

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
Contested Materials Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
1	45	9/16/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bull, via Chapin, to Haldeman RE: the role of speakers in the 1972 campaign and the establishment of a Surrogate Speakers program. 7 pgs.
1	45	9/14/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bull to Chapin RE: the role of speakers in the 1972 campaign and the establishment of a Surrogate Speakers program. 7 pgs.
1	45	7/20/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bull to Chapin RE: turning the 1972 Republican National Convention into a meaningful media event that will grab the attention of American voters. 3 pgs.
1	45	7/8/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bull to Chapin RE: the effective organization of big-name celebrities behind RN in the 1972 campaign. Handwritten note added by Chapin. 2 pgs.

September 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

VIA: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

FROM: STEPHEN BULL *SB*

RE: Scheduling of Senator Goldwater and  
Other Surrogate Candidates

A memorandum dated September 2nd from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Chapin directed the establishment of a procedure for working with Senator Goldwater's schedule and assigning advance support to him. The implementation of such a program immediately introduces a much broader subject with which we will have to deal in the very near future, namely, the total program for surrogate candidates. In fact, since the September 2nd memorandum, Secretary Connally has been added to the list of those who should be supported by an advancement. Therefore, the subject of this memorandum is intended to be:

1. General discussion of the manner in which Administration speakers (i.e., surrogates) are currently handled.
2. What the various recommendations are from staff members as well as officers at the Citizens Committee headquarters.
3. A consensus recommendation for the establishment of a surrogate program.

#### Present Speakers' Program

Currently all turndowns of invitations to the President that have any significance or potential are referred to Pat O'Donnell in Chuck Colson's office by Dave Parker. Pat O'Donnell subsequently evaluates the invitation and considers an appropriate Administration spokesman to fill the speaking engagement. The evaluation is done pretty much solely by Pat and, according to him, his criteria include many elements such as whether the event is in a key State, type of event, the media area, etc. At this point Al Snyder and Van Shumway become involved, Al arranging for appearances on TV shows in the area where the event is to be held, and Van arranging for newspaper interviews with the Administration official.

The Administration spokesmen are limited to members of the White House staff (approx. 8), OMB (approx. 3), members of the Cabinet (approx. 12), members of the Sub-Cabinet (approx. 20), occasionally Senator Dole, and occasionally some outsiders, e. g., Pat Moynihan.

Pat O'Donnell is the scheduler and head of the Speakers' Bureau program, and reports to Dick Howard and Chuck Colson. The Speakers' Bureau program is now running fairly effectively, but the job of making use of Administration spokesmen, even now during this "non-political" and relatively inactive time, can and should be done better. When we get into the campaign situation which is rapidly approaching, the amount of activity will be multiplied manifold.

Currently I discern a lack of overall strategy to the manner in which the speakers' program is operated, particularly as it relates to campaign strategy. Specifically, there is no guiding philosophy that seems to dictate who should go where and why except for where the President is concerned. There are certain guidelines that have been laid out such as designating Sec. Volpe as the Administration spokesman to address labor groups, but there does not yet seem to be an understanding of the overall strategy that would place Administration spokesmen in regional areas where they could do the most good for the President politically.

#### Possible Approaches to a Surrogate Program

In 1968 John Whitaker, who scheduled Candidate Nixon, also scheduled the surrogates. An individual was assigned the task of actually running the surrogate candidates, and second and third string advancements were used to serve these surrogates. In 1970 Nick Ruwe operated the surrogate program which was less complex than that of 1968 and depended more on Administration spokesmen.

In a discussion of a surrogates program, John Whitaker laid forth the basic philosophy that the principal objective should be to find an event for the appropriate spokesman for an appropriate area, and let that event be the vehicle to get him into the area. Once in the area, however, the event becomes secondary to a more important operation which would be to give the surrogate the widest exposure which can usually be obtained by getting him on TV talk shows, special interviews with the newspapers, and all of the things that we are supposedly doing now with our current speakers' program.

