

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
 Contested Materials Collection  
 Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
33	4	6/26/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Patrick E. O'Donnell to Herbert L. Porter and J. Curtis Herge. RE: "Surrogate Attack Plan." 2 pgs.
33	4	6/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 17 pgs.
33	4		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	Handwritten note. This document discusses Humphrey and McGovern and upcoming debates. 2 pgs.
33	4	6/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Ray Price to the President. RE: Debates. 2 pgs.

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33	4		<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Newspaper	"L.B.J. Should Debate on TV: A Man Who Admits that a TV Debate Cost Him the Presidency Attacks Lyndon Johnson for Refusing to Confront the Republican Candidate this Fall," by Richard Nixon. 2 pgs.
33	4	6/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	Handwritten Note. This document discusses a debate and a meeting taking place the following day. 1 pg.
33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert H. Finch to the President. RE: Impact of the "Debates" on the California Democratic Presidential Primary. 3 pgs.
33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: Analysis of California Primary. 3 pgs.
33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ed Debolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates on the California Primary. 4 pgs.

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33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bill Safire to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Some Lessons of the California Primary. 3 pgs.
33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Pat Buchanan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses a field poll as well as Humphrey and McGovern. 1 pg.
33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Newspaper	Evening Star - "McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll," by Jack Rosenthal. 1 pg.
33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman. RE: California Primary. 3 pgs.
33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Jeb S. Magruder to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Impact of California Debates. 3 pgs.

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33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Richard Moore (Dictated by phone from Los Angeles). This document discusses a field poll and the final results. In addition, McGovern, Humphrey, and debates are also discussed. 2 pgs.
33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE: Predictions vs. Results in the California Democratic Primary. 4 pgs.
33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Newspaper	The Washington Post- "Survey of Californi Voting: McGovern: New Constituency," by James Johnson. 4 pgs.
33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	From Buchanan to L. Higby. Speech Insert. This speech discusses McGovern, his views and politics and the speech gives opinions on McGovern. 2 pgs.
33	4	6/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: Primaries: California, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Dakota. 3 pgs.

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33	4	6/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Newsletter	For Immediate Release--Washington. This document discusses black voters, the war in Vietnam, and campaigning. 4 pgs.
33	4	6/13/1972	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Alvin Synder to Larry Higby (cc: Charles Colson, Ken Clawson, Mort Allin). This document discusses McGovern's comments on CBS radio the previous night. 1 pg.
33	4	6/12/1972	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	For Committee for the Reelection of the President. WTOP Radio CBS Network in Washington D.C., June 12, 1972 10:00 PM. Title: Comment by Senator George McGovern. 1 pg.
33	4	6/14/1972	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From L. Higby to Charles Colson. This document discusses several conclusions regarding regarding the Buchanan "assault memorandum." 2 pgs.
33	4	6/15/1972	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	Wire. Title: "Republicans," by Mike Shanahan. This document discusses the concerns with reelecting President Nixon, the California Primary, and McGovern. 1 pg.

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33	4	4/25/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Tod R. Hullin to Bob Haldeman. "John would appreciate having your thoughts on the attached." 2 pgs.
33	4	4/4/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: Quick Reponse Research Capability. 5 pgs.
33	4	5/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From H.R. Haldeman to Pat Buchanan. This document discussing reviewing "basic attack materials" for the campaign during a trip to Russia. 1 pg.
33	4	6/5/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Results of Meeting at Camp David. 5 pgs.
33	4		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	Wire. This document discusses Nixon's reelection and McGovern as an apponent. It includes several comments from John N. Mitchell. 1 pg.

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33	4	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Press Conference Transcript. This document dictates a press conference between John N. Mitchell, National Director of the Committee for the Reelection of the President, David Shumway, and the press. 21 pgs.
33	4	4/27/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Tod Hullin to Bob Haldeman. This document discusses three forwarded memos. 1 pg.
33	4	4/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Ken Cole to John Ehrlichman. This document discusses a meeting on how to better position the President domestically. 3 pgs.
33	4	4/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: Major Presidential Event. 2 pgs.
33	4	4/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: 1701 Campaign and Advertising Strategy. 4 pgs.

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33	4	6/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: George Wallace - Dr. Lukash. 2 pgs.
33	4	6/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Peter H. Daily through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Campaign Slogan: President Nixon. Now More Than Ever. 4 pgs.
33	4	6/1/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	Title: Concept Tests with Detroit Area Ticket-Splitters. (Middle age, high school graduates or less, with middle incomes from the Detroit Metropolitan Area). 7 pgs.
33	4	6/22/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Newspaper	The New York Times. "McGovern's Credibility," by Tom Wicker. 1 pg.
33	4	6/27/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From H.R. Haldeman to John Mitchell. This document discusses the situation in California regarding the president pre-election. 1 pg.

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33	4	6/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Lyn Nofziger- California. 1 pg.
33	4	6/26/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ken Rietz to Jeb Magruder and Fred Malek. This document discusses an attachment. 1 pg.
33	4	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ken Smith to Pat Buchanan. This document is in regards to Young Voters for the President. 3 pgs.
33	4	6/24/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Campaign Surrogate Attack Plan. 8 pgs.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman  
Box Number: 313

Folder: [Campaign 22 Part II June 15-29, 1972 Folder 2]

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
84	Return Private/Political memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-72
85	Return Private/Political memo, Buchanan to Higby, 6-8-72
86	Retain Open
87	Return Private/Political memo, Dent to the President, 6-7-72
88	Return Private/Political [CREEP Press Release #6-56a] 6-15-[72]
89	Return Private/Political memo, Snyder to Higby, 6-13-72
90	Return Private/Political memo, Higby to Colson, 6-14-72
91	Retain Open
92	Return Private/Political newswire, "For the first time..." 6-15-[72]
93	Return Private/Political memo, Hullin to HRH, 4-25-72
94	Return Private/Political memo, HRH to Buchanan, 5-17-72
95	Return Private/Political memo, Malek to HRH, 6-5-72
96	Return Private/Political newswire, "John N. Mitchell said..." 6-8-[72]
97	Return Private/Political memo, Hullin to HRH, 4-27-72
98	Return Private/Political memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-28-72
99	Return Private/Political memo, Dailey to Mitchell, 6-20-72
100	Return Private/Political clipping, "McGovern's Credibility," 6-22-72
101	Return Private/Political memo, HRH to Mitchell, 6-27-72
102	Return Private/Political memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-29-72
103	Return Private/Political memo, Rietz to Magruder & Malek, 6-26-72
104	Return Private/Political memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-24-72
105	Return Private/Political memo, O'Donnell to Porter & Henge, 6-26-72

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: HERBERT L. PORTER  
J. CURTIS HERGE

FROM: PATRICK E. O'DONNELL *POD*

SUBJECT: "Surrogate Attack Plan"

In response to a request for comments issued with distribution of the "Surrogate Attack Plan", we have put together a chronological listing of selected events taking place during the period September 4 through November 7, 1972. They were chosen for a number of reasons and are oriented towards but not limited to large national organizations, key states, major local events and miscellaneous but politically advantageous forums. Input came from such special voting blocks as youth, labor, blacks, aged, farmers, veterans, Jews, ethnics, etc., etc.

On comparing this list with the assignments set forth in the Surrogate Plan, we find a plethora of occasions where either the party scheduled into the geographical area is not appropriate for the job or there is no one allocated to the area at all. Nonetheless, a substantial number of these meetings will demand and, as in the past, must receive Cabinet level Administration representation. Accordingly, we are concerned that the "flexibility" for covering events not included in your plan, as cited in page two of your memo will be, in reality, an unattainable factor. If the lead surrogates are scheduled by 1701 to campaign three days a week, primarily on a key state and geographic basis, it is extremely unlikely they will be available to do further travelling and/or speaking to cover numerous major events not yet taken into consideration by your scheduling operation.

In short, the plan is at least a first step towards thoughtful and intelligent utilization of our top spokesmen during the campaign crunch period. However, we definitely feel that it is a matter

of some priority to cover as many of these important forums as possible with Cabinet level spokesmen rather than attempting to create events on a wholesale basis simply to adhere to a rough plan which, by its very definition is oriented towards percentages and geographic distribution. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the re-election effort that all interested parties resolve these and other logistical difficulties before signing off on or formalizing the plan.

We have not addressed the inevitable issue of the reluctant or choosy surrogate. Past experience has proven these individuals to be a most disconcerting thorn in the side of progress. If they are not properly and fully motivated, the best plan in the world will crumble in execution. It will probably take at least one "head-on" meeting with the President to sufficiently ignite the fire. We can discuss this at a later date.

~~/~~ bcc: Gordon Strachan

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Humphrey-McGovern Debates -  
and the Democratic Primary  
Results in California

Question:

The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey and McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the pollsters' projection to Humphrey's final vote.

Conclusion:

The Hart Survey in the Post found that 53% of the Democrats saw at least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16% thought Humphrey won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's voters thought he won and 30% of McGovern's voters thought he won.

Finch, Colson, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Teeter, Buchanan, and Harper/Morey believe the debates increased Humphrey's vote total. Moore disagrees.

Analysis:

Humphrey increased his position from 26 to 40% because the debates enabled him to drive home his points on jobs and McGovern's fuzzy welfare proposals and Defense cuts (Finch, Dent, Buchanan).

The debates and resultant media coverage "scared hell out of Jews" (Safire). Although the debates may not have had a large audience, the California media began emphasizing Humphrey's attack (Magruder, Dent, Buchanan).

The debates enabled Humphrey to shift the undecideds to his column by hitting McGovern on his "extreme" positions. However, the debates did not cut into McGovern's fairly constant 45% total (Agree: Teeter, Buchanan, Safire, Yankelovich; Disagree: Finch, Hart).

Whether the Field poll was wrong to start with was also considered. Finch, Colson, and Moore believe Field was wrong. Buchanan says the Field poll was not wrong and he has reason to believe McGovern's lead may have been larger.

A more detailed analysis is attached as well as the original memoranda from Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Teeter, Buchanan, and Harper/Morey. Also attached are newspaper reports of the Hart and Yankelovich surveys.

GS/jb

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN G  
SUBJECT: Humphrey-McGovern  
Debates and the Democratic  
Primary Results in California

The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey and McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the pollsters' projection to Humphrey's final vote. Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Buchanan, Teeter and Harper/Morey submitted analyses (attached). Their summarized comments should be considered in light of the Hart Survey which found that 53% of the Democrats saw at least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16% thought Humphrey won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's voters thought he won and 30% of McGovern's voters thought he won. The Hart and Yankelovich surveys are also attached.

Finch believes:

1. The Field poll showing McGovern with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not dishonest. In the past, Field has traditionally "over sampled" in the northern part of the state. But, there is no question that approximately two weeks prior to the election, McGovern had a clear lead probably -- 10 points -- over Humphrey and this was fortified by unlimited money and a superb organization. Even if the Field poll was taken at face value, it would have to be argued that the 13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey -- an unheard of phenomena.
2. While Humphrey was clearly "up tight and on edge" in the first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home

his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain costs of various McGovern proposals and other extreme positions taken by the South Dakota Senator.

3. In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident air. He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner of War issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Democratic New Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.

4. The third discussion, with the five participants, had its impact on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to buttress Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course endorsed HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved her visibility picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black Community on which Humphrey had been relying.

5. Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he "wrang" the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and leaned heavily on his arguments on Defense levels and California jobs. He also appears to have scored well with Catholics, although he probably did not exploit sufficiently McGovern's vulnerability in the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.

Dent believes:

1. Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions, especially welfare and Defense spending, made the Democrat primary closer in California than expected.
2. Dent notes that the Hart Survey minimized the impact of the HHH attacks but pointed out that undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the closing days.

3. Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's positions on Defense and welfare cost him votes. One in five found the debates important in voting, the majority of these going to HHH. The most damaging position of McGovern was his plan to drastically reduce Defense spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed disapproval here.

4. An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out of the black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the more affluent voters moved away as they became better informed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than ever black and brown vote.

Safire believes:

1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern won by far less than had been expected. They clobbered Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48% -- no such bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than say, Muskie (too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic) or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly, McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 -- the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion (Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in his camp. In the news backwash, however -- newsmags and columnists -- we can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing to his fade-out at the end.

2. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's softness in the Middle East. I have a hunch that Jews will not vote for a candidate because he is for aid to Israel (they all say they are) but will vote against one whom they think is against Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a showdown.

3. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern keyword. Fifteen percent of the California Democratic voters became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when they had their first close look at him. Why? My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's clothing, and all that. One fifth may have been disaffected because he backed off his positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be; no longer a virgin.

Buchanan believes:

1. The Field poll was not wrong. He has it from a source that the Field poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was larger than twenty points.

2. Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on Defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare give aways of McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey stridency and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently frightened many people to convince 300,000 to come his way. This I believe explains it coupled with:

(a) The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical; and

(b) The surfacing in the California press of increasing numbers of national Democrats calling McGovern an extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.

3. What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40% in a week -- so, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or, did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats and pick up all the undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell out of them?

Teeter believes:

1. There was not a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey, rather, there were a large number of voters who were originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the Campaign and temporarily moved into the undecided column by the McGovern Campaign. When they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique and relatively unknown commodity and the fact this Campaign was a much larger, more obvious and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have contributed to the shift to the undecided category. The fact McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that the undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically similar to the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.
2. The debates seemed to sharpen the focus on several of McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those positions. This contributed to a movement of undecided voters back to Humphrey.

Colson believes:

1. The debates had a very significant effect, but both candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect, while Colson had thought McGovern came out better because of his "good guy" image, Colson now believes Humphrey scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.
2. The Field Poll was off, as was the ABC poll. McGovern did not have a twenty point lead a week before the Primary. He peaked early plus the fact that the debates did expose some extreme positions. Particularly, in the third debate, McGovern looked very weak on the POW issues and Colson suspects that to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate, the debates had a significant effect.

Magruder and LaRue believe:

1. Although neither the public nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the debate, substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media began to emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied the least advantageous position in the political arena -- that of being on the defense. He spent the next several days trying to explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack. This was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little, if any, paid commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.
2. The second debate in prime time, presented Humphrey in a much more conciliatory light. However, he kept questioning the economic impact the McGovern Defense cut would have on the working man of California. Again the results of the debate were a toss-up, but the media still gave maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack.
3. The Yankelovich survey reveals that one out of five voters considered the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey. More voters voted against McGovern than against Humphrey. One-fourth of the voters preferred their candidate because they disliked their opponent. Senator Humphrey received one-half of these votes while Senator McGovern received one-third. The survey also states that 40% of Humphrey's vote would go to the President on November 7, while 40% would shift to McGovern and 20% is undecided.

Moore believes:

1. The debates by themselves were not a major factor accounting for the difference between the Field poll and the final results.
2. Other reasons for the Humphrey increase include:
  - (a) The Field poll itself generated over-confidence by McGovern workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.
  - (b) McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure for New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously

indicating over-confidence and taking California for granted.

- (c) As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a knack for a strong finish. On the last two days, Humphrey campaigned strenuously up and down the state with good T. V. coverage, while McGovern was absent.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

All believe the debates increased Humphrey's vote total. The old rule -- if ahead, don't debate -- applies. As to specific recommendations:

1. Finch urges no attempt to label McGovern a "flaming radical", rather argue he's naive, otherwise his soft-spoken T. V. manner will destroy the label;
2. Dent suggests a "drip, drip" campaign on McGovern's stands without Presidential involvement;
3. Safire suggests a general appeal to Jews and a specific attack on McGovern's honesty by distributing his WALL STREET JOURNAL ad to students;
4. Buchanan implies we should follow Humphrey's example and scare the hell out of the voters;

In addition to the debates, the other reasons for the Humphrey/McGovern results are:

1. McGovern peaked too soon and left California for New Mexico and Houston indicating he took California for granted;
2. Polls gave Humphrey sympathy and hard-working labor types;
3. Proposition 9's (environment) two-one loss brought out Humphrey voters.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: 6/10/72

To: A.S.

From: L. Higby

A secretary could have clipped  
this together. Do a summary,  
analysis & conclusion for  
H. so he doesn't have  
to wade through 50 pages  
today please! - L

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT: Humphrey-McGovern Debates  
and the Democratic Primary  
Results in California

*all but Harper/Morey believe the debates*

The question is whether the three "debates" between Humphrey and McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the pollsters' projection to Humphrey's final vote. Finch, Dent, *Magruder/Hu Rue* Safire, Buchanan, Teeter and Harper/Morey submitted analyses (attached). Their summarized comments should be considered in light of the Hart Survey which found that 53% of the Democrats saw at least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16% thought Humphrey won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's voters thought he won and 30% of McGovern's voters thought he won. The Hart ~~and~~ and ~~XXXXXX~~ Yankelovich surveys are <sup>also</sup> attached.

Finch believes the Field poll showing McGovern with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not dishonest. In the past, Field has traditionally "over sampled" in the northern part of the state. But there is no question but that ~~a point~~ approximately two weeks prior to the election McGovern had a clear lead probably ~~somewhere in the magnitude of 10 percentage points over~~ Humphrey and this was fortified by unlimited money and a superb organization. Even if the Field poll was taken at face value, it would have to be argued that the 13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey -- an unheard of phenomena.

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- 2) In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident air. He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner-of-War issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Democratic New Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old

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- 4) The third discussion, with the five participants, had its impact on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to buttress Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course endorsed HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved her visibility picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black Community on which Humphrey had been relying.
- 5) Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he wrang the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and leaned heavily on his arguments on defense levels and California jobs. He also appears to have scored well with Catholics although he probably did not exploit sufficiently McGovern's vulnerability in the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.

Finch recommends that care be utilized in not having our people attempt to characterize McGovern as a "flaming radical." Rather, it can be argued that he is terribly naive (i.e., his position on hoping that North Vietnam would release our Prisoners-of-War once we left), and totally unrealistic about fiscal matters. In other words, his positions are "extreme" or "far out." The reason this is important is that he does come across on television as a plausible, soft-spoken, trustworthy sort of man from the mid-West and this appearance belies the gross stupidity of some of his statements and programs.

Dent believes: 1) Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions, especially welfare and defense spending, made the Democrat primary closer in California than expected.

2) Dent notes that the Hart <sup>survey</sup> poll (full POST article attached) minimized the impact of the HHH attacks but pointed out that undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the closing days. Some 53% of the Demo voters said they watched 1 of 3 debates. They split on who won -- 16% HHH, 17% McGovern and 20% said even. The rest didn't watch. Of HHH voters, 30% said he won and of McGovern's, 30% said he won.

3) Yankelovich (Full NEW YORK TIMES articles attached) supports the view that McGovern's positions on defense and welfare cost him votes. One in 5 found the debates important in voting, the majority of these going to HHH. ~~Yankelovich says this raised HHH's vote by several points.~~ The most damaging position of McGovern was his plan to drastically reduce defense spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed disapproval here.

4) An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out on the black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the more affluent voters moved away as they became better informed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than ever black and brown vote.

The HHH attacks were not alone in closing the reported big gap. Here are other factors:

- 1) McGovern peaked too soon.
- 2) Polls gave sympathy to HHH and caused labor and others to work harder. They did a better "get out the vote" job than McGovern's people, who did a good canvas job.
- 3) The President's trips hurt McGovern, and HHH acted and talked like the President.
- 4) Proposition 9's 2-1 loss brought out people opposed to leftist extremism.
- 5) California isn't as liberal overall as McGovern.
- 6) McGovern left for trips to New Mexico and Houston on Monday.

*edwards*  
Safire had four comments on the California Primary.

1) The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern won by far less than had been expected. They clobbered Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48% -- no such bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than say, Muskie (too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic) or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly, McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967-- the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion (Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in his camp. In the news backwash, however-- newsmags and columnists -- we can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing to his fade-out at the end.

2) Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's softness in the midEast. I have a hunch that Jews will not vote for a candidate because ~~xxx~~ he is for aid to Israel (they all say they are) but will vote against one whom they think is against Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a showdown. ~~This could be enormously significant in New York, Illinois and California, not only in fundraising but in vote patterns.~~ A

3) Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern keyword. Fifteen per cent of the ~~xxx~~ California Democratic voters became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when they had their first close look at him. Why?

My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because of the Humphrey attack. A radical in a sheep's clothing, and all that. One fifth may have been disaffected because he backed ~~off~~ off his positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be. No longer a virgin.

*Believes:*  
Buchanan ~~explains the McGovern drop by:~~

*H. H. H.* a) The Field Poll was <sup>not</sup> wrong; ~~xx I discount this~~ -- as I have it from a source that the Field Poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was larger than twenty points.

2) Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare giveaways of McGovern, on Israel and POW's. Despite the Humphrey stridency, and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently frightened many people to convince 300,000 to come his way. This I believe explains it coupled with:

a) The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical; and

b) The surfacing in the California <sup>McGovern</sup> press of increasing numbers of national Democrats calling ~~em~~ <sup>em</sup> an extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.

3) What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40% in a week -- So, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats and pick up all the undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell out of them.

believes:  
- Teeter argues that:

1. There was not a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey, rather there were a large number of voters who were originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the campaign and temporarily moved into the undecided column by the McGovern campaign. When they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique and relatively unknown commodity and the fact this campaign was a much larger, more obvious and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have contributed to the shift to the undecided category. The fact McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that the undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically similar to the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.

2. The debates seemed to sharpen the focus on several of McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those positions. This contributed to a movement of undecided voters back to Humphrey.

