

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
Contested Materials Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
3	60	12/15/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Colson to Bob Dole RE: an ill-informed letter sent by Noel Koch. 1 pg.
3	60		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	"Memorandum of Understanding Between Senator Dole, Chuck Colson and Noel Koch," detailing how the White House and the Republican National Committee can cooperate to help one another. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs.
3	60		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	"Memorandum of Understanding Between Senator Dole, Chuck Colson and Noel Koch," detailing how the White House and the Republican National Committee can cooperate to help one another. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs.
3	60		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	Third page of Dole's copy of the "Memo of Understanding." Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg.

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3	60	12/7/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Photograph	Notes from a meeting between Dole and Colson relating to communication between the RNC and the White House. 4 pgs.
3	60	12/3/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Colson to Haldeman RE: Colson's recent, productive meeting with Dole involving subjects such as attacking the Democrats and improving Nofziger's effectiveness. Handwritten notes added by multiple unknown parties. 1 pg.
3	60	12/8/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	Copy of a memo from "Nedra," of Senator Dole's press section, to Noel, presumably Koch, RE: Dole's press staff. Handwritten notes on original added by unknown. 1 pg.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By jlw NARS, Date 2/20/81

Personal and Confidential

December 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Bob Dole  
Chairman  
Republican National Committee

FROM: Charles W. Colson  
Special Counsel to the President

I have your letter of December 13 regarding the so-called "memorandum of understanding". I couldn't possibly agree with you more. Noel Koch prepared this. He is a good man at keeping fastidious records. God knows why he sent it to you. I certainly didn't view our meeting as any kind of "summit"; nor did I believe that any formal protocols were required.

I, too, believe we are making progress and, if we stay with it, can make a hell of a lot more. Thank you for returning what I would characterize as an "idiotic paper", with no reflection upon the author who is far from an idiot.

*If there are no connections, this will constitute*  
a MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN SENATOR DOLE,  
CHUCK COLSON AND NOEL KOCH *NC*

At a meeting on December 3 at the Vice President's office at the Capitol, the problem of Republican communications was discussed, with particular emphasis on the need for the national chairman to better defend and advance the President and the viewpoint of the Republican Party.

It was agreed that the present apparatus for accomplishing these ends is wholly ineffectual. Dole indicated that substantial difficulty arose from the fact that authority was fragmented. He noted that the services of the Deputy Chairman for Communications at the RNC are not always available, that Nofziger is frequently involved in other affairs for other members of the administration which takes him away from his primary duty.

Colson noted that when Nofziger is available, it is extremely difficult to gain his cooperation in funneling the views of the White House via the Republican National Committee Chairman to the public. Colson made particular note of the effectiveness of the Democratic National Committee in airing its views, in rebutting administration positions, and in attacking the President. He recalled that within thirty minutes of the President's statement on the campaign check-off, notification was given that a statement by the DNC Chairman could be

had by dialing a certain number, that the statement was professionally done, and was carried by the media that evening -- in terms of simple professionalism, imagination and aggressiveness, the DNC is years ahead of us.

We discussed means of alleviating this situation and it was recognized that the problem would best be attacked in a dual effort. First, Senator Dole must have a capacity for making timely rebuttals as they are required and that the apparatus at the RNC complicates his ability to do this. Therefore, this function should rest with his office rather than with the RNC and that one man whom he trusts will be authorized by him to issue statements in his name. It was agreed that Koch might do this, and Dole and Koch will meet Tuesday, December 7, to formalize this arrangement. Second, it was recognized that changes in working relationships, personnel and techniques are crucial in the RNC Communications office. Dole agreed that he would discuss this at length with Nofziger in an attempt to bring about a situation Dole wants. In the absence of a satisfactory conclusion to such a discussion, consideration will be given to replacing Nofziger. Dole indicated that he would first discuss this with Mitchell. He felt that Mitchell would concur in the need for improvement of that operation and would be agreeable to the means through which Dole intends to

bring about that improvement. It was suggested and tentatively agreed that Dole might unilaterally make the necessary personnel changes, or at least certain symbolic changes prior to a discussion with Nofziger in order to weaken Nofziger's position and make clear their relative positions and influence. Dole has a meeting with Mitchell on Tuesday.

*Revised 12/10/74*

*If there are no corrections or objections, this will constitute a*

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*only*  
Addition to Colson Memo  
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Later on the way back to the White House, Colson suggested that Koch take over the Communications job at the RNC. Koch demurred; agreed to discuss it later.

Dole copy 19.3  
-3-

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December 7, 1971

NOTES FROM DOLE MEETING, DECEMBER 7

It was agreed at the Colson-Dole meeting, December 3, that I would be authorized to issue statements in Dole's name. We were to meet Tuesday, December 7, for a final discussion on this. Since it was aimed partly at circumscribing Nofziger's responsibilities and thus expediting the effort to have the Chairman out front defending the President, it was assumed this meeting would not include Nofziger. But he "happened" to be there.

Before discussing the question of issuing statements, I asked why Dole had not hit Kennedy for his attack on the President's handling the India-Pakistan matter. Nofziger said he hadn't been in the office since 11 a.m. I indicated I wanted to put out a statement immediately (it was about 3:30 p.m.) and Nofziger said there wasn't any point -- we should wait until the next day. I said it will be dead the next day and he agreed and said, so why bother? We had an exchange about "why bother?" and then put out a statement, which also went on the Spotmaster. In the end, I don't think there was any pick-up, but the general attitude displayed vis-a-vis getting Dole exposed was not very positive.

I asked why Dole wasn't getting any coverage with the speeches, and Nofziger said he is, but it's local. He also didn't think the two-day lead required to move a speech through that operation was un-

acceptable. I suggested strongly that it is unacceptable. It was agreed that Scali and I would go to the Committee and discuss improving the operation.