John Dean has expressed to Colson and others that the campaign be kept out of the White House and that only the President and Vice President be scheduled politically from here. He has even suggested the possibility that the First Family be scheduled out of 1701. This plan would go into effect after the official kickoff of the campaign, presumably after the first of the year, or maybe as late as August.

Chuck Colson recommends that for a period of time, possibly up to the Convention, we continue to handle through the Speakers' Bureau all Administration representatives they currently handle for all official, non-political events. In order to avoid placing campaign or political activities in the White House, a parallel operation should be established at 1701 to handle all political activities, including fund-raisers. A representative, to be determined, from 1701, would work directly with Pat O'Donnell to coordinate political and non-political events. This would provide the capability for including a political event in conjunction with the Administration spokesman's attendance at the official non-political event. 1701 would be directly responsible for the scheduling and handling of all Administration spokesmen for political events, as well as all non-Administration spokesmen specifically designated as surrogates, including Senator Goldwater and other Congressional spokesmen, Governors, and selected outside speakers such as Mrs. Mitchell. Jeb Magruder has put forth this recommendation, and concurs with the above.

On July 28 Jeb Magruder submitted a memorandum from Don Rumsfeld and a task force which studied surrogates, to the Attorney General, a copy of which was submitted to Mr. Haldeman, setting forth a preliminary recommendation for "SPOKESMEN RESOURCES", which is, in effect, the 1972 surrogate program. The recommendations in that memorandum are summarized as follows:

1. Cabinet, selected agency heads and White House staff members be scheduled in the Colson/O'Donnell operation for the remainder of 1971.
2. The President and Vice President continue to be handled separately.
3. Magruder will designate a staff man to operate Spokesmen Resources from 1701. He will coordinate his activities with the Speakers' Bureau.

4. RNC handle Congressmen until the end of 1971.

Note: Subsequent verbal modification from Jeb would give the RNC the routine Congressmen. The designated surrogates would be handled through 1701.

#### Recommendation for a Surrogate Program

This is where I may be overstepping my bounds and getting myself into trouble, but it appears to me that the overall campaign strategy is still obscure to the operatives, i. e., the Howards, the Porters and the O'Donnells who have been charged with the responsibility for implementing some of the specific tactics for campaign '72. A surrogate program should be one of the major tactics directly related to the overall strategy. By the end of 1971 the President will probably have visited all 50 States and, from what little I have learned about what will be the President's posture during the campaign, there will be emphasis on major TV appearances, much less personal campaigning than in 1968, and much of the campaign period will be spent being the President as opposed to being the candidate. This means that the personal appearances will be through the surrogates in the key States.

#### Considerations for Surrogate Program

1. "Key States" is a fluid entity that will probably be readjusted as the campaign develops. For planning purposes in the formulation of the surrogate program, those States, and perhaps specific areas within the somewhat larger States, need to be specified to those who will operate the program. The Magruder memo to the Attorney General lists 21 States as "key States". This figure includes primary States. I have also heard other figures. One of the questions is--where should be the area of emphasis.
2. The aforementioned memorandum provides a listing of potential surrogates, utilizing four categories: "Cabinet", "White House Staff", "Agency Heads", "Others". There is no category for Congressmen or Governors. The list that is submitted will undoubtedly be modified and is probably intended as a first draft. Jeb Magruder advises verbally that a tentative list of Governors and Congressmen is currently being prepared. At some point in the near future, however, we need to get a firm list of Governors and Congressmen who can fill the role of surrogate for the President.

3. Scheduling - there appear to be two major types of scheduling for surrogates:
  - (a) Opportunity Scheduling - an event for which a specific man is appropriate for a specific function (e.g., Senator Goldwater to the YAF Convention).
  - (b) Creative Scheduling - finding an event that acts as a vehicle to get the proper spokesman into the right area so that he, with the support of the Snyders, Shumways, and the advance operation, can maximize his exposure through the regional media as well as our established techniques of promotion and communication.
4. That individual or group responsible for scheduling the surrogate must be fully familiar with the overall strategy, the points of strength and weakness in the various areas, and the availability of the surrogate so that maximum benefit from the event of the surrogate visit can be realized.
5. Right now the talent and resources are in the White House and 1701 is incapable of providing the necessary support to operate a full-fledged surrogate program.

