

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
3	20	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Copy of a memo from Hallett to Haldeman RE: effectively organizing and consolidating the various individuals and groups necessary for RN's re-election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs.
3	20	2/9/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Copy of a memo from Hallett to Colson RE: polling data on Wallace and an analysis of his viability as a candidate in the 1972 election. Handwritten notes on original added by unknown. 2 pgs.
3	20	11/29/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Colson RE: a review of the Democratic National Committee's analysis of RN, and how to combat those strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 7 pgs.
3	20	1/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Colson RE: California Assemblyman Bill Bagley's advice on state politics, particularly with regard to Reagan. 1 pg.

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3	20	1/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Colson RE: California Assemblyman Bill Bagley's advice on state politics, particularly with regard to Reagan. Handwritten note added by unknown. 1 pg.
3	20	8/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Colson to Hallett RE: RN and Haldeman's approval of a strategy generated by Hallett. 1 pg.
3	20	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Colson RE: campaign strategies for the closing months of the campaign. 1 pg.
3	20	6/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Haldeman RE: responding to a previous memo and making RN visible during the campaign. 5 pgs.
3	20	6/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's campaigning in 1968, what can be learned from that year, and current poll numbers. 5 pgs.

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3	20	8/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Haldeman RE: an analysis of which issues RN seems to have favorable national support, and areas where he could use improvement. A brief analysis of McGovern's campaign is also included. 4 pgs.
3	20	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Colson RE: Buchanan's book of tactics to use against McGovern. Hallett suggests additional points which he believes may prove useful in the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs.
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Worth
Reading

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10 AM

Friday

July 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

Doq Hallett
~~CHARLES COLSON~~

SUBJECT:

Larry Higby's Request of July 19.

The following is in response to Mr. Higby's request that I update and amend my thoughts expressed in my response to your June 12 memorandum -- you seem to have a virtually insatiable appetite for advice you have no intention of following. (That's a joke. No, it's only half a joke.)

The first point I want to reiterate is relatively minor. As you may recall, I suggested that the period between the conventions was a good opportunity to focus on domestic issues with some dramatic, colorful Presidential participation. To date, I have seen no such effort made.

My major point is more central. As you may recall again, my earlier memorandum stressed the difference between a national strategy and a local, regional and interest-group strategy. On a national level, I felt, and feel, we should be aiming squarely at those peripheral urban ethnics and upper-middle-class whites in the Northeast, industrial Middle West, and California who are Senator McGovern's only hope for election -- and that we should be aiming at them with a forward-looking, progressive positive approach geared around reprivatization, getting government off people's back, reordering priorities, decentralization, etc. On the local, regional, and interest-group level, in turn, I felt, and feel, we should be directing our negative issues -- abortion, acid, homosexuality, our more extreme rhetoric about national security, tax reform, welfare reform, etc. -- in carefully-designed, well-researched, probably printed and front group formats so that we ourselves are not hurt by our own efforts.

To date, it has appeared as if this strategy were deliberately being contravened. In particular, our positive national material -- the pamphlets, the "Lift of Leadership" book, the speech inserts, etc. I have seen -- is the same old, puffy bullshit which almost put the nation to sleep in 1968. More seriously, the dominant tone of our national campaign, at least so far, has been negative and negative in what I think is a counterproductive way. Specifically, Secretary Laird's charge about the F-15 and Senator Eagleton, his overly-lavish rhetoric -- "white flag budget" -- and under-researched "analysis" of Senator McGovern's defense budget, the Vice President's rhetoric -- "no-no-bird", Secretary Connally's charge about Senator McGovern's Vietnam policy undermining the President's negotiating posture (really now, who believes that?), and Clark MacGregor's Capitol Hill Club Speech, to name only what I can cite off the top of my head, are all counterproductive. They detract attention from Senator McGovern's extremism and attract attention to our own. They are not credible. They undermine the President's stature and the advantages of his incumbency while giving McGovern the stature he lacks. They give an open invitation to the media to screw us. Most importantly, they turn off the people we know are going to be the swing voters in this election and leave the forward, progressive and potential even the middle ground to Senator McGovern.

On the other side of the ledger, because we are doing the above, we seem satisfied with not doing out in the boondocks, what we should be -- getting rigorously analytical, well-documented statements of Senator McGovern's views out to the various interest-groups on each of the major issues -- Israel to Jews, parochial schools and abortion to Catholics, national security to veterans, etc. In fairness, we have done a few mailings, particularly of the Israel position and the overly-rhetorical Laird defense budget analysis. We have not done nearly enough. And while I do not know what we have done in the organizational sphere, I fear we are spending a lot of time talking to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we know are going to support us anyway while ignoring the opportunity to expand our constituency -- at least if the fact that there is not one Vietnam veteran on our Veterans' re-election committee is any example, that is true.

There are some yard-sticks to measure the success of our campaign so far. It was my understanding that the President wanted us to begin going after McGovern in a rational manner right after the California primary -- how much was done? It was my understanding that we were going to use the Democratic Convention -- that we were going to encourage division, have our own demonstrations by front groups, etc. -- how much was done?

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And it was my understanding that we were not going to let Senator McGovern get away with switching his positions and moving to the middle ground on the particulars of his issues -- how much has been done?

In my humble view, this campaign needs a rather radical reorganization and redirection. The Good Lord is watching over the President and is going to get him re-elected -- if only because nobody else will -- but there is no point in taking chances. My suggestions follow:

1. Part of the problem is simply organizational. While you up there may know what the hell is going on, those of us down here who do the actual writing and telephoning, etc. do not. There is massive duplication of effort, inter-office rivalry, competition, holding back of material from one another, etc., etc. which is not benefitting the President. We need some consolidation. I would suggest:
 - (a) Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701's -- 1701 would get lead responsibility -- and it would also get Colson. Most of the White House-connected re-election efforts -- dinners, funding requests, etc. -- have already been accomplished. (If they haven't, it's too late.) Now what we need is a hard-driving organizational and political effort and that can only be done from a campaign headquarters. Colson could take as many people from here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people, etc. Malek would retain his administrative role, but Colson would have the lead in idea development and kicking ass.
 - (b) That is not all Colson would have. He'd be MacGregor's deputy with authority to run all over the place. It needs it -- still.
 - (c) A skeleton Colson staff would remain here under Colson's direction to provide such support activities as are needed -- agency contact, White House mailings, writing assistance, speaker programming, etc.
 - (d) Writing -- now being done at the RNC, White House, 1701, and God knows where else -- would be consolidated under one chief -- perhaps Bill Safire should take the job for the campaign. No matter whose payroll anybody was on, he would be under one guy and all requests for writing assistance would be funnelled to that one guy.

