has altered its historic foreign policy position to kow-tow to student radicals who bully-ragged those same leaders in the streets of Chicago, etc. The Democratic Leadership should be portrayed as selling out to the crazies in their own ranks -- and selling out the interests and views of the good patriotic Democrats who number in the millions. We might even say LBJ was destroyed by the "ultra-liberals" in his own party.

goad

7. We should stay on the offensive, taken the "out" (and offensive) position even though we are the "ins" (and defensive) by hammering at the "liberal Eastern Establishment" that is responsible for what has happened to America, the "Establishment" that is frustrating our efforts to right the wrongs in Society, the Establishment whose wards are tearing up the colleges, the Establishment that indulges rioters, etc. (Of course, said in better phraseology, but the need to be on the offensive, to act as "outs" seems to me vital.)

agreed -
Disjoint to
other
issues

8. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether or not we are in a "recession" seems to me a utterly foolish idea -- since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help us and since anyone who is hurt in the current economic situation is not likely to be convinced he is not being hurt by anybody's rhetoric. Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and unemployed are being hurt, let's go after the Democratic radicals whose wild schemes are frustrating our efforts to stop the rise in prices. This is the Big Spender theme -- but in different rhetoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same kind of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social Issue.

9. Finally, to change the Vice President now into the traditional Republican campaigner is to change a winning strategy for a losing one.

ultra liberals

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE 1970 CAMPAIGN

Memorandum to the President

From Patrick J. Buchanan

November 6, 1970

STRATEGY

Looking back, in my view, the Social Issue was clearly the right one upon which to focus in the campaign. We took the lead on it with the Vice President's speeches; forced one Democrat after another to defend himself, to get on the right side of it -- and thus precluded their taking the offensive on the only good issue they had -- the economic one. Secondly, the issue clearly worked. Tunney spent half the campaign getting out of police cars; Stevenson was talking about his Marine Corps record by the campaign's end and wearing a flag pin in his lapel; Humphrey ran on law and order -- and Kennedy was calling campus militants "campus commandos." (The President might have noted on election night that the Senior Senator from Massachusetts now has a haircut.) What happened this campaign -- in a number of instances -- was that Democrats like Tunney and

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Stevenson got themselves back on the right side of this issue, through speeches and spots, as Scammon and Wattenburg had urged them to do -- and once they got right on this issue; it became a contest on personalities and on the economic issue, I would guess, and they won hands down.

On the other hand, if Ottinger had gotten well on this issue he would very probably be the new Senator from New York.

Those Democrats who did go hardline on law and order apparently gave up nothing on their left -- just as S-W contended (the kids have nowhere else to go) and won the suburbs. Moreover they were able to endorse the President's peace initiative and Mideast policy, thus losing nothing there.

Those candidates, who came off in the election as out and out liberals, Gore and Goodell and Duffy -- and did not get well on our issues -- were defeated.

The legitimate question to ask the Mortons and others is what issues they would have had us run on, take the offensive on. Had we devoted our campaign to the economic issue -- those final statistics about a seven billion deficit for the first quarter, the .5 retail price increase, the GM loss, the massive increase in industrial price index would have been crippling blows. Had we devoted all our effort to the economic issues, Gore would have won -- and Buckley very probably lost.

right

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As for our domestic programs -- from my travels around the country with the Vice President -- everybody thought revenue sharing was nice while most of our guys were running away from the Welfare Plan -- and we constantly had to stress work incentives. All through the South and Southwest this was hurting, not helping us.

My main reservation about the Social Issue campaign was that we started too hard, too early. We threw the Democrats completely on the defensive in the first two weeks -- but they still had six weeks to get well on the issue, to alter their campaign spots to deal with the issue; and like Tunney and Stevenson and Kennedy, they clearly succeeded in doing this. Smith specifically started his hard-line too soon, considering media's impact.

One thing we underestimated by a long shot is our ability to command the media and get our points across -- we do not need to hit something day in and day out for eight weeks now -- we can do it in a matter of two-hours and be successful. In retrospect we might have been better off to start out -- not full-bore -- but low-keyed, light and positive, and then gone over on the all-out offensive around the second week of October -- which would not have given the opposition enough time to re-orient their campaigns.

There is another point that should not go unanswered. The "social issue" was not a "missile gap" issue -- i. e., a complete

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creation of our campaign -- it was an issue created by the people of this country who declared it to be their prime concern in state after state after state. It would have been utter folly not to recognize public concerns on this issue; recognize we were positioned correctly and go after our opponents.

When one considers the other issues; the economy -- where we had problems; foreign policy, where the Mideast could go up, where the U.S. Soviet relations were cooling; and RN had proposed a cease-fire which the doves could say they had called for long ago -- we had nothing to draw a sharp line of division with them; nothing which we could take to the country and say clearly -- here we stand; here they stand -- throw them out for this reason and put us in. We have to remember that we were trying to throw them out of office -- not keep ourselves in -- and in that kind of effort you have to go on the offensive for the people are not going to understand why there is a need for a change.