Colson believes: ~~that~~ The debates had a very significant effect, but both candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect, while I had thought McGovern came out better because of his "good guy" image, ~~it is now apparent to me that~~ Humphrey scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks. *Colson*

2) The Field Poll was off, as was the ABC poll, ~~and that~~ McGovern did not have a 20 point lead a week before the primary. He peaked ~~xxx~~ early plus the fact the debates did expose some extreme positions. Particularly in the 3rd debate, McGovern looked very weak on the POW issues and ~~I would suspect~~ that to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate ~~that that~~ would have had a significant effect. ~~The NEW YORK TIMES Vankelovic survey today is very interesting revealing on this point (attached).~~ *the debates*

~~xxx~~  
Magruder and LaRue believe: ~~that~~ although neither the public nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the debate, substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media began to emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied the least advantageous position in the political arena - that of being on the defensive. He spent the next several days trying to explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack.. This was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little if any paid commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.

- 2) The second debate in prime time, presented Humphrey in a much more conciliatory light. However, he kept questioning the economic impact the McGovern defense cut would have on the working man of California. Again the results of the debate were a toss-up, but the media still gave maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack.

Analysis

The Hart Survey shows that 53% of the Democratic voters watched at least one debate. As previously stated, the public on the surface did not perceive either candidate as the clear cut winner. The Hart Survey pointed out that 17% thought McGovern won, 16% thought Humphrey won, 20% felt that it was a stand off, and the remainder had no opinion. 30% of the Humphrey voters thought that Humphrey had won the debates while 30% of the McGovern voters thought McGovern had won the debates.

The most revealing clue of the Hart Survey was one out of three voters decided for whom they would vote during the last three weeks (many during the debates). Of those voters, 5 to 4 voted for Humphrey.

- 3) The Yankelovich Survey revealed that 1 out of 5 voters considered the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey.

~~The Yankelovich Survey also indicated that more voters voted against McGovern than against Humphrey. One fourth of the voters preferred their candidate because they disliked their opponent. Sen. Humphrey received 1/2 of these votes while Sen. McGovern receive 1/3. The survey also states that 40% of ~~HHH~~'s vote would go on the President on November 7, while 40% would shift to McGovern and 20% is undecided.~~

*Humphrey's  
belief*

Moore argues that the debates by themselves were not a major factor accounting for the difference between the Field Poll and the final results.

Los Angeles ~~xxxxxx~~ audience ratings were 12% for first debate, 13% for second and only 6% for third debate. Ratings in other California cities probably somewhat higher but still each debate was probably not seen by 80% of the voters. Reasons given by various observers in California for the difference ~~xxxx~~ between the 20% McGovern lead and actual difference of only 5% include the following:

2) other reasons for the Humphrey increase include:

a) Field Poll itself generated over confidence by McGovern workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.

b) McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure from New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously indicating over confidence and taking California for granted.

c) As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a knack for a strong finish. On last two days, Humphrey campaigned strenuously up and down State with good TV coverage while McGovern was absent.

Incidentally, Los Angeles Times attributes Congressman Schmitz' defeat entirely to his opposition to the President's China and Russia initiatives which is very encouraging news from Orange County.

### ~~At the Morey believes:~~

- Roy Morey analyzed the California results for Harper. Morey believes that significant sources of McGovern's strength were identified by Hart Research Associates. Their figures show that while Humphrey had been running as a two to one favorite among blue collar workers in previous primaries, McGovern captured their vote by 46% to 38%. In addition, Humphrey showed a decline among Black voters from 72% in the April Pennsylvania primary to 34% in California. McGovern's popularity among the Blacks increased over the same period from 13% to 36%.
- 2) The data also demonstrates that urban voters feel that McGovern is a better candidate by a margin of more than two to one; less than two months ago, Humphrey held the advantage by similar margin. Humphrey seems to have increased his suburban strength (29% up to 43%) at the expense of core city support.
- 3) Humphrey did well among the elderly (taking California's senior set by two to one margin) slightly less than half his voters classify themselves as conservatives, accounting perhaps in part for his strength in suburban Los Angeles County.
- 3) McGovern on the other hand captured more than 70% of the 18 to 24 year old vote, and among liberals and professional - executives he ran two to one ahead of Humphrey. In previous primaries, McGovern had been finding consistently stronger support among women; in California he did 15% better among the men than did Humphrey, and only 3% better among the women.

There are several factors which are useful in attempting to account for the better than predicted Humphrey showing.

Wall Street Journal ad to students;

4) Buchanan implies we should follow Humphrey's example and scare the hell out of the voters;

~~of also~~  
In addition to the debates the other reasons for the Humphrey-McGovern results are:

1) McGovern peaked too soon! and left Calif for N. Mex + Houston indicating <sup>he</sup> ~~lost~~ <sup>lost</sup> Calif

2) Polls gave Humphrey <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>granted;</sup> sympathy and hard working labor types;

3) Proposition 9's (environment) 2-1 loss brought out Humphrey voters;

~~all but Harper~~

all believe the debates increased  
Humphrey's vote total, <sup>The old</sup> ~~re-emphasizing~~  
rule - if ahead, don't date-applies.

As to specific recommendations:

1) Finch urges no attempt to label  
Mc Govern a "flaming radical;" rather  
argue he's naive, otherwise his soft-  
spoken TV manner will destroy the label;

2) Dent suggests a "drip, drip"  
campaign on Mc Govern's stands without  
P'tial involvement;

3) Safire suggests <sup>an general appeal</sup> ~~specific~~ <sup>to press and</sup> ~~specific~~ <sup>specific</sup> attack  
on Mc Govern's honesty by distributing his

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: RAY PRICE *Ray Price*  
SUBJECT: Debates

You asked for my recommendation on how to handle the question of debates.

First, on timing: If you were going to debate, I would recommend letting it be known as soon as possible, so as not to seem later to have been backed into it. Assuming you will not, however (and I see no reason why you should), I would urge not answering the question publicly now; to do so would simply give the opposition a new political horse to ride at your expense, and allow it to build up pressure. For the present, you can simply say that you won't discuss campaign matters until after the convention.

As for rationale, there are three basic arguments that I think have powerful logic behind them -- the first two of which you could make publicly, and the third of which could be made in a background manner on your behalf:

1) It's unwise. A President, in the ultimate sense, cannot and should not engage in free "debate." His comments must always be somewhat limited, according to a President's sense of their potential impact around the world and according to his private knowledges about sensitive, tentative situations in stages of delicate development here and abroad. The national policies of the United States should not be directly risked because

of domestic politics (they are indirectly risked, of course). Even a no-comment or a decline-to-discuss posture by a President could have major ramifications of an undesirable nature.

If it were possible to separate the incumbent as candidate from the office of the Presidency, it would be another kettle of fish; but this is not possible, and the office shouldn't be subjected to it. Even though speaking as a candidate, you would be heard as President not only in the U. S., but around the world -- and people abroad might not be able to draw the distinctions.

2) It's unnecessary. There is no need for a debate to clarify the details of a President's positions. His views, unlike those of a non-incumbent, are already spread out in exact detail on the public record of his actions in the office he seeks. It is the challenger's views, and his differences with the President's record, that the public needs to learn -- and the challenger can educate the public on these points better or just as well by himself.

3) It's silly. A debate is a bit of campaign theatrics that clarifies nothing and does not contribute to public education on the issues; in fact, it can do the opposite according to the trend and emphases of the subject matter covered or not covered by the debate. The only real purpose is to give a good forum to the non-incumbent and any serious challenger should be well-financed enough to purchase that forum himself. There is no requirement or precedent anywhere that a President should help his opponent campaign.

As for your 1964 insistence that LBJ should debate, I'd answer that quite straightforwardly by saying that now that you view it from the perspective of the Presidency, you think LBJ was right.

As the G.O.P. candidate in 1960, Mr. Nixon participated in the nation's first presidential TV debates. A former congressman, senator and Vice President, he now practices law for the firm of Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and Alexander.

# L.B.J. SHOULD DEBATE ON TV

*A man who admits that a TV debate cost him the Presidency attacks Lyndon Johnson for refusing to confront the Republican candidate this fall.*

**By Richard M. Nixon**



A reporter at President Kennedy's second press conference, held on February 1, 1961, called the President's attention to some remarks that his campaign manager, Robert Kennedy, had made just after the 1960 election. Robert Kennedy, said the reporter, had "expressed some doubt that one who was already President would agree to debate with one who wants to be President."

"Could you tell us," the reporter asked, "to clear the air on this, whether, if you are a candidate in 1964, you would agree to debate?"

The President replied, "I would, sir."

On two other occasions before his death, President Kennedy stated unequivocally in press conferences that he would participate in television debates with his Republican opponent.

A recent Gallup poll shows that 71 percent of Americans want to see the 1964 candidates debate on television. The networks have offered free time, and Congress has removed the last legal obstacle by waiving the equal-time requirement. But at this writing it appears that there will be no debates, because President Johnson has repeatedly refused to participate in them.

Mr. Johnson's position is difficult to understand, not only because it is a repudiation of President Kennedy's decision, but also because it is a complete flip-flop from his own position in 1960, when he urged me to debate and even called for more than four debates.

On this issue, I believe the great majority of the American people would agree that President Kennedy was right and President Johnson is wrong.

I suppose I should be the last person to advocate television debates, in view of what happened in 1960. Most observers agree with Earl Mazo of *The New York Times*, who wrote, "If there had been no debates on television, Nixon would have been elected President." As the late Claude Robinson, who did the polling for our campaign, pointed out in a confidential memorandum to me, "Kennedy

started the campaign as the less well-known candidate. By participating in debates with him, Nixon gave him the opportunity to remove that liability and to fight the campaign out on even terms."

President Johnson faces the same problem I did. He is better-known than any one of the potential Republican nominees. He will be urged, as I was, not to give up this advantage by participating in television debates. Or as Julius Dusha of the *Washington Post* reports, he may feel that "he can do without debates because he believes he does better in other kinds of campaign appearances."

But the issue of debates this year, as in 1960, is much bigger than whether they will help the Democratic or the Republican nominee. Television debates were not designed to serve a candidate for office; they were designed to serve the public. As Roscoe Drummond recently wrote, "President Johnson . . . would, I believe, be doing a great disservice to the cause of bringing the campaign closer to millions of voters if he stands out against the debates."

America's most distinguished political observers have expressed similar views with regard to the public interest in television debates. "The country gained in a unique and promising experiment," wrote columnist James Reston. Walter Lippmann saw the debates as breaking down "the synthetic candidates, the men who communicate with the public only by reading speeches that other men have written." And, to Dr. Malcolm Moos of Johns Hopkins, the debates "presented an opportunity for the voters to make judgments between the half-tints, the semitones, the frequently small, but significant, nuances that make up the difference in American politics."

I believe that television debates contribute significantly to four major objectives which are in the public interest: a bigger vote, better-informed voters, lower campaign costs, and, in the end, a better President.

It has been estimated that over one

hundred million people saw at least part of the Kennedy-Nixon debates. Interest in the campaign, according to polls, rose 12 percent from the time of the first debate on September 26 until the last one on October 21, compared to a one percent increase in interest during the same period in the campaign of 1956. Almost seven million more people voted in 1960 than in 1956, whereas less than half a million more voted in 1956 than in 1952. This spectacular increase in the number of voters, according to most observers, was due in large part to the interest created by the television debates.

Moreover, millions of Americans who would never go out to hear a political speech, or even listen to one on television, tuned in to the debates to see a fight and stayed to learn about the issues. As a result, the electorate in 1960 was probably the best-informed in the nation's history.

As one who has been through the rigors of a presidential race, I am convinced that television debates are essential if we are to have less costly and more thoughtful campaigns. In 1860 Abraham Lincoln ran for President without ever leaving Springfield, Ill. One hundred years later John Kennedy, from the time of the convention to the election, traveled 44,000 miles in 43 states. In that same period I traveled 65,000 miles through 50 states. As the nation approaches the 200 million mark in population, only television holds the key to less frantic and more contemplative campaigns.

But television has become almost prohibitively expensive. It now costs \$11,000 to buy 10 one-minute spots on a New York City station; the same time sells for \$3,150 in Portland, Oreg., and \$3,500 in Dallas, Tex. A large part of the almost \$20 million that was the reported cost of the 1960 campaigns went for the purchase of television time. Such an addition to the already astronomical expenses of running for office has menacing implications for a society that should be concerned with the potentially corrosive influence of money in politics. It was this

\*One measure of a democracy's strength is the freedom of its citizens to speak out—to dissent from the popular view. Although the editors often disagree with the opinions expressed in *Speaking Out*, they dedicate the series to that freedom.

## L.B.J. Should Debate

concern that caused President Kennedy to appoint a blue-ribbon panel headed by Chancellor Alexander Heard of Vanderbilt University to find ways to improve the financing of presidential campaigns. The Heard Commission, aware of the \$6 million worth of free time given by the television industry for the 1960 debates, recommended that the law again be changed to allow debates in 1964. Congress has voted to change the law, but unless President Johnson changes his position, there will, of course, be no debates.

I believe the strongest argument for debates is that they make candidates put on a better campaign, with the result that the man who wins becomes a better President. As Prof. Harvey Wheeler pointed out: (1) Debates prevent a candidate from waging a campaign on the basis of special-interest appeals—no longer can he say one thing when addressing labor and something else when addressing business. (2) Debates force a candidate to present a systematic program; it becomes increasingly difficult, for example, for a candidate to promise a welfare program that is inconsistent with his tax program. (3) Debates tend to make election issues out of problems for which there is no organized lobby, such as foreign policy.

And, as Professors Elihu Katz and Jacob Feldman concluded, "The debates might make for a greater acceptance of the winning candidate." The reason for this, they say, is that "voters learned something about the candidate they opposed—they learned that he was human!" Voters also have the opportunity to see the real man, not the synthetic product of public-relations experts. For example, in our four, hour-long debates, President Kennedy and I discussed over 50 major national and international issues without benefit of notes or ghost-writers. The voters could justifiably conclude that they were hearing our own views on each issue, rather than the views of someone else.

Some who oppose debates argue that it would not be in the best interests of the country for the President to participate because, having knowledge of so much secret information, he might be forced into making a statement that would be detrimental to the national interest.

President Kennedy obviously did not share this view and, in 1960, when I was Vice President, a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council, I also did not share this view, although I, too, knew all the nation's top secrets.

I cannot see how a President's engaging in debate differs significantly in this respect from his weekly encounters at press conferences. When faced by his political opponent or newsmen, he always has the option of turning a question aside and saying, "No comment." And, in view of the fact that President Johnson has offered complete briefings to the Republican nominee on all secret information, his opponent would not try to gain an unfair advantage in case the President was forced to answer a question involving classified information in this manner.

Some object that when two candidates confront each other on television, one may have an unfair advantage—if only because some people look better on television than others do. I certainly can sympathize with this objection. I will never forget my frustration after my first debate with Senator Kennedy, when I learned how arbitrary factors of this sort had affected the result.

I had left the studio confident that I had driven across my arguments and successfully met my opponent's. Polls later indicated that a majority of those who heard us on radio or read the debate in the newspapers felt that Nixon had outscored Kennedy. But of those who saw the debate on television, a solid majority felt Kennedy had won. What irritated me was that while I had put all my emphasis on content, the thing that influenced the television audience was my appearance.

I suppose I should have anticipated that I might look worn and washed-out on camera. Laid up for two weeks with a serious knee infection, I had left the hospital four or five days before my doctor wanted me to and embarked on two weeks of intensive campaigning, prop-stopping across the country, making six and eight speeches a day. Two days before the debate I got a bad case of flu and was still running a temperature during the program. I had lost so much weight that my shirt collar hung loosely on my neck, and my suit looked baggy. But although I was physically exhausted, I didn't feel tired. As my doctor explained to me later, when your morale is high, you can go on fighting battle after battle, even though you are physically spent.

I was so intent on the battle that I never stopped to think about how I looked. I have always detested makeup. I don't like the feel of it or the idea of wearing it. All I did before the program was to shave as closely as I could and apply some powder with a "beard stick." If I had had a makeup man—as my opponent quite properly did—he could have predicted the result: The powder failed to hide my beard but made my skin look even paler.

### A diet of milkshakes

After the program, as the unfavorable reports on my appearance began to come in, I changed my attitude. TV experts explained that makeup for television is not the same as makeup for the stage. Its purpose is not to make a person look better than he really does but to correct for unnatural effects produced by the TV cameras. So for the other debates we got the best TV makeup people we could find. My doctor put me on a diet of milkshakes, and by the next program my weight was up, and I looked a great deal better.

But even if I hadn't been able to correct my televised appearance, I still think it wouldn't have made a crucial difference. It is the man himself and what he says that ultimately affect people.

In this connection, I recall my first impression of Khrushchev. He is decidedly not an attractive-looking man. The first time you see him, you wonder how a man who looks so unprepossessing could run a mighty nation. But, whatever we may think of him, his strength gets across to you. You feel the power of his personality.

Some people object that a meeting of candidates on television puts too much emphasis on debating skill. Perhaps it does. But a President today must be quick on his feet, must be able to respond to questions under pressure, must be articulate. It may not have been necessary in the world of 50 or 100 years ago, but it is today. Voters want to see the way a man handles himself under fire. A confrontation on television is an excellent test of a candidate.

One might wonder who would have won if Eisenhower and Stevenson had debated on television. Some think Steven-

son—but I'm not too sure. Stevenson might have won the first debate, but over three or four debates Eisenhower would have worn better. The force of his personality would have come through.

A very clever debater does not necessarily make a good President. On the other hand, he is not likely to be elected, if debating skill is all he has. It's easy enough to debate well, but on television other things come through. The TV camera shows the man, and the people sense his qualities.

As a result of our experience in 1960, I believe there could be some improvements in the format for the television debates in 1964.

1. In 1960 the candidates were questioned by newsmen. I believe that, in addition to this format, the candidates should participate in some debates where they alone appear and are given the opportunity to question each other.

2. Instead of having all the debates cover the waterfront, it would sharpen the discussion to limit the debates toward the end of the campaign to single subjects of greatest interest. One debate might be devoted entirely to the subject of civil rights; another might be devoted to the subject of our policy in Vietnam.

3. To assure that the debates are decided to the greatest extent possible on the basis of what the candidates say, rather than how they look, arrangements could be made to place the candidates in separate studios so that lighting and other technical factors could be adjusted to suit each one's needs. (Such an arrangement might have prevented an awkward situation that arose during my debates with Senator Kennedy. I tend to perspire in a warm room, and I perspired all too freely in the first debate. So before the second debate, my staff arrived at the studio first and got the air-conditioning going strong. When Kennedy's staff discovered this, the two sides almost came to blows. I remember that Bobby Kennedy had a fine row with our TV man, trying to get the room warmer.)

4. There should be at least one debate between the two candidates for Vice President. President Eisenhower's three serious illnesses, together with President Kennedy's assassination, have brought home to the American people with shattering impact the immense importance of the Vice Presidency. This year, more than any other time in American history, the voters will be giving the qualifications of the vice-presidential candidates the same thoughtful study that they give those of the presidential candidates. A television debate between the vice-presidential candidates will assist the voters in making that evaluation.

Four years ago the United States took a bold new step forward in political campaigning. While the Kennedy-Nixon debates were compared to those of Lincoln-Douglas in 1858, the analogy was faulty. Lincoln and Douglas were running for the Senate; 1960 marked the first debate between American presidential candidates. The Japanese even did us the honor of copying our innovation, though with a slight variation—when Prime Minister Ikeda and his opponent debated before TV cameras, they paused to sip green tea between questions! America has given the world a new and exciting technique in democracy, and we should not allow it now to be discarded in our own country.

*Richard M. Nixon*

L. 6/7  
Analysis of the G vote in Cal

① Effect of debate of Cal vote  
Operated on th. that debate  
didn't help H!

Several people - all pol types

- ~~Feeler~~, • ~~Bent~~, • ~~Moore~~
- ~~Fine~~, • ~~Bushman~~

Tomorrow evening due - 6:30p

Begin

- ~~Magruder (mark)~~ 9
- ~~Walt~~
- ~~Safire~~
- ~~Wilson~~
- ~~Harper~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH

SUBJECT: Impact of the "Debates" on the Democratic Presidential Primary in California

The question ~~has been raised as to~~ whether the three "debates" were in large part responsible for Humphrey's highly improved showing on June 6 in California.

~~The~~ Having watched all three "exercises" and having been in California on and off throughout the period involved, the answer is unequivocally: Yes!

~~Two points need to be made before a discussion of the debates themselves. First,~~ *Finch believes* the Field poll showing McGovern with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not dishonest. ~~As you know,~~ In the past Field has traditionally "over-sampled" in the northern part of the state. But there is no question but that at a point approximately two weeks prior to the election McGovern had a clear lead probably somewhere in the magnitude of 10 percentage points over Humphrey, and this was fortified by unlimited money and a superb organization. Even if ~~you accepted~~ the Field ~~u~~ poll ~~at face value,~~ it would have to be argued that the 13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey--an unheard phenomena.

The following comments relate only to the first two debates since the third discussion, which included Yorty, Chisholm, and a Wallace representative, must be treated separately.

While Humphrey was clearly "up-tight and on edge" in the first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain costs of various McGovern proposals and other extreme positions taken by the South Dakota Senator.

In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident air. He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner-of-War issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Democratic New Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.

~~In my opinion,~~ <sup>T</sup>he third discussion, with the five participants, had its impact on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to buttress Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course, endorsed HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved her visibility, picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black community on which Humphrey had been relying.

~~It seems to me that~~ Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he wrang the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and leaned heavily on his arguments on defense levels and California jobs. He also appears to have scored well with Catholics although he probably did not exploit sufficiently McGovern's vulnerability in the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.