- (e) Press and media relations have to retain a split identity -- and, in any event, the Klein-Clawson operation seems to coordinate pretty well with the Shumway operation. P.R.-types like Rhatican, though, would go with the campaign. Such P.R. activities as the Domestic Council or NSC need would be handled within their own ranks or by the Colson support staff remaining at the White House -- requests would go through Colson.
 - (f) For political purposes, the Domestic Council political operation -- presumably Ed Harper -- would report to Colson at 1701.
 - (g) Democrats for Nixon should report to Colson and coordinate with the 1701 interest-group operation. If it continues to develop as it is now -- as a separate Connally-Colson preserve -- it is going to be duplicative and maybe even competitive.
 - (h) The enthusiasm factor needs to be weighed in. You should be visible to your staff (I've been writing memoranda to you for two years and have, not once, ever met you). So should the President. Starting now, the President should have a series of afternoon pep session-cocktail parties and get everybody to at least meet him in cycles of decently small groups. You couldn't believe how lax people are around here -- and mainly, I think, because they find it virtually impossible to have any personal identity with the President.
2. Not all the problem is organizational, however. We have got to remember that Senator McGovern cannot win this campaign. Only Mr. Nixon can lose it. That being true, we should not be so response-oriented and so quick to jump at every quiver in the McGovern camp. A light travel and speaking schedule for the President should be locked in -- and something attached to the President so he gets an electric shock if he tries to break it. The same goes for everybody else.
 3. Since our lack of ability to verbalize any positive themes and our constant resort to the negative may be as much due to a lack of awareness of what those positive themes should be as anything else, Pat Moynihan should be asked to come down for the campaign, with authority to write or assign to outside writers the President's substantive speeches as suggested in my earlier memorandum. We would also get the additional benefit of having somebody around with a sense of humor.

4. Whatever the November Group is doing -- and I don't know anybody at the White House who knows -- should be available for comment to people who are (a) political and (b) have been around the President for more than one campaign.

I hope you will find these suggestions both annoying and helpful.

cc: Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES COLSON
FROM: DOUG HALLETT
SUBJECT: George Wallace

Attached is all I could get from the Republican National Committee. As you know, I don't have access to any polling we've done or have private access to, but I am told that it is that material which is more conclusive on this question. Nevertheless, on the basis of what I can garner from the attached and my own reading/instincts, here goes:

1. Wallace has slipped steadily in the South since 1968. They are sick of him. He's run too much. They're switching to a less proletarian racism. In 1968, Wallace received 54 percent of the vote in the ~~some Deep South states~~. Now he is the choice of only 30 percent of those voters. President Nixon has 36 percent of the Southern vote and the Democrats 27 percent. Thus, it appears we can win the South even with Wallace. While having Wallace out of the race would probably assure us Alabama and Mississippi, we have a better than even chance of taking every other state and a fighting chance even there. And if our position on busing becomes firmer, so would our support in the South.
2. Wallace is below his peak '68 level everywhere, but is still fairly firm in the North. There, he's still relatively new. His Populism and identity with hard-hat hard-linism -- which no other candidate, including President Nixon, has come close to -- has definite appeal. Given President Nixon's usual campaign style and an opponent like "zig-zag" Ed Muskie, Wallace stands to do very well and, in doing so, he stands to take from the Democrats. Outside the South, Wallace supporters would otherwise go for Muskie over the President by about 5 to 3. Depending on the strength of his overall support, these voters could well be the difference between victory and defeat in Pennsylvania, Ohio, New Jersey and Illinois.

3. There is a vast difference between 1968 and 1972. In 1968, it is possible that Wallace robbed us of certain support both South and North which we might have otherwise received. We were both the out-party, the guys trying to overthrow the status quo. Now we are the Establishment. Whatever appeal we had in 1968 as the change party (and I can't convince myself that it was much among Northern blue-collar types) that appeal is gone, gone, gone. Whatever happened in 1968, this time Wallace will draw certain voters exclusively from the Democrats, the clear-cut out-party of 1972. Wallace is not, fundamentally, a conservative. That is partially why his support has faded in the South with the racial issue. Wallace is a radical and he appeals to certain voters' radical instincts. These are voters we're not going to get no matter how many pics the President has taken with hard-hats. These guys want to overthrow the Ford Foundation, reform the tax structure, redistribute income and do all kinds of things they know Chamber of Commerce-blessed Richard Nixon ain't going to do. These guys are Demos. Wallace knows that, too. Except for busing, he attacks us very rarely. This year, he's trying a Northern strategy and it's aimed at his fellow Democrats.

On the basis of the foregoing, I would argue that it is better to have Wallace in than out. ~~With him out, we guarantee ourselves the South.~~ With him out, we guarantee ourselves the South. With him in, we may lose two or, at most, four (Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia) Southern states, but may make what could be decisive gains in such Northern states as Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, and Illinois. I think the risk is worth taking.

Let me stress, however, that my recommendation is based on a lack of concrete information unusual even for me. There have been only the most superficial (like mine) analyses of his impact, I don't have access to any of our private polls, and most of the above is just speculation. Frankly, it seems to me a simple matter to program some polls in five or six Northern states and find out exactly what Wallace's impact is. Instead of relying on everybody's hunches, why don't we try that?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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
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November 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

CHARLES COLSON

FROM:

DOUG HALLETT 

SUBJECT:

DNC Study of the President

Per request, I have reviewed the confidential DNC analysis of the President. I, too, find it rather unimpressive. Nevertheless, I will summarize its findings, the strategy it suggests, and what I think we should be doing in opposition to that strategy.

