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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1970

Ziegler

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: Ron Ziegler *RZ* -
RE: Election and the next two years

These are my thoughts following the 1970 elections

THE ELECTION

The objective and honest assessment of the 1970 elections must be:

1. The President is better off in the Senate -- he has gained in both party strength and ideological strength.
2. The President is no worse off in the House than before -- the fact that Republicans lost no more than nine seats can be considered significant when compared with past off-year elections -- but basically there is no change in the House.
3. The Gubernatorial and State Legislature races were determined primarily on local issues and should have little effect on 1972.
4. Incumbency seemed to fall out in two opposite directions in the 1970 elections.

The executive (Governor) incumbent seemed to be at a clear disadvantage while the legislative incumbent seemed to have a clear advantage.

Only 13 incumbent Congressmen were defeated (10 Republicans; 3 Democrats) out of 392 who sought re-election.

However, of the 24 incumbent Governors, seven were unseated (all Republicans). The fact is that the executive had to make decisions that were often unpopular -- i. e. tax increases. This issue defeated Tiemann, Bartlett, it almost defeated Curtis in Maine and helped elect Meskill in Connecticut and probably hurt Broderick in Pennsylvania.

5. Poor candidates hurt us in some areas -- in my view we could have done better than Roudebush, Spaulding, Romney, Gross, Carter, and Burton. We lost Illinois the day Ogilvie selected Smith.

NOTE: This raises the question of matter of Karl Mundt. While there is talk about the Senator resigning before the Governor-elect is sworn in, there should also be careful consideration given to who will replace him. Whoever is chosen must be electable in 1972 or we will be giving away another Senate seat.

The Administration has said enough about the 1970 elections. We have analyzed them -- sold our point of view... some critics say oversold it. We should now move on to other things.

The President's efforts in 1970 were necessary and clearly within the campaigning precedent set by former Presidents in off-year election years. Had the effort ended in San Jose or before, the assessment which follows would perhaps be different.

THE ISSUES

The San Jose incident and the events that followed it have tended to give fuel to our critics -- and they will exploit what they feel is the "Leadership issue" to the fullest. We must develop a strategy to deal with this.

Issues

It seems to me there are two categories of issues; the first = substantive contains the issues of the economy, social unrest and foreign policy (Vietnam, defense expenditures, European troop reduction, approach to East-West relations.)

The second category = PR negative that our critics will attempt to build and exploit in an effort to over-ride the Administration handling of the first category contains (1) The Vice President and his so-called devisive rhetoric, (2) Moral leadership in the context of uniting the country, (3) The development of the issue that the Administration is more concerned with political exploitation and interest than about the National interest.

What is positive side of this?

As false as these impressions are, our critics' attempts to build and exploit these points will be assisted by columnist and commentators many of whom are philosophically sympathetic to this point of view. Also, they will see this as a way to strike back at what they feel have been unjust attacks on them by the Vice President. The critics can be expected to base many of their charges on interpretations of Vice Presidential speeches over the past two years and this of course provides good copy.

Finally, one of the results of the events following San Jose is that our critics are claiming and will continue to claim with some credibility that the Vice President is not an independent spokesman but an echo of the President's view... From now on when the Vice President makes a controversial attack we must expect it to be tied directly to the President.

It always has been - and rightly so.

THE STRATEGY

I suggest we develop a strategy that outflanks our critics -- by that I mean proceed in a way that is totally opposite from what the bias of our critics would lead them to think we would do.

While the Scammon-Wattenberg thesis may apply to some of the issues listed in the first category, it is my view that the attitude and direction the President set forth in his Inaugural Address should lay the basis for our strategy to deal with the second category issues.

All the staff would be well advised to re-read the President's Inaugural Address and to reflect on how the President has conducted himself in dealing with the many complicated foreign and domestic problems that he has faced over the last two years. From this the strategy and "posture the President should maintain for the period to the end of this year and in 1971" should be self evident.

Posture
The President has approached every major problem of the past two years with confidence, calmness, grace and a certain amount of mystique -- his decisions have been courageous, and forthright. This posture and attitude should permeate the entire White House staff and everything we do should be geared to maintain this posture in an atmosphere of dignity.

The above elements and the President's competence in dealing with foreign policy and his ability to analyze and calmly solve problems facing the country should become the dominate posture of the Presidency and the White House.

The dignity of these qualities has far more depth and appeal than the shallow charismatic appeal that some will work to project over the next two years.

As DeGaulle has said:

"The great leaders have always stage-managed their effects -- the statesman must concentrate all his efforts on captivating man's minds. He must know when to dissemble, when to be frank.

"He must serve as the servant of the public in order to be its master -- he must outbid his rivals in self confidence."

It has also been said that often times what is said and how it is said is more effective than what is done.

A fitting bridge for our approach to the next two years I think can be found in these words from the President's Inaugural Address:

"Standing in this same place a third of a century ago, Franklin Delano Roosevelt addressed a nation ravaged by depression and gripped in fear. He could say in surveying the nation's troubles: "They concern, thank God, only material things."

Our crisis today is in reverse.

We have found ourselves rich in goods, but ragged in spirit; reaching with magnificent precision for the moon, but falling into raucous discord on earth.

We are caught in war, wanting peace. We are torn by division, wanting unity. We see around us empty lives, wanting fulfillment. We see tasks that need doing, waiting for hands to do them.

To a crisis of the spirit, we need an answer of the spirit.

And to find that answer, we need only look within ourselves.

When we listen to "the better angels of our nature," we find that they celebrate the simple things, the basic things -- such as goodness, decency, love, kindness.

Greatness comes in simple trappings.

The simple things are the ones most needed today if we are to surmount what divides us, and cement what unites us.

To lower our voices would be a simple thing.

In these difficult years, America has suffered from a fever of words; from inflated rhetoric that promises more than it can deliver; from angry rhetoric that fans discontents into hatreds; from bombastic rhetoric that postures instead of persuading.

We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting at one another -- until we speak quietly enough so that our words can be heard as well as our voices.

For its part, government will listen. We will strive to listen in new ways -- to the voices of quiet anguish, the voices that speak without words, the voices of the heart -- to the injured voices, the anxious voices, the voices that have despaired of being heard.

Those who have been left out, we will try to bring in.

Those left behind, we will help to catch up.

For all of our people, we will set as our goal the decent order that makes progress possible and our lives secure."

The same elements in our society that motivated the above exist in our society today -- perhaps to a lesser degree -- perhaps not.

NEW DECADE OF PROGRESS (Suggestion)

The President also said in his Inaugural -- "As we reach toward our hopes our task is to build on what has gone before -- not turning from the old, but turning toward the new."

Theme
We perhaps should use this as the underlying theme for presenting the Administration programs over the next two years -- a series of programs that will lead to the decade of progress in reform, world peace, domestic unity and accomplishment.