As the Los Angeles Times reported:

~~McGovern ran up big margins in San Francisco, Alameda and Santa Clara counties, among others, and this more than made up for the beating he took from Humphrey in Los Angeles, Orange and San Bernardino counties.~~

~~McGovern cut into Humphrey's strength in the black communities but preliminary figures showed he did not do as well as expected with Mexican-Americans nor with some suburban voters.~~

~~A check of three predominantly Jewish precincts -- No. 2236 on Beverly Blvd., No. 2230 on N. Crescent Heights and No. 2226 on Stanley Ave. -- covering different economic groups showed Humphrey winning by a comfortable 20 percentage points -- 58% to 38%.~~

~~A check of blue-collar precincts in South Gate, Bell Gardens and Bellflower showed Humphrey beating McGovern 54% to 33%.~~

McGovern staffers said the decision to go into the three televised "debates" with Humphrey cut into campaign time which had been allocated to the blue-collar areas

As for the black vote, a check of four key precincts -- two in the Watts area and two in Willowbrook -- showed almost a dead-even split between the candidates.

*Final statements*

~~The final point to me would be that care must be utilized in not having our people attempt to characterize McGovern as a "flaming radical." Rather, it can be argued that he is terribly naive (i.e., his position on hoping that North Vietnam would release our Prisoners-of-War once we left), and totally unrealistic about fiscal matters. In other words, his positions are "extreme" or "far out." The reason this is important is that he does come across on television as a plausible, soft-spoken, trustworthy sort of a man from the mid-West and this appearance belies the gross stupidity of some of his statements and programs.~~

<del>* Charles Kerch prediction (week of May 28)</del>	<del>Actual results</del>	<del>Field Poll (May 30-31)</del>
<del>McGovern 54%</del>	<del>45%</del>	<del>46%</del>
<del>Humphrey 26%</del>	<del>40%</del>	<del>26%</del>
<del>Wallace 9%</del>	<del>5%</del>	<del>8%</del>
<del>Muskie 4%</del>	<del>2%</del>	<del>1%</del>
<del>Chisholm 3%</del>	<del>4%</del>	<del>2%</del>
<del>Yorty 2%</del>	<del>1%</del>	<del>1%</del>
<del>Jackson 2%</del>	<del>1%</del>	<del>1%</del>

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HARRY S. DENT *BSD*

SUBJECT: Analysis of California Primary

*Dent believes*  
~~Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions, especially welfare and defense spending, appear to have made the Democrat primary results closer in California, than projected by polls and writers. This conclusion is based on contacts with California leaders, newsmen, and a review of polls in The New York Times (Yankelovich) and the Washington Post (Hart) and a telephone poll (attached) taken by the RNC.~~

~~Most feel the Field Poll has never been too accurate. It showed a 20-point lead. McGovern claimed his poll showed 16.~~

~~Field himself told UPI his poll caused HHH to "get off his dime and hit harder." He thinks the 13% undecided went for HHH.~~

~~The RNC poll of 112 Democrats concluded the debates had a minimal impact for HHH, but those who were undecided tended to go more for HHH.~~

*Dent notes that the (full Post articles attached)*  
~~The Hart poll minimized the impact of the HHH attacks but pointed out that undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the closing days. One of 3 voters said they decided on their candidate in the last 3 weeks. HHH carried these 5-4.~~

*2*  
~~Some 53% of the Demo voters said they watched 1 of 3 debates. They split on who won--16% HHH, 17% McGovern, and 20% said even. The rest didn't watch. Of HHH voters, 30% said he won and of McGovern's, 30% said he won.~~

*(full NYI articles attached)*  
~~Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's positions on defense and welfare cost him votes. One in 5 found the debates important~~

in voting, the majority of these going for HHH. Yankelovich says this raised HHH's vote by several points.

The most damaging position of McGovern was his plan to drastically reduce defense spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed disapproval here. ~~Among those voting for someone other than McGovern, the disapproval rate rose to 2/3.~~

HHH hit heavy with full page newspaper ads the last week. Put Livermore thought these attacks were effective. Tom Reed and Lyn Nofziger agree, especially Nofziger.

Newsman who feel HHH hurt McGovern are Kevin Phillips, Bob Novak, and Bob Semple.

5  
An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out on the black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the more affluent voters moved away as they became better informed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than ever black and brown vote.

Novak suggested at the Governors' Conference that the GOP begin a steady "drip, drip" campaign against McGovern's extremism and keep it going til election day.

Contacts with other Californians confirm the view that HHH's attacks helped.

The HHH attacks were not alone in closing the reported big gap. Here are other factors:

- 1) McGovern peaked too soon.
- 2) Polls gave sympathy to HHH and caused labor and others to work harder. They did a better "get out the vote" job than McGovern's people, who did a good canvas job.
- 3) The President's trips hurt McGovern, and HHH acted and


talked like the President.

4) Proposition 9's 2-1 loss brought out people opposed to leftist extremism.

5) California isn't as liberal overall as McGovern.

6) McGovern left for trips to New Mexico and Houston on Monday.

RECOMMENDATION: That we begin to have surrogates, et al, begin the "drip, drip" plan suggested by Novak, without Presidential involvement. The first TV debate film should be properly edited and used.



Republican  
National  
Committee.

June 8, 1972

To: Harry Dent  
From: Ed DeBolt  
Re: Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern  
Debates on the California Primary

As you requested this morning, the RNC Political/Research Division has attempted to measure the effect of the tactics employed by Hubert Humphrey in the televised McGovern-Humphrey debates.

During the day several hundred homes in the San Gabriel, San Fernando Valley area around Los Angeles were selected at random and contacted. The results were as follows:

Number of registered Democrats contacted	112
Number voting	77
Number that did not view at least one debate	51
Number influenced by debates	3

Due to the time factor the questionnaire had to be brief and the sample selected at random. However, in general our survey indicated that most voters had made their decisions prior to the debates and that the debates by themselves had little impact on the outcomes.

Undertaking a project of this magnitude required the virtual shutdown of the Research/Political Division for the entire workday.

The results of the survey and an analysis follow.

## DEBATE SURVEY: ANALYSIS

A special telephone survey of Los Angeles County voters conducted on June 8, 1972, revealed the Humphrey-McGovern debates had a minimal effect upon the vote preferences of those surveyed. Results of the poll indicated that only 61 of those surveyed even watched any of the debates and of those that did only 3 said these debates influenced their final choice. (These results are hardly surprising considering that Nielsen ratings showed that a Marcus Welby rerun and Cannon outdrew the second debate among television viewers. As a campaign worker stated after one of the debates, "The loudest noise in California tonight was the clicking of television sets to other channels.")

In a survey taken by the Field Corporation at the end of May, Humphrey was trailing McGovern by 20% (McGovern had 46% to Humphrey's 26%). If the debates did not significantly contribute to Humphrey's gain in the last week of the campaign, then one must ask what factors did contribute to the Minnesota Senator's late surge. First, some overconfidence among the McGovern forces was evident during the latter days of the campaign. McGovern left California for two days during this period to make visits to New Mexico (which held its primary on the same day as California) and Houston, Texas, where he met with several Democratic governors. Second, Humphrey probably picked up approximately an additional 2% of the vote through Mayor Yorty's endorsement (whose final vote was about 2% below his showing in the Field poll). HHH may also have been aided by the complicated write-in procedure of the California primary, thus driving a few Wallace voters into the Humphrey camp.

Finally, if the Field poll is accurate, the bulk of Humphrey's gain in the final days of the campaign must have come from undecided voters. According to the Field survey, many of these undecideds were elderly and black -- groups where Humphrey has traditionally enjoyed strong support. Their final decision to vote for Humphrey appears to be more a product of their traditional loyalties than of the influence of Humphrey's campaign, particularly his strong attacks against George McGovern. (Nor does our survey indicate that Humphrey's blasts at McGovern played a decisive role in securing the votes of our respondents who voted for Humphrey, since many of them (29) had decided to vote for him early in the campaign before the initiation of Humphrey's attack strategy). As is so often the case, many of the undecided voters appear to have gone with their traditional favorite (Humphrey) on election day, after having experienced some doubt over their choice when confronted with McGovern's relatively "new" face and, perhaps, Humphrey's aggressive attacks upon the South Dakota Senator.

CONCLUSION

The television debates were viewed by a relatively small percentage of the Democrat voters in the state and even fewer have cited it as a decisive factor in their final decision. It is more likely that other factors i.e. overconfidence by McGovern forces, a cut-back on spending in the closing days by the McGovern campaign, etc., resulted in Humphrey gaining ground while McGovern held the 45% attributed to him by the Field Corporation poll a week before the election.

DEBATE SURVEY RESULT

Date of Survey: June 8, 1972  
Actual Democratic turnout: 72%  
True percentage of Democrats in L.A. County (excluding city) = 57%

I. Question: Are you a registered Democrat?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Total	112 (53%)	98 (47%)

( If a registered Democrat, ask following question )

II. Question: Did you vote in the recent California Democratic primary?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Total	77 (68%)	35 (32%)

( If answer is yes, ask following questions )

III. Question: For whom did you vote in the Democratic primary?

	<u>Total</u>
Humphrey	33
McGovern	29
Wallace	5
Other	10

IV. Question: When did you make up your mind to vote for the Democrat candidate of your choice ... a month or more ago; two weeks ago; or one week ago?

	<u>Humphrey Supporters</u>	<u>McGovern Supporters</u>	<u>Wallace Supporters</u>
One month or more	25	14	4
Two weeks	4	11	1
One week or less	4	3	0

V. Question: Did you watch all, some, or none of the debates between the Democrat candidates?

	<u>Total</u>
All 3	9
1 - 2	33
None	35

VI. Question: Did the debates between the Democratic candidates affect your decision in voting in the California primary?

	<u>Humphrey Voters</u>	<u>McGovern Voters</u>
Yes	1	2
No	32	27

Total registered voters in L.A. county (excluding city): 3,223,825

Total registered Democrats - 1,863,216

Republicans-1,145,172

Unidentified- 215,437

Sample

N = 210

Women = (D) = 73

D = 112

Men = (D) = 49

R = 75

I = 23

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: BILL SAFIRE  
SUBJECT: Some Lessons of the California Primary

*Safire had four comments on the Calif Primary*

1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern won by far, less than had been expected. They clobbered Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48% -- no such bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than, say, Muskie (too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic) or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly, McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 -- the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion (Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in his camp. In the news backwash, however -- newsmags and columnists -- we can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing to his fade-out at the end.

2. Shirley Chisholm turned out to be Humphrey's spoiler. Her 5% could have made the difference for Humphrey. ~~HHH broke even with the blacks who did not vote for Shirley, but I think he would have gotten most of hers.~~

3. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's softness in the Mideast. ~~We should study closely what HHH did with the Jews in California the last two weeks.~~ I have a hunch that Jews will not vote for a candidate because he is for aid to Israel (they all say they are) but will vote against one whom they think is against Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a showdown. This could be enormously significant in New York, Illinois and California, not only in fundraising but in vote patterns, ~~and is a subject we should do a lot of thinking about.~~ A

surrey of the Jewish vote in the California primary -- depth stuff -- would be money well spent. *(Mitchell is doing this)*

4. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern keyword. Fifteen per cent of the California Democratic voters became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when they had their first close look at him. Why?

My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's clothing, and all that. One fifth may have been disaffected because he backed off his positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be. No longer a virgin.

~~I would like us to exploit both these leads. Our tendency will be to neglect the latter, figuring the radicals will never vote for us, and concentrate on showing the centrist Democrat that he's in the hands of leftists. This would be missing a good bet, because a large part of his enthusiasm comes from the kids, and a large part of his basic appeal comes from "honesty" -- if we can dramatize and ridicule the McGovern Shift, we can erode both enthusiasm and honesty.~~

~~One specific way right now: Have the Youth Division of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President prepare this cheap flyer: a full-sized reprint of the May 22 Wall Street Journal McGovern ad, in which he shows he's not really a threat to free enterprise and says that besides, Congress would never pass his proposals. Fold it in quarters and headline it: "Here is McGovern's Special Message to Wall Street: Not to Worry." Then, in the margins around the reprinted ad, write in the McGovern quotes that sharply conflict with what is said in the ad, complete with red arrows between the two. Message on the back: "Maybe now Wall Street will trust McGovern -- but now, can you trust him?" Distribute heavily on campus and in areas where the Democratic left is strongest. Best, of course, would be to have some other Democratic candidate do this, but that is unlikely to happen, and it is too good a shot to miss.~~

~~Then we could use something like this to illustrate the point about "disenchantment" (that's a liberal vogue word, associated with F. Scott Fitzgerald, and can hang around McGovern's neck like an~~

albatross) -- with something to peg it to, the media will go for it in a big way, because it is perfect for the next swing of the pendulum: the story about maybe George ain't the man he's cracked up to be. We could help that along, taking the offensive on "credibility."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

From my knowledge only these can explain the precipitate McGovern drop of fifteen points:

*Buchanan explains the McGovern drop by:*

a) The Field Poll was wrong; I discount this -- as I have it from a source that the Field Poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was larger than twenty points.

b) Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare giveaways of McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey stridency, and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently frightened many people to convince 300,000 to come his way. This I believe explains it coupled with:

1. The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical; and
2. The surfacing in the California press of increasing numbers of national Democrats calling GM an extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.

What needs to be remembered is that for most of the nation, George McGovern is someone they have become aware of for two weeks at least, two months at most. First impressions are favorable -- but they are not firm impressions.

What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40% in a week -- So, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats, and pick up all the undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell out of them.

Buchanan

# McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll

By JACK ROSENTHAL  
New York Times News Service

LOS ANGELES—Substantial voter displeasure with his positions on defense spending reductions and welfare reform appeared to have cut deeply into Sen. George McGovern's margin of victory in Tuesday's California presidential primary.

This was the major conclusion of a survey of 570 Democratic voters as they left the polls in 11 counties. The survey was conducted by the New York Times and Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., a major social and market research concern.

The McGovern positions became a focus of attack from his principal rival, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, notably in three nationally televised debates before the election.

## Proposal Ridiculed

In those debates, Humphrey sharply assailed his South Dakota opponent's call for a reduction in defense spending to \$55 billion and ridiculed his proposal to grant a \$1,000 allowance to every needy American.

As the debates began, the statewide California poll conducted by Mervin D. Field reported that McGovern held a 20-point margin over Humphrey. In the final election returns, McGovern came out 5 points ahead, totaling 45 percent of the Democratic vote.

Field blamed "voter volatility" yesterday for the discrepancy. He told United Press International the undecided voters, who were listed at 13 percent in the poll a week before the primary, probably had decided on Humphrey.

Field also said the poll, taken a week before the primary, "created an unprecedented impact on the campaign itself. We have not witnessed in the 26 years we have been polling in this state anything like the attention it received in the media."

## One in Five

The Times-Yankelovich survey suggested that one voter in five found the debates important in deciding which candidate to vote for. The majority of these voters turned to Humphrey. This appears to have raised the Minnesotan's proportion of the vote by sev-

The debates appeared to be unimportant, however, compared with the substance. And the single most damaging substantive point for McGovern, according to the survey, was his proposal to recalculate—and sharply reduce—the nation's defense budget.

Among all voters, more than a third expressed strong disagreement with this proposal. Among those who voted for candidates other than McGovern, the disapproval rate rose to two-thirds.

EVENING STAR -- 6/8/72

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 8, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER  
SUBJECT: California Primary

*Teeter argues that:*

This memorandum will outline my observations with regard to the effect of the Humphrey-McGovern debates on the apparent shift of voters to Humphrey late in the campaign. My thoughts are largely based on what I have gleaned from the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the CBS polls and not on any data which I have collected or had a chance to analyze. The following are the important points:

1. ~~I doubt~~ <sup>not</sup> That there was a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey, rather I suspect there were a large number of voters who were originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the campaign and temporarily moved into the undecided column by the McGovern campaign. When they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique, and relatively unknown commodity and the fact his campaign was a much larger, more obvious and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have contributed to the shift to the undecided category. ~~This is a phenomenon I have seen in other elections where a new "rising star" was running against an older, well known established political figure.~~ The fact McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that the undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically similar to the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.
2. The debates ~~also~~ seemed to sharpen the focus on several of McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those positions. ~~Apparently many of these views were unpopular with the Humphrey voters (older voters, blue collar workers, and Jews). This probably contributed to a movement of undecided voters back to Humphrey.~~
3. McGovern outspent Humphrey in the media ~~by a considerable margin,~~ while the debates and subsequent reporting of them probably comprised a large proportion of Humphrey's total media exposure. ~~This exposure came shortly after the Field poll was conducted and at the time when the shift back to Humphrey was occurring.~~

4. ~~While I have not had a chance to study the turnout figures,~~  
The active business-labor campaign against the environmental proposition may have caused some disproportionate turnout of people who were against the proposition and who were largely Humphrey voters. This is supported by the Yankalovich survey which found that a large majority of Humphrey's total vote voted against the proposition while a large majority of McGovern supporters voted for it.

5. The Field poll may have had some effect itself in giving Humphrey some underdog votes while causing some apathy among McGovern supporters, although I doubt that this effect was very great.

We will, of course, pick up primary vote on the California study which we are starting next week which should give us some insight into the nature of the Humphrey and McGovern support.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *CC*  
SUBJECT: California Primary

*Colson* I believe the debates had a very significant effect, ~~As I indicated~~ *but* in earlier memoranda, both candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect, while I had thought McGovern came out the better because of his "good guy" image, it is now apparent to me that Humphrey scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.

~~I am sure that~~ *T* The Field poll was off, as was the ABC poll and that McGovern did not have a 20 point lead a week before the primary. ~~On the other hand, I suspect he had better than the 5 point margin by which he won.~~ He peaked early plus the fact the debates did expose some extreme positions. Particularly in the 3rd debate, McGovern looked very weak on the POW issue and I would suspect that to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate that that would have had a significant effect. I think Humphrey also scored very well not only in the debates but in his general campaign on the aerospace and jobs issue. My reports from labor sources indicate Humphrey was finally beginning to gain momentum in the closing days on that issue with the blue collar workers.

The New York Times' Yankelevich survey today is very revealing on this point (attached).

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 8, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER  
SUBJECT: Impact of California Debates

~~Background~~

~~Magruder and LaRue believe~~

The California debate between McGovern and Humphrey served as a much needed forum for Humphrey to sharpen the issues between the two candidates. Although the first debate did not have a large viewing audience, it served as an opportunity for Humphrey to put McGovern on the defensive concerning his stand on reducing defense spending to \$55 billion and welfare reform to grant a \$1000 allowance to all needy Americans. Although neither the public nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the debate, substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media began to emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied the least advantageous position in the political arena - that of being on the defensive. He spent the next several days trying to explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack. This was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little if any paid commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.

The second debate, viewed in prime time, presented Humphrey in a much more conciliatory light. However, he kept questioning the economic impact the McGovern defense cut would have on the working man of California. In order to dramatize his point, Humphrey asked McGovern "What do you plan to do with the air bases in California - make them into golf links?" Again the results of the debate were a toss-up, but the media still gave maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack. Humphrey continued to campaign furiously throughout California receiving good press coverage with the attacks.

The third debate was generally a wash-out because, with five participants, neither major candidate was allowed enough time to hit the issues. Yorty may have offered an added dimension by attacking McGovern. Humphrey once again surprised McGovern by challenging him alone to a fourth debate.

Analysis

The Hart Survey shows that 53% of the Democratic voters watched at least one debate. As previously stated, the public on the surface did not perceive either candidate as the clear cut winner. The Hart Survey pointed out that 17% thought McGovern won, 16% thought Humphrey won, 20% felt that it was a stand off, and the remainder had no opinion. 30% of the Humphrey voters thought that Humphrey had won the debates while 30% of the McGovern voters thought that McGovern had won the debates.

The most revealing clue of the Hart Survey was one out of three voters decided for whom they would vote during the last three weeks (many during the debates). Of those voters, 5 to 4 voted for Humphrey.

The <sup>Yanklovich</sup> ~~Yanklovich~~ Survey revealed that 1 out of 5 voters considered the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey.

The <sup>Yanklovich</sup> ~~Yanklovich~~ Survey also indicated that more voters voted against McGovern than against Humphrey. One fourth of the voters preferred their candidate because they disliked their opponent. Senator Humphrey received one half of these votes while Senator McGovern received one third. It is very probable that the debates triggered many of these negative opinions because Humphrey for the first time was able to show the weaknesses in McGovern's programs.

The survey also states that 40% of HH's vote would go to the P on the F Nov. 7, while 40% would shift to McGovern, and 20% is undecided.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

Conclusion

It is our feeling that the debates served to put McGovern on the defensive and to dampen the momentum of his well-organized and well-financed campaign. McGovern probably peaked several days before the election. It is difficult however, to determine how much they contributed to Humphrey's surge on Election Day. Other important factors were present:

1. The impact of the California poll may have spurred Humphrey workers and caused complacency in the McGovern camp.
2. McGovern's get-out-the-vote activity was not as well coordinated as the voter identification canvass.
3. Proposition 9 on the California ballot was a pro-ecology issue. Most McGovern supporters were pro-9 and Humphrey supporters anti-9. Whitaker and Baxter spent over one million dollars in an anti Proposition 9 P.R. campaign. This may have brought much of the latent Humphrey support to the polls.
4. Humphrey campaigned much harder in the last days, while McGovern went to New Mexico and to Houston to the Governor's conference.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

(Dictated by phone  
from Los Angeles)

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

~~GORDON STRACHAN~~ H

FROM:

RICHARD MOORE

*Moore argues*

*account for the* Seems unlikely that *not a* debates by themselves were a major factor in the difference between *the* field poll and final results. Field poll was taken May 30 and 31 and released June 1. Poll consisted of 857 completed phone calls to self-identified Democratic voters.