I. Summary of Study

Data for the study was obtained from a national poll taken in September, after the announcement of Phase I of the President's economic program. Respondents were asked to volunteer what they liked/disliked about the President. They were also asked to respond positively or negatively to a number of statements about the President; i. e., He has kept most of the promises he made in 1968. Conclusions were based on the percentages volunteering various feelings about the President and disparities between those agreeing and disagreeing with the various statements.

Interestingly, the outstanding positive attribute, volunteered by 25 percent of the respondents, is that President Nixon is doing the best he can. The President's honesty (13 percent), his handling of Vietnam and the economy (both 10 percent), his personality (9 percent), his decisiveness (8 percent), his way of gathering facts before making a decision (6 percent), that he is a family man (6 percent), and his ability to communicate with people (4 percent) followed.

The West -- half of which is California -- rated President Nixon's honesty and intelligence more highly than the rest of the nation -- his handling of Vietnam less highly. This might suggest -- contrary to general assumptions about his media ability that the President is more easily able to communicate his personal values and attributes to people to whom he is exposed again and again than to those who have seen him only occasionally.

It is also interesting that more people in the 21-29 year old group were attuned to the President's Vietnam and economic policies than in the rest of the nation. On the other side, the group over fifty was much more likely to say the President is honest and doing the best he can, but less likely to approve of his handling of the war and very skeptical of his economic policies. The 18-20 year old group was in between these two extremes.

The criticism most commonly volunteered is that the President has a poor personality (11 percent). This is followed by failure to keep promises (7 percent), cannot make decisions (7 percent), failure to end war (6 percent), and bad economic policies (6 percent). Young people, who were most likely to cite the President's war policy as an attribute, were also most likely to cite it as a debit.

Respondents agreed that the President is not afraid to take decisive action (74 percent) and that he is experienced and smart, especially in foreign affairs (55 percent). On the other hand, 50 percent to 40 percent, they agreed that the President does not inspire confidence or faith as a President should. By 44 percent to 37 percent, they disagreed with the statement that the President has kept his campaign promises.

Respondents divided evenly between agree and disagree on statements that the President lacks personal warmth and color and that he is often uncertain and wishy-washy in what he stands for. The contrast between the sample's recognition of the President's decisiveness in particular instances and its recognition of his overall decisiveness is interesting to note.

The group breakdowns in response to the various statements are not surprising. The South is most likely to respond positively to the President; the East is least likely to do so. The older one is, the more likely it is that his composite rating of the President is favorable. The cities are most antagonistic; rural areas are least antagonistic. Here, however, it is worth noting that rural areas cite President Nixon for breaking his campaign promises more than the other two areas; this clearly reflects upon the agricultural situation.

Education and income breakdowns do not appear to be determinants of attitudes towards the President in this study. Among racial groups, blacks are most antagonistic. Republicans respond much more favorably to the President than any single group in the society.

II. Strategy Suggested by Study

The authors of the study draw various -- and sometimes conflicting -- conclusions from their data. At one point, they conclude that the data shows that the President "can duck the responsibility for errors in judgment by pointing to the complexity of the situation he inherited." At another point, they write: "As long as nothing visible is accomplished by his Administration, his position will erode slowly; he is clearly vulnerable in a personality contest."

In general, however, they seem to feel that the data shows the President's coalition is flimsy and tentative, buoyed mainly by the general feeling that he is making the best of a bad situation. They recommend that the Democratic Party attack President Nixon's "stance as an innocent victim of circumstances" asking such questions as, "Is this the best we can do? Is Carswell/Haynsworth the best we can do? Is six percent unemployment the best we can do?"

They also warn that the President will continue to use "major announcements" to boost his position and that these announcements can be damaging to the Democrats unless the Party begins now on a concerted effort to challenge the assumption that these announcements are great breakthroughs and departures from the generally bad situation left by the Democrats in 1968.

Some of these conclusions seem to me to be more along the lines of assumptions. In my view, the only significant conclusions that can be clearly drawn from the study are that President Nixon does have major liabilities in the areas of inspiring confidence and overall decisiveness. The Red China and economic announcements -- as we already know from the popularity polls and trial heats -- did not overcome the general impression that the President is unsure of himself and his goals.

There does seem to be a general feeling -- throughout the country and among every group -- that the President's leadership -- whatever that is -- has been lacking; that he has not disclosed his philosophical values and guidelines; that he has not provided the country with a sense of direction and purpose; that he has not defined the nation's problems in a coherent, thoughtful way.

And although this appears to be President Nixon's only major weakness, it cannot be taken lightly. The President's major strength is only that he is making the best of a bad situation; in other words, there is nothing

inherent in the President's posture to counterbalance the majority view that he does not provide the country with real leadership. Given a mediocre economy or an unsatisfactory war situation and an attractive, positive, forceful Democratic candidate, it seems quite possible that the President's support could quickly evaporate.

III. Combating the Democratic Strategy

If, as presented, what the authors recommend is more of an approach than a full strategy, it is one that warrants some consideration even in its present form. I have never shared in the general optimism that pervades this place about 1972, and I do not now. Nor, I think, should you.

The results of the President's last three election campaigns lead to the clear conclusion that he has a tendency to lose support as a campaign progresses. While many people may support the President on such grounds as issues and experience when a campaign begins, many end up supporting his opponent by the campaign's conclusion. If in the long run he increases confidence in himself by exposure as the California part of the Democratic poll suggests, in the short run he decreases it. The more people see Mr. Nixon juxtaposed to a Democratic opponent, the less they like him.

Why this is so is shown clearly in the Democratic study. People do not have a clear view of Mr. Nixon -- personally or philosophically. Campaigns tend to highlight this aspect of a politician. The Democrats -- able by their posture to resort to more extravagant rhetoric -- fulfill people's expectations for a sense of purpose and direction; unless the nominee is Humphrey, they will be able to do so again in 1972. This leaves Mr. Nixon on the short end of the comparison and causes him to decline the more he campaigns. I think this clearly happened in 1960, 1962 and 1968.

Unfortunately, we seem to be on the brink of letting it happen again in 1972. In both 1962 and 1968, the President started 18 points ahead. He won't have that kind of lead next year, yet few around here seem at all concerned that the same kind of bland, hold-your-ground, middle-of-the-road, say-nothing campaign strategy the President normally chooses will not be satisfactory.

