

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
13	6	3/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Chapin RE: "Survey Information." 12pgs.
13	6	3/30/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Stachan To Dailey RE: Attached newspaper article on Republican strategy points that were rarely acted uopn. 6pgs.
13	6	3/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	From Strachan To DeCair RE: Request to forward letter and Resume to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. 1pg.
13	6	3/1/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Dent RE: Attached materials regarding the President's entry into the Maryland Presidential Preference Primary. 6pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
13	6	3/30/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Unk Recipient RE: Status on the President's estate plan materials. 1pg.
13	6	3/24/192	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Unk author To Haldeman RE: Status on statistically significant variations among approval and trial heats. 1pg.
13	6	3/25/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Finkelstein RE: Analysis of Florida results. 1pg.
13	6	3/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Unk Recipient RE: Follow-up on the analysis of Wallace trial heats and the Kennedy shift. 1pg.
13	6	3/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Unk Recipient RE: Follow-up on Barry Gordy's recruitment. 1pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
13	6	3/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Unk Recipient RE: Follow- up on discussion and materials to be submitted. 1pg.
13	6	3/9/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Unk Recipient RE: Report on the change in CBS projections"""" qp"grgevkp"exg03pg.
13	6	3/10/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Unk Recipient RE: Status of the Detroit news poll. 1pg.
13	6	3/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Unk Recipient RE: Follow-up on the analysis of the President's position. 1pg.
13	6	3/6/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	From Strachan To Hodson RE: Response regarding a possible visit to Kansas city from the President. 1pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
13	6	3/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To Kehrli RE: "Benham's New Computer Programs." 1pg.
13	6	3/30/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan To La Rue RE: Attached article on Republican strategy points that were rarely acted upon. 1pg.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 236

Folder: Strachan Chron A-L March 1972

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>		
291	Retain	Open	
292	Retain	Open	
293	Retain	Open	
294	Retain	Open	
295	Retain	Open	
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298	Retain	Open	
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301	Retain	Open	
302	Retain	Open	
303	Retain	Close	Invasion of Privacy Letter, Strachan to Berend, 3/6/72.
304	Retain	Open	
305	Retain	Close	Invasion of Privacy memo, Strachan to Buchanan, 3/2/72
306	Retain	Open	
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Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
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315	Retain	Open
316	Retain	Open
317	Retain	Open
318	Retain	Open
319	Retain	Open
320	Retain	Open
321	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to Chapin, 3/7/72.
322	Retain	Open
323	Retain	Open
324	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to Dailey, 3/30/72.
325	Retain	Open
326	Retain	Open
327	Retain	Open
328	Return	Private/Political Letter, Strachan to DeCair, 3/16/72.
329	Retain	Open
330	Retain	Open
331	Return	Private/Political memo, Strachan to Dent, 3/1/72.
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Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 236

341	Retain	Open
342	Return	Private/Personal Memo, Strachan for Follow-up, 3/30/72.
343	Return	Private/Political Memo for Follow-up, 3/24/72.
344	Retain	Open
345	Retain	Open
346	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to Finkelstein, 3/25/72.
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349	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan for Follow-up, 3/21/72.
350	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan for Follow-up, 3/20/72.
351	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan for Follow-up 3/15, 3/13/72
352	Retain	Open
353	Retain	Open
354	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan for Follow-up 3/10, 3/9/72.
355	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan for Follow-up, 3/10/72.
356	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan for Follow-up 3/13, 3/8/72.
357	Retain	Open
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Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
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367	Retain	Open	
368	Retain	Open	
369	Return		Private/Political Letter, Strachan to Hodson, 3/6/72.
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377	Return		Private/Political Memo, Strachan to Kehrlis, 3/30/72.
378	Retain	Open	
379	Retain	Open	
380	Retain	Close	Invasion of Privacy Memo, Strachan to Kehrlis, 3/25/72.
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385	Retain	Open	
386	Return		Private/Political Memo, Strachan to LaRue, 3/30/72.
387	Retain	Open	

March 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Survey Information

Bob asked that I pass on the following information by Bob Teeter for your use in planning domestic trips by the President and the First Family:

Research in several state campaigns indicates there is a substantial number of undecided voters who can be turned into committed voters if given some attention before the actual campaign period begins and before the campaign becomes a two (or three) man race.

This memorandum outlines the top priority states for possible Presidential visits during the Spring and the issues and areas within those states having the greatest potential of increasing strength. It does not address itself to the specific types of appearances. Teeter feels that those states which clearly should be top priorities and would benefit from some attention during the Spring and early Summer are:

New York

It will be important for a visit to the New York City area and possibly the Buffalo area. The initial visit to New York City should be oriented to problems relating to middle and lower income persons (under \$12,000). These voters are concerned about drugs, crime and unemployment and live primarily outside Manhattan. A visit to Buffalo should be aimed at attracting middle income Catholics with taxes and pollution as the leading issues. A later visit to New York City could involve pollution problems and be oriented towards younger voters.

Texas

To win in Texas, we must improve our position in the mid-state region, principally Austin. Bussing is the major concern to Austin area voters. Other important issues are unemployment, crime and drugs. A visit to Austin would be helpful.

California

The campaign in California requires that we shore up traditional Republican votes in southern California while decreasing the margin against us in the northern part of the state. Initially, he would suggest a visit to southern California at a business related function. It should deal particularly with the economy, inflation, taxes and unemployment.

A later visit to the northern part of the state, possibly San Francisco is also needed. Pollution would be an appropriate topic.

Pennsylvania

We should visit Philadelphia.

A fact finding trip in cooperation with Frank Rizzo may be an appropriate vehicle to make such a trip. It would be especially convenient if Rizzo would publicly invite us to Philadelphia to study the "problems of the cities," notably crime and drugs.

Maryland

We need a visit to the Baltimore metropolitan area. The issue of most concern will be urban crime.

Missouri

We need to strengthen our position in rural areas with older voters over 65 who voted for us in 1968 and who are now reverting back to their traditional Democratic vote. To improve this situation, the President should visit rural Missouri covering taxes (particularly property taxes) and inflation.

Wisconsin

We need to strengthen our position in the southeastern portion of this state, and a visit to Racine and Kenosha would help improve things here. The principal issues should be unemployment, taxes, inflation and economy.

