

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
Contested Materials Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	11	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Dent to Haldeman RE: RN's presidential posture and general campaign strategies. 5 pgs.
16	11	6/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Haldeman RE: the president's domestic policy stances in the campaign season and dealing with McGovern's opposition. 5 pgs.
16	11	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Safire to Haldeman suggesting a lighter approach to the campaign. 3 pgs.
16	11	6/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haig to Haldeman answering a memorandum on presidential posture and attack strategies for the campaign. 4 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	11	7/5/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to RN, per Haldeman, RE: an analysis of the 1964 and 1968 presidential races. 8 pgs.
16	11		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Anonymously-authored document laying out strategies for how to approach campaign issues, the Republican National Convention, and television coverage. 8 pgs.
16	11	6/26/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From JPS to RN RE: strategies to use against McGovern. 8 pgs.
16	11	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Price to Haldeman RE: RN's presidential image in the 1972 campaign. Outlines of keynote address attached. 8 pgs.
16	11	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Price to Haldeman RE: the First Family's schedule during the campaign season. 2 pgs.

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16	11	7/23/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to RN RE: the role of the Vice President (Agnew) in the campaign. 4 pgs.
16	11	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Talking paper from Haldeman to Buchanan RE: Agnew's campaign responsibilities. 1 pg.
16	11	6/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan and Khachigian to Haldeman RE: RN's national image and McGovern's strategies, as well as useful campaign themes and quotations. 7 pgs.
16	11	6/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Haldeman presenting a response to the latter's memorandum on the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. 5 pgs.

THE WHITEHOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: HARRY S. DENT *HSD*  
SUBJECT: 1972 Campaign Suggestions

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

The President essentially should continue the present strategy of being a professional President working to solve national and international problems. From now until the GOP convention would be a good time to show personal emphasis on domestic programs and problems. This period might be right for some non-political type travelling to important states not to be visited in the campaign--appearances to big and key groups such as the national Jaycees Convention we just passed up under the post-summit strategy.

Surrogates should begin hammering away on the Demo ticket and the issues.

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel..., where..., what type...?

The President's posture from the GOP Convention through the election should be much in the Eisenhower style as contrasted with the Truman style. The approach should be one of humility and dignity, with the President ignoring the enemy. Leave him to the surrogates and others. The President should address himself in appearances to his vision of the

kind of America and world he envisions for 1976 and further down the road--the theme of which would be "don't change horses in the middle of this dream."

Of course, the President would envision an America with a realistic and lasting peace abroad secured by a sufficient national security posture; domestic tranquility, based on fairness and justice for all, and firmness in law enforcement; rising prosperity and stable prices; and continued individual freedoms. These aims could be made to contrast with the Demo record of the past and the policies advocated by the opponent, in the right way.

The President should begin campaigning not later than mid-September. Our forces should emphasize our desire for a short campaign in the public interest. We should start this line now to put the Demos on the defensive as having campaigned for the job too long, especially McGovern.

Travel should cover every one of the key eleven states and at least two big rallies in each region so no area should feel written-off or taken for granted. The regional rallies could be in lieu of visits to some of the key states if 19 visits would be deemed too much. However, 19 or 20 visits should be a minimum, unless the polls show a good victory.

The campaigning by the President should not be very partisan and should avoid local ticket entanglements as much as possible without hurting the candidates, especially key prospects, or local party morale. Having the State-wide and/or Congressional slate on the stage might be necessary.

Each regional rally should be regionally televised. At these affairs, the President could be honored with key leader testimonials and in other ways, so that the President has to do little in the way of appearing to be a politician. He should be depicted as the statesman building a better and more stable USA and world.

Appearances in the key states could be varied, depending on

the type forums or activities available or which could be created to fit the circumstances of the time and place.

3. General thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

All the attacking should be done by the surrogates and others. Our strategy should be to lay the McGovern statements, policies and record on the line through speakers and advertising. We should lay out a steady stream of McGovernisms to keep the attacks fresh, but also repetitious enough to saturate with the points. He should be shown as the advocate of surrender, weakness, gross welfarism, and appeaser of lawless elements. Moreover, he and his party leaders should be charged with undermining the President's efforts for peace, especially the Senate Demo caucus vote to condemn the President in a time of international crisis (mining). We should contrast peace through strength with peace through surrender. Also, responsibility versus irresponsibility. Much emphasis should be placed on stability, individual and national security, and public safety.

The major concerns in all the polls revolve around personal security--peace, economic security, and law and order. The Nixon record is strong in all of these, but it needs public saturation in every good detail.

Presidential leadership, experience, expertise, and realism should also be stressed. Richard Nixon--the man for these times, based on a solid record of performance under very adverse circumstances and against a stacked deck on Capitol Hill (especially Presidential candidates), the press (care here to except good guys), and as the leader of the minority party (outnumbered 5-3). Many people still don't realize all the obstacles in the President's path.

Timing of the attack strategy will have to depend on developments, but the McGovern record should be aired from

the time of his nomination all the way through. Pat Buchanan's compendium on his positions and statements should be helpful in stretching out the attacks.

We must make peace through strength the No. 1 issue--that this determines the success of everything else. The big line of difference should be drawn on this issue.

4. Thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

The opposition strategy will turn on these major points: Vietnam, tax reform, haves vs. have-nots, unemployment, cost of living, credibility, Southern Strategy, insensitivity to the needs and desires of people (anti-people).

If we do our job offensively on the peace through strength theme, then we will have largely blunted the Vietnam charges. Also, a conclusion there would end the debate and the campaign.

Also, our overall offensive strategy of laying out the President's solid record of achievements could blunt most of the Demo attacks. For instance, on the economy, we have the employment figures (6 million more than in 1968), the CPI index difference, and the surging GNP figures to positively make our case. On unemployment we must do more to show that the higher percentage today is due to the influx of women and youngsters into the job markets and point up the change from a war to a peacetime economy. With war we can get unemployment statistics down but casualties back up (jobs vs. lives).

Southern Strategy when it does come up can be answered with many facts--the leadership to desegregate without bullets, blood and bitterness, full participation administration with all the black, chicano, women, et al, appointments contrasted with previous, ending of sectionalism and bias against South, etc. Bob Brown and I can put together a paper on this.

Trying to pit the have-nots vs. the haves can be made into a positive issue for us by accusing them of class warfare-- also, they have promoted race vs. race and section vs. section, all ended now under RN.

Tax reform can be blunted some by the class warfare attack. Also, we can feed out to outside public conduits information that disproves McGovern's mis-statements about some of the loopholes and make the case that most loopholes are the ones all Americans enjoy. We should not get ourselves in the position of defending sensitive loopholes. Fortunately, McGovern's extremism with his tax proposals should enable us to discredit many of his tax reform thrusts.

Credibility can be shored up by doing some things, based on opportunities, that further underscore the President's credibility and get them well publicized. The record of withdrawals in VN is a good example of keeping his word. Platform fulfillments as Rhodes lays out can be used. In fact, we should put together a group to work on ferreting out examples to be highlighted and publicized. This means also finding ways to stress the President's personal characteristics. The same applies for the anti-sensitive and anti-people charges. Show he has compassion through anecdotes and publicized public demonstrations. What he did for the new attorney general at the swearing in and how much it meant to his family.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

DOUGLAS HALLETT

SUBJECT:

Your Memo of June 12.

The following is in response to the four questions raised in your June 12 memorandum:

1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues -- particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conventions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a barrio, take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour -- i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc. in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as possible, do an address on incomes vs. services strategy before a prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform, sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The President should also do something on the human and personal side -- perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation spas.

The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months. Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presidential. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically governmental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then, offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side. The over-all theme -- which can be related to our foreign policy and the Nixon Doctrine -- is that government has been too active, both at home and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed, sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly anti-governmental.

2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip -- the 1970 one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he comes back, his campaign pace should not be much, if any, faster than his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken. The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or statement tied to a visual event: i. e. addressing a conservation group and visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues. The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be scrupulously prepared so that the President would fly into a city and be met with no less than 200,000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,

the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented (one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute "Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-hour conversations -- one of the President with common people (a veteran, a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc.) and one with a group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids. Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices, education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversation leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural, peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i. e. Nixon and Jews -- and negative -- i. e. McGovern and aerospace employment -- spots should be used by front groups in particular areas.

The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others, but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968. Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested substantive speeches -- can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's -- and that that conception of change is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.

3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while maintaining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberals care about words more than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while expanding his base into the center -- but the psychological posture will not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues -- amnesty, defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very carefully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about abortion can only help McGovern by making us seem silly for relying on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there, nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges -- i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. -- should be even more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's \$110,000 home, etc. -- should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially Eastern Establishment liberalism.

On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues, welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation, through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral vote count. And since it is possible -- and since it is the only possible way he could win -- we should worry about countering McGovern's potential

appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no choice but to vote for us -- and whose support can be reinforced by the kinds of covert operation suggested above.

Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsible, positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either irresponsible and counter-productive -- his defense budget -- or that they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our surrogate speakers.

It would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans -- i. e. Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The temptation, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community and sect efforts, to be positive -- and to keep it that way we have to be especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to embody change and we cannot do that if we are demagoguing -- the media, McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of demagoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establishment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only basis on which he can possibly win.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~confidential~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING June 14, 1972.  
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102  
By emf, Date 8-19-87

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: BILL SAFIRE  
SUBJECT: Campaign

You will be receiving all sorts of memos revealing the wisdom of the President acting like a President, not campaigning for sheriff, etc., and I will not belabor that point.

Instead, let me pass along two items of advice from Thomas E. Dewey, whom the President sent me to talk to in 1969.

1. Get a villain. With FDR, it was "economic royalists," as it might well be again this year; with Truman, it was the "do-nothing 80th Congress." With Nixon, Dewey suggested inflation -- in more specific terms, the price-gougers and union bosses who greedily pursue their own concerns to the detriment of the public interest.

If the opposition is McGovern, I would not select Meany as the villain, since the chance exists he will take a passive role in the campaign. On anybody else as the opponent, he will come after us hard with all labor's money, and we should go after him harder.