The Decade of Progress is a phrase that is positive, evocative, far-seeing. It is broad enough to encompass the President's entire foreign and domestic program. Certainly there are other phrases or concepts that might do just as well, but the essential thing is to begin at once with some theme that will build a sense of movement and direction in the national consciousness. Whoever is said to have "won" the election, there is no denying that considerable bitterness has ensued. The Administration has taken on something of a negative look in many people's minds-- admittedly much of this is the doing of our adversaries and the media, but we have to deal with it nevertheless. The President

came in facing some dirty and totally uninspiring jobs -- end the war, end inflation, end the crime wave. With a solid start now made of all these fronts, the time is right to emphasize a spirit of beginning and building, to talk in a more positive and long-range context.

The new theme can be introduced in such a way that no shifting of gears will be apparent. We do not say, "Let us have a new decade of progress," but rather "America has begun a new decade of progress," and then we tick off the areas in which beginnings have already been made. This can be done quite naturally in the context of a mid-term progress report to the American people. The "new decade" idea has a mainly domestic thrust, but it also complements perfectly the "generation of peace" note that the President sounded so effectively in Europe, and it fits with the foreign aid reform, State of the World message, and other foreign policy initiatives.

Specifics

I would make the following specific suggestions:

Short Run -- November, December

The President should not move abruptly.

1. Press Conference

✓ The President should have one press conference before the end of the year. This should be held after Thanksgiving, perhaps the first week of December (December 2nd.)

2. Major Addresses

✓ The President should give one major address wherein he outlines his goals for the future of the country. The address should be compatible with the State of the Union but not as specific. It could be philosophical. The National Association of Manufacturers would be the perfect forum.

3. Lame-Duck Session

The President should be only indirectly involved in the Lame-Duck session, addressing himself to general concepts of such things as welfare reform. We should allow the leadership, Cabinet members and White House staff (Finch, Ehrlichman, Shultz) to deal with the detailed legislative debate.

Long 1

The blatant partisan changes that are likely to come should be ignored by the White House. We should hold our fire and not get into a rhetorical debate with our Senate critics. This should include the Vice President. Our critics will be trying to draw us in and we should stay aloof from them.

The President should devote his time to solidifying his support in the Senate in meetings with the conservative and moderate and liberal factions of the Senate.

4. Travel

Travel,

The President should not travel before the first of the year -- except of course to Florida for the post Thanksgiving period and to California for the post Christmas period. The trip to New York for the National Association of Manufacturers dinner should be the only other exception.

Long Range

1. Media Relations

Media

We should follow basically the same strategy, i. e. the President should remain somewhat aloof and avoid frequent and personal contacts with the press.

I do suggest the following:

A. Press conference

The President should hold one East Room televised press conference a month and one in-office press conference on three week intervals.

The advantages of this are many -- the President sets the line and the tone for the Administration. Administration spokesmen can then bridge off his words.

The President's proven ability to handle these sessions and the tremendous effect they have bodes well for following this pattern.

The TV sessions allow the country to see the President in charge.

The in-office press conference serves our purpose in two ways: It gets the President's line out but it also lets the press in a little closer to the President -- but not too close.

It must be remembered the President can and does control these sessions, despite what some say to the contrary.

B. Media contacts

Television

We should cease immediately the Colson type contact. Klein and myself should increase our sessions with the network heads and commentators. More can be accomplished through "friendly persuasion" based on mutual trust than can be accomplished by intimidation of the networks.

No - should do both simultaneously

As a part of this effort it would be most worthwhile for the President to meet with the network heads periodically after the first of the year for general discussion and acquaintance session.

We have a lot to overcome to stabilize our relations with the networks -- today they do not trust us. They resent us and emotionally react against us.

No Administration ever gets what they consider a fair break from the news media. We perhaps suffer from this more than most. It is my feeling, however, that the way to deal with this adversary is not to confront him head on -- this only gives excuse to their sometimes bias -- but to outsmart him. One never outsmarts the enemy by running at him head-on.

The White House staff should meet more freely and openly with White House regulars. For example, instead of just sitting back and decrying a negative report, let's feed him information that he will have to use.

HRH can be very effective at this.

2. Use of Cabinet and Vice President

Cabinet

Cab
The Cabinet should be revitalized, built and used. Today it is nothing more than a ceremonial body. I would suggest that the Cabinet not only meet more regularly but that they talk programs and substance and after the meeting on occasion -- the Cabinet officers be put before the press to sell and lobby for his programs.

Individual meetings should be set up more often with Cabinet members and the President and then let them go before the press.

Example:

Cabinet meeting could be held this week -- discuss status of appropriations, FAP, etc. Richardson, Schultz and perhaps Finch could go before press -- this would be a good news story ... shows President involved but also Cabinet in there fighting for our programs.

Vice President

HP
I would not attempt to evaluate the effect of the Vice President's activities and statements over the past year and a half ... it is my opinion, however, that he has built a base of support which is constant and will not expand even if he continues to follow the same pattern.

Therefore the Vice President's role should be shifted from that of an outspoken, controversial critic of our society to a hard-working builder of our society, one who takes up the legislative oar and speaks to and works for those programs that will build The Decade of Progress.

3. Relations with Congress

CG
We should be aloof to their criticism and statesmanlike and conciliatory to them personally.

We understand the Legislative process and two party system. They can do the screening and we will do the building.

4. Travel

Travel
The President should continue to go to the country. However the staff should take on the responsibility of only presenting him in a dignified Presidential setting. This does not mean elimination of motorcades and crowds. It's the handling of the situation we should address ourselves to.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Colson II

November 19, 1970

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 13045, Section 6-102
By CP Date 5-11-84

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommendations in accordance with Mr. Haldeman's memorandum of November 7th.

1. Analysis of the President's election efforts: (Copy of memo of November 6th attached)
 - a. Your campaigning was essential to arouse our troops, demonstrate loyalty to the candidates and the party, generate media coverage and keep the economy issue somewhat submerged.
 - b. The law and order issue was effective in the Northeast where the problem exists. It did not score for us in the more conservative, rural areas where there is no disorder problem.
 - c. We were not able to make the public believe that Democratic, liberal permissiveness was the cause of violence and crime. (This has to be done on a continuing basis.) It simply couldn't be sold in the heat of the election when the Democrats moved back adroitly to the center.
 - d. Vietnam was a plus, if anything, but was largely neutralized by the public's very great satisfaction with your handling of the issue.
 - e. The economic issue hurt us critically, particularly in the farm belt where farmers have a severe credit squeeze and high interest rates. The GM strike was a real factor in several key states, particularly Indiana.
 - f. With the issues basically cancelling each other out, i. e., the economy v. law and order, people voted personalities and individual problems in individual states were controlling. We beat ourselves in Florida, Ohio and Texas. Without an overriding issue, people just liked Burdick's personality better than Kleppe's, etc.

- g. We did make significant gains in the blue collar, white ethnic areas (Buckley, Prouty, Weicker and Beall attest to this).
- h. There was too much campaign overall. People tired of it in late October. The Vice President peaked early.

2. Posture the President should maintain:

- Posture
- a. The "business as usual" posture is especially important now and throughout early 1971. The liberal media have unfairly characterized your campaigning as the "free wheeling, attacking, stump speech" type. What is needed is to establish in the public mind a certain aloofness (without isolation) along with the mystique and grandeur of the Office.

The attack on the Democrats must be a continuing party and Congressional effort, but kept disassociated from the White House as much as possible.