If we are unable to cover any or all of the areas indicated, alternative plans should be developed. This may involve the use of cabinet members instead of the President.

Several criteria were used in selecting the priority states. First, we limited our choices to those states where the President is running behind, or in the case of larger states, where he and Muskie are very close. Second, we only considered situations which appear to require immediate action and would benefit from some attention. Of course, the priorities may change as the campaign progresses and further memoranda will be forthcoming as changes become evident in the data. Those states which clearly should be top priorities and would benefit from some attention during the Spring and early Summer are:

New York

At the present time the President is running neck and neck with Muskie. Currently, Muskie's awareness is low and his voting strength will probably increase as he becomes better known.

It will be important for the President to visit the New York City area and possibly the Buffalo area. His initial visit to New York City should be oriented to problems relating to middle and lower income persons (under \$12,000). These voters are concerned about drugs, crime and unemployment and live primarily outside Manhattan. A visit to Buffalo should be aimed at attracting middle income Catholics with taxes and pollution as the leading issues. A later visit to New York City should involve pollution problems and be oriented towards younger voters.

Texas

To win in Texas the President must improve his position in the mid-state region, principally Austin. Bussing is the major concern to Austin area voters. Other important issues are unemployment, crime and drugs. A presidential visit to Austin would be helpful.

California

The campaign in California will require the President to shore up his traditional Republican vote in southern California while decreasing the margin against him in the northern part of the state. Initially, we would suggest that the President visit southern California at a business related function. He should deal particularly with the economy/inflation, taxes and unemployment.

A later visit to the northern part of the state, possibly San Francisco will also be needed. Pollution would be an appropriate topic.

Pennsylvania

The P. should visit
Penn.

~~In order to counter the extremely poor showing of the President in Philadelphia, he should visit this city.~~ The visit should deal with crime and drug problems, especially as it relates to personal safety issues.

A fact finding trip in cooperation with Frank Rizzo may be an appropriate vehicle to make such a trip. It would be especially convenient if Rizzo would publicly invite the President to Philadelphia to study the "problems of the cities", notably crime and drugs.

Maryland

Nixon is weakest in the Baltimore metropolitan area where a visit would improve his position. The issue of most concern will be urban crime.

Missouri

In this state the President is running poorly in rural areas with older voters over 65 who voted for him in 1968 and who are now reverting back to their traditional Democratic vote. To improve this situation, the President should visit rural Missouri covering taxes (particularly property taxes) and inflation.

Wisconsin

The President is weakest in the southeastern portion of this state, and a visit to Racine or Kenosha would help improve his poor showing here. The principal issues should be unemployment, taxes, inflation and the economy.

If the President is unable to cover all of the areas indicated, alternative plans should be developed. This may involve the use of cabinet members instead of the President; but if such approach is taken, the effect of the visit will be greatly reduced.

Retype

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT:

Survey Information

I pass on the following information

we Bob asked that ~~you~~ consider these suggestions by Bob Teeter *for you* when planning domestic trips by the President and the First Family:

~~Our~~ **R** research in several state campaigns indicates there is a substantial number of undecided voters who can be turned into committed ~~(Nixon)~~ voters if given some attention before the actual campaign period begins and before the campaign becomes a two (or three) man race.

~~Moreover, those voters who can be moved from being undecided to the committed column early appear to remain there for the duration of the campaign. Our past experience also indicates that a specific technique used to appeal to these voters is not as important as the fact that the appeal was made. In the case of the President, personal visits will be the most effective means of committing the voter to the President. Wide issue impact is guaranteed with the tremendous media exposure the President commands.~~

~~It will be important for the President to begin his activity now. As Muskie increases awareness and especially if he wins several primaries, the President may not be able to make up the difference. Our experience has shown that there are some limits to the President's level of support and the Democrats will undoubtedly increase their awareness.~~

Presidential Visits This memorandum outlines the top priority states for ~~the~~ *itself* President's attention during the Spring and the issues and areas within those states having the greatest potential of increasing the President's strength. *reasonable* ~~We do not address ourselves to the specific types of appearances as it is impossible to draw such conclusions from the data at this time. Further suggestions as to the types of appearances will be made in a subsequent memorandum. Those states which clearly should be top priorities and would benefit from some attention~~

Teeter

during the Spring and early Summer are:

New York

for a visit to the

It will be important ~~for the President to visit the~~ New York City area and possibly the Buffalo area. ~~His~~ *He* initial visit to New York City should be oriented to problems relating to middle and lower income persons (under \$12,000). These voters are concerned about drugs, crime and unemployment and live primarily outside Manhattan. A visit to Buffalo should be aimed at attracting middle income Catholics with taxes and pollution as the leading issues. A later visit to New York City ~~should~~ involve pollution problems and be oriented towards younger voters.

could

Texas

To win in Texas, ~~the President~~ *we* must improve ~~his~~ *our* position in the mid-state region, principally Austin. Bussing is the major concern to Austin area voters. Other important issues are unemployment, crime and drugs. A ~~presidential~~ visit to Austin would be helpful.

California

The campaign in California ~~will~~ *that we* require ~~the President to~~ shore up ~~his~~ traditional Republican vote in southern California while decreasing the margin against ~~him~~ *us* in the northern part of the state. Initially, ~~he~~ *we* would suggest that the President visit ~~to~~ Southern California at a business related function. ~~It~~ *we* should deal particularly with the economy, inflation, taxes and unemployment.

A later visit to the northern part of the state, possibly San Francisco ~~will~~ also be needed. Pollution would be an appropriate topic.

Pennsylvania

We ~~The President~~ should visit Philadelphia.

A fact finding trip in cooperation with Frank Rizzo may be an appropriate vehicle to make such a trip. It would be especially convenient if Rizzo would publicly invite ~~the~~ *we* ~~President~~ to Philadelphia to study the "problems of the cities," notably crime and drugs.