2. Don't act so Presidential as to be out of touch. FDR tried this in 1944, got a good scare, and wound up campaigning hard; Dewey, of course, learned this the hard way. There is an anomaly we should recognize: While people are titillated and fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, they are also warmed by attention he pays them and evidences of humanity. It is a mistake to go exclusively one way or the other -- a leader should be neither a remote authority nor a buddy-boy. Nixon's greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds.

For example, the President, the First Lady, and the two girls should fan out across the country on the Fourth of July, each involved in some Bicentennial activity (a whole list of grassroots stuff is now in Chapin's hands); it's patriotic, it is visible and it is running for office in a way that cannot be criticized.

I think we would do well to drop our uptightness about campaigning. It is not something to be ashamed of. Jefferson and Madison, on a political trip through New York before the Constitutional Convention, held to the fiction that they were on a scientific expedition looking for varieties of butterflies; JFK nicely turned that one into "I'm not looking for butterflies, I'm looking for votes."

We don't have to be crass about it, but should not be coy, either; the President should begin to say now, well before the convention, that after the convention he'll be campaigning with zest. He wants to get out there and renew his strength. He gets a lift from meeting people. Nixon is no stiff-necked Coriolanus, too proud to ask the electorate for support -- by so doing, he shows respect for the system that shows respect for him. If on the other hand, we take the attitude that affairs of state make it difficult to take the time to campaign, and that campaigning is a necessary evil in getting re-elected, we will be pious, dull, insulting, arrogant -- and dead.

Now for a couple of other thoughts not based on Dewey:

If McGovern is the nominee, we have a unique opportunity to take New York State. Keys are Jews and Puerto Ricans. As to Jews: Humphrey has wounded McGovern on this one; Scoop Jackson's attacks, though not publicized, can be utilized later. He's weak on Israel, the first time that can be said of a Democratic nominee ever -- and with Ambassador Rabin's statement that sure looks like a Nixon endorsement, we can exploit this opening as never before. Every switched vote is two votes, and 175,000 of those wins New York. We should use up-and-coming Jewish office-holders in positions of leadership in our NY campaign: Roy Goodman, the only Republican State Senator from Manhattan, about 40, excellent credentials, and Rita Hauser (she's only half Jewish, and that's good enough) come to mind. Let's not rely on oldtimers who have a defeatist attitude about Nixon and Jews -- this is a new ballgame, and we could get up to 30%.

We should also make a hard pitch at the Puerto Rican vote in New York as part of our Spanish-speaking campaign. Although there is some friction between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, we should, for example, have Manolo Sanchez and Bebe Rebozo interviewed in Spanish on every Spanish station about Nixon just about every week between now and November. We tend to think of our Spanish effort aimed only at Texas and California -- New York is important, the PR registration is rising, and we have a fresh chance there.

I will do a Charlie Regan memo, on how to beat Nixon from a Democratic manager's point of view, in a couple of weeks. (Whenever I do one of those, people look at me strangely for awhile.) The issues that worry me most are health and crime -- we shouldn't gear ourselves up to answer an attack on inflation and unemployment to the neglect of other gut issues that can be exploited by a smart opponent.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: AL HAIG 

Here are my views and accompanying analysis on the four points raised in your memorandum of June 12:

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

Unquestionably the events between now and the Democratic Convention and most importantly events at the Convention itself will influence the ultimate strategy on the President's posture. Nevertheless at this juncture it is quite evident that the President is in a very strong position which is best retained and reinforced by maintaining a posture which is totally consistent with the achievements that have most decisively contributed to his popularity. These achievements are a solid statesman-like performance in the international area. They have been premised on flexible and progressive attitudes and the willingness to take risks in search of world peace and were masterfully combined with: (a) strength and decisiveness when U. S. interests are challenged; (b) the retention of initiative and momentum which has consistently enabled the President to stay ahead of the pessimism normally associated with stagnation, inactivity and lack of imagination; (c) the solidification of the world statesman role through which the President has captured national empathy based on his masterful performances in Peking and Moscow which were well-covered on national television; and (d) the development of a "Mr. & Mrs." team image which would not have been possible had total emphasis been on the President alone.

Based on the foregoing, the President's posture should be one of a statesman who is above the frantic gut-fighting and politicking of the campaign, whose strength and competence is taken fully for granted by a Party machine whose major task should be to engage in the cool organizational arrangements which are designed to exploit a solid posture of accomplishment.

I sense one possible distortion creeping into current assumptions about the Democratic candidate. Many of our political strategists are taking for granted that McGovern will emerge as the Democratic candidate.

EYES ONLY

This was evident in the strategy discussions held in last week's Cabinet meeting. We must be prepared for an emotional convention consensus in favor of Teddy Kennedy. It is difficult to conceive of the old Democratic Party machinery, which relies essentially on a power base of Labor, Jewish money and nouveau riche resources, merging to support a candidate of McGovern's ilk since each of these sources of power could be seriously threatened by his stated policies. For this reason our contingency planning must not overlook the possibility of a surprise popular surge in July which would settle on Kennedy as the only hope for the Democratic Party.

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type of activities should he engage in?

Following the Republican Convention in August and taking full cognizance of events between the Democratic and Republican Conventions, I think the President should pursue a strategy totally consistent with that of a self-confident, competent statesman who is above frantic political campaigning. This means that his travel and public appearances should be most carefully contrived. Above all, they should be paced to avoid over-exposure in the national media, especially television. I do not believe we should succumb to a strategy which would portray him rushing from one adulatory situation to another. Rather, these should be carefully paced and only those which can guarantee maximum effect should be undertaken. That should involve exposure situations which underline the President's attention to the affairs of state and which avoid any appearances of contrived ballyhoo. In my view the greatest danger will be over-exposure and excessive campaign energy.

3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

Obviously McGovern is our most vulnerable opponent. We should therefore be very careful about adopting too strong an anti-McGovern posture between now and the Democratic Convention. The one theme which I believe is best stressed between now and the Democratic Convention is McGovern's irresponsible posture on the war in Vietnam in which we emphasize the fact that he is pushing a strategy which can only encourage the enemy not to negotiate and which in many respects is less stringent on Hanoi than even Moscow and Peking contemplate. Concurrently, we should prepare, but not use, a host of themes which attack McGovern's strategy on domestic spending, inheritance, welfare programs, busing, aid to schools, national defense, etc., that can be used following the

Republican Convention in August. The most important aspect of our anti-McGovern strategy should be to keep the homerun balls to the last phase of the campaign in a way which ensures that the President peaks off in the last three weeks of October. Television will dominate this year more than in any campaign in the past and it is conceivable that national attitudes can be influenced at the last moment in an overriding way. We should also have themes in reserve which can be used on a contingency basis to counter-balance bad news for us which is bound to occur in unforeseen patterns between now and November. A compulsive tendency to exploit McGovern vulnerability from the outset should be tightly controlled to ensure that we do not end up on a wave of criticism against the Republican Party and most importantly that we are able to quickly adjust to unforeseen setbacks which can come from scandle, setbacks in the international environment, or domestic shortcomings. To ensure this is done, a most careful analysis should be made of all McGovern vulnerabilities, a program should be tailored to exploit each of these then the exploitation program should be tightly time-phased to ensure continuing and growing momentum rather than to fire all of our shots simultaneously thus enabling the Democrats to develop compensatory neutralization programs.

4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

In the international area the Democrats will probably exploit the following:

(a) The war in Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam, mining, etc. The only sound way to attack this is to keep constantly in the forefront Hanoi's intransigence and the solid pace of accomplishment represented by our continuing disengagement. It is obvious that we will have to get some break between now and November which will confirm the wisdom of our policy. I am somewhat optimistic that this will occur and the question will therefore become moot.

(b) The Democrats will try to exploit the inadequacy of the SALT agreement with the Soviet Union by stressing the theme that the President has favored an agreement which replaces a quantitative arms race by a qualitative arms race. This charge should be taken head on with straight factual elaboration on the provisions of the agreement.

(c) The Democrats, if McGovern is the candidate, will obviously try to exploit the President's image as a knee-jerk patriot who is hidebound by outmoded conceptions of U. S. honor and power. This attack is easily blunted by a track record of accomplishments which should focus on the

Peking and Moscow Summits and a carefully paced follow-up program of improved relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. Barring no unforeseen setbacks, this kind of momentum is definitely in the cards and should be counted as a strong continuing asset.

(d) Perhaps the most serious danger area is that of international economics, balance of payments, lack of progress in the monetary stabilization and a growing unfavorable balance of trade. This area, I believe, affords the Democrats the most fruitful grist for criticism. We will need a careful assessment in the weeks ahead of where we are going with respect to international trade and economics and to develop some new initiatives which will flesh out the initial philosophical advantage that resulted from the international monetary agreement. We have a long way to go in the area and I doubt that statistics which can be easily drawn upon by the Democrats will confirm that we have not done more than scratch the surface. We should achieve some advantages from improved US-Soviet trade but more dramatic steps have to be taken with respect to our European and Japanese allies.

(e) Accomplishments in Latin America leave room for criticism but we should not overreact to a vulnerability which does not have a particularly strong popular base.

On the whole, the President's performance and accomplishments in the international area constitute his strong suit. For this reason his statesman and world leader role should be carefully but fully exploited.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (Per HRH)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

At HRH's request, some thoughts on 1968 and 1960.

First, it is imprecise to say that "in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign." (If there is a single hallmark of RN's runs against both JFK and HHH it is the remarkable stability of the Nixon vote from August through November.) The President did not so much lose votes from August to November of 1968 -- as we lost a historic opportunity, the "lost landslide" as someone has referred to it. While we failed to edge upwards in the slightest, Humphrey closed a 13 point gap. What were the reasons for this?

A) Some of the HHH gains were inevitable; the Democratic candidate, if he performed reasonably well, was simply going to win back some of the traditional Democratic vote, horrified at the Chicago convention, but not a Nixon voter at heart.

B) We failed utterly to pick up the Wallace defectors in the North, who slipped away from Wallace through Nixon, back to HHH. This return to HHH is partly due to the efforts of the AFL-CIO, probably partly due to RN's "anti-union" image from the fifties, partly due to our own short-comings. (Incidentally, we are in better and the Democratic Left in worse shape with these voters than in 1968; our opportunity is renewed.)