Nofziger said the reason Dole hasn't had any press conferences or briefings was that the White House doesn't keep them informed of what it wants. I asked if that meant that never once since Dole became Chairman a year ago had he been sufficiently informed of what the President was doing that he could effectively represent the President's interests on a given matter, and Nofziger said, well he had local press conferences. We went around in circles with that sort of crap -- but it was productive insofar as Nofziger seemed willing to try to clear it up -- which is probably a change from the intransigence Colson says is typical of him. I also asked why Colson's people couldn't get anything through him, and he went into the old routine about us not understanding how the Senate works.

On the matter of me issuing statements, Nofziger and Dole both agreed that we couldn't have Nofziger and Koch and Colson and Klein and Ziegler and a half dozen other people issuing statements for Dole. I agreed too -- said, No, just Dole and me. So Lyn was happy to include himself back in. I agreed to attempt to reach Dole and then Lyn before we acted down here -- some of this we have to

do -- Nofziger should be able to move this stuff, if we could move him. And Dole has to know what is going out in case he is questioned -- this sounds obvious but, in practice, if Dole is enroute to California and we can't get him and we want to issue something in his name blistering Kennedy, then we have got to be sure he knows what he's saying before some reporter gets ahold of him.

Anyway, we retained the original agreement on issuing statements.

Afterwards, Dole assured me he hadn't set me up by having Lyn at the meeting. As it worked out, I think it was better. Dole really likes Lyn and thinks he is doing a job for him -- personally I think he's doing a job on him. Nofziger has more reasons why something can't be done than anybody in his position ought to have. Other times, of course, Dole complains about Nofziger never being available -- either he's off to California, or he's on a three-hour lunch -- which is apparently a daily event.

Finally, Nofziger talks about hiring somebody to expedite handling of speeches to the press -- a guy named Jack Butram. Later, I asked Dole why we were hiring more people instead of firing some. He said he was going to talk to Mitchell to see if he could fire some of the communications people and get the operation straightened out.

Dole wants to go after the Dems to hold hearings on the Pentagon Papers. They are damaging to them, and not to us, and it's a good idea. He has a speech I did for him that we can couple with a call for hearings. One objection raised here (White House) was that we couldn't do this because we opposed publication. This isn't very compelling. We were defending a principle -- the principle was violated, and the papers are in the public domain. Now we can certainly call for examination of the contents.

The other thing, I have kept on Dole to move on the campaign check-off, but I think it's lost now. We shouldn't have missed that -- we could have torn Larry O'Brien a new behind. Generally, the aversion to speaking on this was based on not knowing what White House strategy was. I made a case that it didn't matter -- that he could go after it without violating the President's options. I took a final shot at this today, but Dole wanted a position, and I couldn't get to anybody here to give it to him, and I can't afford to fake it with him.

Colson

Noel Koch

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *CC*  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Bob Dole

I just finished a meeting -- to my delight -- with the old Bob Dole. He really seemed to have his fight and enthusiasm back and a lot of self assurance. I hope it is not a one day phenomenon.

Bob indicated that he genuinely wants to become a more effective spokesman particularly in attacking the Democrats. To my surprise he said that he felt that he hadn't done a good job at this at all and that he simply wants our help in doing better. Noel Koch was with me and Noel got Bob's agreement to approve rebuttal statements without clearing it with Bob. This means we can really begin to bang back at the Democrats fast, rather than taking the time to go through the Nofziger operation.

Bob believes that one of his principal deficiencies has been his inability to get Nofziger to do the things he wants done. Nofziger, of course, argues that Dole won't cooperate. I don't know who's right but it is irrelevant because the two have to work together. He says he has no control over Nofziger because Nofziger believes that he reports to Evans and/or the White House direct. Bob said that he was going to see the Attorney General to try and get the point clarified and to be sure that everyone understands that Nofziger works for Dole.

Noel and I told Bob some of the things that need to be done to beef up the publicity operation. He is ready, willing and able to do so once he gets control of Nofziger, or so he says.

The one purpose of this memo is that if the issue comes up, I certainly hope we can support this. As long as Bob remains in the frame of mind he is in today, we can certainly get some things done with him. I don't know how long it will last but it is worth a try.

*Keep me posted*  
*H*

1000  
not written & called me in Jan  
nk.

Dec/ 8

To: NOEL

From: Nedra--- Sen. Dole's press section

Re.: EMK - Dole news release

I have found no pick-up on the EMK release as yet, and regret that I was not more cooperative with you last night (though doubt if it affected the news coverage.)

It occurred to me only too late that you seem genuinely interested in how our press works here. Though I expect to terminate shortly, I will be happy to do anything I can to familiarize you with are workings in the press here, if you so desire.

Indubitably you will notice soon, of not already, that the Senator's two press staffs try to stay carefully separated from each other. This is somewhat by design on the Senator's part, and also due to an unfortunate disapproval of both staffs for the other.

I was reluctant initially last evening to work on the RNC statement as in the past, I have been notably burned for putting out an RNC release. But, the release was placed in the gallery, given to all wires, and was called to the attention of the POST. This is really just about all that is ever done for releases around here ---- except for the timing and preparation of the release.

Because of the immediate need for the release in the gallery, and because it appeared suddenly out of apparent thin air, I had to assume that there was a ready or special market for that particular release, or that there was one particular publication that was waiting specifically for it. Perhaps this was the case. But for normal good coverage, the following steps usually help insure coverage:

- 1) Specific release dates and times----AM or PM it pays to have release in galleries from 4 to 12 hours in advance.
- 2) Tie-in to a happening--- gives the release legitimacy. When tied in to an event (I.e. a response to a EMK speech of that day) a letter to the Pres., a Dole speech.