Maryland

We need a visit to the Baltimore Metropolitan area

~~Nixon is weakest in the Baltimore metropolitan area where a visit would improve his position. The issue of most concern will be urban crime.~~

Missouri

We need to visit strengthen our ^{position.}

~~In this state, the President is running poorly in rural areas with older voters over 65 who voted for him in 1968 and who are now reverting back to their traditional Democratic vote. To improve this situation, the President should visit rural Missouri covering taxes (particularly property taxes) and inflation.~~

Wisconsin

We need to strengthen our position

~~The President is weakest in the southeastern portion of this state, and a visit to Racine or Kenosha would help improve ^{things} his poor showing here. The principal issues should be unemployment, taxes, inflation and economy.~~

we are
~~If the President is unable to cover ^{any or} all of the areas indicated, alternative plans should be developed. This may involve the use of cabinet members instead of the President, but, if such approach is taken, the effect of the visit will be greatly reduced.~~

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE N.W.
WASHINGTON D.C. 20006
(202) 333 0920

March 3, 1972

*The ability to
to
the
President
at age
by
C. A. S.*

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

-THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

FROM:

ROBERT M. TEETER *R.M.T. by C.A.S.*

SUBJECT:

Recommended Appearances and Issues

We have now evaluated the results of all of the first wave polls and based on our analysis we believe it is important for the President to improve his standing in several crucial states during the next few weeks. Our research in several state campaigns indicates there is a substantial number of undecided voters who can be turned into committed (Nixon) voters if given some attention before the actual campaign period begins and before the campaign clearly becomes a two (or three) man race.

Moreover, those voters who can be moved from being undecided to the committed column early appear to remain there for the duration of the campaign. Our past experience also indicates that the specific technique used to appeal to these voters is not as important as the fact that the appeal was made. In the case of the President, personal visits will be the most effective means of committing the voter to the President. Wide issue impact is guaranteed with the tremendous media exposure the President commands.

It will be important for the President to begin his activity now. As Muskie increases his awareness and especially if he wins several primaries, the President may not be able to make up the difference. Our experience has shown that there are some limits to the President's level of support and the Democrats will undoubtedly increase their awareness.

This memorandum outlines the top priority states for the President's attention during the Spring and the issues and areas within those states having the greatest potential of increasing the President's strength. We do not address ourselves to the specific types of appearances as it is impossible to draw such conclusions from the data at this time. Further suggestions as to the types of appearances will be made in a subsequent memorandum. It may be useful to try several types of appearances during the next few weeks and then do some quick follow-up telephone studies to test their effectiveness.

Several criteria were used in selecting the priority states. First, we limited our choices to those states where the President is running behind, or in the case of larger states, where he and Muskie are very close. Second, we only considered situations which appear to require immediate action and would benefit from some attention. Of course, the priorities may change as the campaign progresses and further memoranda will be forthcoming as changes become evident in the data. Those states which clearly should be top priorities and would benefit from some attention during the Spring and early Summer are:

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It will be important for the President to visit the New York City area and possibly the Buffalo area. His initial visit to New York City should be oriented to problems relating to middle and lower income persons (under \$12,000). These voters are concerned about drugs, crime and unemployment and live primarily outside Manhattan. A visit to Buffalo should be aimed at attracting middle income Catholics with taxes and pollution as the leading issues. A later visit to New York City should involve pollution problems and be oriented towards younger voters.

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A later visit to the northern part of the state, possibly San Francisco will also be needed. Pollution would be an appropriate topic.

Pennsylvania

In order to counter the extremely poor showing of the President in Philadelphia, he should visit this city. The visit should deal with crime and drug problems, especially as it relates to personal safety issues.

A fact finding trip in cooperation with Frank Rizzo may be an appropriate vehicle to make such a trip. It would be especially convenient if Rizzo would publicly invite the President to Philadelphia to study the "problems of the cities", notably crime and drugs.

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Wisconsin

The President is weakest in the southeastern portion of this state, and a visit to Racine or Kenosha would help improve his poor showing here. The principal issues should be unemployment, taxes, inflation and the economy.

If the President is unable to cover all of the areas indicated, alternative plans should be developed. This may involve the use of cabinet members instead of the President; but if such approach is taken, the effect of the visit will be greatly reduced.

March 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PETER DAILEY

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

You may have noticed in the April Saturday Review that Joseph Napolitan has written a long article entitled "Yes, the Democrats Can Beat Richard Nixon". It makes fascinating reading because he discusses many of the strategy points that we have considered but only sometimes acted upon. I have attached a copy of the article so that you can read it at your convenience if you missed it.

Attachment

Yes, the Democrats Can Beat Richard Nixon

BY JOSEPH NAPOLITAN

What it will take, says this campaign strategist,
is some negative thinking, imaginative
use of polls and media, and a running start.

I start by assuming that Richard Nixon can be defeated in 1972. There are some elections that cannot be won—even on a Presidential level. I'd put the 1964 Johnson victory over Goldwater in this category; I don't see any way that Goldwater could have beaten Johnson that year. But I do think Nixon can be taken in 1972—that's not to say he *will* be, only that he *can* be.

Right now, of course, the Democrats are preoccupied with the internal problem of selecting a candidate, but I hope, and indeed I urge, that at least the leaders of the party concern themselves with the more distant but also more crucial matter of winning the general election once the candidate has been nominated. I say this now because what happens between the present time and the Democratic nominating convention in July will have incalculable impact on the outcome of the election. The status of the war in Vietnam and the economy of the country are the two major variables, and my crystal ball is murkier than most people's, so I wouldn't even hazard a guess about how those important factors will have developed by November 1972. But if I were to lay out a program to defeat Nixon, I would start now, and this is what I would do.

First I would plan a negative campaign. That is, the thrust of the effort would be aimed at influencing people to vote *against* Nixon rather than *for* my candidate, whoever he might be. Any incumbent President in turbulent times

Political consultant Joseph Napolitan was advertising director for the Humphrey campaign in 1968. The article is adapted from his book, *The Election Game and How to Win It*, to be published this month by Doubleday. Copyright © 1972 by Joseph Napolitan.

must run on his record, or be forced to run on his record if he tries to seek another avenue. The powers of the Presidency are awesome, the resources of the President are unmatched by the party out of office, and the staff and services provided by the federal government are far too rich for the out party to match, particularly if the out party still is trying to pay off its 1968 debts.


But there is one big disadvantage to running as the incumbent: You must accept responsibility for what has happened to the country in the four years of your stewardship.