The startling thing about the Gallup Poll, 1968, is the almost precise correlation between the Humphrey rise and the Wallace fall in the polls. Wallace, too, by holding onto Southern votes and Southern states which surely might have been ours, had a hand in preventing the "landslide" that might have been.

But, in my judgment, our own campaign had serious short-comings in 1968. Basically, they were these:

a) A lack of flexibility. We established a game plan, and followed it through, although by early October, it should have been evident that we were losing the interest of the press and the country as well. The hoopla campaign -- to demonstrate RN had the kind of enthusiasm and unity HHH did not, was ideal for September. It was not for October.

Once Humphrey made his Salt Lake City speech, the President should have, in my judgment, attacked him directly and vigorously, to force back the split in the Democratic Party between the pro-bombing and the anti-bombing forces who had fought at the convention and who were yet at sword's point. We let HHH off the hook on this. By so doing, he got off of that petard and went over onto the attack.

On the attack, he began to move, to make new and different charges, to attract interest.

b) The President in the fall campaign of 1968 was plagued by the identical problem he had in the fall campaign of 1960. A Hostile Press. Teddy White testifies to this in 1960 and Miss Efron in 1968. In addition, I have on personal knowledge that a group of 19 Washington press types who had divided 10-9 pro-RN in September, were 18-1 pro-HHH at election time.

What explains the bad press? We are partly at fault I believe. We shut down communication with them -- compared with the primaries where we got good press. We also, because of circumstances, were maneuvered into the upper-dog position. We were the more conservative of the two leading candidates. We did not deviate from the set-speech-Man-in-the-Arena-handout routine sufficiently to attract their on-going attention or interest. They were more concerned with reporting a breaking story, The Humphrey Comeback, which was exciting news, than the RN Radio Speeches, which with few exceptions only got a stick of type or two. Our personal relations with the traveling press deteriorated from the campaign, partly due to the "size" of the corps, the natural hostility of liberals, and our natural antipathy toward them which was coming through late in the game.

c) But, rather than strict comparison of 1960 and 1968, which may or may not be useful, and rather than belabor the shortcomings of the various campaign, which are many -- but which are as well counter-balanced by the right decisions, let me rather enumerate those dangers which lurk for us, in my view, in 1972 -- based on the campaigns presidential of the last 12 years. What we face in my view is:

#### THE DANGERS OF 1968 & THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1964

If McGovern is nominated, in my judgment:

- 1) We must place him on the defensive from the outset, and not let him off of it until November. In our 1968 and 1970 campaign, we did this for the first three weeks -- then either HHH "got well" on Vietnam, or the liberals "got well" on "law and order," and our issue hand had been played. Again, we have enough on McGovern to keep him on the defensive throughout the fall -- we ought not to blast it out of the cannon at once; our speakers should be on the attack.
- 2) We have to maintain a flexibility that I do not believe existed in 1968, and from what I read did not exist in 1960. As Ike said, "planning is essential; plans are worthless." We should have a mapped-out game plan before the campaign starts -- both for attack on the Opposition, and for presentation of the candidate, but there should be a "Review Committee" to look over that plan, and over our media at least once a week.
- 3) While we should rule out the President -- for the time being -- on the Attack Role; I would not rule out a Presidential address to the country, splitting RN off from McGovern on the issues, right now.
- 4) We should have ourselves a strategy meeting on dealing with the press and media between now and November. In my view, we have discredited them for the bias of which they are guilty for three years -- indeed, public confidence in their performance is on the decline. But should there be a "detente" between the White House and national press corps between now and November? While I am more than willing to carry my hod in a campaign to discredit the national media as pro-McGovern, would such a campaign be in our interest, at this point in time. This is something which should not be determined ad hoc -- because in my view a hostile media is one of the prime reasons why RN's presidential campaigns have never seen him rise in the national polls by a single cubit.

5) We should keep in mind that it was not LBJ's performance and personality which won him 60% of the vote -- it was the portrayal of Goldwater as an extremist, which frightened even Republicans.

In my view, given the antipathy of the national media, and the smallness of the GOP, there is no way we could conceivably do better than a 54-46 victory over a centrist, popular Democrat with a united party. Against a divided Democratic Party, however, with a candidate who is far out on the issues, with a press that is less concerned with their antipathy toward RN than with the wild schemes of his opponent, we could go up to 58 to 60 percent.

Thus -- it will not be how wonderful we are, but how terrible McGovern is -- that will make the difference this fall between a respectable clear victory, and a Nixon landslide. Seems to me vital that we keep this in mind.

To get that good media, we should confront McGovern on the "issues," clearly; we should be almost generous to him personally; we should deliberately avoid any nasty, smear attacks. We have enough on the record to hang the guy -- what we have to avoid at all costs are such media-negatives as the 1970 "ads" and the 1972 Watergate Capers, which they are trying to hang around our necks. We should hammer the issues and his positions -- and let McGovern come off as the "name-caller."

6) One great concern of mine is the "Humphrey Phenomenon" -- of McGovern, if nominated, being cast into the role of "under-dog" "anti-Establishment," "come-from-behind" candidate -- whose campaign will provide one hell of a good deal more media interest and human interest than ours.

We should have some real-life "drama" in store for this fall -- to attract national attention. We should, in a pleasant enough way, but unmistakably make this the campaign of Richard Nixon and the Average Man against the Establishment and the Radical Chic.


Goldwater was kept on the bottom through his own and his campaign shortcomings -- and through the media. Again, how the media handles this will determine much. The media could treat McGovern like Goldwater, or they could make him into an inept, but good "under-dog" like HHH -- in which event, they could make a run out of it.

7) As for the suggestion that RN go out and do more, a la 1960, I would say, no -- if that means "political campaigning." However Richard Nixon on the move as President, yes; and Richard Nixon in action in the White House, as President, yes, and Richard Nixon addressing the nation -- for fifteen minutes as President, to strike a contrast with McGovern, yes. But not the stump-speaking. RN as President is a far more effective campaigner than RN as campaigner.

8) Scheduling. This campaign, unlike 1968, we should schedule RN into the "undecided" arenas, union halls, Columbus Day activities, Knights of Columbus meetings, etc. We should keep in mind that there is only -- at most -- 20 percent of the electorate that will decide this, not who wins, but whether or not it is a landslide, and quite frankly, that 20 percent is not a principally Republican vote. Perhaps RN has to make appearance at GOP rallies -- but when he does, he is not going where the ducks are. In a McGovern race the ducks are suddenly in city areas of the North we never carried before.


9) Perhaps this has been repeated before -- but again, of maximum importance is that we not convince the media to make McGovern a picked-on under-dog, by name-calling. We have to massively confront him with his positions, and if we need any characterization -- we can take that from the Democrats. Regrettably, the media does not allow us the same latitude in name-calling it will give McGovern who has already charged the Administration with "racism" Hitler-like conduct and war-mongering.


Buchanan



Gallup Poll - 1960  
 Nixon JFK Und.

	Nixon	JFK	Und.
Early June	48%	52%	
Late June	48	52	
July	50	44	6
August	47	47	6
September	47	48	5
October	48	48	4
November	48	49	3





## THEME AND TONE OF CONVENTION

1. The past is past and merely a basis for the future. Our theme should be future-oriented.
2. No single theme will enhance the convention or campaign. The important thing is to do the appropriate things and not to overstate or charge off in unnecessary directions.
3. People have intense feelings about many issues these days. It is difficult, therefore, to choose one specific issue but the Convention and campaign must reflect a sympathetic understanding of these feelings.
4. The campaign theme should be simple, unambiguous and not invite argument. Compare "Trust Muskie" (all wrong) with McGovern's "Demand the Truth" (very sound). Garment feels "Now More Than Ever" is ambiguous and less effective than "A Better Future for All" which he likes.
5. Tone of the Convention should be crisp, not emotional, confident without being smug or complacent, lively and factual without being gradiloquent and self-serving.
6. Convention should report on the Administration at work, and not prepare for a political fight with the Democrats.
7. McGovern is trying to unite the dissatisfied but even they want "change without chaos". It should be pointed out that the Administration is effecting that now.
8. Our Convention mustn't look slick or overstaged.
9. Convention can't appear to be a vacation for the delegates.
10. Should emphasize that the President has overwhelmingly pre-empted the Democrats theme of "Bring America Home" (re: Vietnam) in the last 3-1/2 years. McGovern is 4 years too late.

## NETWORK COVERAGE

1. Try to get ABC to cover opening session live.
2. Networks should be provided fact sheets on speakers and other information to make coverage more interesting.
3. Networks should be provided with a list of names and seat locations of our celebrities.
4. Networks should be given a complete podium program well in advance.
5. Podium mini-documentary -- Each network should be provided an opportunity to video tape a tour of the podium, its inner workings and functions to give the television audience a better understanding of how the Convention works.
6. CBS ran a mini-documentary on McGovern. If they're planning to do the same for the President, we should provide some good stills.
7. During "Pledge of Allegiance", cameras could cut to film clips of flags flying in various locations and various scenes of the country.
8. Democratic keynote film was suitable for simulcasting on radio. Good idea.
9. Floor cameras should be allowed each network so interviewees don't appear to be looking at the floor but into the cameras.
10. VIP movements must be carefully programmed to receive the best network coverage.
11. When VIP principals move, they should go through large groups where enthusiasm can be generated and will be shown to the public.
12. Coverage of McGovern watching balloting in his hotel room seemed poor decision. Perhaps to prevent this with the First Family, we could have them go to dinner together, to Grand Cay or to Bebe's.
13. Need one or two lively or controversial events which can't damage the President but will create enough public interest to generate a television audience for the Convention.

14. Somehow networks should be made to talk about upcoming GOP strength, e.g. the Brocks and Bushes.
15. Networks should be provided with a breakdown of the composition of the Republican Party.