THE ECONOMY

Clearly, this must have hurt -- I see nothing else to explain why Reagan did not get the margin everyone predicted -- after the dismal campaign of Mr. Unruh. Also, it seems to me the only explanation why our Western Senators went down so badly when we had felt they might all run a close race.

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(Incidentally, whoever was giving us the optimistic poll information ought to be called upon for some ample explanation why they were so far off.)

Looking at the races by State -- which we have to do -- I think we can see what won or lost it. There were it seems no national trends -- as this was not a national election.

Connecticut, the President certainly helped -- so also did the Vice President in convincing conservatives and GOPers that Weicker was acceptable and even desirable. This helped with the Dodd voters.

In New York, the White House and Vice President can legitimately claim to have won this by the attack on Goodell, bringing liberals into his camp, and by letting New York know that Buckley was both acceptable and desirable. The Social Issue here finished the Democratic candidate -- what else explains why a young, good-looking Democrat can't get 40 per cent of the vote in New York. Also, Rocky hit hard on the Social issue.

In New Jersey, our friend, Gross injured himself with his campaign tactics -- wherein he took left-wing anti-Nixon positions and then shifted himself back. I don't know the ultimate reasons for his defeat -- but a social issue campaign by Cahill against a drawing board liberal won by half a million in that state.

Preservation Club

In Pennsylvania, God knows why Scott won so narrowly against an unknown -- we ought to find out. Perhaps economy. *no*

In Maryland, the President helped certainly -- but this was an "anti-Tydings vote" because in my view Tydings ran a hell of a good strong campaign. The Mahoney people just couldn't hack him.

In Virginia we had a nice liberal Republican running and he got 15 per cent of the vote.

In Tennessee, we were running against a hell of a campaigner, in Albert Gore; he had the best media and press of any campaigner in the country; he ran as a fighting underdog, the "Grey Fox," and the only reason we beat this fellow was the issues -- not on candidates or personalities.

In Texas, I don't know why George Bush lost -- but he lost to a fellow who was as tough or tougher than he was on the social issues. So, this surely did not lose Texas. Economy, desire for 1 Dem and 1 GOP Senator (originally won for Tower) and perhaps even rumor about Bush for Agnew hurt.

Florida, we got beat because we beat ourselves with the Carswell gambit, with the Kirk-Guerney-Cramer feud, which turned off the voters of both parties -- and because the Democrats came up with two populist conservatives who had no scars and a lot of attractiveness.

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If I were a Florida Republican, I would have been fed up with the GOP nonsense and Kirk myself -- and the fellows elected seemed conservative enough.

As for the nonsense that this proves the failure of the Southern Strategy -- we ought to ignore it. Bentsen and Chiles are not liberals. The only two Southern liberals in this election -- Gore and Yarborough were defeated. Any Southern Strategy is part of a presidential strategy -- it does not apply to Democratic conservatives running at the State level -- indeed, RN and Vice President Agnew are as popular as ever south of the Mason-Dixon line -- and would sweep that area still in a national election.

In Indiana, we had a candidate who was not the most attractive fellow in the world; some of his tactics brought out into the open were questionable; if he wins it will be because of the issues, and because of our visits. Certainly, it won't be on his personality.

In Michigan, the GOP had a disastrous primary and came out with the worst possible candidate -- and Hart is attractive, without enemies, and the Warren incident made it hard to handle the social issue -- and Mrs. Romney's basic positions are unsuitable to that kind of campaign.

In Illinois, Stevenson scrambled for his life after the first two weeks of the campaign -- and succeeded in getting well on the issue by his flag pin, emphasizing his Marine career, hiring Foran as his

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press!
 Deputy Campaign Manager and climbing between the sheets with
 none other than old Law and Order himself, Richard J. Daley.

In Missouri -- money, and a young and attractive candidate almost knocked off Symington, who has lost touch with the people of the State of Missouri.

In the West, we went down like Ninepins in the Senate races -- the only thing I can see as the reason here is that perhaps the Social Issue does not have the bite of the economic issues in the great plains.

But the economic issue does -- as the President knows from hearing the howls of GOP Senators at even the least mention of a cutback in public works. Perhaps the farm vote let loose here. Shuman's gripes and drops in farm prices had been ominous portents.

In California, it must have been the economy -- since everyone agreed that Reagan ran a tremendous campaign, was popular, and Unruh was a joke. Also, again, Tunney spent the campaign getting out of police cars -- and if that issue was neutralized, then Murphy was through, due to Technicolor, age, condition and economy.

THE HOUSE

Most analyses indicate that one percent in unemployment can be translated into an additional loss of five House seats above and beyond

Franklin D. Roosevelt

usual off-year losses -- well, we had two points of unemployment higher than full employment -- and that might well explain our 10 defeats in the House. Also, a number of popular House incumbents were put up for Senate races -- which contributes to that figure. (US News showed that 51 seats were average off-year loss in those years when unemployment was on the increase.)