Specific Recommendations for Surrogate Program

A meeting was held in Dwight Chapin's office on Tuesday, September 14, which was attended by Messrs. Chapin, Colson, Magruder, Strachan and Bull. Following are recommendations for a surrogate program resulting from that meeting:

1971

1. Between now and mid 1972, Chuck Colson continue to operate the Administration spokesmen for official, non-political events, through the existing Speakers' Bureau program.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. Senator Goldwater, other Congressional spokesmen designated as surrogates, selected Governors, and all Administration spokesmen participating in strictly political events will be scheduled, coordinated, and handled through 1701. 1701 would be responsible for providing full support for these political activities, including arrangements for TV appearances, newspaper interviews, and essentially the same support that the Speakers' Bureau provides Administration spokesmen for official functions.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

3. Coordination between activities of the Speakers' Bureau for official functions and 1701 for political functions will be accomplished through Pat O'Donnell, and the 1701 representative, who will work together in this effort.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

4. Ron Walker has a sizeable list of advancements, some of whom are untested, others who are not ready to be lead advancements. Ron would make these advancements available to the Speakers' Bureau and 1701 for their respective activities. This would provide training for the new advancements and better results on the road for the spokesmen.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

5. Progress reports and evaluations of appearances by political surrogates would be submitted by Jeb Magruder to the Attorney General and Mr. Haldeman upon request.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

1972

1. The Speakers' Bureau will continue to schedule and operate the official spokesmen for official non-political functions up through the Convention and perhaps even afterwards. 1701 will develop its political surrogate program, staffing up appropriately and commensurate to the development of the campaign.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. The decision on who schedules and advances Mrs. Nixon and the First Family will be made as the Convention approaches.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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September 14, 1971

VIA: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

FROM: STEPHEN BULL *SB*

RE: Scheduling of Senator Goldwater and  
Other Surrogate Candidates

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1. General discussion of the manner in which Administration speakers (i. e., surrogates) are currently handled.
2. What the various recommendations are from staff members as well as officers at the Citizens Committee headquarters.
3. A concensus recommendation for the establishment of a surrogate program.

By way of a personal disclaimer, I am setting forth some observations that may be rather naive since I have approached this subject rather superficially because of the lack of information readily available as well as the time requirement for this report, and have attempted to proceed without stirring up too much confusion by my inquiries. The lack of hard information available, I believe, is the result of the necessity for secrecy at this point. I assume that many of the questions and approaches have been thoroughly discussed and probably many of the elements already resolved in personal discussions between Mr. Haldeman, the Attorney General and the President. However, the decisions have not been reduced or otherwise transcribed to written form, and those with whom I discussed the subject of the surrogate program either were not aware of these decisions or the information had not filtered down to them.

### Present Speakers' Program

Currently all turndowns of invitations to the President that have any significance or potential are referred to Pat O'Donnell in Chuck Colson's office by Dave Parker. Pat O'Donnell subsequently evaluates the invitation and considers an appropriate Administration spokesman to fill the speaking engagement. The evaluation is done pretty much solely by Pat and, according to him, his criteria include many elements such as whether the event is in a key State, type of event, the media area, etc. At this point Al Snyder and Van Shumway become involved, Al arranging for appearances on TV shows in the area where the event is to be held, and Van arranging for newspaper interviews with the Administration official.

The Administration spokesmen are limited to members of the White House staff (approx. 8), OMB (approx. 3), members of the Cabinet (approx. 12), members of the Sub-Cabinet (approx. 20), occasionally Senator Dole, and occasionally some outsiders, e.g., Pat Moynihan.