*in the* Note, however, that first debate where Humphrey was on the attack and generally considered most effective had already taken place when poll was taken and second debate took place May 30 when poll was half completed. Only the third debate which included Jorty and Shirley Chissom took place completely after poll. Incidentally, Los Angeles audience ratings were 12% for first debate, 13% for second and only 6% for third debate. Ratings in other California cities probably somewhat higher but still each debate was probably not seen by 80% of the voters. Reasons given by various observers here for difference between the 20% McGovern lead and actual difference of only 5% include the following:

- Field* 1. Poll itself generated over confidence by McGovern workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.
2. McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure for New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously indicating over confidence and taking California for granted.
3. As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a knack for a strong finish. On last two days, Humphrey campaigned strenuously up and down State with good TV coverage while McGovern was absent.

4. Nofziger reports that Al Barkan, political person from COPE, came into State during last two weeks and the labor effort appears to have been effective in closing days particularly in Los Angeles County which Humphrey carried.

Proposition 9 which lost by 2 to 1, attracted non-liberal voters who might not otherwise have voted.

Finally, many suggest that although field poll may be defective in commercial marketing, it has spotty record in political poll and was probably wrong to begin with.

My total impression is that debates did help by generating word of mouth of Humphrey's hard hitting attack and the important factor was McGovern's departure.

Incidentally, Los Angeles Times attributes Congressman Schmitz' defeat entirely to his opposition to the President's China and Russia initiatives which is very encouraging news from Orange County.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: ED HARPER

FROM: ROY D. MOREY *RM*

SUBJECT: Predictions vs. Results in  
the California Democratic  
Primary

*Morey believes* *Roy Morey analyzed the California results for Harper*  
Five days prior to the election, Mervin Field, Director of the syndicated California poll, found that as of May 30 - 31 McGovern was favored by 46 percent of the state's Democrats to Humphrey's 26 percent. The final vote in the California primary indicates McGovern with 44.2 percent, Humphrey with 39.2 percent, Wallace with a 6.8 percent write-in and Chisolm with 4.4 percent. Before analyzing reasons for Humphrey's better than predicted showing, let's first look at the primary results.

The Results

Counties in which McGovern was particularly strong included (results in thousands) Alameda (120-69), Marin (24-9), Sacramento (62-48), San Diego (90-74), San Francisco (82-49), San Mateo (52-38) and Santa Clara (95-60).

Humphrey's major strength was in Los Angeles County (553-472) but he made a respectable showing in districts including Orange, (83-70), San Bernadeno (43-35), and Ventura (25-20).

Significant sources of McGovern's strength were identified by Hart Research Associates. Their figures show that while Humphrey had been running as a two to one favorite among blue collar workers in previous primaries, McGovern captured their vote by 46% to 38%. In addition, Humphrey showed a decline among Black voters from 72% in the April Pennsylvania primary to 34% in California. McGovern's popularity among the Blacks increased over the same period from 13% to 36%.

The data also demonstrates that urban voters feel that McGovern is a better candidate by a margin of more than two to one; less than two months ago, Humphrey held the advantage by similar margin. Humphrey seems to have increased his suburban strength (29% up to 43%) at the expense of core city support.

Humphrey did well among the elderly (taking California's senior set by a two to one margin) slightly less than half his voters classify themselves as conservatives, accounting perhaps in part for his strength in suburban Los Angeles County.

McGovern on the other hand captured more than 70% of the 18 to 24 year old vote, and among liberals and professionals - executives he ran two to one ahead of Humphrey. In previous primaries, McGovern had been finding consistently stronger support among women; in California he did 15% better among the men than did Humphrey, and only 3% better among the women.

#### A Last Minute Shift?

~~There have been a number of explanations advanced for the better than predicted Humphrey showing: The McGovern decision to leave the state the day before the election, a last minute sympathy vote for Humphrey; McGovern's position on the issues as exposed in the television debates and elsewhere finally caught up with him. While there is insufficient data to assess each of these theories, there is some evidence which should cast doubt on the significance of the television debates in influencing voter decisions.~~

~~It may be argued that the debates and issues and positions exposed in the debates account for the diminution of McGovern strength during the final days of the campaign. This is a plausible theory, but difficult to support. Only a little over half of the California Democrats (53%) watched any of the three debates. Among those three watched, there was a mixed reaction on the outcome -- 16% thought Humphrey came out ahead, 17% said McGovern was the winner, and 20% thought the debate produced a stand-off. In short, there does not seem to be much evidence to suggest that the debate played an important role in either insuring a McGovern victory or in decreasing his winning margin.~~

There are several factors which are useful in attempting to account for the better than predicted Humphrey showing. First is the matter of voter volatility in primary elections in general, and the California

primary in particular. It has been demonstrated elsewhere that public opinion polling is a more risky enterprise in primary rather than general elections.

More important, however, in explaining the apparent shift toward Humphrey in the final days is the undecided vote. A week before the election, the undecided vote was 13% in the Mervin Field poll and most of this went to Humphrey on election day. This was especially true among older voters who made up a majority of the undecided group. The Hart poll conducted for the Washington Post indicates that as much as a third of the voters did not make up their minds until the last three weeks of the campaign and that Humphrey picked up most of these late deciders.

In addition, there were early Wallace supporters who eventually decided to forego a write-in and vote for either McGovern or Humphrey. Humphrey picked up more of these nominal Wallace supporters than did McGovern.

#### Weighing the Results

In assessing the results of the California Democratic primary, one should keep in mind the size and composition of the electorate. Only 67% of California's 5.1 million Democrats turned out for this election as compared with the 73% turnout in the 1968 contest between Kennedy and Hartke, *and the Carthy*

We cannot assume that the 67% who turned out constitute a representative microcosm of the entire California Democratic electorate. As Austin Ranney reports in the current issue of the American Political Science Review, the make up of the electorate in primary elections differs from the voters who turn out for general elections. The Ranney data indicates that the primary voters tend to be more affluent, better educated, with an over all higher socio-economic background. They also tend to be more ideologically committed. Although there were a few voter group reversals for McGovern from his experience in other states, the fact remains that his support in California tended to be from those who are more likely to turn out for a primary election.

Among voters with incomes over \$15,000 he did as well as he has in other states. McGovern out polled Humphrey among the better educated and professional groups and he gained two out of three votes among those who classified themselves as liberals.

The VN war and the state of the economy (including unemployment) were the major issues on the minds of both McGovern and Humphrey supporters. Hence, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between the two based upon positions taken on the issues. Humphrey supporters felt he is committed to ending the war and favor his stand on equality for Blacks and tax reform. McGovern supporters tended to mention withdrawal from VN, a guaranteed minimal income for the poor and his stand on tax reform. The distinction drawn in voter's minds seem to be more a matter of style than substance.

Judging from the success McGovern had with the more affluent and professional groups, there does not seem to be much evidence to support the contention that those with incomes above \$15,000 were scared into the Humphrey camp by talk of McGovern's income redistribution scheme.

This year, the primaries have given voters an opportunity to express their feelings of discontent and concern. This is reflected in the successes of both McGovern and Wallace. However, the voter will have to make a considerably different kind of decision in the general election. In the final analysis he is called upon to pass judgment on whom he thinks should be entrusted with the responsibility of the Presidency.

cc: Bradford Rich

Survey of California Voting

# McGovern: New Constituency

By Haynes Johnson  
Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, June 7 — Although George McGovern did not win the California primary by the landslide the pollsters had projected, Democratic voters in the nation's largest state handed him another kind of victory: for the first time this year he has emerged as the candidate with the most broadly based constituency.

In other primaries his strength was concentrated among young voters, affluent suburbanites and liberals. McGovern basically held that constituency yesterday, and ran significantly better among voters who previously had been the strongest supporters of his opponent, Hubert Humphrey.

Those voters who had formed the

nucleus of the Humphrey strength in other contests—the blacks, the poor, the urban dwellers, the blue-collar workers, the ethnics—deserted him in California.

The most striking evidence of McGovern's broader appeal came in two voting groups, the blacks and the blue-collar workers. In previous primaries Humphrey had been getting anywhere from 70 to 80 per cent of the black vote.

Humphrey also had been running about 2-to-1 ahead of McGovern among blue-collar workers.

A survey by Hart Research Associates conducted for The Washington Post showed Humphrey actually losing the black vote by 2 percentage points in California and running behind Mc-

Govern among blue-collar workers by a 46 per cent to 38 per cent margin.

(McGovern's principal pollster, Pat Caddell, estimated that McGovern took 47 or 48 per cent of the state's black vote to 43 per cent for Humphrey and that he picked up 57 per cent of the Chicano vote, 20 points ahead of Humphrey. But Caddell said Humphrey seemed to have won the Jewish vote by 18 to 20 per cent and to have won the blue-collar vote by 2 or 3 per cent.)

The Hart survey, of 847 voters in 26 counties throughout the state, also turned up other evidence of McGovern's increasing acceptance among diverse elements of registered Democrats. Mexican-Americans voted for Mc-

## MCGOVERN BROADENS CONSTITUENCY

Govern by 61 to 31 per cent for Humphrey.

Among voters with family incomes under \$7,000 a year, the two major contenders evenly divided the field. Previously in the Pennsylvania, Ohio and Maryland primaries the Hart/Post survey showed Humphrey running anywhere from 2-to-1 to 3-to-1 over McGovern in that category.

Finally, Humphrey's standing among urban voters plummeted in California. In California the urban vote represents one-third of the potential Democratic electorate. Yesterday Humphrey took only 27 per cent of that vote. In Pennsylvania, by contrast, he had held 45 per cent of the urban vote and in Ohio he took 53 per cent.

McGovern's margin rose from 23 per cent of the urban vote in Pennsylvania to 52 per cent in California.

### Suburban Vote Divided

The key to the closeness of the California vote ironically lies in the one area that had been the bastion for George McGovern: the suburbs. The two candidates divided that vote yesterday. And in California this group makes up nearly half of the Democratic electorate.

In Pennsylvania, Humphrey had carried 29 per cent of the suburban vote to McGovern's 45. In California, Humphrey captured 43 per cent of the suburban vote while McGovern won 41 per cent.

Humphrey's strength was concentrated in one major area—sprawling Los Angeles County.

A reading of the California returns thus clearly shows how successful McGovern has been in establishing himself as a candidate with wide political appeal. His California standing has to be measured against the time, only three months ago, when he was largely regarded as a one-issue candidate who could not rise above 7 per cent in the national polls.

What is intriguing about California—and unanswerable at this stage—is how the polls erred so badly here.

McGovern came into election day seemingly headed for a landslide victory. The respected California Poll conducted by Mervin Field showed him ahead by 20 percentage points. But as they have demonstrated all year in the privacy of the voting booth, citizens refused to be catalogued in advance of the election.

### Various Theories Offered

There are any number of theories being advanced to explain the far-better Humphrey final vote: that the intensely personal nature of his campaigning against the odds spurred a last-minute sympathy vote; that McGovern's position on specific issues, including income redistribution and cuts in defense spending, cast new doubt on his candidacy; that the television debates caused a significant switch to Humphrey.

None of these can be verified with any accuracy. They remain theories.

The Hart survey data does, however, give clues to what was taking place as the election approached. Voters were asked when they made up their minds to support either Humphrey or McGovern. One out of three voters said they decided on their candidate within the last three weeks. Of these voters, Humphrey beat McGovern by a 5-to-4 margin.

In other words, people who were undecided tended to be more influenced by Humphrey than McGovern in the closing days of the election.

The television debates are less conclusive.

Some 53 per cent of all Democratic voters in the state, representing well over a million persons, said they had watched at least one of the three TV encounters. But despite such wide exposure, neither candidate received a clear signal of support based on the way he came over the set.

When asked which candidate was the winner, the citizens responded this way:

Sixteen per cent of all Democratic voters thought Humphrey came out ahead.

Seventeen per cent said McGovern.

Twenty per cent thought the debates were a stand-off.

And the remainder didn't watch.

The same kind of inconclusive breakdown came among those who voted for either McGovern or Humphrey.

Of those who backed Humphrey on Tuesday, only 30 per cent thought he was a clear-cut winner in the debates. Of those who voted for McGovern, the same figure of 30 per cent gave their man the clear edge.

### Marked by Bitterness

The Hart results do cast light on another element of critical importance to not only Humphrey and McGovern, but to their party's chances against Richard Nixon in the fall. This campaign was marked by a current of bitterness, sometimes muted, sometimes flaring into the open, between the two senators who have been long-time friends in Washington.

On election day, that bitterness was most notably expressed by the Humphrey voters. Almost half of those who voted for Humphrey said they would support Mr. Nixon if McGovern is the Democratic nominee in November. Among McGovern's supporters, however, two out of three said they would back Humphrey if he wins the Democratic nomination next month in Miami Beach.

But a full 10 per cent of the McGovern voters said they would not participate at all in the presidential election if the choices are the same as four years ago—another Humphrey-Nixon match.

Implicit in these findings is a potentially perilous situation facing the Democratic Party. They raise the prospect of a party so badly divided that the Republicans could be returned to office as a result.

On the surface that is comforting news for the President and his party. But a careful qualification has to be added to that equation.

In trial heats among Democratic voters yesterday, both Humphrey and McGovern scored substantial victories when pitted face-to-face against Mr. Nixon. The figure for Humphrey was 68 per cent to Mr. Nixon's 21 per cent. McGovern topped the President by 66 to 28 per cent.

#### Findings Confirmed

These confirm the findings of other published polls this week that showed McGovern beating Mr. Nixon among all California voters. Simply put, this means that the President has problems in California, the largest state and a state that he carried in both 1960 and 1968.

Another way of looking at the relative strength of the President in his native state can be seen in examining the issues cited by the voters. In California, as in other states, the war ranks as the greatest concern of most voters. But close behind that is another problem. To a striking degree, California voters yesterday singled out the problems of unemployment and job security as being of paramount importance.

In other states, the issues of inflation or taxes ranked high, but the California voters were saying yesterday that their economic problems are more acute and more demanding of solution.

These two concerns, the war and the economy, will probably dominate the actual presidential campaign.

When it comes to distinguishing between the two leading Democratic candidates, there is little in voter responses to distinguish them. A majority of the Humphrey voters said they thought he would honorably end the war. Only two other issues were strongly associated with Humphrey in their minds. These were his positions on full equality for blacks and on tax reform.

For McGovern, two out of three of his supporters mentioned his call for immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. And almost half cited his stand on guaranteeing a minimum income for the poor. About 40 per cent mentioned his tax reform proposals.

The voters seemed to perceive the men in different ways. McGovern supporters were more inclined to stress his stand on specific issues than his personal qualities, while the Humphrey backers spoke more about their man's personality, his speaking ability, his warmth and sincerity.

#### Support of Elderly

In only one segment of the voting population did Humphrey maintain the strength he has demonstrated in other primaries. Voters aged 65 and over, and those who are retired, gave him a lopsided 2-to-1 margin over McGovern.

His California constituency was marked by another aspect. Slightly less than half of his voters classified themselves as conservatives. That, perhaps, explains his strong showing among Los Angeles County suburban voters. In California, and particularly Southern California, the makeup of the suburbs differs from those in other sections of the country. Here, the suburban voter generally is more conservative.

McGovern maintained his position among young voters, liberals, the more affluent and among professional groups.

In California, as in other primaries, he took better than 70 per cent of voters between the ages of 18 and 24. With voters earning more than \$15,000 a year, he did as well in California as in other states.

Among voters classifying themselves as liberals, McGovern received two out of three of the ballots cast. In the professional-executive category of voters, McGovern received a clear-cut majority, running more than 2-to-1 ahead of Humphrey.

In a political season of contradictions and confusion, these elements among the voters remained constant factors. There was one group in the California electorate, though, that defied the standards set in other primaries.

McGovern had been doing consistently better among women voters all across the country. The Hart survey yesterday turned up yet another contradiction to the political norm.

In California George McGovern ran significantly better among men than women, holding a 15-point spread over Humphrey among men but only 3 per cent among women.

Whether that is an indication of further change in a changing electorate or merely a quirk of California no one can say. Even the pollsters won't venture an opinion of why that is so.

*This story is based on interviews conducted for The Washington Post by Hart Research Associates of Washington. The company interviewed 847 California voters in 26 of the state's 58 counties. These voters represent 92 per cent of the potential Democratic electorate in California. The voters were contacted immediately after they cast their ballots in Tuesday's presidential primary election. The purpose of the interviews was to determine why people voted as they did and to determine the kind and depth of support the major Democratic candidates enjoyed. This is the last of a series of similar voter surveys carried out for The Post by Hart Research on the 1972 presidential primary elections.*

## 4-Primary Record of Rivals' Strength

By a Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, June 7—The changing nature of the McGovern-Humphrey constituencies is shown in the following table, based on voter surveys conducted in four presidential primaries by Hart Research Associates for The Washington Post.

	Pennsylvania April 25 %	Ohio May 2 %	Maryland May 16 %	California June 6 %
<b>Urban Voters</b>				
Humphrey	45	53	48	27
McGovern	23	34	13	52
<b>Suburban Voters</b>				
Humphrey	29	33	22	43
McGovern	45	49	37	41
<b>Blue-Collar Workers</b>				
Humphrey	43	54	33	38
McGovern	19	35	16	46
<b>Blacks</b>				
Humphrey	72	80	67	34
McGovern	13	16	12	36
<b>Low-Income Voters</b>				
Humphrey	44	59	34	42
McGovern	20	32	12	42

To: L. Higby  
From: Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

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SPEECH INSERT

My friends, Senator McGovern's followers tell us that the Senator is a sincere man, a candid man, an honest man -- a man who means exactly what he says.

And when Senator McGovern says he is going to build the biggest welfare program this nation has ever heard of -- one thousand dollars to every man woman and child in the country -- and make the Middle Class pay for it, I take him at his word.

And when the Senator not only introduces in the Senate, but twice publicly embraces a \$6500 guaranteed annual income -- I think the Senator means it.

And when Senator McGovern tells us he would put on the scrap heap nine of our fifteen aircraft carriers, 80 percent of our naval squadrons, half our surface fleet and halt to two-thirds our American bomber force -- I think he means exactly what he says.

And when Senator McGovern says that he would reduce the American armed forces below the level of pre-Pearl Harbor, I think that's exactly what the Senator would do.

And when Senator McGovern votes in favor of racial balance in every major metropolitan area in America, and when he says that forced bussing is an "essential" to achieve compulsory integration, I think he means exactly what he says.

I think that some of the Senator's views are radical, extremist views -- but I believe the Senator means exactly what he says. I believe he is an honest, sincere, committed radical.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President  
FROM: Harry S. Dent *HSD*  
SUBJECT: Primaries: California  
New Jersey  
New Mexico  
South Dakota

George McGovern won all four primaries Tuesday to give him over 900 delegates and clearly establish him as the biggest vote getter, delegate winner, and primary victor on the Democrat side. He appeared to be winning by 9% in California with 56% of the vote counted. Wallace, getting a 5% write-in vote there, pulled a surprise in New Mexico, finishing second with 29% and half the delegate votes -- all without any campaigning.

The President held Ashbrook to 10% in California, while McCloskey got 6% in New Mexico and one delegate vote.

Senators Eastland, Case, and Metcalf won their primaries. In South Dakota, Rep. Abourezk will be pitted against either ex-State Senator Robert Hirsch or Attorney General Gordon Mydland. (Convention to decide because Hirsch didn't get 35%).

James Meredith was defeated in the Mississippi GOP Senate primary by VW dealer Gil Carmichael 80% to 20%.

McGovern won all 271 delegates in California, 9 (half) in New Mexico, all 17 from South Dakota (no competition), and at least 59 of New Jersey's 109. McGovern expects 80 votes from New Jersey.

Page Two  
June 7, 1972

There was no direct head-to-head vote count in New Jersey. McGovern's slate leader got 30,000 more votes than HHH's leader with 80% of the vote counted. It was a defeat for the old Demo machine.

CBS projected only a five point victory margin for McGovern in California. He won big with youth and split the black vote in California and New Jersey. Los Angeles and Orange County almost pulled the Hump through.

HHH says he will keep on, but told his supporters he will see that the Demos are united to beat RN.

CBS also projects 1266 delegate votes for McGovern at convention time to 540 for HHH.

McCloskey beat his two primary opponents 24,000 to 17,000 each.

The President's delegate count now stands at 818, with 674 needed for nomination.

In New Mexico, the Demos nominated ex-State Rep. Jack Daniels to contest with 1970 GOP gubernatorial candidate Pete Domenici who easily knocked off Dave Cargo.--in the U. S. Senate race.

VOTE FIGURES (UNOFFICIAL)

CALIFORNIA

DEMOCRAT PRIMARY (With 62% precincts reporting)

MCGOVERN	969,243	47%	271 delegates
HUMPHREY	791,034	38%	
WALLACE	109,979	5%	
CHISHOLM	91,162	5%	
MUSKIE	46,161	2%	
YORTY	27,420	1%	
MCCARTHY	21,808	1%	
JACKSON	18,320	1%	
LINDSAY	17,456	1%	

REPUBLICAN PRIMARY (With 61% precincts reporting)

RN	1,200,921	90%	96 delegates
ASHBROOK	130,787	10%	

NEW MEXICO

DEMOCRAT PRIMARY (With 96% precincts reporting)

MCGOVERN	48,812	33%	10 delegates
WALLACE	43,378	29%	8
HUMPHREY	38,260	26%	0
MUSKIE	6,497	5%	0
JACKSON	4,241	3%	0
CHISHOLM	3,168	1%	0
NONE SHOWN	3,417	2%	-

REPUBLICAN PRIMARY (With 96% precincts reporting)

RN	48,793	89%	13 delegates
MCCLOSKEY	3,300	6%	1
NONE SHOWN	2,557	5%	

✓ L  
Note names

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT: DeVan L. Shumway  
(202) 333-7060 #6-56a

WASHINGTON, June 15 -- More than 2,500 black leaders from all parts of the country gathered in the nation's capital Saturday and heard former CORE Director Floyd McKissick declare that, "If you have a two-party system or the semblance of a two-party system, it's stupid for all black people to be in just one."