I'd begin my campaign planning with polls. Starting immediately, I would try to make arrangements with the leading political polling firms, Democratic state committees, and Democratic candidates for statewide and Congressional offices to include a brief series of questions in all their polls about the Presidential election. The polling firms might have to get the permission of their political clients to include the questions, but this really shouldn't be a problem. If I were running a statewide campaign for a Democratic candidate in 1972, I'd certainly want a pretty clear look at the Presidential contest anyway. Even if it became necessary to pay the polling firms a few hundred dollars for adding the questions, and I don't think we would have to, it still would be worth it.


There are certain *kinds* of questions I'd like to see included in all polls, starting immediately, with exactly the same wording in each poll, and presented to demographic cross sections as similar as possible in each state. First I would list the candidates and ask the respondent if he had heard of each and

Heavy state polling


"If I had my druthers, I'd
 much rather place
 emphasis (i.e. money) in
 states where I had a better
 chance of winning."



California is probably the key to a Democratic victory in 1972.



But the Democrats could also win without carrying California.



THE TRUST OF THE CROWD
would be aimed at
getting people to vote
against Nixon rather
than for my candidate.”

whether he regarded them favorably or unfavorably or had no opinion. Next I would ask him what he felt were the major accomplishments and failures of the Nixon administration. Then I would have him select who he thought would make the best Democratic candidate. Finally I would have him choose between Nixon and several of the more prominent Democratic contenders.

Obviously, this wouldn't be a survey in depth, but it would give the Democratic National Committee, which bears the ultimate responsibility for organizing the Presidential campaign, a constant and standardized flow of information from the various states. The DNC can feed this information to a computer and get figures and comparisons, broken down regionally and demographically (by age, for example, or by race, sex, income, education, religion, and so forth). And all for free, or practically nothing.

I can readily understand Presidential candidates' reluctance to share their private poll information, but if they would all agree to provide the national committee with this kind of information, with the understanding that all the candidates for the nomination would have access to it, they'd all benefit, and so would the committee.

Another thing I'd do now is line up half a dozen good polling firms, concentrate on the states that need to be polled, and assign them some specific states and dates. For example, I'd want a full-scale poll in the field about a week after the Democratic nominee is selected, probably another one the first week in September, and a third about the second week of October. I wouldn't assign more than three or four polls to any one polling firm, because none of the firms I know of can handle a lot of states simultaneously and turn out high-quality work on time. The questionnaire should be prepared at the DNC and the demographics be selected by someone appointed to supervise polling operations for the DNC so that the polls would be compatible and easily matched. Polling firms use various age breakdowns. My firm happens to use these: twenty-one through thirty, thirty-one through forty, forty-one through sixty, over sixty. We make a ten-year breakdown between twenty-one and forty, because those under thirty really grew up on television, those over thirty weren't as influenced

in their childhood by television. In 1972, obviously, the eighteen- through twenty-year-olds should be included, and I'd put them in a separate category, to measure what impact, if any, they will have in the Presidential election. The breakdowns for income, education, and other factors also should be standardized.

I wouldn't advocate any national polls, because we don't have a national election; we have a series of state elections, and there are many states that the Democratic Party need not poll in 1972.

We tried to do some selective polling in 1968, but by the time we got going—after Labor Day—it was too late to achieve maximum effectiveness. We were in the awkward position of being forced to produce our media materials before the poll results were in hand. But if the Democratic National Committee follows the outline I've presented, or something similar, it will have the best set of polls ever produced for a Presidential candidate.

Another project I'd get started on early would be the selection of target states. We wasted a lot of money in 1968 because of poor advance planning; there's no excuse for allowing this to happen again in 1972.

Picking the target states is easy. In 1968 Nixon won thirty-two states with 301 electoral votes, Humphrey won thirteen and the District of Columbia with 191, and Wallace won five with 46. The clear and obvious Democratic targets for 1972 are the thirteen states Humphrey won in 1968—Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia—plus the states Nixon won that the Democrats have a reasonable chance to carry in 1972. This is the critical list, and on it I would place, in order of importance, California, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, Missouri, Wisconsin, Delaware, and Alaska. Those eight states delivered 137 electoral votes to Nixon in 1968; today, because of census reapportionment, they're worth 140. The states Nixon carried in 1968 now total 305 electoral votes instead of 301; Humphrey's states drop from 191 to 188; Wallace's from 46 to 45.

If the Democratic candidate can carry the thirteen states Humphrey carried in 1968, plus as few as three of

the states Nixon carried (California, Illinois, Ohio; or California, Illinois, New Jersey; or California, Ohio, New Jersey), he can accumulate the 270 electoral votes needed to win, regardless of what Nixon and any third- or fourth-party candidate may do. I don't see this as an impossible task.

The keystone state is California. That's the battleground for 1972. Gainer of 5 electoral votes—booming it to 45 while New York drops back to 41—California is the prize that could decide the election. A Democrat could win without California by carrying Humphrey's 1968 states plus, say, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, Missouri, and Alaska, but it would be more difficult.

Of the states that Humphrey lost in 1968, I would say New Jersey, Missouri, and Alaska will be the easiest to swing into the Democratic column in 1972, closely followed by Delaware, California, Illinois, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The others will be tougher—much tougher, but worth fighting for.

With the objectives clearly defined so early in the game, this is the time to begin tooling up in the target states—for whoever the Democratic candidate may be. Special television programs can be developed for these states. Registration drives should begin at once in Democratic strongholds in these states, among blacks and young people and the poor. The voters aren't hard to identify, but unless they are registered they won't do the Democratic Party any good in November.

I may give the impression here that I am writing off certain states, and I am. There are at least a dozen states I'm willing to concede immediately and avoid spending any money in at all, unless that money is raised in the state to be spent there. This may be a cold-blooded position not calculated to win friends among state chairmen and committeemen and women, but, to tell the truth, I'd rather win the election than make friends. (It's amazing how friendly everyone gets to be after you've won.)