To emphasize your effective handling of critical international problems is our strongest posture. Policy pronouncements in this area are very timely (like military assistance to Israel, Korea, Cambodia, etc.)

On the domestic front we face a very severe danger that the Democrats will attempt to seize the initiative on major spending programs and new, appealing social initiatives aimed at the middle class, like National Health Insurance.

If we start the new Congress on the defensive, we will have great difficulty in re-capturing any momentum. We should not get into a position of fighting the same old issues on their ground (i.e., who can do more), thus casting ourselves in the Republican stereotype of being opposed to everything.

The combination of a very large revenue sharing program with a value added tax plan, launched early and dramatically in the Congress, gives us a rare opportunity to put the Democrats on the defensive. This could be one of the most far reaching, imaginative reforms ever in domestic policy. We need, however, an all-out effort to sell it. It should be sold as a way of getting money back to local communities and out of the tangled federal bureau-

cracy -- money to be used by local communities to manage their own programs as they see fit, or to help reduce the crushing burdens of local and state taxes. By getting programs out of the federal government and instituting a value added tax, federal income taxes can be reduced with particular emphasis on helping the middle class which has been squeezed the hardest. If we promote it well, this package could give us the offensive throughout the coming session.

To propose vast environmental programs, new schemes to help the poor, expanded aid to the cities gets us absolutely nothing politically. Whatever political benefit is in it, the Democrats will take away from us by showing that they can do more in the Congress than we have proposed.

To take a whole new approach -- revenue sharing and value added tax -- has real political appeal because it combines reform in government with tax benefits to the constituency which we must reach. It is also a real signal that we Republicans have faith in the people to manage their own affairs, locally.

Media
3. Recommended changes in the handling of the media:

- a. We should continue quiet but firm pressure from here on the media. The FCC can keep the networks off balance and worried, as they are now, over the possible regulatory measures.
- b. We should work on getting more stations in friendly hands.
- c. We need to brief continually on a positive basis friendly or neutral TV analysts and commentators to get a favorable line to them in advance of their programs -- as we now do with friendly newspaper columnists. Most of them are so biased that it will only be marginally effective but we can't hurt by trying.
- d. At modest cost an independent TV news service can be established here in Washington to feed out "friendly" TV news spots directly to licensees for use on non-network news programs.

- e. Early in the year you should meet separately with the chief executives of the three networks, simply a "get acquainted," general discussion meeting.
- f. There is a need now for a Presidential news conference to be followed in 1971 by news conferences at more frequent, regular intervals. You are at your best by far in this format. The particular style of conference might be varied from time to time. The meeting with the three anchor men last summer, for example, was especially effective.

4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet:

From a political standpoint the Vice President should be programmed to work on the South, and the labor/white middle class ethnic vote.

Obviously, he needs to develop stature in the international field (missions assigned by you).

He further might assume the leadership as the leading spokesman for a major domestic initiative (for example, revenue sharing).

The Cabinet needs to be used in a concentrated effort to help sell the value added tax/revenue sharing package -- a theme to be hit hard by the entire official family.

We need, as you so well already recognize, a much stronger spokesman on economic policy.

5. Relationships with the Congress:

This is touched upon above in reference to the domestic program. It is absolutely imperative that we seize the initiative with Congress. Only something as dramatic as the proposed domestic program will do this.

This is bound to be a hostile and contentious Congress, at war with us. Our success with the Congress will depend on your continued strength in the country. Your standing in the public opinion polls, which remained relatively high despite all of the criticism by the media and the Cambodian aftermath, did more for us in Congressional relationships last summer than everything else combined. If the Republicans in particular respect your political strength, they will be much less likely to break

V.P.
Cabinet.

Cong.

with you. Liberal Republicans should either be frozen out or welcomed in, depending on how they respond to early tests between us and the Congress. Percy obviously wants on board -- so does Ed Brooke. The Goodell situation (Ed Brooke told me he agreed with our position (!)) is bound to have a good effect on all but our most stubborn dissidents.

6. Presidential Travel:

Travel

I do not recommend extensive Presidential travel in the first several months of 1971. It is important, particularly because of the media treatment of the campaign, that the President be in a firm and strong position of leadership of the Government. Over the next several months this can be best demonstrated here in the White House with the use of occasional outside forums, like the NAM on December 4, for major policy pronouncements.

7. Political Emphasis:

Political

It goes without saying that getting the economy moving again and soon is an overriding political objective.

In 1972 we should have with us our natural constituencies in the New South, the border states and the West. The key large swing states will be Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois and perhaps even New York (Texas is a separate situation). The swing votes within these heavily industrialized states will be the white ethnic, middle class working man and family.

This voter, in particular, is frustrated because he doesn't believe that government can solve his problems -- or perhaps any problems. We have and must continue to build an impressive record of government reform (the value added tax/revenue sharing hits this directly).

He is squeezed hard by rising prices and increasing tax burdens. Income tax cuts for the \$5,000-\$20,000 per year worker or deductions (as for college tuition) will have a powerful political appeal.

Above all, he wants stability and order in his economy. We need to show a positive record of accomplishment on law and order issues.

To win the swing vote in the swing states, we must intensify our efforts to cultivate the Catholics, labor and ethnics. We need to be sensitive to their needs and prove we can do something about the problems which concern them most.


Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Buchanan II

November 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan

- (1) The President already has my analysis of the election results. Would reiterate several points.

First, where our operation was far ahead of the field in assessing the impact of the mass media in the 1968 elections --- in the length and intensity of the 1970 campaign we did not take into proper account the enormously enhanced power the Vice President, but especially the President have to dominate the media as incumbents. In past years, it took weeks and months to hammer home a single issue. The same can now be accomplished in days. The 1972 campaign should be thought out on the same kind of basis the President thought out his entire 1966-1968 political profile. Now is our time for a "political moratorium". Further, the fall campaign of 1972 should be so constituted as to emphasize various and changing themes, saving the strongest pitch for possibly the last week (or two). We should not underestimate our ability to make a case, our ability to focus national attention on a single theme or the capacity of the public for being turned off by "overkill."

Second, reexamine the instruments of campaigning. Frankly, to what degree, if any, does campaigning enhance an incumbent's stature in the public mind? Is a rally with a cheering crowd and an effective cheer line by the President on night TV as good a forum for taking RN's case to the country as a nine p.m. press conference telling the nation why RN needs these men. Will the nation respond in better political terms to Nixon the campaigner, or to Nixon the President making his campaign speeches quietly and forcefully in prime time from the Oval Office? Has the day of the front-porch campaign --- or its modern counterpart --- returned?

If I were to make a shotgun judgment now as to what kind of campaign the President should run in 1972 --- I would recommend that he wrap himself in the trappings of his office --- give once a week major address on nationwide television at night -- and make not more than a handful of separate campaign appearances at noon to

show the nation, via networks, the President has the confidence of the people in the provinces -- he is their man.

But the President clearly needs an intensive analysis on the effects of campaigning per se. The team we have put together is by general judgments the best campaign team in history. Even our media adversaries say they wish we could run the government as well as we can run a campaign. The danger that lurks is that we shall become so enamoured of our success at managing the techniques of campaigning, 1968 style, that we may lose sight of the fact that they may now be irrelevant -- or worse, counter-productive -- for a sitting President in 1972.