McKissick also told the guests at a \$100 a plate dinner sponsored by the Black Committee for the Re-election of the President; "It's a new day, brothers and sisters."

"Who created the ghetto?" McKissick asked. "President Nixon didn't create that ghetto."

"Who created the war? President Nixon didn't create the war in Vietnam. But he's tried to get us out."

McKissick was one of several national black leaders who praised President Nixon, prompting Paul R. Jones, Executive Director of the Black Committee for the Re-election of the President to note, "A lot of people are going to be surprised this year. The President only received 12% of the black vote in 1968, but he's going to do much, much better this time...because he's earned it."

Others attending the dinner were: Mayor Robert Blackwell of Highland Park, Mich., who served as Master of Ceremonies; Dr. Charles Hurst, President of Malcolm X College, Chicago; Mark Rivers, President of Watts Manufacturing Company, Los Angeles; former CORE

(more)

Director Floyd McKissick; professional football great and motion picture star Jim Brown, C. A. Scott, Publisher of the Atlanta Daily World, the oldest black newspaper in the nation; W. O. Walker, publisher of the Cleveland Call-Post; baseball Hall of Famer Jackie Robinson; Arthur Fletcher, former Assistant Secretary of Labor and President of the United Negro College Fund; jazz immortal Lionel Hampton, who presented a Cavalcade of Music for the evening's entertainment; recording star Billy Eckstein; former Dodger star Don Newcombe; and 2,500 others.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT: DE VAN L. SHUMWAY  
(202) 333-7060  
#6-56b

WASHINGTON -- Although President Nixon could not be present at the black fund-raising dinner for his campaign in the nation's capital Saturday, he sent a message which was read to the more than 2,000 black leaders attending. The message was read by his younger brother, Edward C. Nixon.

The text of the President's message:

It is a special privilege as well as a great pleasure to send my heartiest greetings to this gathering of supporters from across the nation. I wish it might have been possible to join you this evening so that I could tell you how deeply I share your sense of pride in the many achievements you have brought to the nation through your positions of leadership in the black community.

It is gratifying to know of your willingness to help in the coming campaign, for 1972 will truly be a year of decision for all Americans. It will be a year when we continue to move forward together with the proposals offered by this Administration -- to reorganize government, to further our efforts in returning dignity to the common man, and to bring prosperity to all our people and a lasting peace to our troubled world.

We have an immense challenge before us, but with your backing we will meet it entirely. For your support will inspire countless others to join our cause, one which seeks to make government the effective servant of all its citizens rather than to enslave them under the heavy hand of bureaucracy. Ours is to insure freedom for all men and women to pursue the vast opportunities of America on an equal basis.

Richard Nixon

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT: DeVan L. Shumway  
202/333-7060  
#6-56c

WASHINGTON -- "IT'S A NEW DAY, BROTHERS AND SISTERS," Floyd McKissick, former Director of CORE and Developer of Soul City, N.C., told more than 2,000 Black leaders gathered at a fund-raising dinner for President Nixon's campaign Saturday in the Nation's capital. In this photo, taken at the dinner, McKissick is joined in conversation by Special Assistant to the President Robert Brown (1), Nixon Campaign Director John N. Mitchell (2nd from right) and Rev. Dr. William Holmes Borders, Pastor of the Wheat St. Baptist Church, Atlanta, Ga. (R). McKissick said, "President Nixon didn't create the war in Vietnam, but he's tried to get us out."

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1972  
2:55 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HIGBY  
FROM: ALVIN SNYDER

Attached is a transcript of McGovern's comments  
on CBS radio last night.

*Handwritten notes:*  
K  
Met  
Tape  
from  
Magruder  
6/14 - ISM has +  
will send cc

*Handwritten notes:*  
H  
FC  
6/15

cc: Charles Colson  
Ken Clawson  
Mort Allin

FOR COMMITTEE FOR THE REELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

PROGRAM News STATION WTOP Radio  
CBS Network  
DATE June 12, 1972 10:00 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

COMMENT BY SENATOR GEORGE McGOVERN

STUART NOVINS: Presidential candidate George McGovern said in New York he rejects the advice of those who want him to moderate his positions. The story by Connie Chung.

CONNIE CHUNG: McGovern admitted tonight that even some of his advisors, in addition to political leaders, have suggested he move away from the left of the political spectrum. Speaking in a Bronx rally, he added, however, "the people are not looking for a leader who stands in the middle of the road. They are looking, instead, for a man who stands for change."

SENATOR GEORGE McGOVERN: I'm being advised every day by the political pundits, by some of my advisors, that I ought to move toward the center. Well, let me say that we have demonstrated in one election after another during the past year that the center is moving to us.

CHUNG: McGovern will make his pitch to union workers tomorrow when he tours factories and plants in upstate New York, hoping labor will lean towards his way of thinking.

Connie Chung, CBS News, New York.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12958, Section 6-102  
By EP, Date 4-1-82

June 14, 1972

**CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY**

**MEMORANDUM FOR :** CHARLES COLSON  
**FROM :** L. HIGBY

After discussion with Bob and Buchanan regarding the Buchanan assault memorandum, the following conclusions were reached:

1. It probably would not be that productive to forward the memorandum to Helms and Rogers, and he suggests that we not do it since Buchanan does not want the memorandum to receive wide circulation.

2. Anybody who does look at the memorandum should do so only for the basis of getting comments back in to you and Bob as to their thoughts. No actions should be taken based on the memorandum until some basic strategy decisions have been made and we all agree that it is time to move ahead.

3. It would be valuable for Hallett to take a look at the memorandum on a confidential basis and write up his critique of it, plus cover any additional points that he feels should be made that Buchanan has overlooked.

In addition, Hallett should specifically address himself to the following points:

a. The Buchanan memorandum overlooks our strong point in foreign policy. We need someone to write the case in this area.

b. We need to do an addendum to the Buchanan memorandum that takes up the point of how we attack McGovern in a way that builds the President's foreign policy image.

c. Someone needs to develop a battle plan as to what the holes are in the Buchanan piece.

d. What are the four things that we want to come out versus how we refute McGovern's points.

Have Hallett give this a try and forward his results to Bob.

LH:pm

JUNE 15 # 2

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Republicans Bjt 460

By MIKE SEANAHAN

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON AP - For the first time, Republicans charged with re-electing the President are viewing the potential candidacy of Sen. George McGovern with genuine concern.

Until the California primary most staff members on the Committee for the Re-election of the President were hoping McGovern would be the nominee because they were sure he could be beaten handily, according to Republican political sources.

But now the South Dakota senator is viewed by political pros including campaign director John N. Mitchell, as a man whose string of primary victories make him an opponent to be reckoned with.

Compounding this and more frightful to a Republican success, say the sources, is the possibility of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., joining the McGovern ticket as a vice presidential candidate.

Recently, they say, Kennedy had been dropped from Republican-financed polls taken on potential opponents to Nixon.

But since Kennedy said in a newspaper interview he wouldn't completely exclude the possibility of accepting the vice presidential nomination, his name will probably be added to the surveys, the sources said.

In a meeting with the campaign staff this week, Mitchell, the former attorney general, used tough language in outlining the beginning of the Republican election campaign.

Ironically, Mitchell ordered heavy emphasis on grass-roots political organization, the formula most political analysts agree is the key to McGovern's success so far in collecting over two-thirds of the delegate votes needed to lock up the Democratic presidential nomination.

One source quoted Mitchell as saying, "God damn it, forget all this media stuff. Let's get out and find out where the vote is and get it out."

A staff man was also quickly dispatched for the first time to stay with the McGovern campaign and find out the strength of his organizational structure, how it really works in the states.

"We want to find out what makes it tick, on the assumption they'll do the same thing if he gets the nomination," the source said.

Staff members once believed Sen. Edmund S. Muskie of Maine or Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota were the only two Democrats who had the slightest chance of beating President Nixon.

Now that belief, spurred by Mitchell's talk, is out the window. The California primary also sparked a near deluge of offers from wealthy contributors particularly from California and New York.

"One man had to make a hurry-up trip to New York to meet with 15 people who wanted to contribute large amounts of money," another source said.

He said the contributors, mostly bankers and industrialists, are deeply disturbed by some of McGovern's proposals.

sr2:Opd June 15

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

E.

APRIL 25, 1972

FOR BOB HALDEMAN

John would appreciate having your thoughts on the attached.

Many thanks.

  
Tod R. Hullin

Attachment

*It's just a  
true elemental  
and juvenile  
H*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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April 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

JOHN EHRLICHMAN

Attached is Ed Harper's memo on the establishment of a quick response research capability for the Presidential campaign. I have made some marginal notations, and would also appreciate any guidance you might have before I sit down and review this with Ed.

Please return.

  
KEN COLE

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDING  
EXCERPT FROM THE 10-102  
By EP *4/1/72*  
CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON

April 4, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR KEN COLE

FROM: ED HARPER *EH*

SUBJECT: Quick Response Research Capability

This memorandum describes (1) the need for a quick response research capability to support the President during the coming campaign, (2) the work already underway to develop that capability, and (3) the decisions which need to be made in the near future to insure that capability. This memorandum is not designed as an action document, but as a discussion document which we might use to define further our problems and alternative responses.

THE NEED

All speeches and statements the President makes must be backed up by authoritative research to insure that <sup>they are</sup> ~~it is~~ (1) factually correct, (2) consistent with his established policy positions, and (3) issued with full recognition of secondary programmatic, political and budgetary implications. Present procedures for research back-up for the President's speeches and statements may not suffice under campaign conditions.

The nature of the President's participation in the campaign between the convention and election day is as yet undecided. Campaign requirements might differ little from present research back-up requirements if the President strictly adhered to a rigidly set schedule and only used speeches written in advance. On the other hand, research back-up requirements would differ significantly if the President travels for extended periods of time using a stump speech with new sections for each stop and issuing statements on the campaign trail.

Even if the President does decide on a rigidly set schedule for his campaign involvement, Ray Price feels that special research and writing support will be necessary for several reasons. First, even if we plan to get the speeches done ahead of time, Ray Price doubts that we would get them all done. Second, the President will probably generate new policy ideas on the campaign trail which he will want to use immediately in his speeches. Third, the President will probably want to issue statements from the campaign plane commenting on the proposals of the Democratic candidate.

The research support operation will need to have a wide variety of data and analysis instantly available to the President no matter where he is. The data which should be available include:

- A. Issue and answer data including the opponents' arguments on all major current issues.
- B. Supporting data including--
  - 1. Demographic data
  - 2. Key issue and program data
  - 3. Political data
  - 4. Historic background data
- C. Democratic contender's positions on the major issues.

The President should also have available wherever he is instant (a few minutes) analytic capability as well as a fast (a few hours) analytical capability.

Instant analytical services could be available by having a senior research man aboard the candidate's plane. From their 1968 and 1970 experiences, Bryce Harlow, Martin Anderson, and Alan Greenspan all see this as a necessity. Martin Anderson said that the Administrative people "will give you 10,000 reasons why there should not be a research man on the candidate's airplane, but you must insist that there be a man exclusively devoted to research or everyone will be sorry in the end." Martin noted that on many occasions, if he had not been there to check facts, they would not

IDE?

have gotten checked because everybody else was frantically busy. Bryce felt a research man is important for other reasons: "You need to have somebody with a different perspective from the speech writers, political people, and advance men when you are cranking out messages and statements in the heat of the campaign."

*These are  
the  
best  
contacts  
should  
have  
a  
list  
of  
agency  
analysts*

Fast (a few hours) analytical services can be made available to the President by having the research man on the plane able to get in touch quickly with our top Domestic Council policy person on each issue. This requires good communications facilities. Based on 1968 and 1970 experience, the research man on the plane should have available to him a telephone, a TWX, and a DEX.

In unusual emergency situations when the appropriate Domestic Council staff member is unavailable, the research man on the plane should work with the appropriate OMB or CEA issue analyst. Peter Michel could be particularly helpful in assisting the research man organize fast, analytic responses to specific problems. Only if no Executive Office personnel are available should the research man directly contact agency analysts. For emergency purposes, the research man on the plane should have a list of appropriate OMB and agency analysts to call on every key issue.

WORK UNDERWAY

A number of projects are underway to build a solid data foundation and put in place a fast analytic response capability for the campaign effort.

The following is a list of data gathering projects and their status:

1. Issues and Answers--A system for updating on a weekly basis an "Issues and Answers Book," including the opponents' arguments, has been established and will be in high gear by campaign time.
2. Demographic Data--Standard demographic works as well as political atlases are being collected.

3. Key Issues and Program Data--Federal program expenditures on a state, county, and city basis are being prepared. Significant statistics about each of the major issues have been identified and will be produced on a state-by-state basis and on a city and county basis where available.
4. Political Data--Political data for each state is being collected which will include electoral records, key officials' and contenders' issue positions. Political and issue polls are also being collected on a state-by-state basis.
5. Historical Data--Good reference works on U. S. history and state histories are being collected.
6. Contenders' Positions--Records of the contenders' issues positions are already being kept and some analyses of their most important policy proposals are being made. A major effort to analyze the contenders' policy proposals will be made as soon as the most likely Democratic candidate can be identified.
7. Fast Response Capability--I shall put together an issue-oriented phone book, as campaign time approaches, which will list every conceivable issue and the two or three top? who should handle that issue on the Domestic Council, in OMB, and in the agencies.

*We need further thought on this.*

The fast analytic response capability is being developed through the issues and answers process described above. The process established for developing the issues and answers involves identifying key agency personnel who are able to answer questions about each major contemporary issue. Through this process we will have identified the better analysts in the agencies as well as the Executive Office and have them used to producing useful materials on a fast turnaround basis.

DECISIONS TO BE MADE

If you concur in my general assessment of the problem and how it should be handled, I do not feel that we will need to add any staff beyond some summer interns before the election. The key decisions that do have to be made relate to logistics:

First, after having talked with Bryce, Martin, and Alan, I feel that I must strongly recommend that plans be made to have a research man travel on the campaign plane. Our earlier idea that John Ehrlichman handle this responsibility will probably not work because undoubtedly if John is around, the President will have him doing things other than checking out facts and doing research.

Second, the campaign plane and the campaign stop-over places should have communications facilities for the research effort including a telephone, a TWX, and a DE~~X~~ system. Some of these facilities could be used for other purposes, but let us be sure not to skimp on these critical facilities.

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ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

May 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PAT BUCHANAN

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN

During the Russia trip would be an excellent time to prepare the basic attack materials for the campaign. Your periodic reports on the information gathering systems on the Democratic contenders indicate that the RNC, 1701 (November Group) and Mort Allin have the raw data. This bulk of material should now be culled for the most egregious quotes by Humphrey, McGovern, O'Brien, et al.

As you may know, the Democratic issue attack has already been described in the DNC Fact booklet released last month. Ed Harper on Ehrlichman's staff supervised the preparation of a detailed point by point response.

The Democrats' statements and our issue responses should then be put into the most usable campaign document. This document or manual would then be updated after the Democratic Convention and periodically during the campaign.

John Mitchell and I have discussed this project in general terms, and we look forward to reviewing the material upon returning from Russia.

Thank you.

cc: John Mitchell

HRH/GS/jb  
P/U - 6/5

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



June 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

FRED MALEK *FJM*

SUBJECT:

Results of Meeting at  
Camp David

The purpose of this memorandum is to review for you some of the activities which took place at our recent Camp David meeting and to indicate the results flowing from the meeting.

I had two goals in mind for the Camp David meeting: a) to make the Voter Bloc Directors feel more a part of the top-level campaign team and b) to bring closer together the Voter Bloc Director and his counterpart at the White House. Both of these goals were met.

The meeting began at 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 25, with a presentation by Bill Novelli on advertising in the campaign. Bill began with an overall view of general advertising campaign strategy, then related the role of advertising to each of the voter bloc groups. Bill's presentation was outstanding and many of the subjects discussed evoked a great deal of discussion from both the Voter Bloc Directors and the White House Project Managers.

After dinner on Thursday evening, I conducted a lengthy discussion on field organization. Fred La Rue was our guest and he did a fine job. During the discussion period we zeroed in on some of the existing coordination problems between the Nixon field operation and the voter bloc activities. This was a very beneficial discussion period.

On Friday morning, May 26, Ann Dore gave a presentation on the development of communication and press plans for the voter bloc groups. Since the development of an overall public relations program is the responsibility of the White House Project Manager, I used this opportunity to discuss the responsibilities of the Voter Bloc Directors and the Project Managers. We had a lengthy and very frank discussion period and I identified some severe problems, and developed action steps to correct these problems. While some real weaknesses still exist, I feel the role of the Director and Project Manager has now been clarified; and there is now greater understanding between these two groups.

The second morning session dealt with administration efforts to support the reelection. Stan Anderson and Frank Herringer of my staff presented the various programs we have initiated to make the bureaucracy more responsive and to take advantage of the incumbency to the maximum degree possible.

In the afternoon session Jeb Magruder and I held a discussion on the overall campaign strategy. This session was particularly helpful to both the Voter Bloc Directors and Project Managers. Each participant had an opportunity to ask questions and to comment on the various topics as they were discussed.

All in all this meeting was a huge success. Each participant now has a far better knowledge of the overall campaign direction as well as a better understanding of his responsibilities and those of his counterpart. Finally, it was a great morale boost for all participants, and their gratefulness was quite evident.

Let me close by expressing my deep thanks to you for approving the use of Camp David. In light of the new policy, I am particularly appreciative of your making this exception. I can assure you that it had exactly the desired effect and was enormously helpful.

Attachments

ATTENDEES

Alex Armendariz	Spanish Speaking
Mike Balzano	Ethnic
Howard Cohen	Youth
Bud Evans	Aging
Larry Goldberg	Jewish
Paul Jones	Black
Bill Marumoto	Spanish Speaking
Frank Naylor	Veterans
Bill Rhatican	Veterans
Ken Rietz	Youth
Don Rogers	Labor
Charles Shearer	Citizens
Dan Todd	Aging
Clayton Yeutter	Agriculture

PARTICIPANTS

Stan Anderson  
Ann Dore  
Frank Herringer  
Fred La Rue  
Jeb Magruder  
Bill Novelli

CAMP DAVID AGENDA  
May 25/26

Thursday - May 25

<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
3:00 - 4:00	Arrive
4:00	Opening Remarks (Fred Malek)
4:15 - 5:45	<u>Session I: Campaign Advertising</u> (Bill Novelli)  - Overall advertising strategy - Use of advertising by the Citizens Group
6:15	Cocktails
7:15	Dinner
8:30 - 10:30	<u>Session II: Field Organization</u> (Fred La Rue)  - A typical state organization - The role of the Political Coordinators - Working relationships between the Citizens Groups and Field Organization
Later	Movie

Friday - May 26

7:00 - 8:00	Breakfast
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8:30 - 10:00	<u>Session III: Press and Publicity</u> (Ann Dore) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- The role of the Press Office</li><li>- Development of Press Plans</li><li>- Relationship with the Citizens Group</li><li>- Use of Surrogates</li></ul>
10:15 - 11:30	<u>Session IV: Administration</u> <u>Efforts to Support the Reelection</u> (Fred Malek, Frank Herringer, Stan Anderson) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Description of several programs underway to better utilize the incumbency</li></ul>
12:00	Lunch
1:00 - 2:00	<u>Session V: Summary and General Discussion</u> (Fred Malek)
2:00 - 4:00	Free time
4:15 - 5:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Have baggage ready</li></ul> <u>Session VI: General Campaign Strategy</u> (Jeb Magruder, Fred Malek)
5:30	Leave for Washington

UPI-168

(GOP)

WASHINGTON--JOHN N. MITCHELL SAID TODAY WHAT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM A CAMPAIGN MANAGER WITH A CANDIDATE WHOSE NOMINATION IS ALREADY ASSURED AND WHOSE OPPONENTS ARE BICKERING AMONG THEMSELVES: HE EXPECTS TO WIN.

THE FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL, IN HIS FIRST NEWS CONFERENCE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE TO RE-ELECT THE PRESIDENT, TOLD REPORTERS THAT PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD DEFEAT ANY DEMOCRAT THE OPPOSITION PUT UP.

ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF NIXON WOULD BEAT SEN. GEORGE S. MCGOVERN, THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT-RUNNER FOR THE NOMINATION, MITCHELL REPLIED: "VERY VERY HANDILY."

"I DON'T THINK ANY OF THEM WOULD BE TOUGH," HE SAID.

HE DENIED THE REPUBLICANS WERE HOPING MCGOVERN WOULD GET THE

NOMINATION,

HE DENIED THE REPUBLICANS WERE HOPING MCGOVERN WOULD GET THE NOMINATION, SAYING HE WAS GOING TO LET THE DEMOCRATS DECIDE THAT. AS FOR MCGOVERN'S CAMPAIGN POSITIONS, MITCHELL SAID HE WOULD LET THE SOUTH DAKOTA SENATOR'S DEMOCRATIC OPPONENTS TALK ABOUT THEM TOO. BUT TO PUT A FINE POINT ON IT, MITCHELL SAID MCGOVERN'S OPPONENTS HAVE CALLED HIS VIEWS ON DEFENSE SPENDING CUTS, WELFARE AND TAX REFORM AND "A LONG LIST" OF OTHER ISSUES "EXTREME."