We have been doing better on the personal side since the 1970 campaign, although I have noted something of a fall-off since last June, an unfortunate over-reaction to the over-zealous self-exposure the President went in for last March. We have done nothing on the philosophical direction side. The President continues to mouth the same banalities as always; nobody -- with the exception of you -- seems particularly concerned about expanding our constituency; if in foreign affairs we do go in for dramatic moves and visual events, in domestic affairs we have done virtually nothing of political or media value except for the economic policy.

This must end. We have got to come up with a coherent, consistent and forceful rhetorical, philosophical and personal posture for Mr. Nixon and carry it through from now until the election. When people think of Mr. Nixon, they should think of something more substantial than that he is the Avis of the political set. While there are clearly disadvantages in defining the President better than we have so far, I think these disadvantages are more than offset by the gains we would make among those now turned off by the President's rather vapid public image.

The following are the areas in which I think improvement is needed:

1. The President's Rhetoric. Historians will record that nothing more undermined the President's efforts to exert leadership than his rhetoric. It is, to be perfectly frank, god-awful. This is not to say that I could do better; I have tried, and cannot.

But better speeches could be given. Noel Koch is a thoughtful, elegant and forceful writer -- the President should let Noel really write -- write a full speech, not those silly sets -- and then give what Noel writes in an undoctored form. John Andrews is also a fine writer, although not a particularly original thinker.

The other writers, I think, are not very good. At best, they are good for two pages -- and the President's rambling rhetoric reflects it. Speeches have an important effect in setting the tone for the Administration, in giving clues to columnists, newsmen, scholars, etc. Intellectuals -- it has been said correctly -- live by words alone; sometimes words are more important than substance. We have lost the opportunity; we have to use our speeches to set a tone and supply a direction.

2. The President's Travels. We have done magnificiently on the foreign front -- and miserably in the domestic arena. The President rarely does anything out of the ordinary or gutsy -- aside from the AFL-CIO convention, I cannot think of one thing he has done which has been directed towards expanding his constituency and identifying himself with groups with whom he is not normally identified.

The President spends too much time in airplanes, at hotels, and on military reservations. He has spent too little, if any, time in factories, on farms, with every-day people, on the streets -- it would be great, for instance, if we could get him to drop in unannounced in the Chicano section of Los Angeles.

We should be striving more for visual identification with problem areas -- like it or not, that kind of identification is essential to a public figure's leadership. I still like the idea of a two-day, three-night trip to Indianapolis with an in-depth immersion in the metropolitan region's problems. I'd like to see the President at a juvenile detention center, at a drug treatment center, in a prison, spending a night with a police officer on patrol, camping out in the Rockies with Morton and Governor Love, at a local union meeting, at a gutsy college campus, on an Indian reservation for a day and a half -- these are all things I've suggested before, but they should be done.

The trip to the Redskins camp was the best thing he's done in months -- it was spontaneous and human ; it showed the President in a relaxed, unstructured situation; it allowed people to see that he really is one of them; that he has more to him than mechanistic good sense; that he is not just a "professional President", as Sir Robert Thompson put it, or a "GS-100", as Scammon and Wattenberg have written.

3. The President's Use of Television. We made a good, if over-eager, start in this area after the 1970 election -- presumably because we immediately did not go up 30 points in the polls, we stopped as suddenly as we started. This is unfortunate. Last January, we had a real chance to develop a thought-out, consistent television strategy -- with the use of regular conversations with various interest groups as I suggested -- which could have provided a good vehicle for showing the President as a thoughtful, philosophic, quick, analytically minded leader. We have lost that opportunity, and now the best we can do is slap together whatever we can as best we can.

4. The Use of Written Media. Here, again, there was a good beginning last winter -- with the various interviews (the Sulzberger interview is still the best thing he's ever done) and the articles in some of the magazines. We seem to have dropped off a little bit, however, since that time.

A Sports Illustrated interview-article with the President (if it was not done as a World of Sports Illustrated TV show) talking on sports, his interest in them, what values he learned from them, etc. would be, in my view, fantastic.

Other Administration figures should also write more often. If I were President, I think, I would have six or seven good writers spending their whole time writing articles -- big and small -- for newspapers, mainline magazines, interest-group magazines, etc. We do some of this -- and that is good -- but I don't think we do nearly enough.

As far as it concerns the President, use of magazines should be thought out and planned so the appearance of the President in a magazine is natural and normal. We do not want a whole spate of substantive and human-interest stories appearing all at once -- we want a gradual, steady procession.

Central to all of the above, I think, is the development of a viable, consistent philosophic posture for the Administration. We need a way of explaining ourselves so we don't shoot off in shallow directions like the "New American Revolution" or "We're No. 1" and so we don't appear to be wandering from "bold stroke" to "bold stroke" without any sense of direction or purpose.

While the immediate pay-off in spending time trying to put together such a posture may not be very clear, I think the long-run pay-off will be quite real. At the least, we might avoid some of the phony sputtering we go in for now in our P.R. I have already -- in my response to last year's State of the Union and in some of the other things I've written -- made an attempt -- admittedly an awkward one -- to accomplish this. I think a more sophisticated effort should be made before the State of the Union so that that document does not again become a cacaphony of worn-out slogans instead of a serious statement about the condition of the nation.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

19 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON

FROM DOUG HALLETT



Do me a favor and show this one to the President - I talked to Bill Bagley, my state assemblyman in California and the state's best mind in general on government/political stuff, today. Bill is very concerned that we are letting the campaign out there fall into the hands of the Reagan Right. He's being circumspect and says he'll do headstands in Dubuque, Iowa if the President's reelection depends on it, but thinks we're making a terrible mistake in not broadening the base out there a little more. Being one who recommended giving California to Reagan, I agree. I think we can and should exact something in return for it unless we want to kill any Republican activity to the left of Lyn Nofziger. I think 1972 could be a disaster if we don't - and 1974, the way it's going now, is going to make 1958 in California look like a picnic.