Sears / Third, there are states such as Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio and Florida, essential to victory in 1972, where the Party has been mangled. We have to begin now to move to resolve differences and bring these parties together, or else begin almost at once organizing our own political machinery for the elections of 1972. John Sears told me that if the President were interested, he would draft a political memorandum with his thoughts on what should be done now and in the coming year, both on an organization basis and a strategy basis with regard to downgrading Muskie, and perhaps building up Humphrey as our opponent, on countering Wallace and strengthening our political machinery in the swing states. If the President is interested -- I will tell him to move on it right away.

(2) Posture of the President through 1970 and into 1971.

Posture / The immediate necessity is to put politics and the campaign of 1970 behind us. Nothing we can do or way further is going to alter judgments, already made, about whether or not 1970 was a success or a failure. Our case has been presented -- the other side has presented its version of the results -- and the commentators and columnists have by and large already staked out their positions. Anything more is overkill.

This is consistent with my strong view that the time for Nixon the politician campaigning for his party is over -- the time is now for the President to represent himself to the nation as the elected President of the American people -- above the political wars now certain to ensue within the Democratic Party.

Through its gross distortion of the kind of campaign the President conducted, the media has driven home the impression of Nixon the partisan of the United States. We must not play into their hands with top-level White House discussions of the campaign of 1970 or the prospects for 1972 in either party. We must get back exclusively to the business of governing and leading the nation.

The election-eve impression left of RN the strident partisan -- and Muskie the national conciliator -- can be reversed in a matter of weeks. My strong recommendation is that at the President's first press conference, following the election -- which will be a bear-baiting exercise -- he demonstrate humor, a relaxed attitude, exude confidence -- and speak in terms of politics being behind us and now moving forward to work together on the nation's business at hand. Speak of the national need -- in calm reasoned terms -- for what the President has requested for the defense of friendly nations; speak of the need for action in areas where action has been delayed and people have unnecessarily suffered for that delay. (Unless I hear otherwise, this would be the kind of mood I would try to put into the Q. and A. for the next appearance.)

(With regard to Muskie, he suffers from the fact that he is not considered an outspoken leader by the ideological wing of his party -- he is likely, as McGovern is doing now, to begin taking potshots at us, which will be clearly political. We ought to simply dismiss them as political -- not engage in head-to-head -- and let him go about destroying his media image by himself, which he may well be forced to do to win the hearts of the ideologues that dominate the left wing of his party.)

Looking at further horizons, I see a need for the President to move back toward the role of national reconciliator --- symbolic gestures toward the black majority should be made (not to win votes; we can't) but to indicate to the great middle that the President is attempting to answer the crucial needs of the entire nation --- none excluded.

We also need to have something positive and appealing for the working people of this country in the way of tangible major domestic programs. Since, in any choice between a counterfeit liberal and the real McCoy, the country will take the real McCoy -- we ought to have some domestic initiatives of our own -- with the Nixon brand clearly on them. Regrettably, we are now pouring billions into programs like OEO, Model Cities, Urban Renewal, etc. for which we get no credit whatsoever.

P. S. McCoy

My thought would have been to terminate or diminish as many of their programs as possible in order to shift the considerable amount of dollars into Nixon programs -- which would have a visible impact by 1972. To this degree, I concur with Phillips: To put together a new majority in American politics, we are going to have to provide the working men and women, white and blue collar, with more than rhetoric; we have to bring home the bacon; whether in the form of parochialism, or what.

Finally, to counter the impression being pushed by the media that this is an Administration concerned only with cold statistics, an Administration long on public relations gimmickry and short on substance and vision -- I feel the President should seek out occasions to demonstrate "humanity" and "heart" -- spontaneous occasions, not planned meetings to demonstrate a symbolic affinity with, and concern for the unemployed and the less fortunate.

The old Republican nemesis is the national image of the party of the bankers, party of business, the party that doesn't really give a damn about people. The Democrats are going to use this in 1972 as they have in every election since 1932 -- and we need to consciously consider words, deeds, symbolic acts that will give the lie to this charge before it is made by the National Democratic Party in earnest.

(3) Recommended Changes in Relations with the Media

media The networks are not with us. NBC is openly hostile. The national press is in an ugly mood -- over both the lack of press conferences, and the feeling that we are B.S.ing them about the election returns. Given their natural affinity for a political fight, given their ideological pre-disposition, given their normal enthusiasm for the challenger, the underdog -- our situation here is not good.

On the plus side, it has never really been that good -- the hostility of the liberal media was always one element we had to consider. What to do.

We are never going to be loved by the national press corps -- that is a given fact. Any transparent attempts to become buddies will fool no one; will succeed nowhere. What our specific focuses should be, I believe are these:

- (a) Go over the heads of the national press to the nation on more televised press conferences. Where we run into a problem of over-exposure, do them in the morning or at noon. Have the national press in for more of the Presidential, non-televised press conferences. These carry risks -- but this

instrument is among our most effective; we are extremely good at it; invariably the President scores with the people, if not with the press.

- (b) While our differences with the national media remain irreconcilable we should take the initiative to ease tensions a bit. While there is much psychologically satisfying in roasting them with regularity, there is not much political profit in this. We have garnered much of that already. If we intend to take them on -- and hard -- we ought to first re-establish good relations, and wait until the fall of 1972.

Any future attacks on the media should be rifle shots -- at NBC for a specific abuse -- and not be perceived in such a way as that we are roasting the entire corps. This tends to leave some of them so browned off they make a special effort to gut us at every opportunity.

Our best hope for a fair shake lies now with the Reasoner-Smith team at ABC. We ought to give them our best leaks -- provide them with the best breaks. If we have to pick one network to do some major special on -- clearly it should be this one.

In attacking and supporting, we should as mentioned above, be selective --- a Herb Kaplow who will do something fair for us on the worst network, should not be slighted -- while Chancellors and Vanocurs should get nothing. And if we move on the attack, it should similarly be selective.

4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet

Like the President -- but to a far greater degree -- the Vice President should shift over from the political offensive to the policy offensive. The time for combativeness, for political in-fighting, is clearly over for now. In my view, the Vice President should be given a good slice of the domestic franchise to oversee, an issue or issues, a program or programs, to demonstrate the other side of the man -- the capable and competent executive working to get things done. His role as the President's Terrible Swift Sword should be minimized; he should be used in this assignment only when necessary; the President should utilize Cabinet Members and White House Staffers with good liberal credentials to start carrying the fight. They have capital in the bank to do it; the Vice President needs to replenish capital.

The Vice President makes an effective low-key presentation on television; when he is provided a new franchise, he should take to the networks to argue his case. He should be shown fighting for something -- not just against somebody. It would enhance his stature if he were given a foreign assignment of some duration --- this would broaden his image with the public; he might well make a campus appearance or appearances; he might well make a surprise visit for a A. and A. session with black leaders; he should be given the opportunity to demonstrate his abilities other than as simply campaigner; he should be provided the opportunity to show the many other facets to his personality other than fierce partisan.