## DELEGATES AND SPOKESMEN

1. Democratic delegates represented a broad cross section. Hopefully, ours will do the same.
  2. Democratic delegates lacked color. Should we strive for businesslike looking people or those showing enthusiasm through decorations and costumes?
  3. Delegates should always stand, never be seated, when interviewed.
  4. Delegates shouldn't lean over people's shoulders during interviews.
  5. Delegates should be told to arrive 15 minutes early and that the door will close 5 minutes prior to the beginning of each session.
  6. No one should give interviews during the opening ceremonies of each session.
  7. Delegates should be briefed to respond with enthusiasm, to stay in their seats and to pay attention to proceedings.
  8. Spokesmen on floor should talk not must about the President's political contributions but about him as an individual -- his origins and so forth.
  9. Our top Administration leaders should be available for interviews to show our depth.
  10. Delegates must reflect a commitment to the President as more than just a nominee.
  11. Delegate chairmen should be given one-liners to precede their vote casting, e. g. "Michigan, the State which represents where America stand on busing, casts its 100 votes ..."
  12. As networks will start coverage 30 minutes before each day's opening, we must have well-versed, key spokesmen available on the floor for interviews.
-

## PROGRAM AND EFFECTS

1. To lend a sense of heritage, perhaps a different gavel should be used at each session and a fact sheet about each one given to the networks. The Democrats' gavel sounded tinny. Ours should be solid.
2. Each State should bring its own Stage flag and an American flag.
3. Some thought the Parade of Flags at the Democratic Convention added too much confusion to an already confused Convention. Others thought it was great.
4. Pledge of Allegiance should be conducted as more than just a procedural necessity. The delegates could be asked to stand, cross their hearts, etc.
5. Everyone should sing the National Anthem.
6. Orchestra playing National Anthem should have more brass, creating a "band" sound rather than an "orchestra" sound.
7. Treasurer's report should:
  - set the record straight on the alleged \$40 million war chest.
  - indicate that we spent far less in the primaries than the Democrats.
  - point out how much we are paying for the soup kitchen in Flamingo Park, if there is one.
8. Podium movement should be kept to a minimum, and numbers on the podium to a minimum.
9. Good idea to dim hall lights and spotlight podium when appropriate.
10. GOP Convention should be opened with fanfare unlike the vague Democratic opening.
11. Good idea to have young flag bearers during the Parade of Flags.
12. Think about putting seatcovers on the chairs nearest the aisle, maybe 5 or 6 into the row so our slogan appears.
13. Everything should start precisely on time.
14. Consider using a flag blowing on a multi-media background for the opening of the Convention.

15. Note the songs which carried on TV during the Democratic Convention and repeat them during ours.
  16. Should have at least one foreign accent doing the Pledge of Allegiance.
  17. Our speeches should be short (!) and the only way to prevent their dragging out is to monitor them constantly.
  18. Perhaps a better effect than Ethel Merman singing "God Bless America" would be a young group singing "Born Free".
  19. Should balloons be used during the demonstrations?
  20. We shouldn't announce all escorts for our principals going to the podium. Too confusing.
  21. Should preserve our traditional system of conducting roll calls alphabetically. Democrats' system was confusing.
  22. Speakers should be humorous, a contrast to the Democrats, as the President will be serious.
  23. Delegates should be allowed to leave their seats during demonstrations (Dems did not) as it encourages genuine spirit and is much more exciting to the delegates and viewers.
  24. Democratic keynote film:
    - made all the people look like "the guy next door" and appealed to a sense of civic responsibility rather than the issues. Interviews were too long, some people were interviewed more than once (bad), and names and occupations of people interviewed weren't indicated.
    - Good length (7-8 minutes)
  25. Keep in mind that the Dems invocation was too long and the Archbishop, too political.
  26. Something interesting should always be happening, either on the podium, the floor or outside to insure good network coverage. Must program every movement.
  27. Get approval for use of U.S. seal on front of podium.
  28. Podium microphones should be less obvious than Dems were.
  29. Podium workers should wear neutral colors so as not to distract from the speakers.
-

30. Audio expert should be consulted for musical events setup.
  31. In order to insure ideal sound pickup and framing of the picture from the head-on cameras, a hydraulically controlled platform should be built into the podium. This will allow proper elevation for each speaker.
  32. Our keynote address should be shorter than their 28-30 minute one.
  33. Use of large screen projection of keynote speech in hall was very effective.
  34. Republican keynoter should poke fun at McGovern with one-liners prepared by a comedy writer.
  35. Seconding speakers should be carefully selected to represent various interests and groups.
  36. Good musical entertainment should be arranged for the half hour preceding each day's session.
  37. Physical set-up:
    - GOP hospitality lounge for delegates.
    - Sign outside Convention Hall should read "GOP Convention" rather than "Democratic and GOP Conventions"
    - Chairman of each delegation to be provided with riser near microphone so he can be seen.
    - Collapsible fence should be reinforced so demonstrators can't push through as they did during the Dem Convention.
    - Three interview areas could be set up, away from the p. a. system and band.
    - VIP arrival area needs to be better lighted.
    - Should be no empty spectator seats.
-

## MISCELLANEOUS

1. Democratic contributor figures should be put out. Telethon reported their list had grown three-fold to 350,000 indicating that before they only had 120,000.
2. McGovern had new hairstyle for Convention -- TV slicker image?
3. Midwesterners should be polled for their feelings on conventions.
4. Get the Variety article out to the celebrities.
5. Have Ann Dorh do Convention briefing instead of Ziegler or Klein?
6. Secret Service agents moving with First Family must be kept to a minimum.
7. GOP fund raiser should be business dress, not dinner jackets, for an informal look.
8. McGovern needs to play down his extreme positions from now on, so we should be constantly keeping him on the defensive and trying to frustrate and irritate him.
9. The McGovern and Eagleton families are attractive and articulate. Families will assume a large role in the campaign.

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN

June 26, 1972

FROM: JPS

I. Democratic Situation

The Democrats are on the verge of providing us with a magnificent opportunity by nominating a Presidential candidate whom a majority of their party does not want. In the name of "reform", the Democrats have allowed the control of their party to pass into the hands of an ultra liberal, activist minority which is unrepresentative of any of the former factions of the old coalition, (Southern Democrats, labor, ethnics and minorities).

The key to taking advantage of the situation does not involve labeling McGovern as an ultra-liberal, however. Keeping in mind that the extra votes which we will be aiming for are people who have voted Democratic automatically most of their lives, the wrong thing to do would be to group McGovern as a liberal and us as conservatives; most Democrats still feel "liberal" is a good word.

Although he will attempt to hide his strategy, McGovern will wage a large state campaign (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, Washington, Oregon and California) which would yield just enough electoral votes to win (276). Additional states where he will make an

effort are Maryland, West Virginia, Hawaii, Alaska, North Dakota and South Dakota (31 electoral votes). The rest of the country he will concede. It is important for us to keep this in mind in planning our own strategy since it will mean that we will have the capability of concentrating our own finances, strategy and organizational talents in the few states which he means to contest.

On the Vice Presidency, I still think he will choose some one from a large state which we carried in 1968 (California, Illinois, Ohio or New Jersey). The possibilities here are rather limited (Tunney, Stevenson and Gilligan) and the strongest possibility would be Stevenson. His other possible approach would be to select some one who would be pleasing to organized labor but there doesn't seem to be any obvious choice in this regard. I doubt seriously if Senator Kennedy would accept a Vice Presidential nomination. Abe Ribicoff might have some attraction because of his following in the Jewish and Black communities but he would not run well in the mid-West where McGovern needs desperately to win. Most of the other non-Southern Senators and Governors are not well enough known, would not take it or are too battle scarred.

It would be a mistake to feel that we are looking ahead to a victory of Goldwater purportions since (1) the press will help McGovern to look more reasonable than Goldwater did and (2) the McGovern people, different from Goldwater, realize that they must move toward the center in order to win. We, however, can keep the press honest if we go about it correctly.

## II. Strategy Against McGovern

In most incumbent races the incumbent has most of the advantages and only one disadvantage — to a certain extent he is on the defensive since his non-incumbent opponent is constantly alleging a failure to perform adequately in office. We have a unique opportunity to remove this one advantage of non-incumbency from McGovern.

### A. Intra-Party Disagreements

Over the next few weeks, both before and after the Democratic convention, Humphrey, Muskie, Jackson and others can be counted upon to disagree pointedly and often with many of McGovern's stands. We should do nothing to interrupt this process since the most damning criticism against any man are the words of people in his own party. Any criticism of his stands which come from us during this period will harm the credibility of our disagreements against him in the fall. If we can succeed in making the same criticisms of McGovern which Democrats are used to hearing from other Democrats, we'll have made a great stride toward gaining the support of many Democratic voters in the fall.

### B. Labels and Personalities v/v The Issues

In most Presidential elections there really are no issues which are clear enough for the people to understand since both candidates are trying to seek the votes of a broad center of the populace and usually agree in principal on the larger issues in foreign and domestic policy. Therefore, in past elections, so called issue

debates have degenerated into a difference of means to accomplish agreed upon ends, which leave the voter in a state of confusion and force him to make his choice on the basis of personality, philosophical label or party loyalty.

A McGovern candidacy represents a rather drastic difference of opinion about ends, both in foreign and domestic policy. We therefore have the opportunity, if we can discipline ourselves to stick to the differences in ends between the two candidates, to wage a campaign based solely on the issues. The more we stray from this discipline and rely on personality, philosophical labels, or fear tactics, the more we give McGovern, with the cooperation of the press, the chance to represent that he is not as bad as we say he is, that we are unfairly characterizing him and we lose the value of the obvious difference that exists between RN and McGovern on ends.

C. Scheduling

RN should ignore the fact that there is an election campaign going on. Some large rallies and public appearances can be scheduled in October but as much as possible it should appear that RN is too busy with the affairs of state to pay too much attention to the election. The Vice Presidential candidate on the other hand should have an extremely full schedule starting the day after Labor Day. He should attack McGovern on the issues every day demanding answers to questions raised by McGovern's programs to redistribute wealth, guarantee income, cut defense spending, etc. The Vice President should have

"a-question-a-day" for George McGovern which will create constant pressure on him to start answering the charges of the Vice President. If this is done correctly, the Vice President will be on the news each day with his new question, McGovern will be forced to spend much of his time answering our charges and little attacking the Administration and, since his answers will never quite catch up with the questions, we will be constantly raising new doubts about him in the minds of the voters. Some original thinking should go into formulating these questions so that we can use the most damaging ones with the proper timing to keep the emotions of the campaign at a high pitch and be sure to create hard news every day. Some attention should be given to rifle-shotting many of these questions to appeal to Jews, the laboring man and Catholic ethnics. Of course, the questions should be used to keep the Democrats divided on the issues.