There are some states that Nixon carried in 1968 that a Democrat conceivably could win in 1972—other than the eight I already have listed—but none in which I see the Democrats with a strong chance. Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee possibly—but if I had my druthers I'd much rather place emphasis on

the operation should be ready, the research completed, the techniques perfected."

money) in states where I had a better chance of winning than I do in these places. And I wouldn't bother with the Wallace states at all. It's conceivable a hawkish Democrat such as Senator Jackson might pull off one or two if he wins the nomination, but I wouldn't bet on it. And who knows at this point whether there will be a third-party candidate (Wallace) or maybe even a fourth-party nominee (Gene McCarthy or John Lindsay). But, for planning purposes at this stage, it really doesn't make much difference, because there is a minimum number of electoral votes required to win—270—and efforts should be directed at carrying enough states to accumulate that number of votes.

If this is going to be a negative campaign—and I don't see how it can be any other kind unless Nixon is not the candidate—then the DNC computer should be put to use right away. I'd begin feeding it every public statement Richard Nixon has made since he became a Congressman, properly coded and categorized. I'd also add the statements of Spiro Agnew and any other Republicans who might be targets of one sort or another in 1972—for example, Republican National Chairman Robert Dole. Then when I (i.e., the DNC, any of the Presidential candidates, eventually *the* Presidential candidate and his running mate, or any other prominent Democratic speech-makers) wanted to demonstrate the inconsistencies of Nixon's actions with his words, I could just punch the right buttons on my computer, and it would print out the material I needed.

This information-retrieval system can be a tremendous boon to speech writers, copywriters, film and radio producers, and local Democratic candidates. It's just a question of assembling, coding, storing, and retrieving. I assume something like this has and is being done, because the information it can provide, literally on a moment's notice, will be invaluable to the campaign.

My major interest in campaigns is political communication. This involves the use of mass media, particularly television and radio, but other media as well. When I became advertising director of the Humphrey organization late in the 1968 campaign, I tried to implement some of my theories on the use of media in a Presidential election, with

a fair amount of success. But the shortage of time and funds caused us to fall short of our goal. We have the time now, and I expect there will be enough money around to finance an adequate campaign—not as much as the Republicans will have, but enough to cover the necessities if it is spent properly.

I would try some new approaches to the use of media in the 1972 election, some of which can be initiated before we even know who the Democratic candidate will be. In fact, there is no reason why the candidates could not be informed what is being done (notice I said "informed," not "consulted"; you don't produce good media by committee in consultation) on their behalf. Presumably, the eventual candidate might want to scrub everything, but I doubt it if the material I envision is produced the way it should be; and even if he doesn't want to use it, it will be prepared in such a way that Democratic candidates for Senate, the House, and statehouses will be able to make use of it.

Suppose I had carte blanche to organize and implement media planning and structure for the 1972 Presidential election: What would I do?

First I would take the seven big states I feel are essential to win in 1972—California, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, and Texas—and get some tough research done on how the Nixon administration has failed to solve the problems in those states. I would deal in hard specifics, with problems directly related to the individual states. In New York, for example, this could include the massive problems of welfare and drug addiction; in California, the rampant unemployment in aerospace and the erosion of natural resources.

I would find out not only what the problems are and how the Republican administration has failed to solve them but also what solutions have been presented by the Democrats. We should also note that California, New York, Illinois, and Michigan have Republican governors, and that Pennsylvania and Ohio had Republican governors until the start of 1971.

As soon as I had assembled my research, and probably concomitantly, I would engage three or four of the best television documentary producers to make a thirty-minute film on each state. These films should be suitable for

both Presidential and regional candidates. Wherever and whenever possible, attractive local candidates should be included in the film.

By the late spring or early summer of 1972 I would have a package of half-hour documentaries for use in the major battleground states, specifically relating to their problems, revealing Republican failures and outlining Democratic programs. Remember one thing: We should never underestimate the intelligence of the American voter or overestimate the amount of information at his disposal. We should be giving him solid chunks of anti-Nixon information preparatory to presenting our own constructive proposals.

While I was producing these state documentaries, I also would be working on some *problem* (or, if you prefer, *issues*) documentaries on the major problems facing the country: lack of job opportunities, drug addiction, education, pollution and conservation, education, welfare, and poverty. Again, these would be definitive studies that would document Republican failures and present Democratic programs, and they'd work for whoever the nominee might be. I can't see that there would be sharp differences among Humphrey, Muskie, McGovern, Kennedy, or Jackson programs on drugs or poverty or protection of natural resources or education.

The basic footage could be filmed in the spring and early summer; after the candidate is nominated, he can be worked into each of the films, and there could be time and space provided for tie-ins with local candidates.

These problem-oriented films could, if desired, be shown on national network television, although I would be more inclined to make local purchases within states so that we would be paying for only the states we wanted to reach and not for states where we have no chance of winning anyway. I'd have all these films ready to go on the air by Labor Day, and perhaps run one a week for the next five or six weeks, making them available to state committees and candidates within each state for additional showings at their convenience and expense.

As soon as the candidate is nominated, I'd begin work on a biographical documentary of his, and, perhaps, his running mate. This would be for the

any national
polls, because we
don't have a
national election...."

later in the campaign, say from the middle of October on.

From all these films—the state documentaries and those on problems—five-minute programs and one-minute spots also could be culled. The candidate would go into the campaign armed with the greatest assortment of television weapons any candidate for President anywhere has ever had. What would this whole package cost? About \$1-million—or something less than 8 per cent of the total Republican television time budget in 1968, around 15 per cent of what the Democrats spent on television in the past election. And there would be some offsetting pains: Candidates for senator and governor might be induced to pick up part of the tab by acquiring the films they considered most useful to them in their own races and adapting them to their personal needs.

The key to the success of this project is the quality of the materials produced, as it so often is. That's why I would try to get a lock on the best film producers as early as possible and put them to work on the films before they get so committed in other races that they don't have time to work on the Presidential election. This happened in 1968, to Humphrey's detriment.

Nixon made much better use of radio in 1968 than Humphrey did. For 1972, a series of low-key, factual five-minute radio programs on important issues can be prepared early, utilizing the best speech writers in the Democratic stable, and go on the air during the summer. The cost is low, and the impact can be high.

I'd also make use of the *losing* Democratic contenders in films, perhaps a series of five-minute programs not unlike the one made with Humphrey and Ted Kennedy in 1968. These would not be used nationally but shown in the states where the losing candidate is particularly popular. For example, if Senator Jackson doesn't make it, a five-minute film of him and the Democratic nominee discussing the problems of the state of Washington should have favorable impact in that state. The same would be true with Harold Hughes in Iowa, Birch Bayh in Indiana, Kennedy in Massachusetts, George McGovern in the Dakotas, Humphrey in Minnesota, Edmund Muskie in New England. Not too costly, and potentially useful.