The Veep is the most loyal of the President's soldiers; he took more wounds and scored more direct hits in the campaign than any other of the President's men --- this was his job. But, to continue to do that job effectively, he needs to retire temporarily a political gladiator to show the nation that he is something other than the War Lover of American Politics.

Whenever, there is a new program to be announced that the President is not going to announce --- the Vice President should be the one before the cameras. Whenever RN is about ready to let something go of significance in the domestic arena --- the Vice President might well be the one who gets the headlines by giving an inkling of the new progressive direction of the Administration.

 (The Cabinet)

Unless specifically asked, I would feel it presumptuous to recommend changes in the President's highest appointed body. But my views briefly are these: The President's commitment to clean up the Department of State has manifestly not been carried out by those given the franchise -- the President's men are not the men dominating that body --- the career service historically hostile to the President has too many positions of power -- and we are going to suffer damaging leaks in the 1972 campaign unless we do something about it. The Secretary of the Interior does this President no good and a great deal of harm with his transparent attempts to ingratiate himself with the liberal media. While I continue to admire Secretary Romney's tenacity and guts, he is a committed believer in the compulsory integration of American society --- to solve the race problem. My feeling is that this is socially dangerous at this time and politically disastrous---and we spend too damn much time and effort trying to change peoples minds to change their policy to accord with the President. We might attempt changing the men rather than the minds. Finally, in the area of the economy, a mortal danger for 1972, we need

a man at Treasury who can articulate the President's policies, a staunch loyalist, who has both credentials and capability in the economic and political areas.

(5) Relations with Congress

Conroy.
 With regard to the regular Republicans, we are still in good shape. As for the "Baker's dozen", they are going to make their own decisions as to what to do --- depending on their own political hides; they care as little about ours as we do about theirs. For example, Hatfield -- a True Believer -- can be expected to depart little from his former path. Percy, the Opportunist, who is up in 1972, is already making friendly noises. My view is that we ought not to wage war with them -- but to treat them in accord with the degree of support they give us -- and not lean upon them. Where we can find areas of agreement, exploit them; and see if we can convince them -- in their and the party's interests -- to minimize the degree of Goodellism that goes on.

As for the Democrats, as one of our aides put it, we are going to be "walking through a vat of acid," for the next two years. In the Senate -- half a dozen have their eye on the President -- and all their decisions, actions, statements, attacks and support are going to be on that basis. There is nothing at all we are going to be able to do with them. We should have our Cabinet and White House staffers programmed to answer their charges --- to deal with them on the political warfare level.

As for our own Congressional Relations --- in my view Bill Timmons is not only absolutely loyal -- but also the most hard-working of the President's men in the least enviable of Presidential assignments. I think he needs more manpower over there; I think he needs more visible identification as the President's man for Congressional relations; I think he needs more access to the President himself and his inner councils; I think he needs to be given more credibility for his job on the Hill --- by the President's visible demonstration that he is our man on Capitol Hill.

Finally, the President should place the onus for starting the political war on the Democratic Party in Congress --- by letting them fire the first few shots. Perhaps, when this Congress fails to act, as it will, and goes home for Christmas -- the President could, more in sorrow than anger, go on the nation's networks or lead off a press conference with a doleful recounting of its failures to act in the national interest --- and the President's hopes that the new Congress will serve the nation a little better.

(6) Presidential Travel

Travel

Abroad: The exigencies of foreign policy will dictate if the President must go abroad to advance the national interest. From the standpoint of RN's political posture, I strongly recommend against any "Grand Tour" trips ala the recent sojourn to Europe and the Mediterranean. The President is generally conceded high marks for his handling of foreign policy. The nation via television has already seen the President moving through countless cheering throngs abroad. Repeat performances will be redundant; they will be written off in the media -- as the last trip was by some traveling reporters -- as politically motivated. We have drawn down our balance in this account -- there is not much capital left in foreign visits over the next six months. Lest we be charged, as we have been charged, of going abroad in search of crowds while the gnawing domestic problems remain unsolved, I recommend against. Also, by not going abroad in the near future, the President will have positioned himself well for a major foreign visit in early of mid-1972 -- when it would be perceived as something of a far greater interest, and when it could more effectively underscore the President's successes overseas in time for the 1972 elections.

At Home: Consistent with the view that the President must put the partisan image back of himself, reflect the "humanity and heart" of the Administration, reassume the posture of President of all the American people, I would recommend spontaneous visits, stop-offs to areas of social depression in the country -- whether of unemployed whites or rural blacks.

Because of the appreciable amount of negative reportage we are receiving for "staging" events -- these would necessarily have to be truly spontaneous; symbolic of the President's personal concerns for the people he leads. Democrats have consistently been superior to Republicans with this sort of communication -- and given our party's hereditary image as the Party of Big Business -- this is a woeful weakness. Such visits will also blunt the inevitable charge of the 1972 elections that Republicans are concerned only with cold statistics like 5.5 percent unemployment -- that the President doesn't give a damn about poor people.

Similarly, however, as the nation has seen the President in cheering throngs abroad -- so also, from the campaign, has it seen streets lined with cheering people at home. Though the motorcading through the crowds may serve as a rejoinder to any contention the President is not popular with the people -- it also would seem redundant in the aftermath of the election.

(7) Final Points.

PR
First, we are getting some nasty criticism for having exploited the San Jose incident, and for alleged being an Administration more interested in image than substance -- long on P. R. and short on accomplishment. If pressed, this attack could be very damaging and I recommend we consider drawing in our horns on the P. R. operation side of things. The nation is one that is very keen to and very down on P. R. -- and the last thing we want in the world is to have the press start picking up the McGinnis theme of hucksterism. We should have a high level review of the effectiveness -- or again the word comes to mind, the possible "overkill" of this side of the operation. At all cost we should avoid any tarnishing of the President's image as President in the minds of the people -- and these attacks bother me.

Finally, at all costs we must avoid, in the wake of the election, and in the pressure the President is assuredly getting from the left, any kind of transparant public move to the left. This damaged us after Kent State and such would now be tacit admission the Restons and Sideys were right and we were wrong on the campaign. It would be disheartening to the bulk of our support. Rather than any left or right move it should be a forward move away from the partisan role of the campaign toward fulltime President again.



PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Column II

November 19, 1970

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
L.O. 100-1, Section 6-102
By EP 5-10-82

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommendations in accordance with Mr. Haldeman's memorandum of November 7th.

1. Analysis of the President's election efforts: (Copy of memo of November 6th attached)
 - a. Your campaigning was essential to arouse our troops, demonstrate loyalty to the candidates and the party, generate media coverage and keep the economy issue somewhat submerged.
 - b. The law and order issue was effective in the Northeast where the problem exists. It did not score for us in the more conservative, rural areas where there is no disorder problem.
 - c. We were not able to make the public believe that Democratic, liberal permissiveness was the cause of violence and crime. (This has to be done on a continuing basis.) It simply couldn't be sold in the heat of the election when the Democrats moved back adroitly to the center.
 - d. Vietnam was a plus, if anything, but was largely neutralized by the public's very great satisfaction with your handling of the issue.
 - e. The economic issue hurt us critically, particularly in the farm belt where farmers have a severe credit squeeze and high interest rates. The GM strike was a real factor in several key states, particularly Indiana.
 - f. With the issues basically cancelling each other out, i. e., the economy v. law and order, people voted personalities and individual problems in individual states were controlling. We beat ourselves in Florida, Ohio and Texas. Without an overriding issue, people just liked Burdick's personality better than Kleppe's, etc.