By the way, Bill is very interested in a job back here - probably after the election. Anybody who knows anything about California can assure you that he's qualified for something at the subcabinet level - one of the Assistant AG sibts would be perfect if something is still open. There is nobody brighter in state government and Bill has put together a legislative record that is, according to California political historians I know, second to none in the state's history.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

19 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON

FROM DOUG HALLETT



Do me a favor and show this one to the President - I talked to Bill Bagley, my state assemblyman in California and the state's best mind in general on government/political stuff, today. Bill is very concerned that we are letting the campaign out there fall into the hands of the Reagan Right. He's being circumspect and says he'll do headstands in Dubuque, Iowa if the President's reelection depends on it, but thinks we're making a terrible mistake in not broadening the base out there a little more. Being one who recommended giving California to Reagan, I agree. I think we can and should exact something in return for it unless we want to kill any Republican activity to the left of Lyn Nofziger. I think 1972 could be a disaster if we don't - and 1974, the way it's going now, is going to make 1958 in California look like a picnic.

By the way, Bill is very interested in a job back here - probably after the election. Anybody who knows anything about California can assure you that he's qualified for something at the subcabinet level - one of the Assistant AG slots would be perfect if something is still open. There is nobody brighter in state government and Bill has put together a legislative record that is, according to California political historians I know, second to none in the state's history.

August 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DOUG HALLETT

FROM:

CHARLES COLSON

I know you feel your advice is never taken, but it may interest you to know both Haldeman and the President have concurred in the attached. This is precisely the strategy that we are now employing.

21 July 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM DOUG HALLETT

RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July

I note in today's paper Clark MacGregor's recommendation that the President not campaign until the last three weeks of the campaign and then that that period be set aside for campaigning. Because my two previous memoranda have not been too specific on this point, I want to make my position clear. I think it is important that the President never appear to begin campaigning. He should phase into it after the convention. From September 1 on there should be a mix of D. C. -based substantive activities, substantive travel, and mass rally travel (5 or 6 at most for the entire fall). As September flows into October, the mix should just become more heavily weighted to substantive travel and then in the last two weeks more weighted to mass rally travel. Thus, there might be one mass rally on or about Labor Day, one in late September, one in mid-October, and two during the last two weeks -- and any rally appearance should be connected with a substantive appearance the previous or next day. On the substantive travel side, there might be three trips in September, three in the first two weeks of October, and four from mid-October on. Thus, the overwhelming weight of the President's appearances would be at least theoretically government-related -- and he would appear talking about governmental issues. There is no law that says you have to campaign with a bunch of goddamn balloons and Nixonettes and mouth a lot of partisan banalities -- the President can attract attention and dominate the airways and the issues in other, more effective -- and less destructive -- ways.

cc: Charles W. Colson ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DOUGLAS HALLETT
SUBJECT: Your Memo of June 12.

The following is in response to the four questions raised in your June 12 memorandum:

1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues -- particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conventions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a barrio, take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour -- i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc. in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as possible, do an address on incomes vs. services strategy before a prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform, sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The President should also do something on the human and personal side -- perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation spas.

The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months. Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presidential. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically governmental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then, offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side. The over-all theme -- which can be related to our foreign policy and the Nixon Doctrine -- is that government has been too active, both at home and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed, sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly anti-governmental.

2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip -- the 1970 one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he comes back, his campaign pace should not be much, if any, faster than his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken. The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or statement tied to a visual event: i. e. addressing a conservation group and visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues. The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be scrupulously prepared so that the President would fly into a city and be met with no less than 200,000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,

the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented (one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute "Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-hour conversations -- one of the President with common people (a veteran, a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc.) and one with a group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids. Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices, education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversation leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural, peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i. e. Nixon and Jews -- and negative -- i. e. McGovern and aerospace employment -- spots should be used by front groups in particular areas.

The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others, but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968. Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested substantive speeches -- can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's -- and that that conception of change is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.

3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while maintaining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberals care about words more than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while expanding his base into the center -- but the psychological posture will not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues -- amnesty, defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very carefully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about abortion can only help McGovern by making us seem silly for relying on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there, nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges -- i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. -- should be even more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's \$110,000 home, etc. -- should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially Eastern Establishment liberalism.

On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues, welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation, through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral vote count. And since it is possible -- and since it is the only possible way he could win -- we should worry about countering McGovern's potential

appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no choice but to vote for us -- and whose support can be reinforced by the kinds of covert operation suggested above.

Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsible, positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either irresponsible and counter-productive -- his defense budget -- or that they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our surrogate speakers.

It would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans -- i. e. Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The temptation, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community and sect efforts, to be positive -- and to keep it that way we have to be especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to embody change and we cannot do that if we are demagoguing -- the media, McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of demagoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establishment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only basis on which he can possibly win.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

DOUGLAS HALLETT

SUBJECT:

Your Memo of June 27.

Your supposition that "during the 1960 campaign there was almost no change in the polls, while in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign" is incorrect. In fact, just the reverse is true. In 1960, the President's base of support fluctuated more than it did in 1968 (Harris' figures reflect this better than Gallup's, but since Harris was working for Kennedy in 1960 and complete figures are unavailable, at least to me, I have used Gallup figures in the attached chart). He came out of the conventions with 50 percent support -- his first lead over Kennedy since January, declined to 47 percent with the TV debates, and rose again at the end of the campaign with Eisenhower's intervention and the Republican TV blitz. Meanwhile, except for the last two weeks or so, Kennedy was taking most of the undecided voters as they made up their minds about the election. In contrast, in 1968, the President's base of support was remarkably stable, holding around 43 percent throughout the fall. What happened in 1968 was that the remaining 57 percent of the electorate gradually coalesced behind Humphrey -- the Wallace vote declined and the undecideds moved into the Democratic camp. Whereas in 1960 the President's actions, both effective -- the TV blitz -- and ineffective -- the TV debates, had a substantial impact on the electorate, in 1968 the President's actions hardly affected his base of support at all. He might as well have not campaigned.

In fact, he really didn't campaign in 1968. From the time of the convention forward, the Nixon campaign was immobilized, continuing with the same platitudinous, wishy-washiness which had been appropriate -- and given the situation -- effective during the pre-convention period. The President wandered lazily across the country. The TV-media campaign was as dull as dishwater. The radio speeches, as

usual, were vacuous. Humphrey, in contrast, recovered his momentum with the Salt Lake City speech on September 30, Harry Trumaned across the country, had better media programming when he could finally afford it, and replied extremely effectively to the President's attempt to spur his campaign forward in the final weeks; i. e. the "security gap" speech and Humphrey's same-day, magnificent, reply. Had the campaign continued another two days, Humphrey would have surely captured the White House.