Although Pat O'Donnell is the scheduler and titular head of the speakers' program, Dick Howard is the supervisor and, according to all sources, is the true backbone of the operation. Without getting into an evaluation of personalities and individual abilities, the job of making effective use of Administration spokesmen, even now during this "non-political" and relatively inactive time, can and should be done better. When we get into the campaign situation which is rapidly approaching, the amount of activity will be multiplied manifold.

Currently I discern a lack of overall strategy to the manner in which the speakers' program is operated. Specifically, there is no guiding philosophy that seems to dictate who should go where and why except for where the President is concerned. This conclusion was arrived at quite simply; when asked what the guiding philosophy was, no one could give me one.

### Possible Approaches to a Surrogate Program

In 1968 John Whitaker, who scheduled Candidate Nixon, also scheduled the surrogates. An individual was assigned the task of actually running the surrogate candidates, and second and third string advancements were used to serve these surrogates. In 1970 Nick Ruwe operated the surrogate program which was less complex than that of 1968 and depended more on Administration spokesmen.

In a discussion of a surrogates program, John Whitaker laid forth the basic philosophy that the principal objective should be to find an event for the appropriate spokesman for an appropriate area, and let that event be the vehicle to get him into the area. Once in the area, however, the event becomes secondary to a more important operation which would be to give the surrogate the widest exposure which can usually be obtained by getting him on TV talk shows, special interviews with the newspapers, and all of the things that we are supposedly doing now with our current speakers' program.

In a memorandum I received from Dwight Chapin on September 13, the comment was made that "everyone is trying to stake out his claim to handle the scheduling operation of surrogates and Cabinet members over the next few months". This may be one of the better understatements. Additionally, there seems to be a bit of wrestling over where the surrogates program will be run.

John Dean has expressed to Colson and others that the campaign be kept out of the White House and that only the President and Vice President be scheduled politically from here. He has even suggested the possibility that the First Family be scheduled out of 1701. This plan would go into effect after the official kickoff of the campaign, presumably after the first of the year. Colson recommends that for a period of time, possibly January 1, 1972, we continue operating the speakers' program as we have through O'Donnell and that setup, but that any Congressional spokesmen such as Goldwater and others that we will undoubtedly pick up between now and January, be scheduled and operate from 1701. Colson's feeling is that the White House is put in an awkward, if not untenable, position by making specific engagements for members of Congress, particularly during this non-political year of 1971. As a commentary to this point, however, Dick Howard notes that the RNC, which normally schedules Congressmen, is a bit jealous of its prerogative in this area and might not take kindly to it.

On July 28 Jeb Magruder submitted a memorandum for the Attorney General, copy of which was submitted to Mr. Haldeman, setting forth a preliminary recommendation for "SPOKESMEN RESOURCES", which is, in effect, the 1972 surrogate program. The recommendations in this memorandum are summarized as follows:

1. Cabinet, selected agency heads and White House staff members be scheduled in the Colson/O'Donnell operation for the remainder of 1971.
2. The President and Vice President continue to be handled separately.
3. Colson hire a new staff man to train with O'Donnell and then move over to 1701 in 1972 and operate Spokesmen Resources from there.
4. RNC handle Congressmen until the end of 1971.

There are many other minor elements in that memorandum, none of which seem to be of particular consequence to the development of a well-defined, coordinated surrogate program.

#### Recommendation for a Surrogate Program

This is where I may be overstepping my bounds and getting myself into trouble, but it appears to me that the overall campaign strategy is still obscure to the operatives, i.e., the Magruders, the Howards, the Porters and the O'Donnells who have been charged with the responsibility for planning some of the specific tactics for campaign '72. A surrogate program should be one of the major tactics directly related to the overall strategy. By the end of 1971 the President will probably have visited all 50 States and, from what little I have learned about what will be the President's posture during the campaign, there will be emphasis on major TV appearances, much less personal campaigning than in 1968, and much of the campaign period will be spent being the President as opposed to being the candidate. This means that the personal appearances will be through the surrogates in the key States.