I'd get the best political time buyer available and have him chart the states where we wish to make our biggest push and outline budgets and potential time buys in those states. Buying network time isn't as difficult in a Presidential election, because the networks are, by law, forced to make equal time available to each of the Presidential candidates. The time buyer's skill can best be used within key states.

There also are some more esoteric areas of electronic communication that I would want the Democrats to take advantage of. One is instant reaction, and the other would be the establishment of videotape and radio files. I would establish an "instant-reaction" electronics team, a group of television and radio specialists who could capitalize on an event virtually instantaneously, be it a statement, a speech, or a piece of news, and through electric feeds make it available to the networks and key stations throughout the country. Often this could be news material offered to the stations for use on news programs; in other cases, paid spots produced in twenty-four hours or less and worked into previously purchased time.

No one knows when news that could affect the outcome of the election will break, or even when an opponent will commit a gaffe that could be capitalized on. Under conventional systems of producing television and radio spots, it takes days, sometimes weeks, to turn out reaction spots. Under the system I envision, these could be done in hours. What it takes is an alert electronics team, standing by twenty-four hours a day, ready to act on literally a moment's notice. The problem here really is not so much one of implementation, but of proper planning and having the right people ready to move when they must. I am convinced that the cost of such an operation would be far less than the value we would realize from it.

For years candidates have maintained newspaper clip files; sophisticated ones are beginning to use computer retrieval systems similar to the one I mentioned earlier. But now it is time for candidates, at least for Presidents, to establish data banks of video and audiotapes—not necessarily or exclusively of their opponents, but also of news events. These can be used for recall, to capitalize on the information

already inside everyone's brain. Consciously, we tend to forget fairly rapidly; subconsciously, we retain information for much longer periods, possibly forever. The audio/videotape banks would permit our television and radio producers to create instant recall of major events and to capitalize on both the emotionalism and the rational reactions that surrounded these events during the time they were taking place. For example, no one who lived in New York in July 1970 is likely to forget the suffocating smog that smothered the city for a few days during the middle of that month. Utilization of newsfilm clips and commentaries would instantly recall those horrendous conditions and could trigger the rage and frustration New Yorkers felt during those days.

These electronic data banks could be extraordinarily valuable in preparing television and radio materials for the Presidential election—but the time to start assembling them is *now*, not after the candidate has been nominated in the middle of July 1972. A candidate who goes into the campaign armed with this kind of backup material, and the availability of instant reaction facilities, possesses a big advantage over the candidate who doesn't, and this is the kind of thing the party apparatus can be doing prior to the election. By Labor Day 1972 the operation should be organized and ready to go, the material assembled, the technologists in place, the research completed, the techniques perfected.

This whole operation obviously requires planning, direction, and financing. The last may be the toughest, but I think it's not a question of whether the Democratic Party can afford to do it but whether the party can afford *not* to do it. And, in the long run, I don't think the program I have outlined would cost any more than the haphazard media programs both parties have had in the past; intelligent reallocation of resources would provide maximum value for every dollar—something we did not receive in past elections.

In any event, one aspect of the campaign has worked out well. Former Attorney General John Mitchell will run Nixon's campaign again. Anyone who can manage Nixon from a fifteen-point lead to a seven-tenths-of-a-point victory in seven weeks is too good a friend to lose. □

March 16, 1972

Dear Mr. DeCair:

Mr. Haldeman asked me to thank you for your kind letter of March 12 offering to join the Administration.

He has requested that your letter and resume' be forwarded to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, which, as the title states, is a group of citizens like yourself who have begun thinking about and planning for the Campaign.

Thanks again for your offer of support.

Sincerely,

Gordon Strachan
Staff Assistant
to H. R. Haldeman

Mr. Tom DeCair
852 W. Lakewood Blvd.
Holland, Mich. 49423

NA cc: Mr. Jeb Magruder -- w/incoming

March 1, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HARRY DENT

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

For your information, I have attached a copy of the materials to the President regarding his entry into the Maryland Presidential Preference Primary. Noble Melencamp has the original materials and Bob Marik, at the Committee for the Re-Election, has the responsibility to have the materials prepared correctly if the decision is to enter the primary.

cc: Bob Marik
Noble Melencamp

GS:car

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, being first duly sworn, do solemnly declare and affirm without qualification that I am not now and do not intend to become a candidate for the office of President of the United States at the forthcoming 1972 Presidential Election.

Date: _____

Signature of Affiant

State of: _____

County of: _____, to wit:

I hereby certify that on the _____ day of _____, 1972, before me, the subscriber, a notary public of the State of _____, in and for the county of _____, personally appeared _____ and made oath (or affirmation) in due form of law that the matters and facts set forth in the Affidavit appearing above are true.

As witness, my hand and notarial seal.

(Notary Seal)

Signature of Notary Public

Typed or Printed Name of Notary

My Commission Expires: _____

Send or Deliver in Person To: The Honorable Fred L. Wineland
Secretary of State
State House
Annapolis, Maryland 21404

§ 12-1. Delegates to national conventions.

(a) *Selection of delegates.*—The total number of delegates and alternate delegates to represent the respective political parties at their respective national conventions shall be ascertained and determined by the governing body of each party and certified to the State Administrative Board of Election Laws not later than the first day of March in each year in which national conventions for the nomination of President and Vice-President are held. The selection of delegates shall be as follows:

(1) *Election of District Delegates.* Of the number of delegates allotted to Maryland, with the exception of those provided for in paragraph (3) of this subsection, there shall be elected from each congressional district an equal number of district delegates from the list of candidates certified to the boards by the State Administrative Board of Election Laws. In ascertaining the number of delegates to be elected from each congressional district, the State Administrative Board of Election Laws shall determine the highest whole number that can be multiplied by the current number of congressional districts in Maryland to obtain a product closest to but not greater than 100% of the delegates allotted to Maryland by the respective national party committee. Each delegate may have placed adjacent to his name on the ballot the name of a presidential candidate, provided that the written permission of the presidential candidate has been received by the State Administrative Board of Election Laws at least 53 days prior to the date of the primary election.