- g. We did make significant gains in the blue collar, white ethnic areas (Buckley, Prouty, Weicker and Beall attest to this).
- h. There was too much campaign overall. People tired of it in late October. The Vice President peaked early.

2. Posture the President should maintain:

- Posture*
- a. The "business as usual" posture is especially important now and throughout early 1971. The liberal media have unfairly characterized your campaigning as the "free wheeling, attacking, stump speech" type. What is needed is to establish in the public mind a certain aloofness (without isolation) along with the mystique and grandeur of the Office.

The attack on the Democrats must be a continuing party and Congressional effort, but kept disassociated from the White House as much as possible.

To emphasize your effective handling of critical international problems is our strongest posture. Policy pronouncements in this area are very timely (like military assistance to Israel, Korea, Cambodia, etc.)

On the domestic front we face a very severe danger that the Democrats will attempt to seize the initiative on major spending programs and new, appealing social initiatives aimed at the middle class, like National Health Insurance.

If we start the new Congress on the defensive, we will have great difficulty in re-capturing any momentum. We should not get into a position of fighting the same old issues on their ground (i. e., who can do more), thus casting ourselves in the Republican stereotype of being opposed to everything.

The combination of a very large revenue sharing program with a value added tax plan, launched early and dramatically in the Congress, gives us a rare opportunity to put the Democrats on the defensive. This could be one of the most far reaching, imaginative reforms ever in domestic policy. We need, however, an all-out effort to sell it. It should be sold as a way of getting money back to local communities and out of the tangled federal bureau-

cracy -- money to be used by local communities to manage their own programs as they see fit, or to help reduce the crushing burdens of local and state taxes. By getting programs out of the federal government and instituting a value added tax, federal income taxes can be reduced with particular emphasis on helping the middle class which has been squeezed the hardest. If we promote it well, this package could give us the offensive throughout the coming session.

✓ To propose vast environmental programs, new schemes to help the poor, expanded aid to the cities gets us absolutely nothing politically. Whatever political benefit is in it, the Democrats will take away from us by showing that they can do more in the Congress than we have proposed.

✓ To take a whole new approach -- revenue sharing and value added tax -- has real political appeal because it combines reform in government with tax benefits to the constituency which we must reach. It is also a real signal that we Republicans have faith in the people to manage their own affairs, locally.

Media
3. Recommended changes in the handling of the media:

- a. We should continue quiet but firm pressure from here on the media. The FCC can keep the networks off balance and worried, as they are now, over the possible regulatory measures.
- b. We should work on getting more stations in friendly hands.
- c. We need to brief continually on a positive basis friendly or neutral TV analysts and commentators to get a favorable line to them in advance of their programs -- as we now do with friendly newspaper columnists. Most of them are so biased that it will only be marginally effective but we can't hurt by trying.
- d. At modest cost an independent TV news service can be established here in Washington to feed out "friendly" TV news spots directly to licensees for use on non-network news programs.

e. Early in the year you should meet separately with the chief executives of the three networks simply a "get acquainted," general discussion meeting.

f. There is a need now for a Presidential news conference to be followed in 1971 by news conferences at more frequent, regular intervals. You are at your best by far in this format. The particular style of conference might be varied from time to time. The meeting with the three anchor men last summer, for example, was especially effective.

4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet:

From a political standpoint the Vice President should be programmed to work on the South, and the labor/white middle class ethnic vote.

Obviously, he needs to develop stature in the international field (missions assigned by you).

He further might assume the leadership as the leading spokesman for a major domestic initiative (for example, revenue sharing).

The Cabinet needs to be used in a concentrated effort to help sell the value added tax/revenue sharing package -- a theme to be hit hard by the entire official family.

We need, as you so well already recognize, a much stronger spokesman on economic policy.

5. Relationships with the Congress:

This is touched upon above in reference to the domestic program. It is absolutely imperative that we seize the initiative with Congress. Only something as dramatic as the proposed domestic program will do this.

This is bound to be a hostile and contentious Congress, at war with us. Our success with the Congress will depend on your continued strength in the country. Your standing in the public opinion polls, which remained relatively high despite all of the criticism by the media and the Cambodian aftermath, did more for us in Congressional relationships last summer than everything else combined. If the Republicans in particular respect your political strength, they will be much less likely to break

V.P.
Cabinet

Cong.

with you. Liberal Republicans should either be frozen out or welcomed in, depending on how they respond to early tests between us and the Congress. Percy obviously wants on board -- so does Ed Brooke. The Goodell situation (Ed Brooke told me he agreed with our position (!)) is bound to have a good effect on all but our most stubborn dissidents.

6. Presidential Travel:

Travel

I do not recommend extensive Presidential travel in the first several months of 1971. It is important, particularly because of the media treatment of the campaign, that the President be in a firm and strong position of leadership of the Government. Over the next several months this can be best demonstrated here in the White House with the use of occasional outside forums, like the NAM on December 4, for major policy pronouncements.

7. Political Emphasis:

Political

It goes without saying that getting the economy moving again and soon is an overriding political objective.


In 1972 we should have with us our natural constituencies in the New South, the border states and the West. The key large swing states will be Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois and perhaps even New York (Texas is a separate situation). The swing votes within these heavily industrialized states will be the white ethnic, middle class working man and family.

This voter, in particular, is frustrated because he doesn't believe that government can solve his problems -- or perhaps any problems. We have and must continue to build an impressive record of government reform (the value added tax/revenue sharing hits this directly).

He is squeezed hard by rising prices and increasing tax burdens. Income tax cuts for the \$5,000-\$20,000 per year worker or deductions (as for college tuition) will have a powerful political appeal.

Above all, he wants stability and order in his economy. We need to show a positive record of accomplishment on law and order issues.

To win the swing vote in the swing states, we must intensify our efforts to cultivate the Catholics, labor and ethnics. We need to be sensitive to their needs and prove we can do something about the problems which concern them most.


Charles W. Colson

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Huston

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By *Emberson* NARS, Date *6-4-80*

November 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Tom Charles Huston *TH*

SUBJECT: 1970 Elections and Prospects for 1972

Perhaps the most significant result of the 1970 elections is that the rank-and-file Democrats came out of it convinced that they can win the Presidency in '72. It is only necessary to remember the difference in attitude among Republicans in the dark days following the Goldwater debacle and in the jubilant days following the 1966 elections to realize that the psychology of victory should not be underestimated as a political factor.