Once again, the Vice President should never refer to liberals or conservatives or use trick phrases to characterize McGovern as a radical. We are after normally Democratic voters who will begin to feel sorry for their party if they feel we are being underhanded or unfair in our criticism.

D. Organizational Programs

Special efforts should be made to isolate and inform the conservative Democratic vote in all the states where McGovern will concentrate his campaign. In Michigan, for

instance, this consists of the laboring and ethnic vote in and around Wayne County which supported George Wallace in the primary. In the other states it will involve a much more aggressive campaign in the large cities than we have ever waged before. The Vice President should be seen in union halls and at ethnic picnics and outings which the Democrats are used to attending. If we can go over the heads of the labor leaders to their constituency, at the very least, McGovern will have to spend a great deal of time trying to recapture votes which a Democrat normally gets by default.

E. Helping the Remainder of the Ticket

If we can succeed in grabbing the initiative, thereby placing McGovern on the defensive during the first weeks of the campaign, many Democrats, especially in those states outside McGovern's projected target areas, will lose interest in the top of the ticket and devote most of their attention to saving Gubernatorial, Senatorial and Congressional seats. This will happen quite swiftly in the South and, later, on a state by state basis in the smaller states in the middle and far west. Of course all of our candidates in these areas should be reminded to run against McGovern (and not their opponent) but in aid of their success we should: (1) see that we adequately coordinate the questions which we will be asking of McGovern with local candidates so that they may use them to embarrass their opponents; (2) coordinate all local efforts to ask voters to vote the straight Nixon ticket in order to preempt the predictable ticket splitting efforts by the Democrats;

(3) coordinate advertising efforts to include the names of local candidates on billboards and T.V. spots. While the Vice Presidential candidate will be useful in trying to convert labor and ethnic votes in the larger states, he should also be used to assist the local candidates in areas where we can make some headway.

### III. General Observations and Summary

We can place McGovern on the defensive by sticking to the "ends" differences between Nixon and McGovern. This battle should be carried by the Vice Presidential candidate without use of name calling, philosophical labels or sheer fear tactics. McGovern should be confronted with a "question-a-day" and forced to answer on the substance of his proposals.

If this strategy is successful, it will result in (1) hard political news on a daily basis; (2) continued division among Democratic politicians and voters; (3) a continuing conflict between the Republican Vice Presidential candidate and McGovern which will keep RN above the battle in a statesman-like position and (4) a failure on McGovern's part ever to successfully bring criticism to bear on the Nixon Administration.

One general observation: in 1968 we spent a tremendous amount of money on television advertising, much of which was unproductive and even boring by the end of the campaign. There is no doubt that the value of political advertising is suspect these days since the voters are unwilling to believe self-serving statements of any kind from the candidates themselves. The "question-a-day" approach mentioned above is intended to guarantee daily news coverage on the 6 o'clock news shows which still is of

great value because such coverage comes from an objective source. I would hope to some degree, if the "question-a-day" method is successful, we could tailor much of our spot advertising to those questions which seem to provoke the most interest among the electorate. The value in this approach is to first interest the voters from an objective source (the 6 o'clock news) and then reiterate the most telling points by our advertising. By first testing these items through the news media we gain credibility for each point and then can properly select which we should drum home through spot advertising.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN  
FROM: RAY PRICE  
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy

I've no changes in my June 16 memo, but would add a few additional thoughts:

1. The target is McGovern, not the Democrats. I was glad this point was made so forcefully this morning, and I think it's essential that we stick with it. We should stress the open door theme, and keep coming back to the argument that RN represents the great, bi-partisan traditions of America -- the traditions not only of Lincoln and TR and Eisenhower, but also of Wilson and FDR, of Truman and Kennedy.

2. Whenever possible, RN should help cement this impression by referring back to these traditions, and to positions associated with them: to FDR's leadership of the free world in its time of peril, to HST's forging of the Atlantic alliance, etc.

3. Throughout our history, there have been fringe movements that were briefly and dramatically in the spotlight, then faded back into the shadows from whence they came -- while the great bi-partisan traditions were carried on. We should zero in on McGovern's as the latest of these.

4. We should have a moratorium on discussion of forging a new coalition that will make the GOP the majority party for the next generation -- this will scare off those dispossessed Democrats who see a resounding defeat of McGovern as the only way they can take their party back.


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5. Non-partisan forums are the best forums. The President made this point to the surrogates; at this point it's doubly true for him, if we're to make him the rallying-point for disaffected Democrats as well as Republicans and Independents. To the maximum extent possible, the forums we book him into should be ones associated with those great bi-partisan traditions.

6. We should do our damndest to avoid getting into situations like the one we found ourselves in with Packwood and the Crippling Strikes Prevention Act. This hurts us at our most vulnerable point: it provides some of the most damaging support yet for the picture of RN as an unprincipled politician who would sacrifice anything for electoral support. We could use some fights on principle for unpopular causes to offset it; or at least to resist some obvious pressures to take the expedient course. I saw Packwood on two networks last night; it was devastating. We shouldn't delude ourselves that we can do this sort of thing (if we did) without getting caught at least part of the time, and being severely hurt by it. I think Stew Alsop was right in his column when he asked who could defeat RN in November, and concluded that only RN could.

7. In general, I thought the presentation of strategy this morning was right on target.

8. Attached is an outline I did last Sunday for the keynote presentation at the convention, together with some notes explaining it. It builds up to a direct appeal to dissident Democrats to join with us. I think this kind of thing could also be the keynote of the campaign.

  
Raymond K. Price, Jr.

Attachments

Keynote Presentation: Outline

1. Moderator. There are discontents and dissatisfactions in the land; Americans feel frustrated with the present, and often fed up with government. We share these discontents and dissatisfactions, and we too are fed up with what all too often have been the failures of government. But we don't just complain. For three and a half years we've been doing something about it; we've made progress; the direction is set, the momentum is established, the players are lined up, the openings have been made to Russia, China and others abroad, and to new departures at home. Highlights of what we've achieved. What we've accomplished is a beginning, and a credential; now we're eager to get on with the job, and to finish what we've begun. In the film you're about to see, you will see some of those beginnings.

## FILM: THE NIXON YEARS

2. Keynoter A: What we will do for you. Our plans, our goals, for the future, as we look from now to 1976. A new prosperity without war and without inflation; the beginnings of a full generation of peace; a rebirth of pride in America; a fair shake for the farmer, security for the elderly, progress on the environment, etc.

3. Keynoter B: What we will not do to you. (The attack speech.)

All the McGovern nasties -- we won't take money out of the workers' pockets for a \$1,000 dole, we won't bus your kids, we won't let America become a second-rate power whose President has to beg, we won't spawn a new permissiveness that collapses moral values; we'll work with the young, but won't ignore the old; we'll turn America around without turning it upside down. We'll respect the student, the professor, the farmer -- and also the worker who wears a hard hat. Note: the focus of this will be entirely on the sins of the present Democratic nominee, not on the sins of past Democratic administrations.

4. Keynoter C. From the party of the Open Door, an Invitation.

From the podium of this Republican convention, we address this talk to the millions of loyal Democrats left homeless by Hurricane McGovern. Speaking to them directly, we invite them to make their home with us -- try it, you may like it. Think about why you're a Democrat. Is it because the Democratic party is the party of FDR, Truman and Kennedy? If so, then ask yourself whether Roosevelt or Truman or Kennedy would advocate crippling our defenses and abandoning our allies -- Roosevelt, who led the defense

of freedom in World War II; Truman, the architect of NATO and the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and patron at the founding of Israel; Kennedy, who declared we would "bear any burden," etc. Is it because the Democratic party is the party of labor? -- through a litany of why people in the past have been Democratic, and why those same reasons should now lead them to cast their lot with us in 1972. Its tone is one of respect for the Democratic Party as a great national institution, and sympathy with those members who have seen it seized by a self-appointed elite determined to convert it into a narrow ideological faction -- of warm and open-hearted welcome to those left on the outside at Miami a month ago, and of common cause with them because we share their hopes, their dreams, their concerns about America. In his acceptance speech, George McGovern said, "Come home, America." To millions of Democrats whose ideas no longer have a hearing in the national Democratic Party, I say tonight, "Come home, Americans -- come share our home -- give us not only your votes, but your hands, we will give you ours in welcome." This is the real keynote -- and it should be echoed throughout the rest of the convention proceedings.

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Notes on the keynote outline, and on the invitation:

1. Structure. This is broken into sections not by issue area, but to make a logical progression leading up to what I think should be the real "keynote" of the keynote, and of the convention: an explicit, direct appeal to disaffected Democrats to take refuge with us.

One of our real dangers has been that we'd come across as smug and complacent. This counters that, at the outset of the convention, in two ways: first, by starting off identifying ourselves with the dissatisfactions most Americans feel in one way or another, saying we share those, and that's why we want another four years to complete the unfinished task of combatting them; and second, by reaching out to the Democrats rather than merely patting ourselves on the back. There are more of them than there are of us, so we need them; people like to be courted, and this does so -- showing that we care about them.

The intro establishes an audience rapport by saying we know how you feel; it brags a bit, but without smugness, and leads logically into the film, which shows RN grappling with the inherited troubles, and making headway against them in his first term; the film leaves us at 1972; Keynoter A then takes us from 1972 to 1976, in terms of our hopes and plans; Keynoter B draws the sharp distinctions between what we're offering and what the opposition is; this sets the stage for Keynoter C to make his appeal to the traditional Democrats to come with us.

2. Advantages. Keying off with this unusual sort of appeal to Democrats has several distinct advantages:

- a. Being unusual, it makes news.
- b. It plays against the weakness of the opposition candidate, and highlights Democratic divisions.
- c. It keys off our "party of the open door" theme.

d. It sets up some possible additional convention highlights (see notes below on this).

e. It establishes a set of explicit rationales for dissident Democrats to join with us.

f. It adds interest to what could otherwise be a dull convention, by introducing an element of contest and confrontation -- but making it confrontation among Democrats rather than among Republicans.

g. It provides a theme for the commentators to talk about, with a cast of characters.