(2) *Election of At-Large Delegates.* After the election of the district delegates in accordance with § 12-1 (a) (1), those elected district delegates from any national political party shall meet in convention not more than 21 days after that election and shall elect, as "At-Large Delegates," the remainder of delegates allotted to Maryland by the respective national party committee and not elected under section 12-1 (a) (2).

(3) *Ex Officio Delegates.*

(i) The Governor of the State shall be an ex officio delegate to the national party convention of the party upon whose ticket he ran in the last preceding gubernatorial election.

(ii) If provided for in the party constitution, the national committeeman, the national committeewoman and the State party chairman of each party shall be ex officio delegates.

(4) *Selection of Alternates for Elected Delegates.* The elected delegation to the national party convention shall elect the alternate delegates to the convention.

(5) *Filling of Vacancies.* The entire delegation to a national party convention shall fill vacancies occurring in the office of delegate or alternate delegate.

(b) *Candidate for whom delegates bound to vote.*—All the district delegates to a national convention shall be bound to vote for the candidate of their party for the office of President of the United States who receives the highest number of votes within their respective congressional district at the primary election, and the ex officio delegates and the at-large delegates elected by the district delegates as herein provided shall be bound to vote for the candidate who receives the highest total number of votes at the primary election in the State. All delegates shall be so bound until the candidate for President of the United States is nominated by the convention, receives less than 35 percent of the votes for nomination by the convention, or releases the delegation, or until two convention nominating ballots have been taken.

(c) *Election at party convention.*—In the case of a political party which is not entitled to nominate candidates for public office by means of primary elections, subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall not apply and in lieu thereof delegates and alternate delegates to represent the said political party at its respective national convention shall be elected at a party convention in accordance with the lawful rules and practices of the said political party. (1957, ch. 739, § 1; 1965, ch. 784; 1967, ch. 392, § 1; 1969, ch. 560; 1970, chs. 103, 440; 1971, chs. 268, 354.)

Effect of amendments.—Chapter 103, "ive Board of Election Laws" for "Secretary of State" in the first paragraph of

subsection (a) and three times in paragraph (1) of that subsection.

Chapter 449, Acts 1970, added "District" in the catchline for paragraph (1) of subsection (a), added the exception in the first sentence of that paragraph, substituted "but not greater than 100," for "75," in the second sentence of that paragraph, rewrote paragraph (2), added present paragraph (3), redesignated former paragraphs (3) and (4) as (4) and (5), respectively, substituted "elect the alternate delegates to the convention" for "select their alternates" at the end of present paragraph (4), substituted "district" for "elected" near the beginning of subsection (b), and substituted "at-large delegates elected by the district delegates" for "delegates elected by a State party convention" near the middle of that subsection.

Neither amendment to subsection (a)

gave effect to the other, but both have been given effect in the subsection as set out above.

Chapter 268, Acts 1971, effective July 1, 1971, divided subsection (b) into two sentences, added "ex officio delegates and the" in the first sentence and added "All delegates shall be so bound" at the beginning of the present second sentence.

Chapter 354, Acts 1971, effective July 1, 1971, added subsection (c).

Editor's note.—Chapter 560, Acts 1969, effective July 1, 1969, repealed former §§ 12-1 and 12-2, comprising the subtitle "Presidential Conventions," and enacted in lieu thereof present §§ 12-1, 12-2 and 12-3, comprising the new subtitle "Presidential Primaries and Conventions." Former § 12-1 also related to delegates to national conventions and former § 12-2 was almost identical to present § 12-3.

§ 12-2. Primary election for candidate for President and delegates to national convention.

(a) *Manner of becoming candidate for nomination for President; withdrawal of candidacy.*—Any person who is a candidate for the nomination of a party which must nominate candidates for State public office by means of primary elections under the provisions of this article, for the office of President of the United States, and who desires to obtain the vote of the delegates from Maryland of the party in its national convention, may become a candidate for nomination in primary elections to be held in accordance with the provisions of this article only:

(1) By direction of the Secretary of State who shall place the name of the candidate upon the ballot no sooner than 70 days nor later than 53 days preceding the date set by law for the primary election when he has determined in his sole discretion that the candidate's candidacy is generally advocated or recognized in national news media throughout the United States, unless the candidate executes and files with the Secretary of State an affidavit stating without qualification that he is not and does not intend to become a candidate for the office at the forthcoming election;

(2) By making the payment required and by filing with the State Administrative Board of Election Laws, a petition in the form prescribed by the State Administrative Board of Election Laws which shall contain the signatures of not less than 400 of the registered voters within each congressional district, at least 53 days preceding the date set by law for the primary election. Nothing in this section shall require compliance with § 7-1.

(3) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article, whenever any person who has been nominated in any presidential primary election, in a writing signed by him and acknowledged before a justice of the peace or notary public, notifies the officer or board with whom the certificate of candidacy, or petition for nomination, or name is required to be filed by this article, at least forty-five (45) days before the primary that he desires to withdraw as a candidate for the nomination, his name shall be withdrawn and the name of any person so withdrawing shall not be printed upon the ballots to be used at the presidential primary election. The filing of a valid certificate of withdrawal of candidacy is a final act of withdrawal; and a person who files a certificate of withdrawal may not restate his candidacy, unless the time limit for the filing of candidacies has not expired. No filing fees shall be refunded to persons who withdraw in accordance with this section, subject, however, to § 4A-7 of this article. Nothing in this section shall apply to a candidate who qualifies under § 12-2 (a) (1).

(b) *Right to have name printed on official primary ballot.*—A candidate qualifying under this section shall be entitled to have his name printed upon the official primary ballot of his party in primary elections held under and in accordance with this article as a candidate for the nomination for President.

(c) *Duty of boards of supervisors of elections to have names printed on ballots.*—The board of supervisors of elections in each county and of Baltimore City shall have printed upon the official primary ballots of each of those political parties in each county of the State, and in each legislative district of Baltimore City at the primary election in each year in which a President of the United States is to be elected, the names of the candidates for President and names of candidates for election as delegates to conventions certified to them by the State Administrative Board of Election Laws in manner and form and in all respects similar to the way in which the names of candidates for election as delegates to national conventions are printed on the ballots at such national conventions.