Now, the conclusion from all this is not that the 1960 campaign was better designed than the 1968 effort. The 50-state, rally-to-rally, approach wasted the President's energies, spoiled him for the debates, deprived him of the advantages that should have been his with the Vice-Presidency (advantages which should have been clear to the most obtuse observer given the way the polls shot up after his Guildhall, Soviet and steel strike activities in the pre-1960 period -- why more of this was not done in early 1960 and why Kennedy was allowed to dominate the public's attention, and thus the polls, in the first six months of 1960 is beyond me) and ignored the opportunity for him to appear non-political, issue-oriented, even reflective with effective media programming and better use of his office. It was, after all, only with the beginning of the taking advantage of his office and prestige, with the public blessings of Eisenhower and the TV programming at the end, that the President began to gain. Before that, he was leaving the undecided, swing voters to Kennedy and actually losing ground within his own base. Had the President used the imaginative media ideas which were thought up for 1960, had he paused to give decent speeches, and had he not wasted his energy and his prestige on constant campaigning, he would have been much better off. Indeed, he would have probably won.

Nor do I want to imply that the 1968 campaign was poorly planned. The tone of what little I have seen of your 1967 memorandum on the importance of the tube, the columnists, and the other agents through which a candidate is mediated to the public was right on target. So was the de-emphasis of rallies and the institution of thoughtful speeches, etc. The failure in 1968 was one of execution, not design. The mechanisms through which the President was to be projected to the public were well-thought out; only the product was missing. The President had nothing to say; there were no issues; the radio speeches were generally banal and -- being radio speeches and not visual events -- poorly designed to attract attention from either the media or the public. The 1960 campaign was poorly

designed, but it was salvaged at the end by the President's happening on to good execution of what should have been his design all along; the 1968 campaign was extremely well designed, but miserably carried out, both by the President and the people around him.

What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz the country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led to Humphrey's victory in 1968. On the other hand, it is also not that he should remain above and beyond the battle -- remain Presidential is the way Ray Price would put it -- as he did in 1968. The first approach would rally the opposition in its general contempt for Nixon, the campaigner, and it would deprive him of the advantages which almost pulled it out for him in 1960 and which, as President and not just Eisenhower's Vice President, he has in even greater degree now. The second approach, in turn, would also deprive him of his advantages of access to public attention -- it would leave him victimized by whatever McGovern could manage to do, leave him vulnerable to complacency among his electorate, and fail to take advantage of 1972's unique opportunity to reach out to ethnics, Catholics, and others who could form, at last, a new Republican majority.

What is needed is a campaign approach which combines the dynamism of the 1960 campaign, particularly in the format of the closing days, with the strategy of 1968 magnified to take advantage of the President's incumbency. The President should be on center stage, but he should be on center stage as President. He should be holding down food prices, fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax reform, solving pollution problems, bleeding a bit for the poor, and -- although not as importantly since it has already been accomplished P. R. wise -- bringing about a new structure of peace -- and he should be doing all these things visibly, actively and dramatically. This will involve some travel and some speechmaking, but the travel and the speechmaking should appear non-political and very substantive. Likewise, with the media operation -- our ads should be like news clips and any Presidential appearances made should be information, not rhetoric, oriented. Political rally appearances made should be few and far between -- and the rallies should be so massive that it can be claimed they evidence popular, not just Republican, support for the President. I have already made detailed suggestions and I will not repeat them here.

I suspect, from my rather distant knowledge of the President, that he is beginning to get battle-hungry -- the sight of George McGovern galavanting around the country is becoming too much to resist. He should continue to resist. Hard-charging was not what helped the President at the end of the 1960 campaign; it was not the failure to hard-charge which hurt him in 1968. And, as President, as the 1970 campaign demonstrated, hard-charging can hurt him even more than it did in the beginning of the 1960 campaign and would have had he undertaken it in 1968. As President, we have scores of ways to answer McGovern's charges without involving the President in direct confrontation. If McGovern charges we haven't done anything domestically, we can blast the Congress for inaction on our domestic program. If McGovern charges us with being in bed with business, we can sick the Anti-Trust Division and EPA on a few corporations. If McGovern charges us with a failure to care about the environment, we can print up a few thousand more leaflets to be passed out at national parks or do another hundred thousand mailing at government expense. Hard-charging wasn't beneficial in the past; with the substitute tools cited above it is clearly even less beneficial with the President now in the White House.

The opposite strategy to a hard-charge campaign is not -- and should not be taken as -- doing nothing. McGovern can't win this election and I'm not even sure this time the President can lose it. But if he can lose it -- assuming a rejection of the strident 1970 approach -- the only way he can do so is by being complacent, by failing to take advantage of his governmental tools, and by failing to reflect a sense of dynamism, motion and anti-status-quoism, all of which will turn off those Northern upper-middle class suburbanites and urban ethnics who can either give the election to McGovern or give a new majority to the President. If the President wants to go on the offensive, that is good. But let him go on the offensive with the tools and prestige of his office, not the techniques and tricks of a politician, let him go on the offensive against thirty years of liberal Democratic statism at home and abroad, not against George McGovern, and let him go on the offensive for a new sense of liberty and human possibility, not for a partisan Republican or even "ideological majority" election victory. There is a difference, and it is a difference which has cost the President public recognition of what he has accomplished so far, but which can still be turned to our advantage in the election campaign now facing us.

GALLUP POLL 1960

	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Kennedy</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
Early June	48	52	
Late June	48	52	
July (After Convention)	50	44	6
August	47	47	6
September	47	48	5
October	48	48	4
November 6	48	49	3

GALLUP POLL 1968

	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
June	35	40	16	9
July	40	38	16	6
August	45	29	18	8
September 3-7	43	31	19	7
September 20-22	43	28	21	8
September 27-30	44	29	20	7
October 3-12	43	31	20	6
October 17-21	44	36	15	5
November 1-2	42	40	14	4

August 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DOUG HALLETT
RE: Issues -- Positive and Negative

Positive

(1) Foreign Policy -- The President is the consummate foreign policy strategist who has phased down the war, brought a new relationship with China, negotiated SALT with the Soviet Union, and, just as importantly if not more, needs four more years to complete his structure of peace.