THE GOVERNORS

Here is the big loss; here is the major problem -- along with the State Legislatures. Again, we can go down them one by one.

Pennsylvania -- They had us on the State issues after the Shafer-Broderick Administration.

Ohio -- The scandal plus a commonplace candidate against Gilligan lost this even before it was started. (Note -- however, Gilligan was outraged and went to court on that quote we were using against him.)

get to work Wisconsin -- A real disaster here, a real problem for 1972 -- partially explained by the incredible showing of Proxmire, who gets the entire Democratic vote; who does well on a national television; and who has the image in Wisconsin of a fellow who saves the taxpayers dollars. Erickson was regarded all along as a weak sister and his poor showing pulled Olson down as well.

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Maine and Rhode Island -- the near losses here for Democrats indicate the vulnerability of Governors in times of rising prices and rising taxes; vulnerabilities which have little to do with whether they are pro-Nixon or Democratic. (Muskie's coattails showed little attraction here.)

Arkansas -- A populist Democrat got the Wallace vote, and Mr. Rockefeller did not run on the Social Issue; indeed he would have been especially hard put to hit permissiveness. He lost this one himself -- and Bumpers is an example of the new breed of hard-headed Democrat populists that did well all over the South.

Florida -- Kirk lost it for well-known reasons.

The Western Governors -- I don't know why some of these failed to win; it would be worth a close investigation -- but ab initio I would attach it to State issues, to the vulnerability of executive incumbents -- who are blamed when things go wrong more readily than might a Congressman or Senator be blamed.

FINAL POINTS

SOME TURKEYS

One reason we did not do better was that in many states, we did not field our strongest possible candidate. George would have done

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better than Lenore; Lugar better than Roudebush; Finch better than Murphy; Laxalt better than Raggio; Andrews better than Kleppe; most anyone better than Smith. We had a few turkeys out there -- and it is not an easy thing to unseat an incumbent Senator; the odds are long against it. (Something like 8-1.) Indeed, two of ours who lost were appointed -- not elected to the job -- Goodell and Smith.

CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING

- Much of this has become counterproductive because of the massive nature of it; because of the negative publicity it gets from press and networks. Also, some of the harsher attacks from our side are certain to gather the irate attention of the liberal media -- just as those gutting ads in the final weeks outraged all networks -- and they said so. The adverse reaction to campaign ads may not have helped our last night's stump speech appearance. But clearly the technical problems with that show outranked any gain or loss based on substance of speech.

On the law and order issue -- clearly it can be overdone as we believe Smith overdid it in the suburbs -- where he ran as poorly as any Republican ever ran. There is a point of diminishing returns on the Social Issue -- as George Wallace found out. But our problem was that we began too early too hard in my view -- enabling the Democrats to reposition themselves and effectively defend it.

From the 1970s

SOCIAL ISSUE

It was the right issue for us in 1970 -- but we should remember that in 1972 -- they will be using it against us to some effect, if it is not visible that there has been a national change in either climate or statistics.

THE PRESIDENT

We are getting a bum rap on the President's campaign -- being accused of appealing to fears, of a divisive polarizing campaign -- that is simply not true -- but it is a result of our natural enemies in the Media. The President however, did go out and fight for his candidates, in the GOP -- and the presentation of RN as a partisan necessarily involves some attrition in his national image as President of all the people, above the battle. We ought to review here whether the gains from this campaigning is worth the risk of depreciation of our most vital political asset -- the Presidency.

THE CAMPAIGN

Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan. Some of the bitching and moaning are now coming from individuals who had no hand in the selection of the strategy -- and much of what they say might reflect certain sour grapes. This should be taken into consideration just as the consideration that those who favored this strategy (i. e., me) also have an investment in its vindication.

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VICE PRESIDENT

He carried out his assignment to the letter. We kept the national media off our backs -- gnawing at us -- until the final two weeks by virtue of an unprecedented amount of fresh, useable copy.

We ran a rough hard-hitting campaign, which has been distorted by the media -- but which raised both money and enthusiasm and good publicity very nearly everywhere we went.

The President will recall that in 1958, with more serious economic dislocation, and a popular Republican President, and a hard campaign -- we lost 57 seats in the House. We did one hell of a lot better this year -- and among the reasons is the aggressiveness of our campaign against the Democrats, the media we received by virtue of the Vice President's controversial positions and his out-spokenness -- and the strategy we used which was devised and approved by the President.

But, just as the President suffered nationally, by his reputation as a fighting partisan in the fifties -- so also, has this Vice President.

Strong recommendation is that he be given responsibility for some domestic area where he can come off as a fighting progressive -- also, that he be authorized to deliver some speeches on new Nixon Administration initiatives, in domestic policy. And perhaps a major speech

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or two outlining Administration foreign policy. All these things he can garner great publicity for -- at the same time he broadens his own national image -- and thus becomes a more effective campaigner on the stump.

Because of the nature of the request -- I will withhold for the time being thoughts both substantive and political -- looking toward 1972.

Preservation Society