The fact that many folks now believe that a Democrat can win in '72 could, however, work to our advantage. Our best hope is that the ambition of the Democrat contenders will re-open the ideological wounds self-inflicted upon the party in 1968. Of particular interest is the possibility that the Kennedy people may decide that 1972 is the year for a Democrat, and if Teddy doesn't move, he will be out for eight years and that is too long to wait. Initially I would think this impulse to move would be stronger among the Kennedy camp-followers than with the Senator himself, but he

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

might very well be convinced that all is forgiven and he should go for the big one. Should this happen, I would look for the Kennedy allies in the media to pull a "Romney" on Muskie and knock him out of consideration as a serious contender. Broder is already warning Muskie to be on the alert for such a move.

POSTURE THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAINTAIN IN 1971

Posture

The President's posture in 1971 should not be much different than it was in 1967 -- he should maintain a relatively low profile and leave the arena to the hustling contenders. A Democrat aspirant will be pressing hard to make out an independent record in the Senate that qualifies him as the preferable nominee, which means he will have to promote himself at his colleagues expense. This may work in several ways. For example, I would not be surprised to see Senator McGovern open up on Muskie on the grounds that he compromised on the law and order issue at the expense of principle. The left-wing of the Democratic Party is not at all happy with the shift many of their candidates made on the law and order issue; after all they have a considerable investment in the repression issue. If we played our hand properly, we could see a fine row going among the Democrats over who has yielded to political expediency at the expense of the young, the black, and the poor.

If we wish to pursue a policy of leaving the Democrats enough rope for a family lynching party, it follows that the President should strike a posture of studied statesmanship and bold leadership. The contrast should be between a working President coping with tough problems and bickering Democrats jockeying for partisan advantage.

If I had to select a single word to characterize the posture the President should assume, it would be "candor." Candor requires that one take others into his confidence, that one convey a sense of partnership, of shared experience; it requires an openness of opinion as well as of deed, a willingness to admit mistakes as well as to claim success. The best illustration is the November 9, 1969, address on Vietnam. It was a masterpiece precisely because the viewer had the impression that he was being talked with, not to; that the President was taking him into his confidence, explaining the problem and discussing the solution, asking for understanding without demanding support.

In pursuing a policy of candor, it is not necessary to ignore political realities. The political battle is waged on two levels. Where the public interest is demonstrably at stake, the appearance and the reality must be one. What is done and how it is done are equally important and both must be clearly visible and credible. However, where the problem is strictly political (i. e., tactical) the appearance must often be at odds with the reality.

It was said of President Van Buren that he rowed toward every objective with muffled oars. This is a wise and necessary political tactic, one which we appear to have foresworn in the recent election, but it is a difficult and dangerous one, for the temptation is to confuse the tactic with the strategy. The distinction is between political objectives and national goals. Candor is a philosophy of government, "muffled oars" a practice of politics -- and practice should always be the servant of philosophy.

THE MEDIA

media

We take the media too seriously. It is hostile, it is irritating, it is even on occasion demaging, but there isn't much we can accomplish by worrying that David Brinkley is going to burp in our face. We have attempted to neutralize the media by employing tactics that presuppose that ideological hostility can be overcome by advertising techniques. We should deal with the media on our terms and in a manner that is conducive to presenting the image we want to get across, not the image that someone else (usually our enemies) expects of us.

There are several dangers from a concentrated effort to maximize media coverage. First, the risk of over-exposure. Studied aloofness is often the best politics (DeGaulle certainly understood this). The President

doesn't have to intrude on everyone's supper to earn their respect, confidence, and support. Second, there is the risk that an extensive media effort will look contrived. We are already seeing columns accusing us of attempting to substitute a media-created image for substantive programs and policies. We are rather overt in our media orientation and the public might conclude that we are trying to con them.

We should use the media to project the image we want on the terms we desire. In this respect, I believe we should concentrate on portraying RN as a working President, as an educator who uses the media as a means of reaching and educating the people and not as a means of exploiting or deceiving them. Obviously, what I am saying is that the media should be used to convey the candor of the President. Specifically, we should have more televised press conferences, more in-depth discussions with network commentators, and some televised "fireside chats." Moreover, we should not go to the people only when an issue is burning and we should not go simply to solicit overt support. We should try some new formats. In short, we should use the media as a precise and targeted weapon.

The burden of carrying the day-to-day message to the people on the programs and policies of the Administration should fall to the Veep, the Cabinet, the National Chairman, and the Congressional leadership. It is

not enough to say that they don't do the job -- we should see that they do it.

The President should not be burdened with the inadequacies of daily television news coverage. Unless we are prepared to go all the way and buy a network, we ought to quit worrying about the problem. It is fruitless to attempt to meet Brinkley, et. al. on their own terms and all we can get in the process is ulcers. It's not worth it.

THE VICE PRESIDENT

WP

The Vice President did his campaign assignment well, but he may have committed political suicide in the process. To an increasing portion of Middle America, he is coming across as radical as those whom he attacks. He needs to develop an image as a reasonable and credible man, a task which he can easily handle if encouraged to do so.

Many people believe the Vice President has told a lot of truth, albeit in language that they regard as excessive. However, people can tolerate only so much unpopular and disconcerting truth. They want to be reassured, not alarmed. More importantly, they want to believe in the man as much as the message. The Vice President should shift his emphasis without yielding an inch on the substantive issues he raised. He should de-escalate the rhetoric without de-escalating the substance of his message.

The Vice President should take four steps in the months ahead. First, he should address himself to proposed solutions to the problems he has outlined. He should indicate that having identified various problems, he is now ready to offer possible solutions. Second, he should make a conspicuous effort to resume the exercise of his official responsibilities, i. e., presiding over the Senate, presiding over the various councils he chairs, etc. He needs to reassert himself as a working as opposed to a campaigning Vice President. One area where he should concentrate his efforts is in the field of inter-governmental relations. He should be our principal spokesman for the New Federalism. Third, the President might consider giving the Vice President a more prominent role in the formulation and articulation of our domestic programs. And finally, the Vice President should arrange to appear on as many interview-type television shows as possible where he can develop his image as a rational, reasonable, and believable man.

The risk of such a course is that the Vice President will be ignored by the national media. However, I don't think that is too important. If he gets out in the country he will get local coverage by virtue of his office. Moreover, if he begins to play a prominent role in substantive policy and program areas, he will have to get national media attention by virtue of the newsworthiness of the subject matter.

Consistent with my view that the President ought to maintain a rather low and select profile, it might be advantageous to let the Vice President assume a more prominent substantive role. Not only would this enhance the prestige of the Vice President, but it would buffet the President and enable him to avoid exposure except on the big ones where we want to make a decisive point.

CONGRESS

Long We are going to have to get along with Congress if we want to get our legislative program through. In addition, we want to encourage the Senate Democrats to fight among themselves in anticipation of securing advantage in the race for the nomination. We should avoid institutional attacks of affronts; we should also avoid making a major fight out of minor issues. However, on carefully selected issues of major importance to the success of the Administration, we should not hesitate to fight like hell. Although beyond the scope of this memorandum, I might note in passing that I believe there is political profit to be gained from drawing the line with Congress on foreign and defense policy.

The key to our success on the Hill will be our ability to forge a fairly united Republican team in the Senate. We should make every effort to pacify the liberals consistent with the policy posture of the President.