3. Convention follow-up. I'd like to see us issue this call to Democrats at the outset, and then follow it up throughout the convention -- not only returning to it in subsequent speeches, but adding some items to the program that would pick it up. Examples:

a. A special, spotlighted appearance by Connally, speaking as a Democrat to his fellow Democrats.

b. On the second night, a special series of short speeches by Democrats responding to the Republican invitation -- assuming the right people can be rounded up. Examples: a prominent labor leader, life-long Democrat, saying the candidate who in 1972 best represents what labor represents is not McGovern, but RN; an attractive, articulate young voice of the New South, saying his party has left him; a respected academic or student leader, saying he's been a Democrat but McGovern is too much, and we need responsible leadership; Floyd McKissick saying the real road to black progress is not the McGovern way, but the Nixon way.

c. Release telegrams and letters from dissident Democrats during the convention, saying they're going Republican.

d. Plug dissident Democrats into the outside-the-hall schedule.

4. TV Coverage. Perhaps the biggest payoff, if we follow a course like this, will be in the cud-chewing of the TV reporters and commentators. They desperately need something to talk about, and if we can get them talking about how many Democrats the Republicans are going to get, and speculating about what Democratic switch-overs we're going to parade out next, we've achieved four crucial goals:

a. We've used our convention to condition Democratic voters, in explicit, personal terms, to thinking about voting Republican.

b. We've established a "prior approval" factor -- that is, we've made switching seem respectable to the TV viewer by showing him that other good Democrats are doing it.

c. We've injected a note of drama into the convention, and we've done it by moving the battle to the other guy's turf.

d. We've got the commentators talking about our issues.

Not to mention that we've opened our convention in an even better way than the Democrats opened theirs -- we've made it not just a GOP Convention, but a convention of and for the new coalition.

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: RAY PRICE

SUBJECT: First Family Scheduling

I haven't thought this one through carefully, but would hope that they'd be scheduled extensively. They've become a first-rate asset. In particular, we should get them on as many talk shows as possible. I caught Tricia on the Merv Griffin show the other evening and she was a knockout -- real star quality, said all the right things, and was stunning in all respects. At a time when average Americans are worried about holding the family together as an institution, about alienated kids, etc., simply demonstrating that RN has daughters like these who are as loyal to him as they are is an enormous plus -- especially with parents and grandparents.

Booking them into some political forums is fine -- but where I think they can be most useful is in those situations that give them a chance to express their (and RN's) concern for people. This sense of caring about people is one that we're weak on, and that we've got to bring through more successfully -- and they have the credentials to help do it. In particular, as a result of the coverage of her travels Mrs. Nixon has built up great strength in this regard. Merely by visiting nursing homes, hospitals, disaster areas, etc., she can remind people of it. We might again have her make non-political visits to some outstanding volunteer projects, that are doing things for people. Incidentally, I was rather forcefully struck a few weeks ago, when looking at the pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy's visit to Kennedy Center, surrounded by the "beautiful people," etc., that there might be a strong if somewhat subconscious vein we could tap: I suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly come to realize how refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, involved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather than a frivolous pleasure-seeker from Camelot.

I'd like to see all three give a lot of attention to the elderly. Not only are the elderly a big voting bloc, and the most conspicuous non-quota group from the Democratic convention (where they were represented by a token Colonel Sanders), but they in particular would respond both to Mrs. Nixon and to the girls.

A possibility that just occurs to me now: maybe we could organize a Grandparents' Day at the White House, with Mamie as an honored guest, and stir a lot of sewing-circle speculation that maybe RN-PN are soon to be grandparents. They'd love it in Peoria.



Raymond K. Price, Jr.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 23, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (As Requested)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

SUBJECT: The Vice President and the Campaign

Because the Vice President remains, outside RN, the biggest gun we have, the Veep should be staffed up -- at least on the level of the 1970 campaign. Full plane, and gear and constant contact and communication with the White House and Re-Election Committee.

1. He will have to visit those states the President cannot visit, as of course the first responsibility.
2. However, as often as possible, the Vice President should be scheduled into those areas and among those groups -- that are the battleground in 1972. And that is not Republicans. We, by and large, have the South now. In the North, it is Catholic, ethnic, urban, Jewish, middle-income, working class Democrats who are the swing votes, the ones who will decide by how large a margin we will win this one, if we do win it.

Therefore, schedulers should look to Pulaski Day Parades, Columbus Day Parades (What about a WH function, along the lines of the St. Pat's Party), union halls, Knights of Columbus, Queens, PBA, and ethnic community meetings.

This is vital, in my judgment -- and we should schedule Dole and MacGregor into the GOP functions, using the Veep for those areas where he can do us the most good -- among the Wallace Democrats in the North, in places like Michigan and elsewhere.

3. The Vice President should have a set-piece speech, as the President had, and instead of an entire new text every day -- as in 1970 -- we should have a new "Ten Graphs" in each speech. This is one hell of a lot easier on speech writers, and gives us greater control of the material that the press runs.

4. The Vice President should carry the fight to the opposition ticket, by and large ignoring Eagleton -- and zeroing in on McGovern. The Veep has the Assault Book. What is needed now more than anything is co-ordination of the attack strategy so that we don't pee away everything in the first weeks, and so that our strategies can be co-ordinated.
5. Frankly, we need better press relations between the Vice President and the national and local press; this might well require a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Veep's staff toward the traveling press. (We had good relations we thought, by and large, in the 1970 election.) Certainly, the Vice President should do something for the locals at each stop. And we ought, of course, to shelve for the campaign the broad anti-media attacks; unless a) it proves politically necessary in light of their shafting. We have the political dividends out of this -- our target is McGovern.
6. Contact on a regular basis between the President and the Vice President would be especially helpful -- not simply for morale purposes, but to review the success of failure of a given strategy and to maintain campaign flexibility.
7. We should, on the campaign trail, avoid I think, the epithet and make our charges -- based strictly on the record. So that McGovern is forced to respond to what he himself said -- not to what we called him. However, the extremism of the McGovern positions and statements, and the "elitism" of the New Left controllers of the Democratic Party remains an effective theme appealing to Democrats.
8. We should remember that the swing voters in this election are Democrats -- and strictly Republican appeals this fall are only useful for rallying the troops, nothing more. The "McGovernites" is right on the mark.
9. The situation of 1970 where the President's people were on board the Veep's plane-- at the Veep's invitation -- was a good one. Since the President is not going to be stumping, his top writing talent, or much of it, should be with the Vice President.
10. I recognize the need to defend the President and his Administration, but what the press considers "news" is usually negative news, i. e., an "attack" rather than a defense. And we must not allow McGovern to swing over onto the offensive -- i. e., I would argue that the Vice President should be carrying the struggle to their ticket, rather than waiting for them to attack, and defending the President.

In my view, whereas in 1968 it was relatively easy to scare the voters, with attacks on RN's economics and position on medicare, etc. -- that tactic on the part of the other side won't work today. Whether they agree with RN or not, very few Americans are "frightened" by the prospect of another RN term. The same cannot be said of McGovern; and this is the factor which opens up the possibility of a landslide. Thus, a campaign which continually raises specters about McGovern's extremism, and the crazyness of his ideas, is the only kind of campaign I think that can win us a major landslide. A defensive strategy, thus, does not commend itself to me -- especially for our biggest gun outside of the President. We ought to have other views on this.

11. We have to be wary of making George a Martyr. Mean-spiritedness has no place in this campaign; thus, it is important that the campaign staff not be tired and bitchy as the campaign heats up. The humor used should be light and needling -- not mean in character.

Again, on this score, though unfair, it is true that we have a smaller margin for error than the Democrats. The Veep can call McGovern a "fraud" and be excoriated for it -- McGovern can compare RN to Hitler and his policy in Vietnam to the "extermination of the Jews" and get away with it, without comment. Without tearing into our friends in the media, we have got to keep pointing this up.

12. Vitally important that we not allow a situation to develop, as in 1960 with RN or 1968 with the Veep, when the candidate and his traveling press were at sword's point. Even if the press is shafting us, it is not to our advantage to conduct a Cold War with them -- when they are reporting what we say and do. In the fall, on the Vice President's plane, there should be some who will bring that "can of oil" when necessary, and will, in a good cause, eat a little crow and humble pie.

13. Essential that the Vice President, this fall, feel that he has the full confidence and support of the President, and regular backing. My view is that in 1968, when the Vice President was under attack, we would have done better by bringing him on to answer the charges against him. In 1972, we can be sure that the Vice President will be an issue -- the answer to this is to put him on the air, on national television, and to let him in his own calm way, with his own accents, answer the allegations that will be made against him. To show he does not have horns. We might even consider a visit to some campus -- or a youth confrontation on the tube -- for the campaign. As in 1952, a

harsh and strident and unfair attack on a Vice President can be made to back-fire against its perpetrators.

Considering that one of the advantages of McGovern is that he may be perceived as the underdog, the anti-Establishment candidate, it might be good to get the Vice President into this role, and come fighting back fairly, against all these elements and institutions that are out to get him.

14. Lastly, the major appearance the Vice President -- the major national impression -- will come from his acceptance speech. This speech can do a tremendous job for him, and for us, in laying out the record of the Democratic ticket, in appealing to those Democrats who have bolted, and in leaving an impression of the Vice President before the country.

PJB would like to help put some of this together for the Vice President, and if the President suggested that, would be most helpful.

15. Recognizing that there are many within the White House and the Hill who are not exactly enthusiasts of the Vice President, word should go forth that this is a "team" effort, there should be no "background" knocking the Number Two man, who will be shouldering as RN did, much of the nasty workload of the party and the campaign. Nothing is more embittering than to pull off the wire some holier-than-thou statement from a fellow Republican, when -- in the interests of the Administration -- we are throwing Goodell to the sharks. Even a word from RN to all involved that this is a team effort; that no good is served us or the Party by background back-stabbing, and that this is an all-for-one, one-for-all operation, would be beneficial in the campaign, I would think -- from the 1970 experience.

