

TELCON
Genl Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Sat., Oct. 6, 1973
7:10 p.m.

K: and claimed that the Russians alluded to the Israelis. I told them in three days they would ~~through~~ ^{throw} them out and be coming to us.

H: Sure.

K: I told them the Gen. Assembly debate on Monday which will start if we don't start on the Security Council. -- ~~my~~ recommendation unless you feel strongly to the contrary. I have told him unless he hears from me to the contrary, I will give him until tomorrow to avoid this dilemma.

H: Yes.

K: If not, we will have to go to the Council. If we don't do that we will get creamed in the GA on Monday.

H: I think they have understood the position they are talking; tonight is fine.

K: I told Dobrynin if it goes to the GA and if the US is taken over the coals I want them to know we are taking the position that words are words and deeds are deeds and people who can commit deeds will be let run loose for a couple of days. You make sure the President is fully informed.

H: I will. I know he is anxious to do something in the morning.

K: By 10:00 you will be able to announce he has asked that it be moved to the Security Council.

H: I don't understand what the Soviets think they are going to gain.

K: Actually, they seem to have gotten across in larger force than they thought possible.

H: Really.

K: The Israelis say there is a real bridgehead across the Canal. Sixty dead and 110 wounded. You have to multiply that by a hundred to get the equivalent American casualties. If we suffered 6,000 dead and 1500⁰ wounded in one day. No joke. The Israelis say they have shot down six helicopters with troops.

H: There are generally 10 to 15 in a helicopter.

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K: O.K. We will proceed on that basis.

H: If you feel you need to change.

K: I am comfortable with this.

H: I take it you had rather do it tomorrow.

K: Yes.

H: You will get much better news play tomorrow. From a political point of view, it is better to have given the Russians a few more hours and lean over backwards.

K: We had better keep book on that. If they play it the hard way we know what we are up against. There are two things: No. 1) is I think as long as we know that the Soviets have been capricious and that way it proves to be there will be no limits on what we can do. If they play soft and spongy it would be very hard to be tough.

H: With the President.

K: That's right.

H: He will be making a mistake.

K: You have to figure as you go down this thing if the Soviets are using us we have to call a spade a spade and not play with them whatever the price.

H: That is my view.

K: We are in good shape.

H: That is totally my view. I don't think we can play it spongy.

K: As long as you play it that way.

H: They will be playing it spongy and we will still have to call a spade a spade.

K: That is alright too. That has a time limit on it. I have given them until 9:00 tomorrow morning. I think it would be ~~again~~ a mistake because we have no one else lined up.

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H: Precisely. I told him that.

K: Would he rather go tonight.

H: Instinctively, he would. I told him the British fell off the status quo anti aspect and you felt we ought to be very careful not to go against the others until they had thought about it. If you go back to Dobrynin and tell them this is what we are going to do.

K: I have already told them that.

H: As much as you can.

K: I told them I would try to sell this in Key Biscayne.

H: Alright, Henry.

END