However, I think we should not overlook the possibility of putting pressure on the deviants within the ranks of the party, making use of Dole, Tower, and other loyalists for this purpose. In addition, we should not let Hatfield, et. al. forget what happened to good old Charlie. We should also emphasize that we must all sink or swim together in '72 and it is certainly not in the interests of those seeking re-election to be publicly at odds with their President. If possible, we might consider our own "shadow" leader, a loyalist in the Senate who is unofficially recognized as the President's personal spokesman, a man who can count noses so that when it is obvious we have the votes we can leave the deviants alone and let them do their own thing. This would probably get Hugh Scott's nose out of joint, but since he is so expert at looking after his own skin, I don't see why we should be reluctant to do the same.

PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

Hand Consistent with my suggestion of a low profile, I would recommend against extensive travel except where demonstratively purposeful. While the exposure when abroad is extensive, I am not convinced that it has any lasting impact unless associated with concrete accomplishments. I keep thinking of LBJ and the Spirit of Glassboro -- what a fleeting moment of glory that was!

THE CABINET

Sub. We need some changes in the Cabinet. While perhaps I am vindictive and narrow-minded, I have never forgiven Secretary Hickel for the letter he sent during the Cambodian operation which was a gratuitous embarrassment to the President. He should have been fired upon receipt of the letter and he has no claim to his seat by virtue of estoppel. He still should go.

If Secretary Romney persists in his plan to launch a massive federal integration drive in northern suburban housing developments, he should be sent back to Michigan to discuss the political wisdom of his plan with the voters of Warren, Michigan.

There are a couple of other potential nominees for retirement, but Hickel and Romney are initially adequate to get the message across that loyalty and good judgment are values highly regarded in this Administration.

At the sub-Cabinet level there should be a major purge. We are being screwed daily by people who have been held over or (I say this reluctantly) by people whom we appointed. HEW could afford a complete house-cleaning from Under-Secretary on down, and I suspect that I could put together a list of two dozen top-notch candidates for purging without even bothering to consult Senators Goldwater and Thurmond.

While I am on the purge kick, I would like to put in a word for a man who should be first on any list: Randy Thrower. The best argument against Thrower is that there is no one in the White House who dares call IRS for information without fear that word of the inquiry will be leaked. I am a strong admirer of Van Buren's "muffled oar" strategy, but it is only possible if you have control of your own Administration. I assume that we intend to play for keeps in '72 and that means we need to have the goods on the guys who are determined to do us in. We need control of IRS. It is less important that the Commissioner be a tax whiz than that he be willing to follow orders. Thrower can't. He is arrogant and insubordinate and should go immediately.

Finally, a word about method. The impression is abroad that we are afraid to purge disloyal or incompetent personnel. This is dangerous for it breeds contempt as well as insubordination. Certainly there will be screams of outrage if we have a massive purge, but the screams will last about 10 days and we will have a loyal team for the next two years. Surely we can afford to take the heat when the stakes are so high. Cabinet shake-ups are not unusual in American history. Jackson fired his entire cabinet save the Postmaster General. Truman fired Wallace when he was the

darling of the liberals, progressives, and communists. Roosevelt had no compunction about throwing overboard anyone whom he regarded as a political liability. We should draw up a list of those who are either disloyal or incompetent, find suitable replacements, and strike with a single sudden blow. While the screams in the liberal press would be awesome, the long-term benefits would be more than compensating. We have to get control of the government; there are too many Trojan horses within the walls as we prepare for what could be a close election in '72.

PARTY ORGANIZATION

GOP

I am beginning to sound like Stalin, but we also need a purge at the National Committee. Larry O'Brien stands head-and-shoulders above our man as a party chairman. He is a gut fighter and he is effective. During the past campaign, many of us were appalled at the inability of the National Committee to produce. And Jim Allison's appearance on television the morning after the election where he admitted to our major defeats and discounted the impact of the President and Vice President was hardly helpful. Moreover, there have been so many columns about how the White House refuses to listen to the sound advice of Morton and Allison

that one must surely conclude that they are inspired by National Committee personnel who are more concerned about their own interests than the President's. We need a national chairman who is a fighter, who is effective on the stump, who can use the media, who is loyal to the President but not too closely identified with him personally, who is a good administrator, and who will do as he is told. We also need a new management team at the committee which is efficient, loyal, and able to make use of the resources that are potentially available. We attempt to do too much here that should and could be done at the National Committee if they had the proper staffing and leadership.

STATE PARTY ORGANIZATION

We took it on the chin in some states with potential serious consequences in 1972. States like Ohio, Wisconsin, Indiana, Florida, and Texas are vitally important to us in 1972. We should take a direct interest in party rebuilding efforts in those states to ensure that we have a viable organization ready to field strong candidates in '72.

INTELLECTUALS AND ISSUES

The anti-war types have a song which begins, "Give Peace a Chance." We should consider giving selected conservative alternatives a chance.

Jim Buckley's campaign suggested that large numbers of traditionally Democratic voters are searching for alternatives and not merely on the law and order issue. In fact, the interesting thing about Buckley's campaign is that he, as a professed conservative running on a third party ticket, came across as a more reasonable and credible candidate on a variety of issues than many regular Republicans who thought they were waging a "conservative" campaign. These fellows were about as successful in their efforts as I would have been running as a New Leftist, for the voters can spot a phony. The heavy-handedness of their campaigns suggested that they thought the conservative alternative was what the New York Times said it was.

Since 1964 there has emerged a new generation of principled but practical conservatives of whom Buckley is but one. On many university faculties there are young intellectuals who are developing alternatives to current programs whose intellectual well spring is the New Deal. We ought to consider opening some lines to these people and soliciting their ideas and suggestions. There is doubtless going to be a big push for a program of national health insurance. I fear we may respond with a proposal that merely splits the difference with Meany, that accepts his major premises

and opens the door to socialized medicine. On such major issues where it is obvious we should do something, we ought to look beyond the bureaucracy of HEW and consider other alternatives. We ought not let Buckley and Reagan become the spokesmen for an emerging conservative program. We don't have to make any sharp swing to the right, but we ought to translate some of our conservative rhetoric into a few conservative programs. We might find as Reagan did that they don't hurt us politically. And if we choose those that are directed to ethnics, blue collar workers, and Catholics, we might find they help us considerably.

A FINAL SUGGESTION

It might be worth the trouble and expense to ask a group of talented political types on the outside to take on the assignment of keeping their ear to the ground and passing on their thoughts and recommendations for your study on a regular basis. I have in mind such people as Kevin Phillips, John Sears, a couple of young intellectuals with public opinion analysis backgrounds. These people might be able to give us an insight on a regular basis that would be helpful in gaining a fresh perspective on what is happening in the country. Perhaps this is unnecessary, but it might be of some help.

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In conclusion, I would suggest we take the following steps over the near-term: (1) get control of the government; (2) emphasize substantive policy and minimize media exposure; (3) start organizing for '72 by establishing a working organization at the White House, putting in a new team at the National Committee, identifying key states that require special party-building attention, and considering the use of outside analysts; and (4) have the Vice President shift his emphasis to a positive tone in order to establish himself as a reasonable and believable man and a working member of the policy team.

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