Considerations for Surrogate Program

1. "Key States" is a fluid entity that will probably be readjusted as the campaign develops. For planning purposes in the formulation of the surrogate program, those States, and perhaps specific areas within the somewhat larger States, need to be specified to those who will operate the program. The Magruder memo to the Attorney General lists 21 States as "key States". I have also heard the figure 14. One of the questions is --where should be the area of emphasis.
2. The aforementioned memorandum provides a listing of potential surrogates, utilizing four categories: "Cabinet", "White House Staff", "Agency Heads", "Others". There is no category for Congressmen or Governors, although I would assume that there are still one or two Republican Governors left over who could do us some good (e.g., isn't Rockefeller lobbying for Secretary of Defense these days?). The list that is submitted, I presume, will undoubtedly be modified and is probably intended as a first draft. At some point in the near future, however, we need to get a firm list of Governors and Congressmen who can fill the role of surrogate for the President.
3. Scheduling - there appear to be two major types of scheduling for surrogates:
  - (a) Opportunity Scheduling - an event for which a specific man is appropriate for a specific function (e.g., Senator Goldwater to the YAF Convention).
  - (b) Creative Scheduling - finding an event that acts as a vehicle to get the proper spokesman into the right area so that he, with the support of the Snyders, Shumways and the advance operation, can maximize his exposure through the regional media as well as our established techniques of promotion and communication.

4. That individual or group responsible for scheduling the surrogate must be fully familiar with the overall strategy, the points of strength and weakness in the various areas, and the availability of the surrogate so that maximum benefit from the event of the surrogate visit can be realized.
5. Right now the talent and resources are in the White House and 1701 is incapable of providing the necessary support to operate a full fledged surrogate program.

Specific Recommendations for Surrogate Program

1971

1. Between now and January 1, 1972, Chuck Colson operate the surrogate program through its speakers' bureau program (O'Donnell and Howard).  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
2. Assuming that the campaign will require an increase in personnel to administer such a program, additional people who will ultimately serve in a supervisory role during the campaign be hired now (but be paid by 1701 due to the wage-price freeze) and work with those individuals administering the speakers' program. The purpose would be to learn how to run a surrogate program while beefing up our existing speakers' bureau.  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
3. Senator Goldwater and other key primary surrogates such as selected Governors and others outside of the Administration would be scheduled and coordinated through the speakers' bureau for the remainder of 1971. Those events appropriate for this select group would be determined by the speakers' bureau operation, but would be nominally set up through 1701 in order to maintain the appearance of detachment between the political operation and the White House. In actuality, however, coordination, supervision and implementation would be effected through the speakers' bureau operation. As a concession to the RNC, they could be called upon for their assistance in schedule planning and responses to correspondence and other relatively harmless activities.  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

4. A full effort be made to coordinate with the key personnel at 1701 all of the activities that will be taking place at the White House until 1972. This would include providing full information on the Presidential activities.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

5. Ron Walker has a sizeable list of advancements, some of whom are untested, others who are not ready to be lead advancements. Ron would make these advancements available to the speakers' bureau now for support of not just Senator Goldwater and Secretary Connally, but others as well. This would provide training for the new advancements and better results on the road for the surrogates.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

6. Progress reports and evaluations of appearances would be submitted by the administrator of the speakers' bureau (Chuck Colson) to Mr. Haldeman directly.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

1972

1. Effective around the first of the year we admit that there is a campaign going on, and that those support personnel in the White House who have been administering speakers' programs be detached, eliminated from the White House payroll, and transferred over to 1701 where they will operate the campaign. Those individuals who had been training with O'Donnell and others administering the speakers' program would move over to 1701 for the program operation.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That 1701 administer the scheduling and advance support of all of the surrogate candidates with the exception of the President, the Vice President, and Mrs. Nixon. The remainder of the family would be scheduled through 1701.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1971

4:45 p.m.

FOR: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

FROM: STEPHEN BULL 

RE: Random Thoughts on the RNC Convention

Provided that matters do not change drastically, the 1972 Convention will be an exercise in confirmation rather than in nomination. This, of course, could be altered by a real race for the Vice Presidential nomination, but that could be a positive factor in that it might lend color to an otherwise colorless event.