(d) *Arrangement of names on ballots; preparation and casting of ballots.*—The names of the candidates for the nomination for President of the United States and the names of the candidates for election as delegates to conventions of the several political parties upon the official primary ballots shall be arranged and the ballots shall be prepared and shall be marked and cast by voters in the same manner as is prescribed by the provisions of this article with respect to the nomination in the primary election of candidates for the office of Governor of Maryland.

(e) *Canvass, ascertainment and certification of results.*—The results of the primary elections in the several counties and legislative districts of Baltimore City in presidential years shall be canvassed, ascertained and certified in the same manner as provided by law with respect to the election of delegates from the several counties and legislative districts to State conventions of the respective parties to nominate candidates for State offices. The votes cast in each primary election in each county and legislative district of Baltimore City shall be canvassed and certified by the respective board of supervisor [boards of supervisors] of elections in Baltimore City and the several counties of the State. The Board of State Canvassers then shall tabulate the votes so canvassed and certified in a manner plainly to indicate for each party which candidate for President and which candidates for election as delegates to a national convention received the highest number of votes in the State as a whole. (1969, ch. 560; 1970, ch. 103; 1971, ch. 354.)

Cross reference.—See note to § 12-1 of this article.

Effect of amendments.—The 1970 amendment substituted "State Administrative Board of Election Laws" for "Secretary of State" twice in the first sentence of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) and in subsection (c) and substituted "§ 7-1" for "§§ 7-1 and 7-2" at the end of subdivision (2) of subsection (a).

The 1971 amendment, effective July 1, 1971, substituted "which must nominate candidates for State public office by means of primary elections under the provisions of this article" for "subject to the provisions of this subtitle" near the beginning of subsection (a).

§ 12-3. Presidential electors.

(a) *Nomination.*—The State convention of any party shall nominate or provide for the nomination of candidates for presidential electors of the party in such manner as the convention determines.

(b) *Number of electors.*—The State convention shall nominate or provide for the nomination of as many candidates for presidential electors of the party as this State is entitled to appoint.

(c) *Certification of nominees to State Administrative Board of Election Laws.*—The names of persons nominated by the State convention as candidates for presidential electors shall be certified by the presiding officers of the State convention to the State Administrative Board of Election Laws. (1957, ch. 739, § 1; 1965, ch. 784; 1967, ch. 392, § 1; 1969, ch. 560; 1970, ch. 103.)

Cross reference.—See note to § 12-1 of this article.

Effect of amendment.—The 1970 amend-

ment substituted "State Administrative Board of Election Laws" for "Secretary of State" at the end of subsection (c).

March 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FOLLOW UP FOR MONDAY

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

Check with Larry on the status on the President's estate plan materials that were submitted to Bob last Friday.

Also check with Larry on the status of the Slocoloff letter.

March 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR H. FOLLOW-UP

Follow Up with Bruce Kehrl and Tom Benham on Monday (March 27) regarding a computer print-out sheet that separates the highs the lows and the statistically significant variations among approval and trial heats.

March 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ARTHUR FINKELSTEIN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

What does this mean? Are you doing an analysis of the Florida results in English?

FU MARCH 23

Administratively Confidential

March 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR FOLLOW-UP

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

Check with Tom Benham on Thursday, March 23, regarding his detailed analysis of Wallace trial heats and the Kennedy shift among the trial heats.

Also check with Bruce Kehrl on his analysis of the detailed charts from Benham.

GS:lm

Administratively Confidential

March 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR FOLLOW-UP

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

On March 27th check with Henry Cashen and Alex Butterfield regarding the recruitment of Barry Gordy, the Motown owner.

GS:lm

Administratively Confidential

March 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FOLLOW-UP MARCH 15

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

Check with Pat Buchanan on March 15 regarding his discussion with John Sears and the material to be submitted to Bob.

GS:lm

Administratively Confidential

March 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR FOLLOW-UP MARCH 10

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

Check with Dick Howard for Chuck Colson's report on the change in CBS projections on election eve.

GS:lmGS:lm

Administratively Confidential

March 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FOLLOW-UP

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

Check with Bob Teeter on April 15th regarding the status of the Detroit news poll in Michigan with the Presidential trial heat results.

GS:lm

Administratively Confidential

March 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FOLLOW-UP FOR MARCH 13

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

Check with Cliff Miller on the Lloyd Free analysis --
the President's position from the political matters memorandum --
on March 13.

GS:lm

March 6, 1972

Dear Mr. Hodson:

Mr. Haldeman was travelling with the President when your letter of February 24 arrived so I am responding in his absence.

It is unlikely that he will be visiting Kansas City in the near future, therefore I am forwarding your letter to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President which, as the title states, is a group of citizens like yourself who have begun thinking about and planning for the campaign.

You should be hearing from them in the near future. Thanks again for your offer of support.

Sincerely,

Gordon Strachan
Staff Assistant
to H. R. Haldeman

Mr. Gary Hodson
4048 Main Street
Kansas City, Missouri 64111

cc: Jeb Magruder w/cc: incoming

GS:ki

March 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRUCE KEHRLI
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Benham's New Computer Programs

Tom Benham called me this morning to discuss his reaction to your request for modified computer runs so that we could spend more time analyzing the figures for Bob instead of manually preparing them. He indicated that to prepare the new "specifications" would cost approximately \$500 and would add 2 to 2 1/2 hours of computer time to our regular use of the computer following a poll. Apparently the computer can fit all the approval charts on one page with an asterisk indicating the statistical significance of individual results. On the trial heats, however, according to Benham, only one candidate with the current and past three polls can appear on each page. Obviously we'll have to review what he can produce after the next poll but I wanted you to be aware of his suggestions about the cost and format so that if you feel that it's appropriate to discuss it at more length with Kant.

Follow up five days

March 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FRED LA RUE

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

You may have noticed in the April Saturday Review that Joseph Napolitan has written a long article entitled "Yes, the Democrats Can-Beat Richard Nixon." It makes fascinating reading because he discusses many of the strategy points that we have considered but only sometimes acted upon. I have attached a copy of the article so that you can read it at your convenience if you missed it.

Attachment