MITCHELL SAID MCGOVERN'S LEADING POSITION IN THE DEMOCRATIC RACE DIDN'T SURPRISE HIM. HE SAID THE SENATOR HAD DONE "REASONABLY WELL," BUT HAD RECEIVED LESS THAN A MAJORITY OF THE VOTES IN A NUMBER OF THE PRIMARIES HE WON. HE ALSO CALLED MCGOVERN "AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO HAS BEEN PRETTY WELL PACKAGED BY SOME EXPENSIVE MEDIA CAMPAIGNS." HE SAID THE "PROLIFERATION OF CANDIDATES" ALSO HELPED MCGOVERN.

MITCHELL, WHO ALSO MANAGED NIXON'S 1968 CAMPAIGN, SAID THIS YEAR'S CAMPAIGN WOULD BE THE TYPE "AN INCUMBENT PRESIDENT SHOULD RUN -- I SEE NO PLACE IN IT FOR BITTERNESS OR DIVISIVE TACTICS." NIXON WILL RUN ON HIS RECORD, MITCHELL SAID.

6-8--W0405PED

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PRESS CONFERENCE

Thursday, June 8, 1972

2:25 p.m.

Participants:

HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL,

National Director of the Committee for the Reelection  
of the President; accompanied by

DEVAN SHUMWAY

and

MEMBERS OF THE PRESS

- - -

Petite Ballroom,  
Roger Smith Hotel  
Washington, D. C.

MR. SHUMWAY: Ladies and Gentlemen, I am Devan  
Shumway. Mr. Mitchell will have a brief opening statement and  
then will be happy to take your questions, and I will stop it  
at about half an hour.

MR. MITCHELL: Are you all set?

This must be the only show in town from the looks of  
the crowd.

VOICE: Can't hear you.

MR. MITCHELL: Why don't you stop making noise back  
there, and maybe you will. It looks like the situation is  
normal.

All set?

1 Who produced this one?

2 In case you gentlemen haven't taken cognizance of it,  
3 I would like to make sure you know that President Nixon now  
4 has enough committed delegates for his nomination at the  
5 Republican Convention in Miami.

6 Secondly, I would also like to have you ladies and  
7 gentlemen know that contrary to some published reports, the  
8 Committee for the Reelection of the President is not engaged  
9 in the selection of the Democrat candidate for the Presidency.

10 And, having set the record clear on that, I am  
11 available to take your questions.

12 QUESTION: What do you mean by that last remark?

13 MR. MITCHELL: It seem that some of the press thought  
14 that the Committee for the Reelection of the President had been  
15 engaged in selecting the Democrat candidate and I want to  
16 flatly deny that.

17 QUESTION: Haven't you already picked McGovern?

18 MR. MITCHELL: No, and I don't know anyone else that  
19 has, definitively.

20 QUESTION: Are you implying that Senator McGovern  
21 would be the softest touch, the softest nominee they could  
22 nominate?

23 MR. MITCHELL: No, I am not implying that whatso-  
24 ever. I made no statement with respect to which of the  
25 numerous Democrat candidates that we should run against, or

1 would like to. I think that is entirely within the process of  
2 the Democrat Party and we will refrain from that subject matter  
3 until after this convention in Miami.

4 QUESTION: What is --

5 QUESTION: How do you feel about the prospect of  
6 facing McGovern?

7 MR. MITCHELL: We are not particularly concerned who  
8 the candidate is. We think President Nixon will be reelected.

9 QUESTION: What will the possibility of Mr. Wallace  
10 going on a third ticket do to your strategy?

11 MR. MITCHELL: Well, this, of course, is an open  
12 question. I think that it is one in which nobody can speak  
13 to it with certainty. Governor Wallace ran as a third party  
14 candidate in 1968 and the debate is still going on among the  
15 experts as to whether or not he hurt or helped a Democrat  
16 or Republican.

17 I think that at this particular time, as then, you  
18 have to look at it as a campaign that is divided into 50 parts  
19 and the effect of a third party candidate, by Governor Wallace,  
20 would depend upon the particular states in which he might be  
21 entered.

22 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, you seem to use the word  
23 "Democrat" as an adjective. Is that going to be the style this  
24 year or--

25 MR. MITCHELL: Is there another, better use for it?

1 QUESTION: Well, it usually is the word "Democratic",  
2 using the adjective.

3 MR. MITCHELL: Well, you can have my permission to  
4 write it that way in your story if you prefer it.

5 QUESTION: You prefer it the other way?

6 MR. MITCHELL: It depends on the context in which I  
7 use it.

8 QUESTION: What will the issues be this year, Mr.  
9 Mitchell, in your view?

10 MR. MITCHELL: Of course, it depends entirely on who  
11 the opposing candidate may be and I would believe that as far  
12 as the campaign for the reelection of the President, it will  
13 be his outstanding record as an incumbent and we certainly will  
14 run on that.

15 QUESTION: What will be the issues if McGovern is  
16 a candidate?

17 MR. MITCHELL: Well, I am not quite certain what  
18 issues Mr. Mac may bring up. I don't think that we will have  
19 any problem of assessing what some of his Democrat opponents  
20 have said during the campaign in which they pointed out that he  
21 has taken extreme issue on cutting the defense budget, and his  
22 so-called welfare and tax bill, his statements on the POWs  
23 and there will be a long list of them.

24 QUESTION: Have you met with the President since his  
25 return?

1 MR. MITCHELL: Since his return from Moscow? No, sir,  
2 I have not.

3 QUESTION: Do you regard Senator McGovern as an  
4 extremist in his views?

5 MR. MITCHELL: I am not quite certain what views the  
6 good Senator is going to stand with. I was referring to the  
7 fact that people within his own party have so characterized him  
8 as taking extreme positions and extreme views.

9 QUESTION: Do you have reason to believe that  
10 Vietnam will not be an issue?

11 MR. MITCHELL: I would believe that Vietnam could  
12 very well not be an issue. I would expect that the North  
13 Vietnamese are going to have to come to the realization that  
14 the President has put before them a very, very attractive  
15 peace proposal that would be in their interest to accept and I  
16 trust that before too long they will come to this conclusion.

17 QUESTION: Senator McGovern's people have already  
18 suggested they have looked to this to be a rather bitter  
19 campaign and they expect it to be rather bitter in nature.

20 Can you allay their fears on that?

21 MR. MITCHELL: I can assure you as far as the  
22 Committee for the Re-election of the President is concerned we  
23 are going to run the type of campaign that an incumbent  
24 President should run and deal with the issues and we see no  
25 place in it for bitterness or any of the other divisive

1 activities that may have been suggested.

2 QUESTION: Is the Committee planning for the President  
3 to go out on the hustings and do any campaigning among the  
4 people?

5 MR. MITCHELL: Well, the President has stated that he  
6 will not even consider the subject matter of politics or  
7 campaigning until after the conclusion of the Republican  
8 Convention in August. I believe that the decision as to what  
9 he will do at that particular time will be made in relationship  
10 as to what is the state of the nation and what time he might  
11 be able to allocate to campaigning as distinguished from his  
12 duties as Chief Executive.

13 QUESTION: If I can follow that up, Mr. Mitchell,  
14 are you in any shape at this time to recommend to what  
15 extent he will go around to the various states as an active  
16 candidate?

17 MR. MITCHELL: Quite the contrary. The determinations  
18 in that area will be made on the basis of the availability of  
19 his time as President.

20 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, what specifically do you  
21 have in mind doing to carry to the people your feeling about  
22 the success of the Moscow-Peking summit trips? Any specific  
23 campaign plans in that connection?

24 MR. MITCHELL: I don't believe they need the campaign  
25 plans. I think the people in this country are quite aware of

1 the accomplishment of the President in Peiping, in Moscow,  
2 and of the agreements that came out of Moscow, and their follow-  
3 on effect on the American people.

4 I believe that the American people are well aware of  
5 it and you don't have to merchandise that or package it to  
6 try and sell it.

7 QUESTION: Would that overshadow any differences  
8 you might have politically with regard to the status of the  
9 economy?

10 MR. MITCHELL: I believe that the President's  
11 performance in office is such that nothing needs to be over-  
12 shadowed, including the economy, where every possible indicator  
13 is showing that the economy is on the upswing.

14 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, why do you think Senator  
15 McGovern has done as well as he has done?

16 MR. MITCHELL: I am sorry; I can't hear you.

17 QUESTION: Why do you think Senator McGovern has done  
18 as well as he has done in the primaries?

19 MR. MITCHELL: Well, I am not so sure I would put  
20 it into that context. I think to date he has done remarkably  
21 well. You must remember that in his so-called wins in these  
22 different primaries he had relatively low percentages, certainly  
23 less than a majority throughout most of all of them.

24 If I had to suggest the thought, it would probably  
25 be on the basis that George McGovern is an unknown quantity to

1 the American people, who has been pretty well packaged by some  
2 expensive media campaigns. If you will just take a look at  
3 California where I understand his file expenditures in the  
4 middle of May were in excess of \$1.6 million and add on the  
5 amount that was expended from that time to the date of the  
6 California primary, you can see what I am talking about.

7 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, do you have any idea what his  
8 principal sources of financial support are?

9 MR. MITCHELL: We have some ideas as you gentlemen  
10 do in the media; and I am sure that after he files his  
11 report, that is required by the new election law, this weekend,  
12 that we will all know who they are.

13 QUESTION: Why did you choose not to submit the  
14 President's contributions prior to April 6, the cutoff date?

15 MR. MITCHELL: That is very simple. We believe in  
16 complying with the dictates of Congress that exist in the  
17 legislation and, as you know, under the Corrupt Practices  
18 Act, it was in effect until the 7th of April. We did not have  
19 to file them. We will, of course, comply fully with the new  
20 election law that is on the books and the filing will be made  
21 in the requisite time.

22 QUESTION: Is there anything to forbid filing  
23 anything?

24 MR. MITCHELL: Well, there is nothing to forbid anybody  
25 from filing anything, but it was not required and I would point

1 out that none of the candidates who went about the so-called  
2 filings complied with the provisions of this new law.

3 QUESTION: Would you give us a list of preferred  
4 running mates that might be considered by the President?

5 MR. MITCHELL: I believe that the President--you are  
6 talking about President Nixon, I presume?

7 QUESTION: Yes, the Republican.

8 MR. MITCHELL: I don't think that you need a list. I  
9 think what you should do is to go back to the conversation that  
10 Mr. Rather here had with the President and some of the state-  
11 ments that have been made by the Vice President and you will  
12 come to the realization that that determination will be made  
13 at a later date.

14 QUESTION: How much of a role will Mr. Connally  
15 play, then, in the the developing campaign?

16 MR. MITCHELL: Well, I, of course, have not gotten  
17 to the point where I have talked about any assigned role to Mr.  
18 Connally. As you know, he is now on a very extensive trip for  
19 the President. Undoubtedly, he will be undertaking further  
20 trips for the President. I believe that in what Connally has  
21 stated publicly, in his own statements, that he fully supports  
22 the President and he will continue to actively do so.

23 QUESTION: Would you interpret the votes of George  
24 McGovern and George Wallace as protest votes and, if so, how  
25 would you deal with them?

1 MR. MITCHELL: Well, I don't know that they are  
2 necessarily protest votes. I think that they are votes for a  
3 particular candidate and certainly they are candidates who are  
4 poles apart and I don't think that we have to deal with both  
5 of those blocks.

6 If you will look at the popular vote that the  
7 President has received in relatively uncontested primaries, he  
8 has received more votes than any other candidates and I am  
9 sure that when you transfer from the primaries to the general  
10 election it will become evident that he will receive even more  
11 of a majority than the comparison between what he has received  
12 and those other candidates.

13 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, were you personally surprised  
14 at the emergence of McGovern as the front runner for the  
15 Democrats?

16 MR. MITCHELL: Not particularly, no.

17 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, would you care to predict  
18 what the outcome would be if Mr. Nixon ran against Mr. McGovern  
19 without any third party?

20 MR. MITCHELL: Would I predict the outcome?

21 QUESTION: Yes.

22 MR. MITCHELL: I think the President would win very,  
23 very handsily.

24 QUESTION: Would you give us some numbers, just  
25 ballpark numbers?

1 MR. MITCHELL: I am leaving that to you fellows. You  
2 have such a good track record over the past six months.

3 QUESTION: Everybody else is surprised by George  
4 Mac today. Why aren't you surprised?

5 MR. MITCHELL: Well, I am not surprised for a very  
6 simple reason: As I mentioned before, he is a candidate who  
7 has received a minority of the votes in the Democrat Party.  
8 He has had more financing than any other candidate in the  
9 Democrat Party. He has picked the spots to go into and when  
10 you come off with 30 percent of a vote in a state like Wisconsin,  
11 after the type of campaign that he ran, I am not surprised at  
12 all. It was proliferation of the candidates in the other party  
13 that allowed him to emerge.

14 QUESTION: Are you saying, then, he is just lucky?

15 MR. MITCHELL: I don't think luck has anything to  
16 do with it.

17 QUESTION: Do you agree with Mr. Finch's statement  
18 yesterday about Mr. Connally?

19 MR. MITCHELL: I didn't hear Mr. Finch's statement;  
20 I am sorry.

21 QUESTION: Mr. Finch said it would be supremely  
22 unlikely for Mr. Connally to be nominated as Vice President.  
23 Would you agree with that?

24 MR. MITCHELL: Well, I have said I couldn't address  
25 myself to it because that is a matter that is to be decided

1 down the road, under the circumstances that exist at that time.

2 QUESTION: Do you find as he did that there is a  
3 certain amount of opposition within your party to the idea  
4 of Mr. Connally becoming Vice President?

5 MR. MITCHELL: No, I haven't.

6 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Nixon asked you your  
7 advice on running mates four years ago and we assume he will  
8 again.

9 MR. MITCHELL: How do you arrive at that conclusion?

10 QUESTION: I heard about it; read it some place.

11 MR. MITCHELL: That, along with about 50 other  
12 people, as I recall.

13 QUESTION: Yes; at any rate, my question is,  
14 without necessarily telling who are your choices, are you  
15 ready at this time to make a recommendation?

16 MR. MITCHELL: No, I wouldn't want to do that  
17 either to him or to you. I think the appropriate time to make  
18 that recommendation would be closer to the convention.

19 QUESTION: What is wrong with Mr. Agnew's record?

20 MR. MITCHELL: As far as I am concerned, there is  
21 nothing wrong with Mr. Agnew's record. I think he has been an  
22 outstanding Vice President.

23 QUESTION: Why not renominate him?

24 MR. MITCHELL: Well, I say that that decision should  
25 be made further down the road. The nominating process

1 doesn't take place in this first week in June and I think  
2 anybody in politics ought to reserve all of their options.

3 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, do you see a role for the  
4 President after the convention is in helping elect a Republican  
5 Congress or Republicans to Congress?

6 MR. MITCHELL: I most assuredly do. By running  
7 strong in the Presidency, it would provide broad coattails to  
8 help in the election of a Republican Congress.

9 QUESTION: Where do you consider the President is  
10 vulnerable? To put the question another way, where do you  
11 expect the Democrats to attack, on what issues--on the issues  
12 of the President's personality?

13 Where are you expecting the major thrust of their  
14 campaign?

15 MR. MITCHELL: I think that would be dependent  
16 entirely on who their candidate was and how they proposed to  
17 approach it. Obviously, as I have said before, they have this  
18 issue of unemployment which is more rhetoric than it is  
19 a political issue. When you look at the fact that this  
20 Administration has provided some 6.5 million additional jobs  
21 since it has been in office, that the heads of households that  
22 are unemployed is in the 2.4 or 5, 6 or 7 range, that the  
23 statistics relate mostly to women who have come into the labor  
24 market, the rate of unemployment will decrease and I think it  
25 will be more rhetoric than it will be a factual issue.

1 QUESTION: Would you consider Hubert Humphrey a  
2 tougher candidate to beat than George McGovern?

3 MR. MITCHELL: I don't know as I could possibly  
4 answer that because it would depend upon what would happen after  
5 the nomination of either one of them. Question mark: Will  
6 labor support the nominee? Will there be a third or fourth  
7 party? You would have to make those determinations or  
8 ascertain those facts before you could make a determination.

9 QUESTION: Who do you think would be the toughest  
10 Democrat candidate?

11 MR. MITCHELL: I don't think any of them are tough.

12 QUESTION: How about Senator Kennedy?

13 MR. MITCHELL: Well, I am not sure that the good  
14 senator is interested in becoming a candidate and I think if he  
15 did become one, we would have to assess where he stood and  
16 how the American people assessed him before we could make that  
17 judgment.

18 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, by any measure that you would  
19 choose, do you think the Republican Party is still as much  
20 a minority party as it was four years ago?

21 MR. MITCHELL: I believe that at the present time,  
22 certainly on the basis of registration, that it is. I believe  
23 also, and certainly depending upon the candidate of the other  
24 parties, that there may be considerable movement to the  
25 Republican Party. We recognize the fact that it is a minority

1 party and that is why it is so important that our campaign be  
2 run directed at the independents and Democrats as well as  
3 the Republicans. It is absolutely necessary in order to elect  
4 a President in these United States running on a Republican  
5 ticket.

6 QUESTION: Are you speaking more of a movement if  
7 McGovern is nominated--are you expecting more of a movement  
8 to the Republican Party if he is nominated?

9 MR. MITCHELL: According to what the governors were  
10 saying down in Houston, I think that might be reasonably assumed.

11 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, you quited Democrats as  
12 labeling McGovern's views as extremist. Do you so label them,  
13 too?

14 MR. MITCHELL: I would prefer to stand on what the  
15 Democrats are saying about Mr. McGovern rather than get mixed  
16 up in their nominating process.

17 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, what are the chances of a  
18 peace settlement in Vietnam before the election?

19 MR. MITCHELL: Well, I can't answer that question, but  
20 I would believe that they are probably better now than they  
21 have been in the past.

22 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, how do you intend to--while  
23 employment has gone up--the number of people employed, the  
24 unemployment rate has also gone up--how do you intend to answer  
25 that if it ever comes to that?

1 MR. MITCHELL: Well, the unemployment rate is start-  
2 ing down; as you know, it is below 6 percent and it will  
3 continue down between now and the election according to the  
4 prognostications of all of the informed people.

5 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Mac beat Mr. Humphrey  
6 in most of the blue collar areas in New Jersey. Does that  
7 worry you?

8 MR. MITCHELL: I am sorry; I didn't hear your question.

9 QUESTION: I said Mr. Mac beat Mr. Humphrey--the  
10 candidate of labor--in most of the working class areas in New  
11 Jersey, on Tuesday; does this bother you, because New Jersey is  
12 like--

13 MR. MITCHELL: I am not ready to accept your premise  
14 but I still believe if it came to a choice between either one  
15 of them and the President, because of their respective positions,  
16 that they will still vote in the majority for the President.

17 QUESTION: Do you think they will vote for Mr. Nixon  
18 over Mr. McGovern?

19 MR. MITCHELL: Or Mr. Humphrey.

20 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, what sort of a campaign  
21 committee -- kitty, excuse me -- are you figuring on? How  
22 much financing will you have for the campaign? Is it in the  
23 neighborhood of \$40 million as widely speculated?

24 MR. MITCHELL: Well, that is a very respectable  
25 neighborhood and I would like to believe that we could get there.

1 but we are not setting our sights that high.

2 I can put it very simply, that every dollar that we can  
3 appropriately use that we can obtain through legitimate  
4 channels, we will find a use for it, in my opinion.

5 QUESTION: Well, sir, that is simple, but it doesn't  
6 tell us anything.

7 MR. MITCHELL: That is right.

8 (Laughter.)

9 QUESTION: I will try again.

10 MR. MITCHELL: Ted, I am glad you found that out.

11 QUESTION: Will you tell us approximately what you  
12 are figuring on?

13 MR. MITCHELL: We are figuring on expending as much  
14 money as we can properly use and properly collect. Now, let  
15 me tell you how we are starting the campaign because raising  
16 of funds is not an exact science.

17 We are structuring our campaign and putting our  
18 dollars into the organizational process of it. That is where  
19 our first dollars are going to. If we get through with that,  
20 and we still have some money left over, we will use them for  
21 the media and direct mail and those other activities that are  
22 the frosting on the cake.

23 QUESTION: How much do you want to spend on organiza-  
24 tion?

25 MR. MITCHELL: I can't tell you because we haven't got

1 all of our budgets in from the 50 campaigns that are being  
2 run in the 50 states.

3 QUESTION: What is your position on televised  
4 debates between the two candidates in the campaign?

5 MR. MITCHELL: Well, I am sure you gentlemen are  
6 aware that no incumbent President has ever debated a candidate  
7 in a presidential election and as far as my position is  
8 concerned, I would advise the President against it.

9 You are also well aware that every statement that a  
10 President makes is a policy-forming statement and I am sure  
11 that any incumbent of the White House would be very, very  
12 foolish to undertake a debate to the point where people around  
13 the world and in this country might get a misimpression from the  
14 contents of that debate as to what the policies of this country  
15 might be.

16 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, what is your current assessment  
17 of what the role of Governor Wallace will be in this election?

18 MR. MITCHELL: I haven't the faintest idea. I am  
19 sure it will depend entirely on his health.

20 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, do you have any strategy  
21 for getting votes in the South?

22 MR. MITCHELL: You bet, Sarah, we are going to send  
23 you down there.

24 QUESTION: Do you have any strategy to get John  
25 Ashbrook back?

1 MR. MITCHELL: I think John Ashbrook's statement  
2 of yesterday or today, whenever it was made, is a clear case  
3 he is already back.

4 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, do you think the President's  
5 cause has been hurt by the ITT matter?