Concerning both of the 1972 Conventions, it is quite likely that the Democratic Convention will be a lot more interesting than the Republican since the Democrats will have a valid horse race going. In the minds of most people, it is a foregone conclusion that Richard Nixon will be the Republican nominee. Therefore, we must take a different approach than the Democrats in order to make our effort worthwhile. I am just speaking off the top of my head and do not have before me the programs of the 1968 Conventions but, as I recall, there are a number of aspects that are just downright boring. Elements that come to mind that fall into this category include lengthy, dry key-note speeches, lengthy reports from the Platform Committees, and reports from the Accreditation Committees. Additionally, by the time that any of the candidates receives his second or third seconding speech, I have long gone to the refrigerator and turned the stereo up a few decibels. In short, much of the traditional events of the political conventions just turn people off, or cause people to turn the events off.

This need not be. The presentation of a platform committee report, for example, could be an exciting thing. Instead of having some political hack from the Mid West drone on and on in a monotone that it shall be the policy of the Republican Committee to encourage, say, agricultural development, think how much more exciting it would be to present this idea graphically, e.g. a professionally produced film or video tape showing the verdant fields of corn, the State agricultural research facilities, and clips of the President conversing with Dr. Borlaug in front of the miracle wheat exhibit on Salute to Agriculture Day. A presentation on the strides the Administration has made in the environment could be a

fantastic show with footage of the proverbial "purple mountains' majesty..." with occasional scenes of the President viewing Grand Canyon, or Yosemite National Park. Such an approach would likely encourage the networks to stay tuned in on this footage rather than breaking to the commentary as they usually do during such periods.

Color, specifically rally-type activity, will be necessary and undoubtedly we will engage in it rather extensively. But the "spontaneous" demonstrations following the completion of the nominating speech for a candidate will be a joke unless we put a new twist to it. The standard balloon drops, balloon rises, and marches around the hall will be just old stuff and just like the Democratic Convention. However, it is necessary, if for no other reason, to generate as well as demonstrate enthusiasm for the candidate. We should give some thought, however, to making the demonstrations something more than a "whoopie session". Perhaps the signs and banners should reflect accomplishments of the President's first four years in office and that, rather than indiscriminate whooping and hollering and marching around the convention hall, there be different segments that concentrate on such things as the breakthrough in Southeast Asian relations, the successful winding down of the Vietnam War. Again, with a little originality, we can keep the TV cameras trained on what we want the cameras to see. This is in contrast to the normal procedure of the cameras carrying the first couple of minutes of the demonstration, and then breaking to David Brinkley for a few sardonic comments, and then a Gulf Oil commercial.

I see the 1972 Convention as an opportunity for President Nixon, and the Republican Party, to set forth its philosophy on where we are and where we are going. We are going to be dealing with a lot of free TV time, and we can make this one of the greatest shows ever. The concept of depicting where we are and where we are going parallels our approach to the Bi-Centennial. On July 3rd the President declared the next five years to be "the era of the Bi-Centennial". This concept demands a review and appreciation of the 196 years of history that will have led up to the 1972 Convention, and gives the President the greatest opportunity to speak out on where we have been and the greatness that lies before this country. The implicit message is that President Richard Nixon will help us realize these goals. Perhaps the theme of the Republican Convention in 1972 could tie in directly with the Bi-Centennial. Between now and August of 1972 perhaps "the Spirit of '76" or the "era of the Bi-Centennial" or some other slogan will be an appropriate one. We can see what develops in the next year, but I would favor a close association between those two events--the Bi-Centennial and the Republican Convention--so that we can get mileage out of the non-partisan Bi-Centennial work that will be increasing from now on.