(2) Returning Power to People -- This is more a theme than an issue, but it does embody a range of issues -- revenue-sharing, welfare reform, governmental decentralization, etc. -- where we have done enough to get by and which reaches into the core of McGovern's appeal. This, too, must involve some discussion of what is to come as well as what has happened -- deregulation, reprivatization, etc.

(3) Concern for the Workingman -- This, again, is more a theme than an issue, but it is a theme which can and should be used to unite our very commendable and very unknown record in this area -- occupational health and safety, pension guarantees, social security, tax reform, unemployment compensation, and the other Rosow Report issues. We should press hard with the idea (tacitly) that the Kennedy-Johnson Administration concerned itself almost exclusively with the exotic (and, if we want to get racist, with the blacks) whereas the Nixon Administration has reached out and involved itself in lower-middle-income and middle-income issues.

(4) The Economy -- This should be pressed not because our record is great (it is not), but because McGovern will be pressing it against us and the best way to obscure our debits is to claim (which we can, with some evidence) success in this area. The idea implicit in our discussions should be that the President is the cool, tough, pragmatic operator who can face the fact that his policy is not working, change and adjust it, etc. -- not explicitly said like that, but implicit in what we say.

(5) Restoration of Integrity to the System -- The President can travel anywhere, the campuses and cities are quiet, the Supreme Court has been turned around, our anti-crime efforts, etc. However, we must be careful not to take an undynamic approach here -- order is not good for its own sake and McGovern is right that people know it.

Negative

(1) McGovern is an inept, inexperienced, hyper-idealistic dreamer who is more concerned with the problems of the exotic few than he is with the problems of the majority of the American people. Our best issue is McGovern himself. This has to be handled carefully. Being heavy-handed refocuses attention on us -- and that we don't want, for the President is not exactly everybody's idea of what a President should be -- but a controlled, second-level attack from Democrats like Connally and through mailings, articles, etc. can get this across. McGovern's ties with liberal elitists, his concern for amnesty, abortion, homosexuals, etc. all get tied up with his inexperience, lack of toughness, etc. into an effort to make him seem incredible as President of the U.S.

(2) National Security -- The President's strength is McGovern's weakness. We shouldn't be quite so bombastic as Laird was, but, without the rhetoric, we can get the idea across that McGovern has no experience in and no knowledge of the realities of mid-twentieth century power politics. Getting Kissinger involved -- perhaps through an hour-long Walter Cronkite conversation or something -- would get across the real sophistication of our policy and mailings, etc. can be used to chip away at McGovern.

(3) McGovern is more of the same at a time when we need a new direction in domestic policy -- At the same time we're attacking McGovern as a light-weight idealist, we can also get him as just another high-spending, bureaucratic-oriented New Deal problem-solver -- behind the froth of "new politics" lies the same old stuff

we've gotten for the last thirty years -- more taxes for the workingman, no problem-solving for the poor. The "radical" tag can be put on with certain groups, but the focus for the national strategy should be that while Nixon is redirecting domestic policy, McGovern is just proposing a blown-up version of the failed solutions of the past. Shriver is a perfect point of attack for this.

(4) Specific Voter-Bloc Issues -- Veterans, aging, youth, Spanish-speaking, labor, etc. etc all have their separate range of issues on which McGovern's record can be attacked and compared with ours unfavorably. These should not be made into national issues by and large -- but should be pressed hard through front groups, Democratic organizations, mailings, local speakers, local ads, etc.

From McGovern's point-of-view, all issues are necessarily negative -- he's attacking us and his qualities are attributes only insofar as they differentiate himself from us. He will stress:

(1) End the War Now or if it's ended why not sooner -- McGovern believes that the American people, deep in their hearts, know the Vietnam war is a moral travesty and that only pride keeps us from ending it now. Whatever happens, he will use this issue to point out the frontier hubris which he sees at the core of America's lack of maturity and its failure as an international power since World War II.

(2) The Economy -- The domestic equivalent of Vietnam is our handling of the economy. McGovern will say we favor the rich against the poor, the powerful against the weak -- that the economy is suffering from no temporary malady, but needs to be unchained from corporate control through anti-monopoly laws and tax reform to allow greater competition and growth. Jobs for everybody and holding down of prices will be the immediate foci for his attack.

(3) Openness, Credibility and Candor of Government -- The President lies and when he does not lie, he does not level with the American people. The government is out of people's reach and beyond their control. It lies to them about bombing abroad, unemployment statistics at home, it bugs their telephones and collects massive data files on them, it controls their lives without being under their control.

(4) Nixon is a low-brow, not very thoughtful, low-quality mid-1930's Depression-influenced, out-of-date man on the make. Anybody who can keep Bebe Rebozo, John Mitchell, Bob Haldeman, Chuck Colson, Spiro Agnew, Billy Graham, Clement Haynsworth, and the other people Nixon surrounds himself with is not fit to be President of the United States in 1972. At a time when the country is searching for new values and new directions, Nixon represents the past at its most mediocre. Poor boy made good, he reflects all the worst aspects of American conservatism -- a bigoted, reactionary, unfeeling, un-humanistic make-it-or-else philosophy influenced far more by Horatio Alger than Edmund Burke. A wooden figure ready to use people for his own ends and then cast them off, Nixon cannot understand an America which has no choice but to confront itself and what it is becoming if it does not want to fall victim to the machinery and the psychology which has brought it to preeminence. Nixon's like a Fourth of July speaker who doesn't believe himself what he's saying; McGovern knows what's happening, baby. It's time to start speaking up to people, not speaking down to them in the hyper-patriotic, obscure-the-substance rhetoric Nixon uses.

(5) Corporate Bias -- The tax structure, ITT, the economic program, etc. -- all reflect a bias towards reactionary corporate chiefs. Peter Flanigan says the government is open to each and everyone, but, if I called him, I couldn't get through -- why should James Roche?