6 MR. MITCHELL: I do not believe so. I do not believe  
7 the American public has swallowed one bit of that nonsense that  
8 was tried to be portrayed by a small segment of the Judiciary  
9 Committee. I think the ploy was overplayed and the majority,  
10 large majority of the people in this country recognized it for  
11 what it was.

12 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, how do you plan to get along  
13 with the press in this campaign?

14 MR. MITCHELL: I always get along very well with  
15 the press; haven't you noticed?

16 QUESTION: Institutionally.

17 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, if I heard right, you said  
18 the war in Vietnam may not be much of an issue, unemployment  
19 would be more rhetoric than an issue, and that the  
20 summit thing doesn't need any merchandising. What are we going  
21 to have--a noncampaign?

22 MR. MITCHELL: I would not believe that that would be  
23 the case. I would believe that the opposing candidate, whoever  
24 he might be, might try to raise certain issues. What I am  
25 saying is that I think that they will fail because of the

1 record that the President has produced.

2 QUESTION: You seem to be suggesting a defensive  
3 campaign there.

4 QUESTION: You said that--

5 MR. MITCHELL: There is never a defensive campaign  
6 to go out and sell the record of the incumbent President.

7 QUESTION: The President has said that he would run  
8 or that the public should watch his actions in relation  
9 to the Negro community. What action will be cited?

10 MR. MITCHELL: Can I correct you? That was a mis-  
11 quote of me, not of the President, and now if you will put  
12 your question in that context and relate it to me, I will be  
13 glad to answer it.

14 QUESTION: Well, I do believe that the President  
15 himself has said the he should be judged by his actions, not  
16 by his words.

17 MR. MITCHELL: Well, if you are talking about the  
18 actions of this Administration in the black community, this  
19 is a great record to run on.

20 Starting with the Justice Department of which I have  
21 some personal knowledge, in every conceivable field in that  
22 department there were more accomplishments than any previous  
23 Administration, whether it be in the field of housing or school  
24 desegregation or equal employment or whatever it was; all you  
25 have to do is look at the record and measure it in any way you

1 want and our accomplishments have been greater.

2 I think the record goes similarly to what has been  
3 done over in HUD, over in HEW, in Commerce with respect to  
4 the help for the business community among the minorities.

5 I think it is a great record and it has been so  
6 accepted by anybody who has taken the time to look at it in an  
7 impartial manner.

8 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, why is the black leadership  
9 so ungrateful?

10 MR. MITCHELL: Which black leadership are you talking  
11 about? You mean the ones that are financed by the  
12 Democrat Party and labor unions or the real black leadership in  
13 the country?

14 QUESTION: Well, you name a black leader who has  
15 praised the Nixon Administration.

16 MR. MITCHELL: It depends on what you classify as  
17 leaders. If you will come to a dinner here in town on  
18 Saturday night, I think there will be 1,500 there to carry that  
19 thought forward.

20 QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell --

21 MR. SHUMWAY: Thank you very much, Ladies and  
22 Gentlemen.

23 MR. MITCHELL: Thank you for coming.

24 (Whereupon, at 3:02 p.m., the press conference  
25 was concluded.)

MEMORANDUM

X

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1972

FOR BOB HALDEMAN

Attached are three memos that have come to John's attention. He has asked that I forward them to you and request that you review them. He would most appreciate having your reaction.

 Tod R. Hullin

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN EHRLICHMAN

FROM: KEN COLE

As I mentioned this morning, our senior staff got together to discuss how we might do a better job of positioning the President domestically and more specifically to determine whether or not there was some unifying theme which could be advanced and under which we could place the President's domestic programs.

I would characterize the results of this meeting as inconclusive, but I didn't expect much more given the mere 1-1/2 hours which we had to discuss the issue.

The following are some random thoughts from the meeting which may be of help to you:

1. The basic thrust of what the President is trying to do in both domestic and foreign policy runs along the lines of the Guam Doctrine. In foreign policy -- the U.S. will help but the countries that we are helping have got to take a major initiative to help themselves. In domestic policy the Federal Government can help but the States, the Cities, and Counties must play the major role in solving their problems.
2. The President's strong point is that he is pragmatic. He wants to do what will work. Promises aren't good enough. He is looking for performance.
3. We believe that the President should run as an "In" as far as foreign policy is concerned and as an "Out" as far as domestic policy is concerned. We believe this is possible because he has been able to achieve his decentralization of power on the foreign side while he has not been able to achieve it on the domestic side. He should run against the establishment - Congress, the bureaucracy and special interests.

*note response*

4. While we all agree that we need to find a better way to communicate the above, unfortunately none of us have very good suggestions as to how it might be done. I know this is an unpopular line of thinking, but we still feel that the President needs to play the major role in communicating domestic policy. While the polls indicate he is experienced, trained, informed, competent, safe, and conservative, they also indicate that he lacks one attribute which we feel is the mark of a leader, especially in today's world - and that is compassion.

He obviously does not lack compassion, it's just that the public rarely gets to see it. All of us agreed that we have never been at a meeting with the President where those others present from the outside had not said to us afterwards what an entirely different man he was from the picture they had received from the media. In the majority of instances, their comments were directed not only to his knowledge but most importantly to his understanding of their situation. We need to find a way to communicate this to the public.

5. Two examples of what might be done come to mind:

- #
- A. On his trip to the Capitol, apparently while walking in the building, a lady in the crowd thrust a "Stop The War" sign in his face and the President walked on by. As we see it, much more could have been gained (assuming TV cameras and some sound were present) had he stopped to explain that he understood her concern and then gone on to give the reasons why he had to do what he was doing despite these concerns and that perhaps he shared them.
- B. Another example would perhaps dramatize revenue sharing and the President's belief that the people as well as state and local governments share the responsibility for their destiny and that things are not just up to the Federal Government. A visit to a ghetto area would provide the President an opportunity to demonstrate that he did have a first-hand knowledge of how awful things were, and then to point out that for years Washington has not been able to solve these problems and in some cases has only added to them. He could then go on to state his belief that the citizens of the area can best solve their own problems given the

resources, hence revenue sharing. Only the establishment -- Congress and the bureaucracy are preventing progress.

Little of this is different from what we have been saying, but the visual or physical approach on the President's part is quite different. It involves some risks, but we are convinced that he can't "reach the world" from the Oval Office or through impersonal situations with governmental leaders and others of the same ilk who lack credibility in the eyes of the people.

6. We feel too that the President could do more press conferences. These are a pain in the neck to prepare, but they are always "10 strikes" for him.
7. One of my thoughts is that the President should not use the "for all of the people" theme. My judgment, which was not discussed with the others, is that this won't work. He is perceived as being for big business and if we keep saying he is for all the people it will be viewed as a hoax. Rather, we need to show, and the President's domestic programs demonstrate this in some areas, that he is for the "little guy" or whatever it is you want to call him. Specific programs which prove the point are Revenue Sharing, Reorganization, Drugs, Busing, Education, and to a lesser degree environment and health. Additionally, smaller programs such as pension vesting, minority business enterprise, public feeding (Food Stamps, School Lunch, School Breakfast), Jobs for Veterans and our Aging initiatives also count.
8. Lastly, we talked about Chapin's "Generation of Peace" theme. It has some possibilities but needs additional conceptual thought with regard to its relationship to domestic policy.

I have attached a copy of Ed Harper's memos on the overall subject which you have reviewed previously but may want to take a look at again. Also attached is a paper from Ed - "The President takes a Vacation" - which he proposed at the meeting.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR KEN COLE

FROM:

ED HARPER *EH*

SUBJECT:

Major Presidential Event

This is to propose that the President take a vacation. The logic of it is that the President has worked hard for three years and never taken a vacation. Furthermore, he will have just worked hard preparing for and participating in the Moscow Summit and will have a very demanding campaign before him.

Everybody takes a vacation once in a while; why shouldn't the President?

The President's taking a vacation would serve some very important political purposes. First of all, it would identify him with the average American who takes a vacation trip with his family to see the great sights of America. Secondly, it provides the President with an opportunity to show his spontaneous concern about America and its people. Third, it would show dimensions to his personality that are not readily apparent in the White House setting.

A vacation trip would give him the opportunity to do the following things:

1. Casually meet many average Americans in different circumstances.
2. Go to a baseball game, perhaps in Chicago.
3. Eat out with the public at a restaurant.
4. "Stand in awe" of the Grand Canyon.
5. Visit some Chicanos in a small town in the Southwest.

6. Drive around some of America's inner cities.
7. Independence Hall, Philadelphia.
8. Table Rock, Missouri - School of the Ozarks - Silver Dollar City.
9. Wisconsin Dells.
10. Savannah, Georgia.
11. Disney World, Florida.
12. Yosemite National Park.
13. Sante Fe, New Mexico (Taos Pueblo).
14. Fort Ticondaroga.
15. Atlanta - Stone Mountain.
16. Museum of Science and Technology - Chicago.
17. Ottumwa, Iowa.
18. Leadville, Colorado.

The trip would not be as hard as it might sound logistically. To maintain the vacation format, the President would make no speeches, attend no formal events, and issue no prepared remarks. Thus, the President and Mrs. Nixon need be accompanied by no more than perhaps one staff member beyond Secret Service and servants. The small press pool could accompany him, but they would be given no advance warning as to where they were going to go, or what he would do. The President should scrupulously avoid meetings with any political types. Perhaps the trip could retrace an old vacation route of the Nixon family in previous years.

ELH:ppd

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 19, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR KEN COLE

FROM:

ED HARPER *EH*

SUBJECT:

1701 Campaign and Advertising Strategy

At Len Garment's request, the 1701 Advertising Group gave Len Garment and me a special showing of their presentation on campaign and advertising strategy. Pete Dailey, Phil Joanou, and Bill Taylor made the presentation. Jeb Magruder stopped in at the outset to emphasize that this was very preliminary and that it would be a couple of months before they were ready to make any firm decisions. The following are my notes on the presentation.

I. BACKGROUND

Decisive Personal Attributes of the President:

RN IS--

Experienced  
Trained  
Informed  
Competent  
Safe  
Conservative

RN IS NOT--

Frank  
Warm  
Extroverted  
Relaxed  
Sense of Humor

Right Track vs. Wrong Track

"Is America going the right direction or is it on the wrong track?" is a Roper question going back to 1960. A majority felt America was on the right track until 1965. Since then a majority have felt America is on the wrong track. There has been no significant change since 1968.

### Election Climate

1. Country is in trouble.
2. Government is not concerned... or responsive.
3. Politicians don't care.
4. Things are too complicated.
5. Government is not truthful.
6. People are fed up with government; they think it doesn't work.

### Credibility

1. You can't eliminate a credibility problem; you can only minimize it.
2. The best ways to handle a credibility problem are avoid overstatement and to admit small mistakes, but at the same time contrast little mistakes with big right decisions.

### Some Issues Setting Vietnam Aside

1. High and unfair taxation.
2. Lack of credibility, trust.
3. Waste, inefficiency in government, high taxes and prices,
4. Personal safety (related to crime and drugs).
5. Favoritism of "haves" over "have nots."
6. High prices.
7. Jobs.
8. Break-up of neighborhood schools. Be careful with busing; low key it.

Weak point is public's opinion that RN is not the best man to handle key domestic issues; thus, our strategy should be to bolster his handling of domestic issues.

## II. OVERALL CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

--RN does not have to be a defender of the status quo. He is against status quo.

--Inform public of RN's accomplishments:

How things were in 1968.

How they are today.

How they are going to be. (What kind of a country is the United States going to become? Give the people hope. His solutions the best solutions.)

--Shift more concern to the domestic scene. RN is the clearly perceived master of international affairs, but not the master of any domestic areas.

--Strongly counter the opposition. RN should NOT attack the opposition; he is not at his best in the attack and this is not Presidential. Other Administration officials can do the attacking.

--Aggressive campaign--be positive.

### III. CREATIVE STRATEGY

What we should say:

1. RN is an activist.
2. RN has long-range vision--everything part of master plan.
3. RN inherited a mess. Remind public of '68 mess.
4. RN is a man of courage, decisiveness, and dedication.
5. Present the issues.

--Use specific issues, both those which have high problem ranking and those which allow us to tell a good story; e. g., economy, peace, Vietnam, drugs, crime, environment, elderly.

How should we say it?

1. Personalize the issues.
2. Limit the use of the President in advertising.

--President on camera--avoid RN as campaigner.

--President voice over--avoid RN as campaigner.

--Announcer's voice over clips of President in action.

--Announcer's voice over no Presidential footage.

3. Humanize the President; never subject of commercial; incidental to coverage of other issues.
4. Presidential tone--honest, understated, believable.

IV. COMMERCIALS

Bill Taylor of the Advertising group showed rough mock-up's of 10 TV commercials. They seemed to be technically competent and one showed some real imagination.

Each commercial ends with the slogan, "America Needs President Nixon." The PR Group proposed that, "America Needs President Nixon," replace, "Re-elect the President."

V. MY OVERALL REACTION

1. I agree with Jeb Magruder that it will be some time before they are ready to make any firm decisions.
2. The work on the commercials to a layman looks good, but leaves me wondering if anybody will ever be convinced by any commercial.
3. I am left with a very uneasy feeling about the 1701 Survey Research Program, because it really does not seem to be producing in-depth motivational analysis which is being applied to the development of the advertising strategy. To be fair, no one from the Research Group was at this presentation.

ELH:ppd

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

George Wallace - Dr. Lukash

Dr. Lukash visited George Wallace today for 45 minutes. Present in the hospital room were the Governor and Mrs. Wallace, Dr. Shannow, and Lukash. Lukash extended the President's best wishes to Wallace and had these observations:

- 1) Wallace is in better condition than newspaper pictures indicate. Wallace has lost weight in his face which makes him look sicker than he is;
- 2) Wallace is gaining weight, is experiencing some abdominal pain, but is moving about well with braces and wheel chair;
- 3) Wallace will attend the Democratic Convention. Lukash believes he could meet with delegates and could even make a speech to the Convention;
- 4) After the Democratic Convention Wallace will be recovering in braces and a wheel chair for 3-6 months;
- 5) Wallace was very outgoing and talkative. The Russia trip and Wallace's sincere appreciation of the Haig briefing were mentioned;
- 6) Wallace's tendency toward depression is decreasing though he was reluctant to hold a press conference to counter the misquote of his son indicating Governor Wallace could not attend the Democratic Convention;

7) Although Wallace doesn't want any "freebies and thereby obligate himself", the Governor asked Lukash about the President's offer of a plane to Miami Beach. Lukash was in the room when the President visited Wallace on May 19 and overheard the offer of "one of my planes" to Wallace. The Wallace staff is aware of the offer of the plane because it has been discussed since the President's offer. However, they want to keep the offer confidential according to Lukash. The unresolved question is whether the President intended to offer something comparable to 970 or a "medevac" plane. Lukash believes Wallace could travel on 970 and would not require a "medevac" plane. Wallace has not indicated which he expects. Lukash will remain in close touch with Dr. Shannow, the local Republican physician Wallace is relying on.

8) The Governor and Mrs. Wallace sincerely appreciate the President's concern.

GS/jb

Committee for the Re-election of the President

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM

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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL  
THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER  
FROM: PETER H. DAILEY  
SUBJECT: Campaign Slogan: President Nixon. Now  
More Than Ever.

Based on the research that was done in Michigan over the last weekend, it is our recommendation that we adopt the slogan: President Nixon. Now More Than Ever.

We believe that the testing we have done is adequate. It indicates that the slogan can affectively tie in with our creative work, it can stand alone, and it has the open-ended quality that we have been looking for. With your approval of the concept, we will finalize the campaign materials and have them ready for your approval by Monday.

*Pete Dailey*

CONFIDENTIAL

June 20, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT: Further Study of Slogan "President Nixon. Now more than ever."

We were requested to conduct further research on the slogan, "President Nixon. Now more than ever." to determine whether the slogan was understandable and not too sophisticated in the context of other competing slogans. To study this question two group sessions were conducted in Detroit with ticket-splitters, over 35 years of age, with middle incomes, and non-college. At each session we discussed several slogans including those used by McGovern and Wallace in the primaries. This memorandum will outline the results of the research.

In both of the groups the slogan was understood to refer to unfinished work in progress. The groups pictured the President's past record and looked to the future. This slogan embodied the concept of "help him finish the job." The slogan was not interpreted by anyone as anti-McGovern.

The statement also contained a sense of urgency not perceived with the other slogans. The use of the word "now" seemed to express this urgency. Also, the slogan had a certain emotional appeal which the other slogans did not seem to possess. In discussing the slogans, both groups stated that the words "we need" Nixon were mentally added to the phrase "Now more than ever."

Each group responded favorably to the various ways the slogan was presented for banners, buttons, and bumper stickers except the groups did not like the manner of execution for the outdoor billboard proposal. With regard to the materials, the groups readily understood the connection between the contraction "Nixon. Now" with the longer version. The shortness of "Nixon. Now" has very strong appeal to lower middle class ticket-splitters. They view it as simple, direct, and easy to understand. Regarding the outdoor proposal, the groups did not like the use of a black background and the reproduction of the President's picture. Apparently because of the color and the picture the groups felt the outdoor proposal portrayed the President as sinister. Nevertheless, the concept of using the slogan in the outdoor medium was readily accepted.

In general, the groups responded well to the slogan, "Now more than ever." Every person in the group seemed to be able to give the statement some personal meaning. The slogan did clearly communicate its message. It is important to note that the participants generally ranked the slogan between the other alternatives studied. Our earlier study showed that "Now more than ever." ranked behind the statement, "Help him finish the job." Comparatively, however, the slogan under consideration expressed more urgency and emotional appeal and also clearly embodied the concept of "finish the job." If other ideas which convey the unfinished job are merged with "Now more than ever," the result should be a powerful communication device. To answer the original question raised, we see no reason to reject the slogan as not being understandable and too sophisticated.

CONFIDENTIAL

SELECTED VERBATIM COMMENTS

It has emotional appeal.

We need him more than ever.

He's done a good job before and things aren't getting any better, so we still need him.

He's been good and we still need him to finish the job.

We need him more now than we needed him before.

He's started so many things and he would like to follow through.

It's perfectly clear. It's not a complete thought, but its clear.

It starts you thinking more. Starts your imagination thinking over things he has done, has not done, will do, or will not do . . . of his past record.

I like the word "now" because we need to take action now.

It means we need him more than ever. He ain't going to do anything in the next four years anyway.

I think there's more in it than "now more than ever" because there are the things . . . that he's planning for the future and why change horses in the middle of the stream when the trouble's still there.

We do need him if he will finish the job he started.

I think that's assuring. Its saying stick with what you know. You don't know what you're going to get if you don't have Nixon. I think its reassuring in that way, -- that we know what we have and can go from there.

Really, it doesn't matter too much to me what the slogan is. The name -- when I see the name I conjure up my own thoughts about what the man is, what he has done, what he stands for. Any slogan that's put after his name or any other name, really doesn't mean that much to me because the old saying "paper lies still, you can put anything on it."



**Concept Tests  
with  
Detroit Area  
Ticket-Splitters**

**(Middle age, high school graduates  
or less, with middle incomes from  
the Detroit Metropolitan Area.)**

**June, 1972**

Executive Summary

Purpose

To determine if "President Nixon Now More Than Ever" is understood by the "average" voter. (lower middle class ticket-splitter)

We know it's an open ended concept and that people like the "Now" orientation but as an idea, does it float?

Conclusions

- 1) While "President Nixon Now More Than Ever" is immediate, it has more strength when other ideas are built into it.

Three of the 18 panel members openly suggested that the words "we need" went through their heads when they read it, or they suggested these words be added.

- 2) The shortness of it to "Nixon Now" has very strong appeal to the core lower middle class ticket-splitter. They like simple, direct, easy to understand communication.
- 3) If the message that rides with "Now More Than Ever" can also include the idea of "Help Him Finish The Job", then as several panel members noted, this merged idea will be very powerful. "Finish the Job" can

relate to any job and it includes all of us including the President in their mind.

- 4) The "Now More Than Ever" idea has the orientation of dependency and emergency, and several of the women panel members didn't like the "Now" idea for this reason.
- 5) "Now More Than Ever" does not rebound against McGovern as a radical -- i.e., we need Nixon now because McGovern is too radical. (This result may be due to the fact that most of the panel members could not mentally see McGovern as a serious candidate of this time -- "Who is he, what's he done, I don't know enough about him.")
- 6) "Now More Than Ever" will do it because it is an open ended idea, BUT in all or nearly all of our communication efforts, the one liner -- "Help Him Finish The Job" should be used because it is clear, simple, understandable, positive, and relates to the future from our present base and more importantly, is the leading reason people are supporting the President for a second term.

WOMEN

NOW MORE THAN EVER

"It has emotional appeal."

"We need him more than ever."

"He's done a good job before and things aren't getting any better, so we still need him."

"He's been good and we still need him to finish the job."

"Need him more now than we needed him before."

"He's started so many things and he would like to follow through."

"It's perfectly clear. It's not a complete thought, but it's clear."

"I like it better that "Re-Elect the President."

"It starts you thinking more. Starts your imagination thinking over things he has done, has not done, will do, or will not do--whatever your choice of the man is, whatever you think of him -- of his past record."

(Banner, coaster, pin)

"Impressive."

"There's too much writing in the pin."

"The top one is easiest to read."

"The larger print is easier to read from a distance."

"The banner is better because there's too much to go on the pin."

(Button)

"Ostentatious."

"Too much money spent."

"It's pretty, but too expensive."

"I don't like it. There's too much money spent."

"How else can you get the message across?"

"You could get it across without so much of the frill."

"The middle one has more decor."

"It's more eye catching."

"The button is more respectful."