Even though the Convention will be centered in some large hall, perhaps there can be participation by certain individuals from sites other than the Convention Hall. For example, we might have a close-circuit TV set up with Sec. Morton speaking from some park site that he would be visiting in the northwest part of the country. Not only would this inject a change of routine and additional color into the Convention, but would highlight the Administration's efforts and accomplishments in the development of parkland. Along the same lines, Sec. Laird might be conveniently in Vietnam overseeing the withdrawal of the final contingent of American troops, and since he would not be able to be in attendance at the Convention in person, we could conveniently fly in some film footage of the Sec. of Defense reporting on the final winddown of the war and extending his greetings to the assembled delegates at the Convention site.

When it comes to the acceptance speech, I think that the President would probably have to deliver his in person to the assembled delegates at the Convention site, particularly if the Convention site is San Diego. However, perhaps the Vice President's acceptance speech could be delivered from a remote site utilizing closed-circuit TV. Along these same lines, consideration might be given to having a nominating or seconding speech given from a site other than the Convention center. The logic behind going to remote locations would be to bring together the various geographical locations rather than merely bringing human representatives from as many geographical sections of the country as possible. This also ties in to the extensive travel that the President has done--hopefully, by 1972 he will have visited all 52 States.

Returning to the initial thought of this memo, I might summarize by reiterating that our Convention is one of affirmation and confirmation, which, in itself, does not provide a great deal of viewer interest. However, since the TV time will be there we can get a great deal of mileage out of this free TV time if we can plan a three-day program that is exciting, relevant, and truly kicks off the campaign, not in the "old politics" style of hoopla, but with imaginative and creative flair which we are capable of providing. As usual, it would be necessary to push aside some of the old party hacks who have "been doing it such and such a way since Wendell Wilkie" but then again we had to do this in 1968 so this will be nothing new.

MEMORANDUM

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102 NARS, Date July 8, 1971

By rennell

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN  
FROM: STEPHEN BULL  
SUBJECT: Celebrities Program

*Steve -  
you right - this  
is supposedly being done.  
Henry is working on  
it - and all the  
new you make  
C*

Working as an advanceman in 1968, I found that one of the greatest problems is finding celebrities to appear at Nixon rallies. Cy Laughter ran the celebrities program, but to the advancemen Cy's program was known derisively as "has-beens for Nixon".

We have made some pretty good inroads in the last two years in obtaining the favor and perhaps the cooperation of a number of celebrities. I know that Henry Cashen theoretically has cognizance over the area of entertainers and sports figures, but I wonder just how much we are really doing. It seems to me that now that we're starting to approach the campaign, we should make an all out effort to cultivate the active cooperation of celebrities. We've made a start with entertainers such as Glenn Campbell, Vicki Carr, Johnny Cash and Pearl Bailey. Also, athletes such as Carl Yastrzemski also may be of assistance to us later on.

Once we get into campaign '72, it will be such a terrific asset to us, not just in drawing crowds, but in drawing votes, to have respected big-name entertainers standing alongside the President. The proper cultivation of these individuals is going to have to include the President in one way or another. I would suggest that Henry Cashen, in conjunction with the campaign organization and other areas of the White House who are so involved, institute a program that would include the following elements:

1. Determine now those individuals in the entertainment and sports worlds who might be potential supporters of the President.
2. Of those who are selected, begin an immediate screening program to eliminate those who will be of no value to us, either because of ideological opposition or their lack of stature.

3. Set forth a complete 12-month program of contact with the White House. This would include:
  - a. Extension of an invitation to the individual and his or her spouse to a White House function.
  - b. Inclusion in some sort of Presidential meeting (Open Door Hour, drug conference with a large group, meeting with an ethnic group, etc.)
  - c. Appointment to a Presidential Commission, e.g. Sammy Davis, Jr. appointment to the Advisory Commission on OEO.
  - d. Continual contact and follow-up by Henry Cashen and whoever else might conceivably have an excuse to contact the individual.

It is very simple to say that these matters are being taken care of by Henry, and although I don't wish to demean the job that he may or may not be doing, I think that we can, and should, do a lot more. People cast votes for some very illogical and irrational reasons and I would certainly think that to a great many people, whether or not Johnny Cash thinks that Richard Nixon is a good man will mean a great deal more than whether President Nixon has been able to get revenue sharing past the House of Representatives.