Buchanan

TALKING PAPER FOR DUEHANAN

HF  
FCU  
7/20

You should talk with the Vice President and sell him on your idea of the day talk with the press.

Also, we need some heavy thinking regarding the Vice President's role and how he should play it if he is the nominee for reelection.

We should determine first how he can help, and second, how he can avoid hurting the prospects of the ticket.

We need your strategy views on this, but we also need you to talk with the Vice President, try to get him to stop the swipes at the NEW YORK TIMES, and so forth, and also to avoid the personal attacks on McGovern as you suggest in your latest memorandum.

HRH  
July 13, 1972

HRH:kb

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12065 6-102

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102  
By Conf NARS, Date 8-19-81

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN/KEN KHACHIGIAN

SUBJECT: Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972

Many of the points HRH mentions were omitted in our original Assault Strategy memo for the basic reason that we were focusing exclusively upon the "negative" rather than the positive. Some recommendations in the HRH memo we would concur with -- others we do not. Let's take them point by point:

"1. The Buchanan memorandum fails to recognize the necessity to keep our strength up front and center. In other words, all of our attack lines on the opposition should end up emphasizing our strengths."

We don't agree with this. For the following reasons. First, millions of Americans vote not for, but against -- their hostility toward one candidate is the compelling motive at the voting booth, not their enthusiasm for. And a "negative" campaign -- largely directed from the positive one on RN -- would in our judgment be much more convincing to those swing voters who have never been pro-RN, but who can be "terrified" by this new phenomenon. LBJ could not conceivably have gotten his sixty per cent against RN -- he got it against Goldwater, not because of the positive LBJ "ads," but because Goldwater was portrayed as a threat to the Republic. We should, in our judgment, recognize that potentially millions of knee-jerk Democratic voters are going to come our way, if they come -- because though they are not enthusiastic about RN, they are anti-radicalism.

Secondly, when one observes that McGovern apparently lost 15 points in one week in California -- among Democrats, it is clear that there is tremendous room for movement downward by McGovern -- from a relatively small investment. On the other hand, we see that RN -- from the unprecedented China trip and attendant publicity, and from the historic

Moscow visit and SALT agreement -- has only risen seven or eight points.

The lesson is clear. The potential for movement by McGovern -- downward -- is far easier and less costly, than the potential for additional upward RN movement. In short, if it takes a Peking and Moscow summit, and a SALT agreement -- and reams of hours of heroic copy to move up up seven points -- while George can be dropped fifteen in a week by some hard-nosed Humphrey attacks -- dollar-for-dollar -- when it comes to McGovern this argues we ought to put our campaigning dollars into attacking him, rather than boosting ourselves.

Third, and related: RN is known to the nation; impressions of RN have hardened over a period of twenty-five years. There are not likely to be any sudden new perceptions of RN by the masses, in five months. On the other hand, the perceptions about McGovern have not even begun to harden with the nation as a whole. We have a far better chance of affecting a change in the present image of McGovern -- than we do in the present image of the President.

Fourth, let's look at it this way. RN cannot possibly get below 40% of the vote, and cannot probably exceed 60%. Those swing voters are more than likely Democrats, or independents somewhat lukewarm toward the President (a group that would probably split half for RN and half for JFK in 1960.) What is most likely to convince them to vote 95% for RN: Is it a major campaign convincing them of what they already know fairly well -- that RN is competent, experienced and innovative in foreign affairs. (Even many of RN's opponents would concede this.) Or is it more likely to result in greater returns if we convince them rather that the "alternative" is an utter disaster for the country. In short, anyone who can be convinced that McGovern is a disaster is automatically a vote for RN. While someone who can be persuaded that RN is an imaginative foreign policy leader is not necessarily a vote for RN -- and he can still vote for McGovern. My view is that the negative McGovern campaign need not be -- and should not necessarily be -- tied to a pro-RN pitch at the end. If there were five people in the race, I would subscribe wholly to point one -- but there are only two; and anyone whom we can convince that McGovern is a wild man is ours -- for certain -- even if he at the same time thinks RN is a conservative square.

Fifth, and finally -- not only does the pro-RN approach tend to dilute an anti-McGovern message; the President should not be twinned with McGovern on those issues where our disagreements are of degree rather than kind. For example, if we are going to say McGovern is toying with the security of our country -- whereas we, too, have cut back, but only responsibly on defense -- then we are weakening our case. Where the

President can be contrasted with McGovern is where the breach is clean as a whistle. I. e. McGovern favors abortion on demand -- RN thinks this is morally wrong; i. e. McGovern favors legalization of marijuana; RN thinks this is wrong, and a threat to the American family. We should keep in mind that what we have is a President and a statesman and what they have is a light-weight and a wild man -- and we ought not to be comparing them too much in speeches, just as we don't want any debates which would have the effect of putting them on the same plane.

Lastly, look at it this way. During the fall campaign the pro-RN news footage of RN as President will probably amount to seven times the pro-RN advertising footage. Thus, the pro-RN ad materials will only be a minor reinforcement of the RN national image -- a minor fraction of the time RN is seen. On the other hand, given the pro-McGovern disposition of the liberal media, the anti-McGovern material from our campaign is likely to be a major and crucial segment of the entire anti-McGovern materials that go out to the nation.

"2. We must not get trapped into McGovern's bog of peddling himself as a new face. If people want new ideas, this Administration has the boldest initiatives in history."

We agree with the first sentence, but not necessarily with the second. The reason is this: We have spent countless hours and unrecorded effort selling the bold dynamic "New American Revolution," -- more effort probably than we can duplicate between now and November -- and the returns are, in my judgment, not encouraging. If we took a national poll dealing with RN's domestic proposals -- and asked how many considered them bold, new, imaginative and then further, how many were going to go with RN because of them -- the returns, one assumes, would not be particularly heartened. Dollar-for-dollar, again, it is not a cost-effective investment of PR time, money or effort to attempt to portray the Nixon Administration domestic program as "exciting". We would be going against a public perception; we would be attempting to convince millions of the attractiveness of "programs" when increasing numbers have about had it with government "programs" in general.

The first sentence -- about knocking down the "new face," is right on the money. McGovern has been part and parcel of the Congress which has sat on its duff for two years; he has been a member of the Democratic majority which has controlled both houses of Congress, since McGovern came to Washington.

Who wrote the loopholes in the law; who raised the taxes; who failed to provide relief; who is now sitting on its can doing nothing for the average man -- but waste his dollars. Why who, other than the Congress of which George McGovern has been an integral part since 1956, the Congress he and the left-wing liberals have been in control of, absolutely, ever since McGovern came to Washington. Wallace hit them on this, and so can we. McGovern should rightly be portrayed as not someone with new ideas, but someone with a plan to dump new billions in tax dollars down the old ratholes, he and his friends constructed over the last 16 years.

(Both the Broder and Drummond columns hit the nail on the handling of this issue.)

"3. The Buchanan memorandum deals almost entirely with domestic matters and totally misses our big issues which are foreign policy. Who is the bold leader? Who is the fresh leader? Who is the dramatic leader in foreign policy?"

Basically, we agree that foreign policy will be a long suit for the President -- and we mentioned specifically attacks on McGovern on Israel, Europe, defense and Vietnam. But, again, the same question arises. The entire nation has seen RN in China, seen RN in Moscow, seen RN sign SALT -- the coverage has been sweeping and massive. Can we really advance that appreciably with speeches and verbal references to what the nation already knows and already believes -- that RN is an imaginative statesman.

We should -- in our positive advertising, and in RN's posture during the campaign, publicly, emphasize the Somber Statesman, the imaginative statesman, who has mastery over the issues of peace and war. But we don't need to constantly draw explicit comparisons. The implicit one is satisfactory. If we can get individuals like Rockefeller, liberals and moderates, saying that McGovern is naive and a madman, if he thinks we can gut the Sixth Fleet, without Israel going down the tubes. If George can be portrayed as something totally out of his element in questions of foreign policy, a man who is both too soft and too much of a light-weight, a foolish man whom Brezhnev would eat for breakfast -- than anyone who is convinced of that is automatically an RN voter. There is no other choice.

There are two foreign policy problems we see. One -- Vietnam. Polls show McGovern's support is tied inextricably to the desire to get out of Vietnam. In our view, the "wrong from the start" materials in the Assault Book, portraying McGovern as repeatedly duped, and misled by

Communist profession of good intentions, and his "abandoning" of our prisoners should help neutralize his potential strength here. Also, if RN pulls the rug out on McGovern, with a settlement -- we should lace into him as a "squalid nuisance" who only harassed and nit-picked and back-stabbed the President who brought America out of the war -- while McGovern and company got us into a war they could not win or could not end.

The second serious problem is that McGovern is milking the old right and the new left isolationism both. Frankly, foreign aid truly has no constituency left -- and McGovern recognized this. The argument against spending our money for exotic weapons, when we need to re-build here at home; the argument that maybe our allies should do more for themselves -- these arguments hit home far beyond the McGovern constituency. (The McGovern endorsement of that 1% of GNP foreign aid [\$11 billion] with "priority on Africa" ought thus to be hung around his neck. Like Mr. Wallace used to say, "Those fellows want to give more billions of dollars away to Hottentots.")

Given the necessity for foreign military assistance and its growing unpopularity, we may have to out-demagogue George on this one, case him in that role, and use the arguments that the only way to prevent Americans from fighting future wars is to provide the natives with the guns to defend themselves. If we don't we'll have American Marines, rather than South Vietnamese Marines defending South Vietnam, as we did when McGovern's men sat in the White House.

"4. We should attack McGovern in a way that surfaces our point, not just hit his points. We should not get trapped into putting out the enemy line."

We concur. We think this is covered in our earlier points.

"5. We have to build the foreign policy issue in terms of the question of changing horses in mid-stream. In other words, President Nixon has launched some very major, far-reaching, foreign policy initiatives. We can't afford to let an inexperienced novice come in and pick up the reins at this point. We cannot afford to have McGovern in the White House in terms of foreign policy. His inexperience and

naivety in the foreign policy field would be disastrous. Do we really want "White Flag McGovern" in the White House?"