(Poster)

"It looks like he has a beard."

"I don't like the blue on black."

"I like the orange because it shows up better."

"We know what he looks like, we don't have to be reminded. What he looks like isn't what's important."

"It's not a good likeness."

"It reminds me of Castro."

"It's not clean cut at all."

"I like the word 'now' because we have to take action now."

"It means to me that we need him to finish the jobs that he started."

"It shows that he's done a lot and wants to still keep working and finish what he's started."

"It impresses me."

"President Nixon has helped more than ever to finish what he did start."

"I like that one, but not as well as the other one. We do need him if he will finish the job he started."

"I don't know if I want it to always say 'now' more than ever. We need him but I don't want him in an emergency. We need him, but what's he going to do? It's not quite as reassuring as the other one."

"There's something lacking in this and I can see it's 'now'. But, I'm concerned about now and the future."

"I think that's assuring. It's saying stick with what you know. You don't know what you're going to get if you don't have Nixon. I think it's reassuring in that way -- that we know what we have and can go from there."

"Really, it doesn't matter too much to me what the slogan is. The name -- when I see the name I conjure up my own thoughts about what the man is, what he has done, what he stands for. Any slogan that's put after his name or any other name, really doesn't mean that much to me because the old saying 'paper lies still, you can put anything on it'."

"Gives the message that when you read 'Nixon', you have your own opinions of him and you would think of that."

NEN

NIXON NOW MORE THAN EVER

"Too long and there's no name mentioned."

"The first one was better." (Re-elect)

"If you're for Nixon you might laugh and if you're not, you might be sorry. You'd laugh because it's always been Nixon if you're a Nixon backer. So you'd get a great charge out of that."

"It wouldn't swing me. If you ask yourself this here question: 'Do you think Nixon will end the war if he's re-elected in the next four years?'. By the same token, I go along with saying 'Will the next guy end the war in the next four years?' So what's the difference, now President Nixon now more than ever. What's he going to do?"

"It means we need him now more than ever. He ain't going to do anything in the next four years anyway."

"I think there's more in it than more now than ever because the things that have come up, say in the last year, the things that he's planning for the future and why change horses in the middle of the stream when the trouble's still there."

"He's not going to do anything anyway. Take bussing. He wants to stop bussing until November 1973. Why? He's going to be in the next four years after that."

(How would you change it?)

"I'd take 'The President' out and just say 'Nixon'. Everybody knows Nixon's the President."

"Add 2 words: We Need Nixon Now More Than Ever."

"I'd throw out 'More Than Ever' and just have 'President Nixon Now' in big letters."

"To me that's too long because if you're walking by, you have to read everything and you're likely to get half way through and you are passed the person. That's my personal opinion. But the coasters are okay because you must be sitting down to use a coaster."

"Not fair to compare the two. There you have the other one on a ribbon and this one on a paper board. You're losing class."

"Too many words."

"The shorter the sentence, it's eye catching. If you have too many words, who wants to read it."

"Blue with white background would be better."

"It's mandatory that Nixon wins."

NIXON NOW MORE THAN EVER--Short messages

"That's an ideal bumper sticker."

"That's more like it."

"It flags out."

"You have the colors in there and it shows up a lot better."

"Everything that he's needed."

"Right to the point."

"Short and simple."

"Everybody knows what 'Now' means and everybody knows who Nixon is."

NIXON NOW MORE THAN EVER--Poster

"It's too dark -- it looks like he has a beard."

"I like the black background. It's okay but the lettering should be in red flourescent."

"They're not taking full advantage of that advertisement. If they would put the picture of him in a proper color, the rest of it could be the same. You see there's a lot of funny people in this country who vote for the guy because he's beautiful. As far as being beautiful, this isn't going to do anything for him."

"This is basically the thing we agreed on before. Nixon Now More Than Ever without 'The President'. The picture eliminates the word. Everyone recognizes the picture and you've only got four words to read. This idea is fine, it's just that the color scheme is wrong."

LA

# McGovern's Credibility

By TOM WICKER

WASHINGTON, June 21—His victory in the New York primary puts Senator George McGovern on the brink of the Democratic Presidential nomination. That makes it all the more necessary that those who believe the McGovern campaign promises the right directions for the nation should insist that he himself live up to that promise.

Specifically, Mr. McGovern cannot at one and the same time proclaim his intention to restore the "credibility" of the Presidency and at the same time pretend that his program for income redistribution was just a casual idea to which he was never really committed. The fact is that it was only when analysts began to show the economic holes in that program that Mr. McGovern started backing away from it.

In this space on June 4 there appeared an explanation of how the complicated scheme—for an income supplement of \$1,000 per person to every American—was supposed to work. That explanation was based on conversations with, and a seven-page document prepared by, the McGovern staff. All this was accepted far too uncritically, with the result that the McGovern income program was made, in this column, to seem more practical and carefully worked out than it is. This was a journalistic sin for which responsibility is hereby accepted; it was also reaffirmation of the cardinal lesson that every political reporter learns and re-learns—that everything said and done by politicians seeking or holding power has to be constantly challenged.

The most obvious distortion concerned the net gain to the Government if the \$750 personal tax exemption for every taxpayer were eliminated in favor of the \$1,000 McGovern grant.

## IN THE NATION



McGovern men put that figure at \$63.6 billion; Mr. McGovern himself, in the California primary, repeatedly said it would be either \$60 billion or \$70 billion; in fact, disinterested tax authorities say, it would be less than half that much—a fact which both aspiring politicians and gullible reporters should have had no difficulty in establishing.

For another example, the McGovern staff document—and consequently the article here—said that a family of four, earning \$60,000 a year, would have less income under the McGovern program because they would pay taxes on \$64,000 a year (without exemptions) rather than \$57,000 a year (with exemptions but no grants). In fact, as many persons have since pointed out, depending somewhat on its deductions, that family's after-tax income—if rates remained the same—would be little changed, and might in some cases be higher.

Again, the McGovern staff document said that to provide income supplements up to a \$12,000 income for a family of four, without a net increase in its taxes, would require an average tax increase of \$50 per taxpayer on those earnings between \$12,000 and \$20,000 a year. It did not add, as it should have, that for those above \$20,000 the tax increase might average 80 per cent or more, if the estimate of \$27 billion in additional needed revenue was to be reached.

Senator McGovern now seems to be disavowing this specific program, so all these errors of omission and commission may not much matter, in a practical sense. What does matter is that expert economic analysis so impugns the program that it was either extremely careless or deceptive to put it forward in that form; and what also matters is that it is not believable that Mr. McGovern himself considered it only an experimental idea.

He discussed the program, for instance, in six pages of text with Elizabeth Drew in a television interview in Los Angeles and never suggested it was a tentative proposal ("Well, actually, Liz," he said at one point, "I don't think it would cost much of anything.") He did suggest the \$1,000 figure might have to be adjusted but he consistently referred to "the program that I've recommended."

That, of course, may be what is finally important—George McGovern is thinking of a program of income redistribution, and it may well be that nothing is more vitally needed in a society in which 1 per cent of the population holds 28 per cent of the wealth, and in which the poorest fifth of the people receives only about 4 per cent of the annual national income.

In that sense, Mr. McGovern's errors of specificity are less important than his intentions; but the same could have been said of Richard Nixon's 1968 pledge to "end the war and win the peace." The road to credibility gap and elsewhere is paved with good intentions, and if George McGovern really wants to restore the faith and trust of the American people in their Government, he has made a bad start of it with his income program.

As is always the case with credibility lapses, he also has called into question some other pledges and calculations.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102  
By CP , Date 4-1-82

June 27, 1972

**CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN MITCHELL**  
**FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN**

I wanted to pass along to you some information from a contact in California who is now with Spencer-Roberts. He has been involved in most state-wide campaigns for fifteen years in California so should have some feeling for what's happening there. He, of course, has an axe to grind since Spencer-Roberts was in the running to get the campaign. He reports the following:

1. If the election were held today, the President would lose California.
2. Our effort out there is not very good.
3. Nobody in our top command has any real organizational experience. Nofsiger is a press man, and the people who he has brought in around him are all non-experienced.
4. The regional structure Nofsiger has imposed on the state -- five divisions -- is contrary to the historic Northern/Southern division with strong emphasis on the counties. It is not a good division. There should be much more emphasis on the counties. (I'm not convinced this is right.)
5. While we should be in a good position to pick up disaffected blue collar types, Mexican/Americans, etc., we are not doing one thing to go after these people, and we are not set up to do so.

I know that all you need is more advice on how to run the Campaign, but pass this along for what it's worth.

HRH:LH:kb:HRH:kb

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Lyn Nofsiger - California

Lyn Nofsiger is in Washington today. He has been meeting with Mardian, Halek, Magruder, and others at 1701. Nofsiger wonders whether you would like to discuss the California campaign with him. Nofsiger is not pushing for a meeting, but wanted you to know he was available. In light of the memorandum you signed for Mitchell on California (which has not been delivered to him) you may want to talk with Nofsiger.

Whether you see Nofsiger or not, I will talk with him at length.

Recommendation:

\_\_\_\_\_ Haldeman see Nofsiger.

\_\_\_\_\_ Haldeman will not see Nofsiger.

\_\_\_\_\_ Re-schedule.

GS/jb

*London - 6/27*  
*AK*  
*has*  
*w/cw*  
*note*

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

*FTI*

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006  
(202) 333-0920

June 26, 1972

*Fred*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JEB MAGRUDER  
~~FRED MALEK~~

FROM:

KEN RIETZ

I thought you would be interested in the attached.

**Young  
Voters  
FOR THE PRESIDENT**

June 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: PAT BUCHANAN

FROM: KEN SMITH *KRS*

The following are some of the indications of youth support for the President we have on record. As we discussed this record has not gotten the kind of coverage it deserves. Whatever you can do to help get the work through the Administration would be appreciated.

The last Beggs Copeland Campus poll showed RN to be the #1 choice for President (26%). This was roughly double (from 14%) his support found by the same poll in January.

The President has won 92 mock elections in 25 states since February; We know of only 24 losses. Our wins include the following:

1) University of South Dakota

A state wide mock convention with over 500 students from 30 schools participating.

RN .....	53.9%
McGovern .....	41.8%

2) Kansas University

In separate two way races, the President beat all contenders getting in excess of 50% against all candidates except McGovern, who he bested 46% to 42%, with 13% undecided.

3) University of Southern California

The President was the first choice of all candidates receiving 390 votes to 331 votes for second place McGovern.

4) University of Mississippi

The President showed his Southern strength by beating all candidates, including Wallace in separate two way races, receiving 70% or more of the votes in each race.

5) Ohio State University

In separate three way races that included Wallace, students gave the President more than 50% of the vote in each race.

6) Washington State University

The President was the first choice of all candidates - receiving 1,238 votes to 777 for McGovern, 418 for Jackson, 386 for Muskie and a scattering for the other candidates.

7) University of California at Davis

In an eight way non-partisan primary, Nixon received 57.7% of the vote. McGovern was second with 34.6%

8) Florida Statewide College Primary

The President won the Republican primary on 35 out of 36 campuses participating and received more votes statewide than any candidate in either party.

Especially significant are three recent polls taken by National Organizations:

1) Phi Theta Kappa

This is the national junior college Honorary Fraternity that corresponds to Phi Beta Kappa in universities. A mock election held at their national convention, with 800 representatives from 50 states attending, selected the President, giving him 49.4% of the vote to second place McGovern's 21.8%.

2) California Junior Statesmen

This prestigious statewide group surveyed 13,000 students at 45 selected high schools. Results: RN - 30%; McGovern - 22%; Undecided - 23%; Wallace - 8%; and the rest scattered among other candidates.

3) American Education Publications

This group's fifth national high school students presidential preference poll yielded first place to RN with 59,911 votes - roughly 31% of the total. Kennedy came in second with 15%, followed by Wallace, Muskie, McGovern, Humphrey and Chisholm.

In addition to polls, support has been shown by the endorsements of over 150 college leaders across the country, including the student body presidents of such large and prestigious institutions as University of Southern California, University of Nebraska, University of Washington, Oregon State, Brandeis, University of Colorado, University of Alabama, University of Mississippi, University of San Francisco, New Mexico State, University of Texas at Arlington, Old Dominion University, Bradley University, Wabash and many more. These endorsements were announced in a press conference in Los Angeles last month and received very good press coverage.

Finally, there have been rallies on campuses from Florida to California in support of the President's Vietnam policy. A realistic survey conducted by Young Voters for the President on five campuses in the Los Angeles area, just two days after the mining of Haiphong showed that 25.5% of the students strongly agreed with that action, 21.9% agreed, 3.3% were indifferent, 21.6% disagreed, 21.5% strongly disagreed and 6% were undecided.

June 24, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. BALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Campaign Surrogate Attack Plan

The campaign surrogate division at 1701 submitted the attached plan to John Whitaker on June 9. Whitaker's June 22 response is at Tab A. Comments from other White House Staff members were solicited on your behalf. Cole, Chapin, Malek and Howard agree that a "thorough, well done plan" has been prepared. It is conceptually sound to get three-day-a-week commitments from the 32 surrogates, to send them only to the key states, and to target the media appearance by their appeal to voter blocs.

Cole, Chapin, Malek and Howard each had specific suggestions. Cole wanted Bill Magruder and Phil Sanchez added with increased events in New Jersey, Connecticut, Maryland and Syracuse, New York. Chapin questions whether surrogates such as Romney and Meckill should be permitted to "count" events in Michigan and Connecticut. Also Chapin questions their news value in their own states. Chapin wonders why Ehrlichman, Scali, MacGregor and Garment aren't programmed. Malek urges a heavier than three-day-a-week speaking schedule and wants Tom Kleppe and Arthur Flemming added. Howard urges the commitments from the surrogates be ruthlessly enforced or the plan will collapse. John Whitaker shares several of these concerns and the specific suggestions can be implemented.

The real problem, however, remains the division of responsibility between John Mitchell's campaign surrogate group under Bart Porter, Chuck Colson's domestic road show and sub-Cabinet speaking operation under Pat O'Donnell, and John Ehrlichman's spokesman role and responsibility.

On May 4 when you met with Mitchell, Ehrlichman, and Colson to discuss the division of responsibility the decision was to assign Whitaker full authority. After a personal appeal by Mitchell, Whitaker did not accept. He will only "advise". On May 19 when you met with Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Timmons

to discuss the Convention, Mitchell gave you the May 8 memorandum attached at Tab B. Mitchell wanted you to assert the supremacy of 1701 over Colson's operation. Al Haly made Ehrlichman's substantive briefing for the surrogates on June 23 an unqualified success. However, the surrogates do not understand Ehrlichman's role or why he called the briefing without informing 1701.

The solution, according to Whitaker, is to put the 1701 and Colson operation in one room. Colson does not want O'Donnell to move to 1701. The 1701 scheduling operation cannot move to the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you direct Whitaker and O'Donnell to move to 1701 to implement the Surrogate Attack Plan.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENT \_\_\_\_\_

GS:dg

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BART PORTER

FROM: John C. Whitaker *John C. Whitaker*

SUBJECT: Surrogate Attack Plan  
August 24 to November 11, 1972

It is a very fine comprehensive job.

1. The key question is, who is really in charge between you working for John Mitchell and Pat O'Donnell working for Chuck Colson. If Bob Haldeman, John Mitchell and Chuck Colson agree on a split responsibility (i. e., O'Donnell schedule sub-cabinet, Domestic Council road show, Kissinger, Rogers, Laird, or certain prima donnas who need the "call from the White House", or in the case of "very non-political events" it is imperative the request not come from your operation, etc., etc.), either a very clear division of responsibility has to be worked out -- with you and O'Donnell present so you both understand the ground rules or a decision has to be made that one or the other is running the whole show. My concern is primarily one of lack of physical proximity between you and O'Donnell. Maybe I rely on my own experience too much. In '68, I was responsible for the President, Vice President, their wives, Julie, Tricia, David, the Agnew children and only about 10 surrogates. Not nearly as ambitious an undertaking as 34 surrogates plus a side bar relationship with Senator Buckley. I had four schedules, one each for (1) the President, (2) the Vice President, (3) the girls and David Eisenhower, and (4) the surrogates. We worked in a large room - shouted at each other and hung together - no memos, etc. It moved too fast to do otherwise. Nowadays, the President and Vice President and First Lady are all different operations and so are Julie and Tricia. I just wonder if you and O'Donnell won't get your wires crossed in spite of the best intentions if you are not in the same room.

2. The heart of scheduling is, be hard as rock on your battle plan, i. e. never go out of the key states and lock TV in first and then figure out an excuse to be there. Everybody will fight you on this -- including John Mitchell and Bob Haldeman. There will be all sorts of appeals to go to non-key states. Your answer should be, "fine, after each surrogate has finished his three days a week work in the key states." In other words, non-key states are add-ons -- not substitutions for getting firm commitments for coverage of every media center in every big state. You will find too many nice guys who will break the rules and you have to fight them off.

3. If McGovern is nominated, I'd lighten up Texas and focus more on liberal states.

4. Double check your frequency of visits in each state -- seems like there are times when you have three surrogates in a state the same day, then none for a week.

5. Many cities in key states seem to be missing from your media center list. I don't know the criteria you are using, but from a seat-of-the-pants feeling where either the President or surrogates have worked in the past, I'd make sure the following cities are covered with surrogates not on your media center list.

California: Santa Barbara, Bakersfield, San Jose - and because the state is so darn important, even Eureka, Redding and Santa Rosa.

Illinois: East St. Louis, (tri cities of Rock Island, Moline and Davenport -- yes, even go to Iowa for Illinois TV coverage), Decatur, Peoria, Rockford.

Michigan: Muskegon, Grand Rapids, Bay City, Saginaw and Flint.

Missouri: St. Joseph, Rolla and good old Springfield (the GOP bastion of Missouri - a "get out the vote" exercise).

New Jersey: With no TV (I may be out of date) you need to cover it like hairs on a dog - a very rough one.

New York: Syracuse

Ohio: Dayton, Youngstown, Canton, Toledo

Oregon: So they don't feel forgotten out there in eastern Oregon, do Pendleton, and in the south, Roseburg, Medford and Kiamath Falls.

Pennsylvania: Allentown and Scranton/Wilkes Barre. Pennsylvania is so important that there are two bus trips or one railroad trip with potential that cover strings of small to medium size towns that collectively are a lot of votes: (1) Philadelphia along the Penn Central line to Pittsburg; and (2) Allentown north to Scranton then go pick up Erie off by itself - but important.

Texas: Amarillo, Wichita Falls, San Antonio, El Paso. Dallas/Fort Worth - jealousies preclude kissing off Fort Worth.

Wisconsin: Green Bay, Manitowac and Sheboygan, Eau Claire, LaCross, Rhinelander, Wausau and Stevens Point. They are used to a lot of attention after their primaries and they should get it.

7. I assume as you get polls every two weeks during the heat of the campaign, the key state targets will shift -- those we can't lose and those we can't win, that we thought otherwise when the campaign started. It is therefore darn important that you maintain control over your surrogates and take the pressure and never commit more than two weeks in advance through September and one week in advance through October 25, and even less lead time the last ten days of the campaign.

8. A letter from John Mitchell to each surrogate "annointing" you is important. You should also talk to each surrogate to go over each schedule. John Mitchell has to give you clout because everybody else is going to tear you down.

9. I take the 15 key states as a given - Florida not being on the list bothers me, but that isn't my call.

10. I would suggest sub-cabinet and celebrity, rather than surrogates, focus in New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota. The President has basically been weak in those states (particularly New Mexico and Nevada).

cc: John D. Ehrlichman  
H. R. Haldeman ✓  
Fred Malek  
John Mitchell

Committee for the Re-election of the President

May 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: HERBERT L. PORTER *HL Porter*

SUBJECT: Scheduling of Surrogate Candidates

Pursuant to your request, attached is a proposed memorandum from you to Mr. Haldeman regarding the procedure to be followed in scheduling surrogate candidates.

Attachment.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

May 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: JOHN N. MITCHELL  
SUBJECT: Scheduling of Surrogate Candidates

This memorandum is written to record the conclusions reached at our conference on Thursday, May 4, 1972, regarding the scheduling of surrogate candidates. I would appreciate it if you would review our conclusions with Chuck Colson.

Predicated on the theory that surrogate candidates can be utilized most effectively through adherence to a program of creative scheduling based upon political necessities, we agreed to the following:

1. Effective immediately, all scheduling of the surrogate candidates, including the members of the Cabinet, will be done through the Spokesmen Resources Division at 1701. This includes scheduling into non-political, as well as political, events. We plan to have four or five schedulers working at 1701 with the surrogate candidates.
2. The Spokesmen Resources Division may call upon spokesmen other than the surrogate candidates, including Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries and White House personnel, to appear at approved events.
3. The Executive Speakers Bureau at the White House shall continue to exist and shall be responsible for the organization of White House briefings and special events. Examples are the busing road shows, Dr.

Kissinger's foreign policy briefings, and the extensive scheduling of the sub-Cabinet group. Pat O'Donnell will also schedule Secretary Laird and Secretary Rogers, which should not be done from 1701. (As you know, we would still prefer to have Pat O'Donnell move over to 1701 and work under the direction of our Spokesmen Resources Division, at the same time being available to assist Colson on special projects, such as White House briefings and road shows.)

4. To take advantage of the incumbency, we will coordinate our activities with the White House. For example, if it appears that the White House would have a better possibility of placing a surrogate into a non-political forum, 1701 will call upon O'Donnell to make that contact. 1701 will also coordinate its T.V. and media activities with White House personnel.
5. Copies of invitations to the President and the Vice President, which are regretted and which are worthy of consideration, shall be forwarded to the Spokesmen Resources Division at 1701 with copies of the letters of regret.