(6) Redirect Priorities -- Whatever we have done, it's not enough. The defense budget can be slashed and domestic spending must be increased.

cc: Charles Colson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON

FROM DOUG HALLETT

RE: Issues -- Positive and Negative

Positive

(1) Foreign Policy -- The President is the consummate foreign policy strategist who has phased down the war, brought a new relationship with China, negotiated SALT with the Soviet Union, and, just as importantly if not more, needs for more years to complete his structure of peace.

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This has to be handled carefully. Being heavy-handed refocuses attention on us -- and that we don't want, for the President is not exactly everybody's idea of what a President should be -- but a controlled, second-level attack from Democrats like Connally and through mailings, articles, etc. can get this across. McGovern's ties with liberal elitists, his concern for amnesty, abortion, homosexuals, etc. all get tied up with his inexperience, lack of toughness, etc. into an effort to make him seem incredible as President of the U.S.

(2) National Security -- The President's strength is McGovern's weakness. We shouldn't be quite so bombastic as Laird was, but, without the rhetoric, we can get the idea across that McGovern has no experience in and no knowledge of the realities of mid-twentieth century power politics. Getting Kissinger involved -- perhaps through an hour-long Walter Cronkite conversation or something -- would get across the real sophistication of our policy and mailings, etc. can be used to chip away at McGovern.

(3) McGovern is more of the same at a time when we need a new direction in domestic policy -- At the same time we're attacking McGovern as a light-weight idealist, we can also get him as just another high-spending, bureaucratic-oriented New Deal problem-solver -- behind the froth of "new politics" lies the same old stuff we've gotten for the last thirty years -- more taxes for the workingman, no problem-solving for the poor. The "radical" tag can be put on with certain groups, but the focus for the national strategy should be that while Nixon is redirecting domestic policy, McGovern is just proposing a blown-up version of the failed solutions of the past. Shriver is a perfect point of attack for this

(4) Specific Voter-Basic Issues -- Veterans, aging, youth, Spanish-speaking, labor, etc., etc. all have their separate range of issues on which McGovern's record can be attacked and compared with ours unfavorably. These should not be made into national issues by and large -- but should be pressed hard through front groups, Democratic organizations, mailings, local speakers, local ads, etc.

cc to
HRT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES W. COLSON
FROM: DOUG HALLETT
SUBJECT: McGovern Briefing Book

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4. We should begin now undermining McGovern's Vietnam image -- right from the start. This, really, is the key to his image as a credible, conscientious, non-political senator -- but to undermine it will take hard work beginning now. For starters, I would suggest a Hugh Scott or Gerry Ford op ed for the major dailies and an RNC pamphlet. This stuff should be particularly useful with youthful types.

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5. ✓ The Spanish-speaking sector, like the labor sector, is an area where I suspect McGovern has done nothing. Again, we should begin working now to undermine him there.

6. ✓ McGovern talks a lot about including women in his government and he has made pledges of certain appointments, but his campaign organization is all male. It is also virtually completely WASP. This point should be made to women -- and to blacks, Spanish-speaking, etc.

George McGovern is unconvincing as a war hero. Has anybody gone through Pentagon files to find out what he really did in the war?

8. *good point* We need some work on McGovern's personal finances. He wears \$300 suits, \$15 ties, has a \$110,000 home, vacations in the Caribbean, and pays to send his kids to school -- the son of a preacher who has never made more than \$42,500 per year? Somebody's got to be bank-rolling this guy and we ought to find out who and use it to undermine his credibility image.

9. *Low cost* We have to be more careful with the Chicago demonstrations, Ellsberg, McGovern's friends, etc. material that Pat suggests, I think. A national ad identifying Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin as future White House dinner guests would be, in my view, disastrous. This kind of material must be carefully targeted, used by non-national speakers in particular communities, and distributed through mailings, ethnic press advertising, etc.

10. *Excellent* On foreign policy, we should develop the idea that McGovern is a radical in the American prairie isolationist tradition -- a tradition Americans have accepted only at their peril. Somebody should do a quality piece on McGovern as the successor to the isolationist tradition -- Lindberg before World War II, the obstructionist Republicans after Versailles, etc., and, of course, the nineteenth century Populists. This will assist us on the domestic side, too. Quoting McGovern and calling him a wild-eye radical nationally will hurt as much as it helps, but thoughtfully, systematically identifying him with an isolationist and radical strain in American history -- a strain which has been destructive -- will allow us to get at him, and get his positions out, without making ourselves the issue.

Another quasi-historical idea that we should develop is that there is an historical anomaly in prairie isolationist-populist McGovern's acceptance among the Eastern Establishment elite which has traditionally been our most internationally-oriented community. Again, a thoughtful piece can be done on the decline of the eastern elite -- its failure in Vietnam, the degradation of its universities, the collapse of the WASP churches, the failure of the elite to raise decent kids, etc. -- and how in its decline, in its exhaustion, it has accepted the viewpoint of its traditional opposition. Conversely, The Republican Party of Richard Nixon is moving away from its obstructionist role, is developing a new internationalism, is incorporating the white, ethnic, Catholic middle-class working population, is proposing energetic -- instead of tired retreat-- solutions to domestic problems, and will produce the new elite for the final third of the century. At your request, I did something along these lines last summer, but nothing ever came of it -- it is a theme we should now revive and get circulated.

The idea is that the Eastern Establishment has gotten soft and flabby. It is unable and unwilling to see it through -- to find new ways to solve domestic ills; to take the hard, tough steps necessary to bring peace to the world. The Eastern Establishment has turned to wishful thinking, to imagining that something can be accomplished by wishing it. President Nixon, in contrast, is tough, hard and realistic. He realizes that it takes time and patience and courage to solve our international problems. Similarly, he recognizes that we have to remove the crutch of a patronizing government and free peoples' individual wills if we are not to smother over our people and their ability, their willingness, their courage to solve their own problems here at home. Indeed, RN is even closer to the best thinking among blacks, browns, etc. than is George.

11. Presidential anger at some kind of business price-gouging is not enough to shed the "in bed with business" image. In my view, it is too bad we don't have a stronger anti-trust program with legislation if necessary. But if we can't do that now -- at least until the second term, I will bet, though I'm not yet a lawyer, that we could go after one or two major, publicly-identifiable corporations with existing anti-trust laws -- or with something. Business has no place else to go -- we ought to be on their asses.

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BRET

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WASHINGTON

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