Excellent here. This is one area where we can contradict No. 3 -- especially in a possible RN<sup>N</sup> speech. How should we build RN up while tearing McGovern down. Here are several ideas:

The theme that RN has brought 500,000 boys out of Vietnam, has saved that little nation from collapse, has opened the door to China, has negotiated a truce in the Cold War, has brought into bearing the most historic arms agreement in history -- and, for God's sake, let's not throw this away by putting into the White House, some rank amateur and clown who doesn't know his fanny from first base about foreign policy.

We can build up this theme, and should. The United States today stands on the threshold of building a structure of peace that can last for the remainder of this century. There is a chance, a good chance, but not a certain chance, that if RN can finish the structure which is now half built -- that for the remainder of this century no more American boys will be dying in places like Vietnam. But for God's sake, to fire the architect when the cathedral is half finished, and replace him with an engineering student is insane. This is like firing the research physicians at NIH right at the point at which they may have a cure for cancer -- and replacing them with some hippie medical students.

This could serve as a counter to the McGovern argument that RN's initiatives in foreign policy are good -- but that job is done. We must now turn to the home front. Our argument has to be the job is not done -- and anyone who thinks it is and acts on that belief, is likely to bring down the entire structure just before it is completed. The concrete is still soft -- it has not yet hardened; now is not the time to change builders.

Further, along these lines, we should emphasize the incredible naivete of McGovern who thinks that the way you negotiate with the Soviets is to cut your fleet in half, reduce your army to pre-Pearl Harbor level, mothball half your bombers, scrap much of your nuclear deterrent -- and then negotiate. RN and the people high up around him can say -- We have been there in Peking and Moscow and candidly, they will not be impressed by a nation which strips itself naked to show its good will.

They will not treat an America that abandons its strength with respect, but with contempt. They will not then be convinced that the path of peace is best, but the path of hostility and testing. My friends, a weakened and softened and beseeching America is not the kind of America that can keep the peace. Only a strong and resolute and tough nation will be respected, and be treated with respect. If we throw our arms into the sea -- the enemy response will not be to love us, but to laugh at us -- and to treat our friends and allies as totalitarians and bullies have always treated the weak.

Lines such as, "My friends, the price of peace cannot be unilaterally reduced by the United States, or George McGovern. You cannot buy security in a nuclear world by cutting your defense budget in half -- and doubling your hopes. "

"My friends, the greatest threat to peace today is not the American defense budget; it is the mistaken and indeed naive belief that permanent peace is guaranteed -- and we need not make any great sacrifices or efforts to maintain. That is not reality. That is a dream from which Americans will awake with a terrible shock, if we believe it is reality."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: DOUGLAS HALLETT  
SUBJECT: Your Memo of June 27.

Your supposition that "during the 1960 campaign there was almost no change in the polls, while in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign" is incorrect. In fact, just the reverse is true. In 1960, the President's base of support fluctuated more than it did in 1968 (Harris' figures reflect this better than Gallup's, but since Harris was working for Kennedy in 1960 and complete figures are unavailable, at least to me, I have used Gallup figures in the attached chart). He came out of the conventions with 50 percent support -- his first lead over Kennedy since January, declined to 47 percent with the TV debates, and rose again at the end of the campaign with Eisenhower's intervention and the Republican TV blitz. Meanwhile, except for the last two weeks or so, Kennedy was taking most of the undecided voters as they made up their minds about the election. In contrast, in 1968, the President's base of support was remarkably stable, holding around 43 percent throughout the fall. What happened in 1968 was that the remaining 57 percent of the electorate gradually coalesced behind Humphrey -- the Wallace vote declined and the undecideds moved into the Democratic camp. Whereas in 1960 the President's actions, both effective -- the TV blitz -- and ineffective -- the TV debates, had a substantial impact on the electorate, in 1968 the President's actions hardly affected his base of support at all. He might as well have not campaigned.

In fact, he really didn't campaign in 1968. From the time of the convention forward, the Nixon campaign was immobilized, continuing with the same platitudinous, wishy-washiness which had been appropriate -- and given the situation -- effective during the preconvention period. The President wandered lazily across the country. The TV-media campaign was as dull as dishwater. The radio speeches, as

usual, were vacuous. Humphrey, in contrast, recovered his momentum with the Salt Lake City speech on September 30, Harry Trumaned across the country, had better media programming when he could finally afford it, and replied extremely effectively to the President's attempt to spur his campaign forward in the final weeks; i. e. the "security gap" speech and Humphrey's same-day, magnificent, reply. Had the campaign continued another two days, Humphrey would have surely captured the White House.

Now, the conclusion from all this is not that the 1960 campaign was better designed than the 1968 effort. The 50-state, rally-to-rally, approach wasted the President's energies, spoiled him for the debates, deprived him of the advantages that should have been his with the Vice-Presidency (advantages which should have been clear to the most obtuse observer given the way the polls shot up after his Guildhall, Soviet and steel strike activities in the pre-1960 period -- why more of this was not done in early 1960 and why Kennedy was allowed to dominate the public's attention, and thus the polls, in the first six months of 1960 is beyond me) and ignored the opportunity for him to appear non-political, issue-oriented, even reflective with effective media programming and better use of his office. It was, after all, only with the beginning of the taking advantage of his office and prestige, with the public blessings of Eisenhower and the TV programming at the end, that the President began to gain. Before that, he was leaving the undecided, swing voters to Kennedy and actually losing ground within his own base. Had the President used the imaginative media ideas which were thought up for 1960, had he paused to give decent speeches, and had he not wasted his energy and his prestige on constant campaigning, he would have been much better off. Indeed, he would have probably won.

Nor do I want to imply that the 1968 campaign was poorly planned. The tone of what little I have seen of your 1967 memorandum on the importance of the tube, the columnists, and the other agents through which a candidate is mediated to the public was right on target. So was the de-emphasis of rallies and the institution of thoughtful speeches, etc. The failure in 1968 was one of execution, not design. The mechanisms through which the President was to be projected to the public were well-thought out; only the product was missing. The President had nothing to say; there were no issues; the radio speeches were generally banal and -- being radio speeches and not visual events -- poorly designed to attract attention from either the media or the public. The 1960 campaign was poorly.

designed, but it was salvaged at the end by the President's happening on to good execution of what should have been his design all along; the 1968 campaign was extremely well designed, but miserably carried out, both by the President and the people around him.

What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz the country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led to Humphrey's victory in 1968. On the other hand, it is also not that he should remain above and beyond the battle -- remain Presidential is the way Ray Price would put it -- as he did in 1968. The first approach would rally the opposition in its general contempt for Nixon, the campaigner, and it would deprive him of the advantages which almost pulled it out for him in 1960 and which, as President and not just Eisenhower's Vice President, he has in even greater degree now. The second approach, in turn, would also deprive him of his advantages of access to public attention -- it would leave him victimized by whatever McGovern could manage to do, leave him vulnerable to complacency among his electorate, and fail to take advantage of 1972's unique opportunity to reach out to ethnics, Catholics, and others who could form, at last, a new Republican majority.

What is needed is a campaign approach which combines the dynamism of the 1960 campaign, particularly in the format of the closing days, with the strategy of 1968 magnified to take advantage of the President's incumbency. The President should be on center stage, but he should be on center stage as President. He should be holding down food prices, fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax reform, solving pollution problems, bleeding a bit for the poor, and -- although not as importantly since it has already been accomplished P. R. wise -- bringing about a new structure of peace -- and he should be doing all these things visibly, actively and dramatically. This will involve some travel and some speechmaking, but the travel and the speechmaking should appear non-political and very substantive. Likewise, with the media operation -- our ads should be like news clips and any Presidential appearances made should be information, not rhetoric, oriented. Political rally appearances made should be few and far between -- and the rallies should be so massive that it can be claimed they evidence popular, not just Republican, support for the President. I have already made detailed suggestions and I will not repeat them here.

I suspect, from my rather distant knowledge of the President, that he is beginning to get battle-hungry -- the sight of George McGovern galavanting around the country is becoming too much to resist. He should continue to resist. Hard-charging was not what helped the President at the end of the 1960 campaign; it was not the failure to hard-charge which hurt him in 1968. And, as President, as the 1970 campaign demonstrated, hard-charging can hurt him even more than it did in the beginning of the 1960 campaign and would have had he undertaken it in 1968. As President, we have scores of ways to answer McGovern's charges without involving the President in direct confrontation. If McGovern charges we haven't done anything domestically, we can blast the Congress for inaction on our domestic program. If McGovern charges us with being in bed with business, we can sick the Anti-Trust Division and EPA on a few corporations. If McGovern charges us with a failure to care about the environment, we can print up a few thousand more leaflets to be passed out at national parks or do another hundred thousand mailing at government expense. Hard-charging wasn't beneficial in the past; with the substitute tools cited above it is clearly even less beneficial with the President now in the White House.

The opposite strategy to a hard-charge campaign is not -- and should not be taken as -- doing nothing. McGovern can't win this election and I'm not even sure this time the President can lose it. But if he can lose it -- assuming a rejection of the strident 1970 approach -- the only way he can do so is by being complacent, by failing to take advantage of his governmental tools, and by failing to reflect a sense of dynamism, motion and anti-status-quoism, all of which will turn off those Northern upper-middle class suburbanites and urban ethnics who can either give the election to McGovern or give a new majority to the President. If the President wants to go on the offensive, that is good. But let him go on the offensive with the tools and prestige of his office, not the techniques and tricks of a politician, let him go on the offensive against thirty years of liberal Democratic statism at home and abroad, not against George McGovern, and let him go on the offensive for a new sense of liberty and human possibility, not for a partisan Republican or even "ideological majority" election victory. There is a difference, and it is a difference which has cost the President public recognition of what he has accomplished so far, but which can still be turned to our advantage in the election campaign now facing us.

GALLUP POLL 1960

	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Kennedy</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
Early June	48	52	
Late June	48	52	
July (After Convention)	50	44	6
August	47	47	6
September	47	48	5
October	48	48	4
November 6	48	49	3

GALLUP POLL 1968

	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
June	35	40	16	9
July	40	38	16	6
August	45	29	18	8
September 3-7	43	31	19	7
September 20-22	43	28	21	8
September 27-30	44	29	20	7
October 3-12	43	31	20	6
October 17-21	44	36	15	5
November 1-2	42	40	14	4